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Abstract . 
This thesis examines Australian foreign policy with a focus on relations 
with Africa. I contrast the foreign policy position of the Whitlam Labor 
Party government with the international policies of the Fraser Liberal and 
Country Parties government. The structure v.f analysis demonstrates the 
links between general and specific elen1ents of foreign policy. I discuss 
Australia's relations with the United States, approach on the Indian Ocean 
region.... voting pattern at the United Nations, and role in the 
Commonwealth. I also examine Australia's policies in relation to the 
demands of developing countries in general, and study the positions of 
Whitlam and Fraser on China .... Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea. This narrowing of analysis culminates with an investigation 
into Australian foreign policy on Africa, particularly South Afr~ca and 
Rhodesia. The comparison of the foreign policies of the Whitlam and 
Fraser governments illustrates the extent of change and continuity in 
Australia's international position over time. I argue that Whitlam and 
Fraser produced similar foreign policy positions on Africa from different 
political perspectives. I also argue that Whitlam and Fraser established an 
anti-racist and anti-colonial foreign policy for Australia. 
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Introduction 
In December 1972, Gough Whitlam and the Labor Party were elected 
following twenty-three years of Liberal and Country Parties government. 
The Whitlam government initiated many changes to Australian foreign 
policy, including a significant shift in relations with Africa. In December 
1975, Malcolm Fras,~r and the Liberal and Country Parties were elected after 
Whitlam was dismissed from office. The Fraser government adopted some 
of the policies established by Whitlam, in particular, the position to oppose 
racial discrimination in South Africa and Rhodesia. 
In this thesis, I argue that Whitlam and Fraser established an anti-racist and 
anti-colonial foreign policy for Australia. This was a considerable shift from 
the international position instituted by Menzies and the subsequent Liberal 
and Country Parties governments. I also argue that Whitlam and Fraser 
produced remarkably similar foreign policy positions on Africa from quite 
different political perspectives. This outcome was not predicted at the time 
and has not been analysed in detail in the academic literature on Australian 
foreign policy. As such, I illustrate the extent of change and the degree of 
continuity in foreign policy from Whitlam to Fraser. 
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I demonstrate that the personal influence of Whitlam and Fraser, within 
their respective governments, was an important factor in the construction 
and implementation of Australian foreign policy. Also, by narrowing the 
analysis through the structure of this thesis, I explain that vVhitlam and 
Fraser forged links between the general and specific elements of foreign 
policy. For example, I show that both Prime Ministers connected Australia's 
position in the United Nations and Commonwealth with Australia's 
approach toward the developing countries and with Australia's policies on 
Africa. In this way, I illustrate the roles played by Whitlam and Fraser in 
reforming elements of foreign policy while linking Australia's position on 
Mrica with Australian foreign policy in general. 
Approach 
The research process for this thesis was based on several assumptions on my 
part which establish the boundaries of the topic and argument. The thesis is 
an examination of Australian foreign policy with a central focus on 
relations with Africa·. However, the nature of Australian relations with 
Africa means that I analyse Whitlam and Fraser's policies on southern 
Africa primarily, and this implies a concentration on South Africa and 
Rhodesia as the dominant issues. Australia did not have extensive 
relations with the countries of North Africa or West Africa. Policy 
initiatives in these areas were limited to a small amount of economic aid to 
Egypt and occasional discussions with Nigeria during Commonwealth 
meetings. 
The chosen time frame begins with the election of the Whitlam Labor 
goverru-nent in December 1972 and ends with the electoral defeat of the 
Fraser Liberal and Country Parties government in March 1983. More 
importantly, W'hitlam and Fraser instituted substantial changes in 
Australian foreign policy in this period. In particular, both Prime Ministers 
were attentive to African issues, notably the political conflicts in southern 
Africa. 
This th~sis also embodies the assumption that political history is useful and 
valuable in itself. This i~ not a theoretical discussion of the basis of foreign 
policy to be used to examine the foreign policies of other countries. The 
primary value of this research is the analysis of issues which have not been 
adequately explained, such as Whitlam's position on South Africa and 
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Fraser's role in the political and constitutional settlement in Rhodesia. My 
argument carries the research somewhat further than this task but the 
content and style of this thesis remains within the conventional approach 
to the analysis of Australian foreign policy.I 
Literature 
The academic literature on Prime Ministers Whitlam and Fraser includes 
an unusual combination of works. The material on Whitlam prior to 
November 1975 reflected either an enthusiasm for the reform process or a 
revulsion for the agenda and style of the Labor Party government. 
Subsequently, the literature O? Whitlam was affected by polarised views on 
the constitutional crisis and the dismissal of the Whitlam Labor 
government.2 In both cases, there was a wealth of material produced on 
Whitlam as Prime Minister and on the policies of the Whitlam 
government. 
The dismissal of Whitlam, and Fraser's role in the constitutional and 
political crisis, impacted upon the literature on Prime Minister Fraser and 
the Liberal and Country Parties government. The small amount that has 
been written about the policies of the Fraser government reflects opinions 
on Fraser's path to power. The academic community that analysed the 
policies of the Whitlam government did not demonstrate the same interest 
1 The style of this thesis accords with an approach to analysis as demonstrated in the major 
academic sources in the discipline, such as Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign 
Policy 1938-1965, Cambridge University Press, London, 1967; Henry S. Albinski, Australian 
External Policy under Labor, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1977; T.B. Millar, 
Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977, Australian National University 
Press, Canberra, 1978; W.J. Hudson, ed., Australia in World Affairs 1971-75, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, 1980; P.J. Boyce and J.R. Al.1.gelF eds, Independence and Alliance: Australia in World 
Affairs 1976-80, Allen & Unwin and the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
Sydney, 1983; Coral Bell, Dependent Ally, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988; and the 
twice yearly surveys of foreign policy in the Australian Journal of Politics and History. 
2 On the constitutional crisis and the dismissal of the Whitlam government, see Colin 
Howard; The constitutional crisis of 1975, Australian Qua;terly, vol. 48, 1, March 1976; 
David Butler, Politics and the Constitution: 20 questions left by Remembrance Day, Current 
Affairs Bulletin, vol. 52, 10, March 1976; Geoffrey Sawer, The Governor-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 52, 10, March 1976; Manning 
Clark, Are we a nation of bastards?, Meanjin Quarterly, vol. 35, 2, June 1976; Fran.cis West, 
Constitutional crisis 1975 - an historian's view, Australian Quarterly, vol. 48, 2, June 1976; 
Edward StJohn, The dismissal of the Whitlam Government, Quadrant, vol. 20, 9, September 
1976; Paul Kelly, The Unmaking of Gough, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1976; John Kerr, 
Matters for Judgement, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1978; E.G. Whitlam, The Truth of the 
Matter, Penguin, Ringwood, 1979; M. Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, 
CCH, North Ryde, 1988; and Paul Kelly, November 1975, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1995. 
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in the Fraser government.3 Little academic attention was focused on the 
policies of the Fraser goverrunent and therefore the positive work of Fraser 
b. foreign affairs was r2re!y recognised.4 
Most recent literature ignores Fraser's work on foreign policy or 
characterises Fraser's foreign po.licy, in passing, as split between an anti-
Soviet security agenda and a concern for African issues.s An example of this 
literature is the influential work of Evans and Grant which spends only 
four paragraphs in 350 pages to describe Fraser's foreign policy as 
incoherent. 6 While I would not have expected this partisan account to 
adopt a positive view of Fraser, the contribution of Fraser to Australia's 
international standing should have been acknowledged and the links 
within Fraser's foreign policy should have been identified. 
Somewhat separate from this academic or specialist literature, there have 
been several biographies and anal~rses of Whitlam anr "5'raser. 7 The most 
important contribution has been Patrick Weller's study of Fraser as Prime 
Minister and the nature of the F:~~aser government. Weller's research 
3 Commentators writing on Whitlam that did not subsequently focus on Fraser foreign policy 
include, for example, D. Altman, The First Six Months, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 50, 2, 
July 1973; B.D. Beddie, ed, Advance Australia- Where?, Oxford University Press with the 
Australian Institute of Ir tational Affairs, Melbourne, 1975; J. Camilleri, A New 
Australian Foreign Policy, Arena, no. 31, 1973; OvJen Harries, Mr Whitlam and Australian 
Foreign Policy, Quadrant, vol. 17, 4, July-August 1973; and D.J. Murphy, New Nationalism or 
New Internationalism: Australian Foreign Policy 1973-74, World Review, October 1974. 
4 The obvious exception was Henry S. Albinski, The Australicm-American Security 
Relationship: A Regional and International Perspective, University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucia, 1981. 
5 See F.A. Mediansky and A.C. Palfreeman, eds, In Pursuit of National Interests: Australian 
.Foreign Policy in the 1990s, Pergamon, Sydney, 1988; Coral Bell; ed., Agenda for the Nineties: 
Australian Choices in Foreign and Defence Policy, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991; P.J. 
Boyce and J.R. Angel, eds, Diplomacy in the Marketplace: Australia in World Affairs, 1981-
90, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1992; F.A. Mediansky, ed., Australia in a Changing 
World: New foreign policy directions, Macmillan, Botany, 1992; Gary Smith, Dave Cox and 
Scott Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford 
University PrP.ss, Melbourne, 1996; Richard Leaver and Dave Cox, eds, Middling, Meddling, 
Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1997; and F.A. 
Mediansky, ed., Australian Foreign Policy: into the new millennium, Macmillan, South 
Melbourne, 1997. 
6 Gareth Evans and Bruce 'Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, 
second edition, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1995, pp. 27-9. 
7 See Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam in Politics, Macmillan, 
Sydney, 1977; J. Walter, The Leader: A Political Biography of Gough vVIzitlam, University 
of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1980; John Edwards, Life wasn't meant to be easy: a political 
profile of Malcolm Fraser, Mayhem, Sydney, 1977; Russell Schneider, War without blood: 
Malcolm Fraser in power, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1980; Philip Ayres, lvfalcolm Fraser: A 
Biography, Heinemann, Richmond, 1987; Graham Little, Strong Leadership: Thatcher, 
Reagan and an eminent p'n'son, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988; and Patrick Weller, 
Malcolm Fraser PM: A Study in Prime Ministerial Power in Australia, Penguin, RinfWood, 
1989. 
1 ~ ~ ~ v..l-wv~c.w-1 ~ y~v~t- ~~(A--.I.,V r ""'"~ ~-A-. kt- 'tlv ~ 
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focused on the role of F'raser as Prime Minister, the operation of cabinet and 
Fraser's presentation of the government to the electorate. With this focus, 
Weller provided a unique study of power within the Australian political 
system by gaining unprecedented access to materials relating to the Fraser 
government. The research drew on the private papers of Malcolm Fraser, 
official classified documents, interviews and the public record. The problem 
with Weller's account is the over-reliance on unavailable material and lack 
of supporting evidence from the accessible sources.s 
In contrast to Weller's book, this thesis focuses on the public record to 
construct an analysis of Australian foreign policy. I aim to complement the 
research conducted by commentators such as Weller by concentrating on the 
Parliamentary debates, newspaper article'; and academic literature. Further, 
the public record contains a wealth of information which, particularly for 
Fraser's foreign policy, has not been employeJ to analyse Australia's 
international position. 
Each o.f the public documents provide material for analysis and 
complement each other in offering specific parts for a complete picture. 
Parliamentary statements by Prime Ministers and Foreign J\1inisters offer a 
clear indication of government policy against which outcomes can be tested, 
while debates in the Parliament expose arguments and Parliamentary 
questions reveal details of policy at particular times. Newspaper articles add 
information on specific issues, provide commentary within ongoing debates 
and fill gaps in academic analysis. Further, the academic literature offers a 
more thorough and considered account of government policies over time 
whHe linking and contrasting related issues to explain the development of 
policies. 
l Essentially, this thesis uses public dot::uments, both primary and secondary, 
which were available at the time of the vVhitlam and Fraser goverrunents. 
With this material, the argument is situated in the political context of the 
filll.e. Exceptions to this rule are two important books that were published 
some time after the event. However, both of these wor-kc; employ primary 
sources from the terms of the Whitlam and Fro:ser governments. The first 
is Whitlam's 1985 book The Whitlam Government 1972-1975 which details 
8 For example, Weller, ibid., p. 319, stated that th2 Department of Foreign Affairs prepared 
a Cabinet submission prior to the 1977 London CHOGM which advocated a progressive but 
moderate role for Australia, including opposition to armed struggle as a solution .in Rhodesia. 
This is revealing and interesting as background to the analysis in this thesis but it is also 
UI\Verifiable and therefore less useful here. 
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the historical background to the Whitlam government and provides 
information not a·i ;· ';l~•.ble else'Yhere.9 I have been careful in using this 
work because the h~ ~*;·.k is a lengthy attempt by Whitlam to highlight the 
achievements of the Whitlam Labor government. Second, I have used 
Renouf's 1986 book because it is the only source which examines the range 
of issues related to Fraser's foreign policy .to Here again I have been cautious 
as Renouf was one of Fraser's harshest critics. 
The question of sources relates to where this thesis fits with other large 
studies in the area. I have found no substantial acadernic works that 
provide a direct cmnparison of the foreign policies of Whitlam and Fraser 
and nor have I found a doctoral thesis that analyses Fraser's work on 
African issues. The Ph.D. thesis of Wilkinson on aid policy and the shorter 
thesis of Toenniessen on Australian foreign policy in general provide a 
background to the argument presented in this thesis.n In relation to events 
subsequent to the time frame of this thesis, the Ph.D. thesis of Cox 
investigated Australia's policy on South Africa.12 Not uniquely, Cox failed 
to acknowledge the importance of Fraser's work on South Africa and 
Rhodesia. These substantial works form the academic bookends to this 
thesis.13 
9 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Governmene 1972-1975, Penguin, Ringwood, 1985. 
lO Alan Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian foreign policy, Australian Professional 
Publications, Sydney, 1986. This is notwithstanding Albinski, The Australian-American 
Security Relationship, op. cit., which examined the 3ecurity aspects of Fraser's foreign 
policy. 
11 Alan E. Wilkinson, The Politics of Australian Foreign Aid Policy 1950-1972, Ph.D. thesis, 
Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian Nationa1 University, 1976 and Robert C. 
Toenniessen, An Analysis of the Changing Basef\ of Australian Foreign Policy, thesis 
component of Ph.D., American University, ·w::.;;hington, D.C., 1971. 
12 David Cox, Profits and Principles: The Hawke Government's South Africa Policy, Ph.D. 
thesis, Flinders University, 1994. See also David Cox, Sanctions and White Racist Regimes: 
Experience and Possible Action, Honours thesis, Flinders University, 1987. 
13 There are also many shorter theses on specific topics related to this thesis. On Whitlam, 
see A.F. Cameron, Relations between Australia and Africa under the Whitlam governments, 
Honours thesis, Flinders University, 1978; Gail Hesselman, lhe Australian Labor 
Government's Attitudes and Policies towards Indonesia, 1972-1974, Honours thesis, 
University of New South Wales, 1975; Heather Johnson, The Labor Government and the 
American Alliance, 1972-1975, Honours thesis, University of New South Wales, 1980; R. 
Marlowe, Australian Official Development Assistance to the Third World under the 
Whitlam government, Honours thesis, Flinders University, 1980; and Marcia Rochey The 
Labor government's Timor policy, Honours thesll;, LaTrobe University, 1979. On Fraser, see T. 
Agnew, The Fraser government and East Ti: :1.or, Honours thesis, Flinders University, 1987; 
Florence Anderson, Australia, China and the IndoChina Problem during the Fraser period, 
1975-1983: National Interest, Security and Morality, Masters thesis, Griffith Universit'j, 
1984; P. Donnelly, Australia and the Moscow Olympic Boycott, Honours thesis, University of 
Melbourne, 1982; Anthony McCaughey, Fraser and the Soviet Union: Australian-Soviet 
Relations 1975-1980, Honours thesis, La Trobe University, 1985; Alistair MacLean, The Role 
and Influence of Malcolm Fraser in A'\lstralian Foreign Policy Initiatives toward southern 
Africa, Honours thesis, University of Melbourne, 1987; and Johji Takeuchi, Australia's 
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In terms of the literature employf!d for this thesis, I have focuned on the 
political and legislative processes in the Australian context, thus situating 
the foreign policies of Whitlam and Fraser within the parameters which 
defined their work as political leaders. Therefore, I am aware of related 
fields of literature but do not focus on this rnaterial in this thesis. First, 
there is a iarge body of work that focuses on the leadership role of the. 
United States President. This literature examines the role of the President 
as directly elected, in conflict with the legislative structure, and as promoter 
of the executive arm of government.14 These. issues are significantly 
different from the situation in Australia where the Prime Minister must 
operate as a part of the legislative process and lead the political party of 
government. I have found some interesting comparisons in this literature 
but this contrast is a separate project. 
Second, there is a field of study which examines the role of Prime Ministers 
in Westminster systems.15 The central question in this literature is whether 
Relations with ASEAN under the Fraser government, 1976-1982, Masters thesis, University 
of Sydney, 1983. See also Alison Gaines, The context of Australia's foreign policy toward 
southern Africa within her broader foreign policy and domestic concerns, Honours thesis, 
University of Western Australia, 1981. 
14 For example, see Colin Campbell, The US Presidency in Crisis, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1998; Thomas Cronin, ed., Rethinking the Presidency, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 
1982; Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1998; James W. Davis, The American Presidency, second 
edition, Praeger, Westport, 1995; Erwin Hargrove and Michael Nelson, Presidents, Politics 
and Policy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984; Samuel Kernell, Going Public: 
New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington 
D.C., 1984; H.J. Laski, The American Presidency, Grosset & Donald, New York, 1940; 
Theodore Lowi, The Personal President, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1985; Michael 
Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, Congressional Quarterly Press, 
Washington D.C., 1984, and subsequent editions; Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: 
The Politics of Leadership, John Wiley, New York, 1960, and subsequent editions; Lyn 
Ragsdale, Presidential Politics, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1993; Gary L. Ros~, The American 
Presidency under Siege, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1997; Richard Rose and 
Ezra Suleiman, eds, Presidents and Prime Ministers, American Enterprise Institute, 
Washington, 1980; M. Shaw, ed., Roosevelt to Reagan: The Development of the Modern 
Presidency, Hurst, London, 1987; and Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey, 1987. 
15 See for example, H. Berkeley, The Power of the Prime lvfinister, Allen & Unwin, London, 
1968; R.H.S. Crossman, Introduction to Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, Fontana, 
London, 1963; R.H.S. Crossman, Inside View: Three Lectures on Prime Ministerial 
Government, Cape, London, 1972; R.H.S. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, three 
volumes, Hamilton & Cape~ London, 1975.~ 1976, 1977: Bernard Donoughue, Prime Minister: 
The Conduct of Policy under Harold Wilson and fames Callaghan, Cape, London, 1987; J. 
Hart, President and Prime MinistE'.r: Convergence or Divergence?, Parliamentary Affairs, 44, 
2, April 1991; Thomas A. Hockin, ed., Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political 
Leadership in Canada, second edition, Prentice-HaJJ, Scarborough, 1977; Anthony King, ed., 
The British Prime Minister, second edition, Macrnillan, London, 1985; William A. Matheson, 
The Prime Minister and Cabinet, Methuen ... Toronto, 1976; Robert M. Punnett, The Prime 
Minister in Canadian Government and Politics, Macmillan, Toronto, 1977; Patrick Weller, 
The Vulnerability of Prime Ministers: A Comparative Perspective, Parliamentary Affairs, 
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cabinet government has been ~eplaced by prime ministerial government. It 
is argued that Prime Ministers are now pre-eminent through control over 
substantial powers, including the role to speak on behalf of their country in 
international forums. Certainly in regard to foreign policy, Prime Ministers 
have considerable freedom to determine relationships with little 
interference from the Parliament or the cabinet. This ·thesis makes a 
contribution to these debates by focusing on the influence of the Prime 
:tviinister within the Australian Parliamentary systern. 
Similarly, the distinct set of literature which examines the role of the 
Australian Prime Minister offers some reflections on the governments led 
by \Vh:itlam and Fraser.16 This field has been driven by the work of Weller 
on the position of the Australian Prime Minister and is small in 
comparison with the research completed on the roles of the US President 
and the British Prime ~1inister. No doubt, the power held by Whitlam and 
Fraser as Prime Ministers contributed to their success. in implementing 
foreign policy initiatives. However, to examine their international agendas 
from the literature on the role of the Australian Prime Minister is a 
different task. 
Also, there are many books and papers which analyse the domestic policies 
of the Whitlam government and an eclectic collection of articles on the 
Fraser government.17 In this thesis, I have alluded to several domestic 
issues in explaining elements of foreign policy, including aspects of 
immigration policy in relation to the arrival o.f refugees and elements of 
36, 1, 1983; and Patrick Weller, First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in Westminster Systems, 
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985. 
16 See H. Mayer and R. Curnow, Hunting the P.M., Australian Quarterly, 40, l, 1968; R. 
Curnow and H. Mayer, Hunting the P.M.- Country Style, Australian Quarterly, 40, 4, 
December 1968; C.A. Hughes and J.S. Western, Hunting the P.M.: The Sequel, Australian 
Quarterly, 44, 1, March 1972; C.A. Hughes, Mr Prime Minister: Australian Prime Ministers 
1901-1972., Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1976; P. Edwards, Prime Ministers and 
Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1949, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbowne, 1978; and Patrick Weller, ed.~ Menzies to Keating: The Development of the 
Australian Prime Ministersrdp, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1992. 
17 See for example, C.J. Lloyd and G.S. Reid, Out of the Wilderness, Cassell, North 
Melbourne, 1974; Joe Camilleri, Under Labor: Aboriginal Land Rights, Arena, no. 36, 1974; 
Patrick O'Brien, Labor: Vision and Reality, Quadrant, vol. 20, 2, February 1976; Alan Reid, 
The Whitlam Venture, Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1976; Laurie Oakes, Crash through or 
Crash: The Unmaking of a Prime lt'!inister, Drummond., Richmond, 1976; Allan Patience and 
Brian Head, eds; From Whitlam to Fraser, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1979; 
Lachlan Chipman, The Menace of Multiculturalism, Quadrant, vol. 24, 10, October 1980; 
Campbell Sharman, FraBer, the states and federalism, Australian Quarterly, vol. 52, 1, 
Autumn 1980; Fabian Society, 'Th2 Whitlam Phenomenon, Mc:Phee Gribble & Penguin, 
Fitzroy, 1986; and Brian W. Head and Allan Patience, eds, FrOJrl Fraser to Hawke, Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989. 
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federalism with regard to the representation of Rhodesia in Australia. 
While I have not pursued the related domestic topics here, some valuable 
research could be undertaken to analyse the interaction between domestic 
and foreign policies during the Whitlam and Fraser governments. 
In total, this thesis accords with the conventional method of foreign policy 
analysis through the use of the public record to examine the foreign policy 
positions of Whitlam and Fraser. This approach places this thesis within 
the substantial academic literature on Australian foreign policy. 
Structure 
The structure of this thesis is based on a series of comparisons of the foreign 
policies of Whitlam and Fraser. Again, it demonstrates that Prime 
Ministers Whitlam and Fraser arrived at similar foreign policy positions on 
Africa from different political starting points. Specifically, the argument is 
based in the comparative analyses of different foreign policy issues within a 
single government and corresponding foreign policy issues between 
governments. For Whitlam and later for Fraser, I examine the domestic 
context of foreign policy, compare Australia's key international 
relationships, narrow the analysis to investigate relations with developing 
countries, and finally focu~ on policies on African issues. At the same time, 
I analyse and compare each issue over time to demonstrate the extent of 
change or continuity in policy outlook. In total, the structure of the thesis 
projects a matrix of comparisons to present a clear picture of the connections 
between foreign policy issues. 
In establishing the historical context for the Whitlam Labor government, 
chapter one examines the foreign policies of the Liberal and Country Parties 
governments prior to December 1972. I analyse Australia's connection with 
Britain, particularly in the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and 
Australia's parallel defence alliance with the United States. I also focus on 
Australia's colonial administration of Papua New Guinea, the nature of the 
aid program, and the support of the Menzies government for the minority 
populations in South Africa and Rhodesia. This chapter establishes the 
central issues which were the focus of the Whitlam and Fraser foreign 
policies, particularly in refereP_~e to Africa. I highlight Australia's 
conservative international image prior to the election of the Labor 
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government and detail the foreign policies that Whitlam claimed were in 
need of significant change. 
In introducing the foreign policy of the Whitlam government, I argue in 
chapter two that Whitlam was central to the construction of Australian 
foreign policy through the Labor Party Platform and the November 1972 
policy speech. This chapter demonstrates Whitlam's success in changing 
the Labor Party's foreign policy agenda prior to 1972 and capacity to 
implement significant changes to Australian foreign policy as both Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister. 
In chapter three, I analyse the general international issues which formed the 
context for the Whitlam foreign policy on the developing countries and 
Africa. I examine the Whitlam Labor government's criticisms of the United 
States with regard to Vietnam while Prime Minister Whitlam also 
attempted to secure Australia's alliance with the United States. This issue 
included the future of US military facilities in Australia and the strategic 
balance of forces in the Indian Ocean. This chapter shows that Whitlam 
initiated significant changes to Auetralian foreign policy in general, 
especially at the United Nations, but maintained the central assumptions of 
Australia's international relationships. 
On more specific issues, I argue in chapter four that Whitlam aligned 
AustraJ.ia with the demands of the developing countries in international 
forums, thereby projecting a new image for Australia. This chapter includes 
analysis of Whitlam's approach on the Asia and Pacific region, including 
the proposal for an Asia Pacific forum, Australia's recognition of the 
People's Republic of China, the complex diplomatic relations surrounding 
Cambodia, and the debate \vithin the Labor goverrunent on Vietnam. I also 
provide a discussion of the Whitlam government's response to the 
situation in East Timor through 1975 and the debates on changes to the 
Australian aid program, including the end of colonial administration of 
Papua New Guinea. Through these issues, I demonstrate that Whitlam 
supported the interests of the developing countries and thereby provided an 
anti-racist and anti-colonial foundation for Australian foreign policy. 
Chapter five focuses the analysis on the significant change initiated by 
Whitlam on Australia's relations with Africa. I examine the Whitlam 
government's strong diplomatic opposition to apartheid while continuing 
to trade with South Africa. I also detail Whitlam's decisions to reverse 
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Australia's voting pattern in the United Nations to- act against the minority 
regime in Rhodesia and highlight the decisions to provide Australian aid to 
Africa in support of liberation groups. This chapter is central to the thesis in 
providing the key comparison with Fraser's foreign policy on Africa. 
In shifting attention to the Fraser government in chapter six, I initially 
examine Fraser's response to the movement of Indonesian troops into East 
Timor prior to the December 1975 federal election. This chapter analyses 
Fraser's personal political stance and shows that Prime Minister Fraser 
played an important role in the implementation of foreign policy. This 
chapter demonstrates that Fraser's foreign policy outlook was based on a 
coherent philosophy which directed the Fraser government's relations with 
Africa. 
Fraser's approach on international relations focused on security concerns 
and, in particular, the intentions of the Soviet Union and the capacity of the 
United States to respond to conflict. Chapter seven examines Fraser's 
agenda as outlined in the June 1976 statement to the Parliament, the 
strengthening of the strategic alliance with the United States, the security 
concerns about the Indian .Ocean region, Fraser's critical stance on the 
Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan, and support for President Reagan, 
particularly in relation to the revolution in Iran. This chapter analyses the 
details of the Fraser foreign policy in the context of scarce academic 
literature in this area. 
Chapter eight shows that Fraser maintained Australia's support for the 
demands of the developing countries. I anal.':."""~ the Harries report on 
Australia's relations with developing countriet, Fraser's support for the 
developing countries in the North South debate, especially on the idea of a 
Common Fund, and the extension of relations with countries in the Asia 
Pacific region, including mixed success in terms of conflicts in Kampuchea 
and East Timor. I also examine the Fraser government's support for the 
independence process in Papua New Guinea and the use of aid policy to 
support foreign policy objectives. I argue that Fraser aligned Australia with 
the developing countries in general, not only with the countries of the Asia 
Pacific region, and that Fraser's approach on developing countries was 
important for the policies on Africa. 
Finally, on Africa, Fraser clearly built upon, and extended, Australian 
foreign policy in opposition to the minority governments in South Africa 
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and Rhodesia. Chapter nine examines Fraser's participation at the 1977 
London CHOGM, the significant role of Fraser at the 1979 Lusaka CHOGNI, 
and the continuation of policies into the 19"'1. Melbourne CHOGM and 1982 
Brisbane Commonwealth Games. Through this analysis, I illustrate the 
continuity in foreign policy on Africa from Whitlam to Fraser. 
In total! this thesis examines aspects of Australian foreign policy that have 
received little academic attention. Indeed, the purpose of the thesis is 
revealed in the structure. which places Fraser's foreign policy, with 
emphasis on Africa, against the background of the Whitlam foreign policy. 
This exercise shows that Whitlam and Fraser were central to the 
construction and implementation of Australian foreign policy and both . 
Prime Ministers arrived at a position which opposed racial discrimination 
in South Africa and Rhodesia. Indeed, from different political perspectives, 
Whitlam and Fraser established an anti-racist and anti-colonial foreign 
policy for Australia. 
chapter 1 
Australian foreign policy prior to the Whit lam government 
The foreign policies of the Liberal and Country Parties governments prior to 
December 1972 provide the obvious background to the foreign policies of the 
Whitlam Labor government. The Liberal Party, led by Robert Menzies, and in 
conjunction with the Country Party, formed govenunent in Australia following 
the federal election in December 1949. Menzies remained Prime Minister for 
sixteen years, winning seven federal elections, until retirement in January 1966. 
The Liberal and Country Parties governments were subsequently led by Harold 
Holt, John Gorton, and William McMahon until the December 1972 federal 
election.l In terms of foreign policy, the Liberal and Country Parties 
established a conservative agenda for Australia in international debates. 
In this context, the Labor Party, led by Gough Whitlam, claimed that there was 
a need for significant change in Australian foreign policy. The speed and 
extent of reform instituted by the Whitlam government after December 1972 
1 On the Liberal and Country Parties in government, see Scott Prasser, J.R Nethercote and 
John Warhurst, eds, The Menzies Era: a reappraisal of government; politics and policy, Hale & 
Iremonger, Sydney, 1995; Alan Reid, The Gorton Experiment, Shakespeare Head Press, Sydney, 
1971; RG. Menzies, Afternoon Light, Cassell, Melbourne, 1967; and A.W. Martin, Robert Menzies, 
a life, volume 1, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1993. 
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reflected this understanding of the need to reassess and alter Australia's 
international position. 
This chapter is not intended to provide a comprehensive outline of the foreign 
policies of the Liberal and Country Parties governments. Rather, this analysis 
of key topics is designed to assist with the discussion of the Whitlam foreign 
policy agenda. Also, in a different way, this background will be valuable for 
the assessment of the foreign policies of the Fraser government. 
The foreign policies of the Liberal and Country Parties governments, as 
initiated by Prime Minister Menzies, focused on the historical connection with 
Britain while recognising the need for defence arrangements with the United 
States. ..\ustralia prioritised security issues as the basis of foreign policy which 
led to active involvement in regional conflicts, including Vietnam. Within the 
United Nations and the Commonwealth, the Liberal and Country Parties 
governments reinforced a conservative approach to international relations by 
consistently aligning with Britain, especially in opposition to the demands of 
developing countries. 
As a part of United Nations trusteeship arrangements, Australia was 
responsible for Papua New Guinea and Nauru. The Liberal and Country 
Parties governments were slow to promote the independence of Papua New 
Guinea until the work of Minister for External Territories Peacock in 1972. 
Further, aid policy \Vas administered through the Colombo Plan and was 
closely linked -co the security agenda of foreign policy. Related to these 
elements of foreign policy, the Liberal and Country Parties governments 
maintained loyal support for the minority population in South Africa and, 
while reluctantly conforming to international pressure to impose sanctions, 
provided active diplomatic assistance to Rhodesia. In particular, Australia was 
seen to support South Africa's colonial administration of South West Africa. 
These foreign policy positions were reflected in the Liberal and Country Parties 
policy statements for the 1972 federal election. 
International relations 
Prior to the election of the Whitlam Labor government in December 1972, 
Australia pursued an explicit security agenda on international issues. The 
Liberal and Country Parties governments reinforced the historical connection 
with Britain and established a close link with the United States. Part of this 
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approach was the commitment of Australian troops to a number of conflicts, 
notably in Malaysia and Vietnam, to support the United States role in the Asia 
Pacific region. By the late 1960s, the international political environment was 
changing and this caused some difficulties for the Liberal and Country Parties 
government. 
From December 1949, Prime Minister Menzies constructed and implemented a 
foreign policy based on security and defence.2 For many in the Liberal and 
Country Parties, the security of Australia was linked to the colonial history 
with Britain, including the understanding that Britain would defend Australia 
and that Australia would assist with the defence of Britain. Particularly for 
Menzies, the relationship with Britain was fundamental to Australia's 
international position. In addition, and in response to Britain's linlited capacity 
to assist Australia, the Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty was 
launched in 1951 which, for the Menzies government, extended the United 
States security alliance into the Asia Pacific region. 
Further, the Menzies government believed that Australian contributions to the 
deterrence or defeat of communist-inspired activities complemented foreign 
policy security objectives. Thus, upon election, Prime Minister Menzies 
increased the level of military support for the British counter-insurgency effort 
in Malaya and subsequently committed troops to the Korean conflict and to 
action in Borneo. In 1962, military advisers were dispatched to Vietnam 
followed by combat troops in 1965. The Australian forces in Vietnam exceeded 
8000, including conscripted soldiers, costing 500 deaths and 3000 wounded 
Australian personnel. By December 1972, the Australian government had 
withdrawn combat troops from Vietnam but advisers remained. 3 
At relatively high costs, particularly in Vietnam, the Menzies government 
seemed to be successful in committing the United States to the defence of the 
Asia Pacific region, that is, to actively oppose communism and thereby to 
support Australian foreign policy goals. Further, the Liberal and Country 
2 For general references on Australian foreign policy, see T.R Reese, Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States: A Survey oflntemational Relations,1941-1968, Oxford University Press, London, 
1969; Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy,1938-1965, Cambridge University 
Press, London, 1967; J.G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 1965; G. Greenwood and N. Harper, eds, Australia in World Affairs, 1961-1965, 
Melbourne, Cheshire, 1968; and G. Greenwood and N. Harper, eds, Australia in World Affairs, 
1966-1970, Melbourne£ Cheshire, 1974. 
3 See Henry S. Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor, University of Queensland Press, 
St Lucia, 1977, pp. 6-7. Also, in 1971, Australia entered into the Five Powe111Ag;eement with 
Malaysia, Singapore, Britain and New Zealand. See also H.S. Albinski, Politics and Foreign 
Policy in Australia: The Impact ofVietmzm and Conscription, Duke University Press, Durham, 1970. 
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Parties governments enthusiastically supported the relationship with the 
United States by hosting information-gathering military facilities in Australia. 
These facilities included the US naval communication station at North West 
Cape which ·transmitted ultra-low frequency mess,.ges to submarines in the 
Indian Ocean, and the Pine Gap base near Alice Springs and Nurrungar near 
Woomera which both monitored Soviet and Chinese nuclear missile systems. 
This arrangement complemented . Australia's foreign and security policy 
objectives by enhancing the global military capability of the United. States and 
apparently committed the United States to the long-term defence of Australia. 
This approach to foreign policy and the focus on narrow understandings of 
security wa~ seen as outdated by 1971-72. The Liberal and Country Parties 
government led by Prime Minister McMahon from March 1971 was slow to 
react to changes in the international political climate and failed to appreciate 
the implications of change for Australia. The United States and the Soviet 
Union were moving toward a guarded accommodation of their rival military 
capabilities while new regional influences such as China and Japan were 
emerging. Long held positions on Vietnam and China were changing which 
produced a realignment in international relations. Nevertheless, the McMahon 
government a.dher~d to established understandings of the world, spedfically 
continuing to view the Asia Pacific region as volatile and placing responsibility 
. with China for perceived instability. The Liberal and Country P.:trties 
government continued to stress the need fur strong security ties with the 
United States and remained;treticent about embracing the aspirations of 
developing nations. 
the United Nations and the Commonwealth 
The Liberal and Cotmtry Parties governments aligned with Britain and the 
United States in the United Nations, and embraced Britain within the 
Commonwealth of Nations.4 In particular/ Prime Minister Menzies valued the 
intimacy and British character of the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meetings. As part of this approach, AustraJia joined the colonial powers in 
both forums to act against the demands of the developing countries. For 
example, the Menzies government did not support the UN Declaration on the 
4 In the early 1950s, the 'British Commonwealta.l.;. of Nations' became known as the 
'Commonwealth of Nations', or simply the 'Commonwealth'. T.B. Millar, The Commonwealth 
and the United Nations, Sjdney University Press, Sydney, 1967, p. xi. 
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Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960.5 
Sin1ilarly, Prime Minister Ivienzies disliked the practice of converting the 
Commonwealth meetings into forums for the condemnation of South Africa 
and Rhodesia. Over time, Menzies became disillusioned about the value of the 
Commonwealth as the membership became more diverse with the inclusion of 
independent countries from Africa, Asia an.d the Caribbean.6 
Further, Australia argued that the United Nations should not act in relation to 
matters within the 'domt~stic jurisdiction' :1of member states. The Menzies 
government relied upon e:1rticle 2(7) of the UN Ch:uter: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United 
Nations to intervene in m.atters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any s·tate or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the preee:nt Charter? 
Menzies also invoked t..his argument at Commonwealth conferences to halt 
discussions on the domestic concerns of me1.nbers. In supporting the 'domestic 
jurisdiction' principle in all cases, Australia attentpted to protect the regimes of 
South Africa and Rhodesia from interference from the United Nations and the 
Commonwealth. In turn, it was thought that '-d.herence to the notion of 
'domestic jurisdiction' v,rould exclude Australian policies on Aboriginal peoples 
or immigration from cnricism.s 
Linked to this approach, Prime MiP1~· -··Menzies attempted to support the 
apartheid r;~ginte by opposing the exc~usion of South Africa from the 
Commonwealth. Menzies was unsuccessful and South Africa was effectively 
expelled from the Corrtmor:-;?ealth in 1961.9 On the efforts of Menzies, the 
5 Claire C1Cl1.'k, ed., Ausimlian Foreign Policy: Towards a Reasr,essment, Cassell, North Melbourne, 
1973, pp. 139-44. Also, Australia consistently opposed the seating of 0Jn.3. in the General 
Assembly. 
6 Richard Higgott, Australia and Africc>. 1970-80: A Decade of Change and Growth, Africa 
Contempormy Record, vol. 14, 1981, p. 221. 
7 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Department of 
Public Information, United Nations, New York, 1990. The previous Australian Labor Minister 
f"r External Affairs, Dr. H.V. Evatt was successful in mserting the 'domestic jurisdiction' clause 
at the San Francisco conference to establish the United Nations in 1945. See also J. David E. 
Plant, The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture at the UN Conference on 
futemational Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 
l967. See generally, D. Harper and D. Sissons, eels, Australia and the United Nations, Manhattan 
and Australian Institute of futemational Affairs, New York, 1959 and A. C. Castles, Australia and 
the United Nations, Melbourne, Longman, 1973. 
B See G. Sawer, The United Nations, in G. Greenwood and N. Harper, eds, Australia in World 
Affairs, 1956-60, op. cit., p. 158. 
9 South Africa decided at a referendum in October 1960 to leave the Commonwealth the 
following May. See Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., pp. 21-2 and Millar, op. cit., p. 
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South African Prime Minister Verwoerd wrote that 'you are seen by all shades . 
of opinion as the best friend South Africa has, and the feeling of comradeship 
with Australia has never been better' .10 For others, Menzies' approach was 
exposed as a commihnent to colonialism and a clear rejection of the aspirations 
of many African countries. 
After some time, the Australian stance in the United Nations was modified to 
offer a more flexible approach on some i&'sues. By 1969, a partial change in 
style was instituted by Prime Minister Gorton with some influence from 
Andrew Peacock.11 Gorton allowed the Australian delegation to use their 
initiative in UN debates and were thereby free to endorse or reject resolutions 
in line with government policy to assist in tactical manoeuvres in the voting 
process. Nevertheless, Australia resigned from the United Nations Committee 
on Decolonisation.12 While this action received a muted response, it signalled 
that Australia had withdrawn support for the decolonisation process. 
Resignation from the Committee on Decolonisation again demonstrated the 
Australian government's sympathy for the colonial powers and the minority 
regimes of southern Africa. 
The relatively mixed but apparently more constructive position of Australia 
within the lit'-I General Assembly prompted the McMahon government in 1972 
to seek election to the Security Council for a two-year term.13 Australia was not 
competing against another nomination, only for the required two-thirds 
support, that is, eighty-eight votes in the General Assembly. It appeared that 
the improved image and hard work from the Australian delegates attracted 
support from most Asian states, Egypt as well as Israel, a number of African 
countries including the influential Nigeria, along with European and most 
169. See also Nigel S. Roberts, Africa and the six crises of the Commonwealth, World Review, 
vol. 13, 3, October 1974. 
10 See letter from Verwoerd in Menzies, op. cit., p. 202. 
11 Andrew Peacock was Minister .for the Army from 12 November 1969 to 2 February 1972, 
Minister assisting the Prime Minister from 12 November 1969 to 27 May 1971, and Minister for 
External Territories from 2 February 1972 to 5 December 1972. 
12 Albinski, Australian External Polict; ... , op. cit., p. 23. The correct title of this committee is the 
United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, also known as 
the Committee of Twenty-four or the Committee on Decolonisation. In fact, Australia decided 
in lc..ie 1968 to withdraw from this Committee and conveyed the decision to the Secretary-
General on 28 January 1969. 
13 Australia was elected to the Security Council for terms in 1947-48 and 1956-57 as a nominee 
of the Commonwealth group. No provision was made for representation of the 
Commonwealth when, :in 1965, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council were 
enlarged. Henceforth Australia, New Zealand and Canada became members of the Western 
European and Others Group therefore reducing the opportunities for nomination. 
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Latin American members.14 Australia was elected with 109 votes, only 
marginally behind the other candidates,.., Peru 116, Austria 115, Indonesia 115 
and Kenya 112. Also, given that Australia stood for an available European seat, 
some African and Asian members may have preferred Australian cu:ndidature 
over the prospect of a continuing European presence. An alternative 
explanation may be that many members of the UN General Assembly were 
expecting the Australian Labor Party to win the next federal election and 
therefore supported Australia for a term which began in 1973. 
Finally, in November 1972, the McMahon Liberal and Country Parties 
government sponsored a resolution at the UN which was critical of French 
nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean.15 New Zealand and eleven other Pacific 
countries sponsored the resolution along with Australia to condemn 
atmospheric tests 'in the Pacific and elsewhere' and secured the withdrawal of a 
Belgian amendment designed to delete the reference to the Pacific in order to 
reduce the direct criticism of France. Public opinion in Australia appeared to 
compel the McMahon government to take a strong line against France as 
Australia had not previously supported criticism of nuclear testing. 
Papua New Guinea 
The Menzies government placed considerable importance upon the strategic 
position of Papua New Guinea.16 Australian fears persisted long after japan's 
occupation of the territory during the second world war. Australia provided 
financial assistance to Papua New Guinea, at first, as an expression of gratitude 
for help by the people of PNG to the Australian armed forces.17 Subsequently, 
aid was provided for economic and social development in conjunction with the 
defence of Papua New Guinea as part of Australia's security strategy. This 
14 Clark, op. cit., p. 154. Also, the Soviet Union supported Australia, perhaps in response to 
Australia's policy on the containment of Chir~~- rille China did not support Australia, the 
delegation of the People's Republic did not actively lobby against the nomination. 
lS See ibid., pp.150-1. 
16 Under United Nations arrangements, Australia administered trustee relationships with the 
territories of Papua New Guinea and Nauru. Papua was not a trust territory but from the 
initiation of moves to create a union with the trust territory of New Guinea, Australia reported 
to the Trusteeship Council or~ administrative matters and common policy associated with the 
union. The western half of New Guinea was a Dutch territory until its acquisition by Indonesia 
as West Irian in 1963. See Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., p. 23, Clark, op. cit., p. 
148, and Millar, op. cit., pp. 121-2 & 130-5. For more 011. Australia's policies toward the island 
territories of the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, see David Goldsworthy, British Territories 
and Australian Mini-Imperialism in the 1950s,Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 41, 3, 
1995. 
17 See Ward, Minister for External Territories, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, vol. 183, 4 Julyr 1945, p. 4052. 
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policy was generally supported within Australia and the allocation for both 
development assistance and general administrative support steadily increased 
from $1million in 1945 to $100million in 1974-5.18 
International attention focused on Papua New Guinea and Nauru following the 
1962 UN Visiting Mission to the territories which recommended 'an 
acceleration of political, economic and educational development in Papua New 
Guinea'.19 Australia implemented many of the reforms suggested by the UN 
Report but the Trusteeship Council criticised the continuing practises of racial 
discrimination and different wage scales for Australian work~rs in PNG. 
Meanwhile, in Nauru, th_e Menzies government facilitated a substantial 
measure of self-government by instituting representative decision-making 
bodies. However, Australia abstained on a General Assembly resolution in 
December 1965 which requested a fixed date for Nauru's independence as 
envisaged by the Nauruan leader, Hammur de Robert. Also, the UN 
Committee on Decolonisation became increasingly resentful of the Australian 
government's refusal to allow another visiting mission to the territory. The 
Menzies government ~ay have attempted to delay talk of independence to 
offer more time for Australian mining companies to exploit Nauru's phosphate 
deposits. Nevertheless, the Nauruan Legislative Council decided upon a date 
for independence and this was achieved in accordance with UN expectations.2o 
Again, the Liberal and Country Parties gover:nments had a mixed record on the 
administration of Nauru and this partial reluctance to promote an early 
independence date reinforced Australia's colonial position for many United 
Nations members. 
The independence of Papua New Guinea remained a problem for the Liberal 
and Country Parties governments.21 It was not until1970 that momentum for 
18 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1978, pp. 374-5. The aid to Papua New Guinea was not tied to 
purchases of Australian goods but elsewhere from 1950, aid was required to have a two-thirds 
Australian context. The Australian aid contribu_tion declined from eighty percent of PNG 
government revenue post-war to fifty percent in the early 1970s, including the differential costs 
of Australian public servants in PNG. 
19 Led by Sir Hugh Foot, the UN mission also stressed the need to resettle the Nauruans before 
the island's phosphate deposits were exhausted. Plans were formulated to resettle the people 
of Nauru on an island off the Queensland coast but these lapsed in 1964 due to opnosition from 
within that state and the Nauruans' insistence on the preservation of theirnationa ·dentity and 
their demand for either independence or an extensive measure of self-govemmen~. See Clark, 
op. cit., p.148. 
20 The independence date was 31 January 1968. 
21 The PNG House of Assembly first met in 1964 and, from this point, responsibilities began to 
be transferred to the people of the territory. 
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independence was increased with the arrival of Peacock as Minister for 
External Territories. The progressive role of Peacock was credited for restoring 
a bipartisan consensus in Australia on PNG.22 Indeed, the initiatives of 
:tviinister Peacock from early 1972 provided the McMahon government with a 
constructive image on Papua New Guinea. The role of the Prime Minister was 
essentially one of concurrence with Peacock and the cabinet was quiet on the 
issue. This personal dominance of foreign policy demonstrated the rather 
disjointed state of affairs in which the Liberal and Country Parties governments 
were operating in the later years. This example also signalled the possibilities 
for a single Minister to fashion policy and implement initiatives without a large 
degree of cabinet influence or Parliamentary debate. 
In total, the Liberal and Country Parties governments acted slowly on the 
independence of both Papua New Guinea and Nauru. PNG was understood as 
a strategic elernent of Australia':; defence which seemed to legitimise the 
increasing financial support for the PNG economy. The attempts by the United 
Nations Committee on Decolonisation to monitor Australia's trustee 
relationships with PNG and Nauru through the 1960s coincided with 
Australia's international support for other colonial powers and for the minority 
regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. 
Aid policy 
The Australian aid program was focused on the Colombo Plan, established in 
1950, to allocate aid through the structures of the Commonwealth to 
developing countries. The Menzies government highlighted humanitarian 
concerns as well as trade opportunities, in addition to the need for political 
5tability and the imperative to oppose communism. Thus, the aid policy fitted 
with Australian foreign policy which prioritised se~urity and defence issues. 
The post-war international context saw the largest international aid donor, the 
United States, directing economic assistance through bilateral channels to 
Greece, Turkey, China and the countries of Western Europe under the _Marshall 
Plan of 1947-52. Subsequently, President Truman's 'Point Four' program 
outlined in January 1949 was implemented in an atmosphere of hostility 
toward the newly acquired communist enemies.23 In Australia, the Menzies 
22 See Prime Minister Whitlam, Address in Port Moresby, 18 February 1973, in Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 44r February 1973, p. 104. 
23 President Truman listed four major guidelines for US fi..ceign policy: (1) support for the 
United Nations; (2) support for continued economic recovery; {3) strengthening the 'free 
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government attempted to ban the Communist Party and was gripped by the 
hysteria surrounding the activities of Senator McCarthy in the United States. 
This political environment produced Australian foreign aid programs designed 
to assist recipient governr.~:'lents in resisting communist pressures. 
Apart from the major aid comrnitment to Papua New Guinea, the Colombo 
Plan was the central instrument of Australian aid. In January 1950, the new 
Australian Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender attended the Colombo 
conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers with a plan for bilateral 
economic assistance between members.24 Spender introduced the aid scheme 
with support from Ceylon, which had proposed a more extensive yet less 
acceptable strategy, and encouragement from the United Kingdom, despite its 
economic problems. The Spender Plan, subsequently known as the Colombo 
Plan, presented a series of bilateral aid programs from the Commonwealth 
donors allowing for recipient countries to decide on the need for capital 
equipment, technical assistance and consumer goods.2s The scheme was 
approved by the Commonwealth conference and subsequently endorsed by the 
Australian cabinet. Millar claimed that the Spender plan was part of the 
Australian policy to ensure its own security and trade but it nevertheless had 
its own economic objectives and political momentum.26 Specifically, Australia 
undertook to provide £31 million over the initial six years from July 1951. 
The rationale underlying Australia's aid policy was announced by Minister 
Spender in Parliament several months after the Colombo conference: 
In the first place, on humanitarian grounds we cannot ignore the 
basic needs of such a large and hnportant section of the world's 
population. Secondly, a permanent improvement in world trade 
depends in a substantial degree upon the economic development 
and increased productive capacity of the countries of South and 
South-East Asia. Thirdly, the task of achieving political stability in 
this area will be well-nigh impossible unless living standards ar~ 
lifted from their present very low levels. Finally, conditions 
nations' against aggression; and (4) a plan to embark on a 'bold new program' makin~' 
benefits of American scientific advances and industrial progress available for the r d'i ; 
underdeveloped areas. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., pp. 369-70. 
24 ibid., p. 370. The agenda for the conference was not singularly focused o:r, but was 
arranged to consider the entire international situation, including the proposec:. japanese peace 
treaty, the recognition of the People's Republic of China, regional security, international 
monetary issues and economic assistance. See Alan E. Wilkinson, The Politics of Australian 
Foreign Aid Policy 1950-1972, Ph.D. thesis; Australian National University, 1976, especially 
chapter 3, pp. 51-104. See also Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., p. 16. 
25 Spender argued that the United States should be invited to provide a financial basis and that 
various international institutions be requested to co-operate with the plan. Millar, Australia in 
Peace and War, op. cit., p. 370. 
26 ibid., p. 371. 
page23 
misery and want provide a fertile breeding ground for philosophies 
and forces, particularly imperialistic communism, which seek the 
destruction of democratic institutions.27 
The order of these priorities did not seem to correspond with the underlying 
priorities of aid practice. Clearly, the links between anti-communism and 
security were at the forefront of government policy formulation. These 
objectives remained as the basis for the Australian aid program for more than 
twenty years. 
The aid policies of the Menzies government maintained a humanitarian feature, 
but this consideration was secondary and was conceived as enlightened self-
interest. This justification for providing aid was useful in explaining the 
allocation of Australian resources for distant countries to the domestic 
electorate and to the narrow protectionists within the Liberal and Country 
Parties. Again, this approach was justified as assisting the stability of recipient 
economies in order to quell destabilising domestic or external pressures as well 
as an efficient device for creating economic opportunities for Australia. 
Moreover. ~he Liberal and Country Parties' concentration on South East Asia as 
e-
Australia's prhnary security concern was compl,.iinented by the direction of 
foreign assistance.28 
In the end, the Colombo plan was unable to raise sufficient resources to assist 
the recipients even at a marginal level. Australia's commitment was set at a 
low level, only eight shillings per capita compared with fourteen shillings for 
New Zealand, eighteen for Canada and nineteen for the United States.29 As 
Millar candidly stated: 
Apart from a few concerned people, the public and parliament were 
not interested in aid. It was not a political issue. The Treasury was 
sceptical about the value of aid, felt aid had to yield to balance of 
payments problems, and used all its weight to limit or reduce aid 
funds. Of the two ministers who should have given a lead in cabinet 
and in the country, the Prime Minister (Menzies) had little feel or 
sympathy for Asian peoples, and the Minister for External Affairs 
(Casey) did not have the strength to persuade his fellows.30 
27 Spender, Minister for External Affairs and Minister for External Territories, CPD, HR, vol. 
208, 6 June 1950, p. 3723. 
28 Albinski, Austra!fr:n External Policy ... , op. cit, p. 17. 
29 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 372. 
30 ibid., p. 373, parentheses in original. The Minister for External Affairs also explained that 
At the end of this afternoon (and at the end of the consideration of the expenditure 
side of the Budget), my Colombo Plan and International Relief items came on in 
Canberra. I proposed a reduction of 250,000 pounds (in total) from what we had 
proposed for all these items. Treasury proposed a 500,000 pounds cut. I did not 
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While there was minimal interest in the aid program, the allocation of aid funds 
was seen to benefit Australia in terms of access to the region, opposition to 
communism in developing countries and assistance to defence objectives. Aid 
programs provided a link to ministers and officials in neighbouring countries 
for discussions that otherwise would not take place. Also, it was important for 
Australia's position in Asia to provide an image of co-operation on regional 
issues. 
In total, the transfer of Australian aid resources contributed to important public 
works, employment and productivity along with education in Australia for 
many students. It may also be argued that Australian aid helped to maintain 
particular authoritarian regimes, increased inequalities and social dislocation, 
provided access for Australian business to the detriment of recipient peoples 
and continued to enforce colonial policies which perpetuated the dependent 
attitudes and economies in South East Asia, especially Papua New Guinea. 
On an adntinistrative level, the Australian aid program was directed by the 
Department of External Affairs, later Foreign Affairs, and the Department of 
External Territories with contributions from Treasury, Department of Trade 
and Industry and Department of Primary Industry. A formal co-ordination of 
aid policies was attempted through an interdepartmental committee after a 
review in 1964-65. From this committee, Australia decided to join the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee which, subsequently, was critical of the 
quantity and quality of Australia's aid program. As a result, the Australian 
government established a tariff preference scheme in 1966 for the importation 
of selected products from developing countries.31 
Finally, at the close of the Liberal and Country Parties governments, foreign aid 
spending for 1972-73 was projected at $220million. The emphasis of Australian 
aid had become firmly fixed on South East Asia where political instabilities 
fuelled Australian fears. The Liberal and Country Parties governments 
demonstrated the useful purposes of economic assistance within the 
have a supporter and the Treasury case won. The discussion reflected a complete 
absence of appreciation of the situation- which makes it very hard- and rather 
frightening. The gap in thinking is so great it is useless to argue. 
Casey quoted in ibid., p. 373. The Minister for External Affairs may have been more successful 
by arguing in terms of the threat to stability in the region, reflections of Japan during the war 
and the need to oppose communism in the region. It seems Casey preferred not to use this 
tactic. 
31 ibid., p. 376. See P.J. Lloyd, The Australian Tariff Preference Scheme for Developing 
Countries, Journal oJWorld Trade Law, May-June 1970, P.J. lloyd, The Value of Tariff Preferences 
for the Developing Countries: Australian Experience, Economic Record, vol. 47, 117, March 1971, 
and P.J. lloyd, Australian Tariff Preferences for LDCs, lntereconomics, 11, 1972. 
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framework of reghmal economic and strategic objectives. Significantly, the aid 
policy was not directed nor evaluated, rather the policy simply evolved.32 By 
1972, this situation provoked suggestions from the community and the Labor 
Party that a statutory body should administer aid and that aid policy was in 
need of substantial change.ss 
Africa 
Prior to the election of the Whitlam Labor government in December 1972, 
Australia's relations with Africa were limited to a close association with the 
minority governments of South Africa and Rhodesia. Australia was seen to 
share a common history with South Africa and Rhodesia through the Boer war 
and this bond was subsequently reinforced by strong political and diplomatic 
ties, sustained by long-standing trade and sporting links, and formalised 
through the Commonwealth of Nations. 
At the United Nations, the Liberal and Country Parties governments ensured 
that Australia provided overt support for the South African and Rhodesian 
regimes. The notion of 'domestic jurisdiction' as derived from the UN Charter 
was used to substantiate Australia's position but clearly the Australian 
government was primarily defending the minority regimes of southern Africa. 
Also, Australia opposed sanctions, encouraged trade with both South Africa 
and Rhodesia, and supported the continuation of the South African mandate 
over South West Africa. Further, Australia voted against the inclusion of 
apartheid as an item on the General Assembly agenda when first moved in 
October 1952, a position which was defeated, and continued to oppose this 
discussion within the UN.34 Not surprisingly, the words and actions of the 
Australian government in the United Nations prior to 1972 were interpreted as 
support for the apartheid system in South Africa and for the minority regime in 
Rhodesia. 
32 Millar, op. cit., p. 377, claimed that the aid program became a 'series of actions and reactions 
by public servants in the terms they understood'. See also David Evans, Australia and 
Developing Countries: Contradictions of Capitalism, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 2, 1972, 
p. 154 and Anthony Clunies-Ross, Foreign Aid, chapter 6 in Greenwood and Harper, eds, 
Australia in World Affairs 1966-1970, op. cit., p. 9. 
33 Ounies-Ross, ibid. 
34 Australia, ¥lith Britam, were the only two members voting against U±'J res-clutiorn~ 
-amdemaiag South Afriea after 1956. See Oark, op. cit., p. 144; J.D.B. Miller, Notes on 
Australian Relations with South Africa, Australian Outlook, vol. 25, 2, August 1971, p. 134; 
Millar, The Commonwealth and the United Nations, op. cit., pp. 149, 153 & 156; and A.K. Fryer, 
South Africa, A Target for Foreign Policy: A Footnote to J.D.B. Miller's 'Notes', Australian 
Outloa~ vol. 26, 2, August 1972, pp. 216-21. 
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A critical juncture for Australia on South Africa followed the Sharpeville 
massacre in March 1960.35 A general motion of condemnation of the South 
African government appeared on the UN General Assembly agenda and, as 
expected, Australia announced its intention to vote against.x However, Britain 
surprisingly changed its traditional position and decided to vote in favour of 
the resolution which in turn jolted the Australian delegation to alter its stance. 
It seemed that the practice of following Britain prevailed over Australia's 
insistence upon South Africa's domestic jurisdiction. Prime Minister Menzies 
claimed slightly more independent grounds for the change in vote when 
concluding that Austr-alia 'would have been misunderstood all over Asia about 
our attitude' and could no longer afford to be isolated.36 Without a change in 
attitude toward apartheid, and without an apology for past support for the 
apartheid regime, Australia for the first time, and with some reluctance, 
supported a move in condemnation of South Africa. 
Subsequently, Australia supported a UN resolution requesting South Africa to 
abandon the trial of Nelson Mandela and other opponents of the apartheid 
system and to grant an unconditional release to all political prisoners. 
Nevertheless, Australia consistently voted against the implementation of 
sanctions against South Africa.37 Prime Minister Menzies v;.as adamant in 
opposing economic, diplomatic or military restrictions on South Africa given 
Australia's adherence to the principle of domestic jurisdiction and 
encouragement of favourable trade relations. Indeed, the economic and 
investment relationships between Australia and South Africa were cultivated 
over a long period by both governments. Members of the Liberal and Country 
Parties in Australia openly advocated the benefits of the apartheid system for 
African workers and displayed overt racism in support of trade with South 
Africa.3s Further, the Australian Trade Commissioners in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg were attempting to bind Australian investors to the apartheid 
35 At Sharpeville, sixty seven Africans were killed and one hundred and eighty-six wounded 
by the South African police and military forces at the start of an action campaign led by the 
Pan-Africanist Congress. Subsequently, pressure against the South African regime mounted 
both within the Commonwealth and at the United Nations. Clark, op. cit., p. 144. 
36 Menzies quotation in The Times, London, 1 May 1.961, reproduced at greater length in 
Albinski, Australian External Policy, op. cit., p. 22 and Millar, The Commonwealth and the United 
Nations, op. cit., p. 164. 
37 Oark, op. cit., p. 145. Notwithstanding the Australian approach, the Security Council 
adopted a resolution for an arms embargo agai."1St South Africc.\ in December 1963. See also 
Millar, op. cit., pp. 163 & 165. 
38 Treasurer Holt displayed the racist view of the Liberal Party in describing a visit to the 
South African goldfields, quoted in Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975, 
Viking, Ringwood, 1985, p. 67. 
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economy. Also, publications from the Australian Department of Trade and 
Industry highlighted the 'monetary advantages to be gained from the apartheid 
conditions' .39 
An important element in the growth of Australian trade with the apartheid 
economy was the South African regime's need to maintain ties with faithful 
allies such as Australia, Britain and Portugal, in order to protect investments 
and provide alternatives against intemationa.l dissociation. By 1972, continued 
business and govenrment approval marked South Africa as one of the most 
importan~e;,qJort markets for Australia.40 
On the question of responsibility for South West Africa, Australia again 
supported the Cl.partheid regime. The South Mrican government had retained 
South West Africa under a mandate provided by the League of Nations and 
subsequently had not sought trusteeship from the United Nations. The South 
African mandate was challenged in the International Court of Justice where, in 
July 1966, the ICJ President, Sir Percy Spender, delivered the casting vote.Ato 
reject the declaration. Whitlam claimed that this judgement had serious 
implications: 
The Court's decision had a catastrophic effect in disillusioning the 
African nations with legal processes and converting them to political 
methods to secure independence for their neighbours.41 
Irrespective of the merits of the ruling, the resolution was bitterly resented by 
the African and Asian members of the UN, and once again Australia was seen 
to be in alliance with the apartheid regime in South Africa.42 
At the subsequent session of the UN General Assembly, thirty-five African and 
Asian countries moved to end South Africa's mandate over South West Africa 
and to transfer direct responsibility for admL11istration of the territor-;r to the 
United Nations. Australia suggested that South West Africa be placed under 
the trusteeship system, a solution long advocated by other members. As 
39 The exploitative wage structure central to the apartheid system significantly lowered 
production costs and thereby offered higher profits. Ron Witton, Australia and Apartheid: The 
Ties that Bind, Australian Quarterly, vol. 45, 2, June 1973, p. 19 referred to the Departm~<t of 
Trade and Industry, Report: Trade Survey Mission to the Republic of South Africa, supplement 
to Overseas Trading, 6 December 1968, p. 10. The Department outlined the economic benefits of 
subsistence wage levels in conjunction with an explicit racist justification. 
40 See Witton, op. cit., pp. 18-19. See also Miller, op. cit., p. 132. 
41 \1\Thitlam, op. cit., p. 68. 
42 See Millar, The Commonwealth and the United Nations, op. cit, pp.171-91, esp. pp.180-1. See 
also John Dugard, ed., The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute~ University of California Press, 
Berkeley .. 1973. 
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expected, South Africa objected to UN jurisdiction over the territory. The 
Australian delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution but, in later 
sessions, abstained regarding the establishment of :l United Nations Council for 
South West Africa and the appointment of a UN Commissioner to carry out 
administrative tasks in relation to the territory.43 Australia's mixed record on 
this issue reflected the competing considerations of support for South Africa 
and endorsement of the trusteeship system. Indeed, the Australian position 
recognised that South Africa would retain control over the territory of South 
West Africa while conceding little to the United Nations. 
In contrast, after 1969, the Australian government displayed a mr.re flexible 
position at the UN by supporting resolutions on the expansion of the Special 
Committee on Apartheid, assistance to the people of South Africa, and in 1971, 
five humanitarian resolutions condemning apartheid.44 However, the 
appearance of a constructive approach on South Africa was engineered through 
support for issues on which the Australian government did not fear domestic 
repercussions. On tbis, the McMahon government directed that Australia vote 
against resolutions on severing ties or condemning all contact with South 
Africa, consistently oppose the denial of the credentials of the South African 
delegation and vote against a resolution denouncing 'foreign economic interests 
in South Africa for impeding decolonisation and the end of racial 
discrimination' .45 As such, in 1971, Australia was singled out for criticism over 
the maintenance of trade and sporting contacts with South Africa. 
As an example of Australia's support for the South African regime, the 
Mdvlahon Liberal a..Tl.d Country Parties gc vernment supported the tour of the 
South African rugby team to Australia in 1971. There was substantial support 
within the Australian government and the community for the view that politics 
should not intrude upon sport and therefore the tour should proceed. 
43 The appointment of a UN Coxr..missioner appeared to be a futile task while South Africa 
mamtained its strong resistance to the exercise of UN" authority. Further, in 1971, the 
International Court of Justice, its composition changed since 1966, confirmed the illegality of 
South Africa's continued presence in Souf.h West Africa. In 1972, however, South Africa 
allowed a visit to the territory by the newly appointed UN Secretary-General Kurt WaldheimF 
and in October-November 1972, a special representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador 
Escher of Switzerland, visited South !\f~·ka and Namibia and submitted a written report on the 
question. Clark, op. cit., p. 146. 
44 The Australian representatives w~rt· consistent in their contributions to debates and 
committees focussed on socio-legal questions and technical expertise while beginning to play a 
more consb.uctive mediating role on issues of procedure and substance. See ibid., p. 152. 
45 See ibid., p. 150 .. Alsor Australia did not contribute to the UN Fund for South Africa nor the 
UN Educational and Training Programme for South Africans. Further, while not opposing, 
Australia abstained on resolutions to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa, the 
provision of information on apartheid and an end to all sporting contacts with South Africa. 
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Alternatively, it was argued that the visit to Australia offered acceptance of 
South Africa's practice of segregated sport and of the apartheid policies. When 
opponents of the tour threatened to disrupt the rugby matches, Prime Minister 
McMahon offered a Royal Allstralian Air Force aircraft to the tourists if 
required and warned of an early federal election based on the issue of law and 
order.46 lvlore important was the Prime Minister's overt support for South 
Africa to the domestic constituency and the international community. 
Similar to Australia's relationship with South Africa, the Liberal and COlli"1try 
Parties governments displayed a clear sympathy for the Rhodesian regime. 
Australia complied with pressure from the United Nations to isolate the 
Rhodesian government but supported the minority regime through alternative 
methods. 
The question of Southern Rhodesia was before the UN General Assembly in 
1962 where Australia voted against its inclusion on the agenda and 
subsequently abstained on resolutions calling for a 'new constitution ensuring 
majority rule and urging the release of political prisoners'.47 Following the 
collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963 and the 
independence of N orthem Rhodesia as Zambia and Nyasaland as Malawi in 
1964, the progression toward the declaration of independence for Southern 
Rhodesia seemed inevitable. At this time, African governments were faced 
with a dilemma. While opposed in principle to imperial rule, they could not 
advocate independence for Rhodesia while it continued to be ruled by a 
colonial minority of the population. Britain was not prepared to concede 
A mdependence under-eenditions demanded by the Mrican governments, and 
thus Southern Rhodesia proclaimed a unilateral declaration of independence 
on 11 November 1965. Later that day, a resolution condemning the UDI was 
adopted in the General Assembly. Australia supported the resolution with 
only Portugal and South Africa against.48 The following day, the Security 
Council adopted a resolution urging all states to refuse to recognise 'the illegal 
46 On this, ~;ee Albinski, Australian External PolicyJ op. cit., pp. 24-5, Bruce GrantJ The Crisis of 
Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Polietj, Angus & Robertson with the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs, Sydney, 1972, p. 30, and Colin A. Hughes, Australian Political Chronicle 
May-August 1971, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 17, 3, December 1971, p. 419. 
47 Oark, op. cit., p. 146. The issue of Sou them Rhodesia was first introduced to the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1961. Britain was asked to supply information regarding a new 
constitution for Southern Rhodesia which eliminated Britain's reserve rights and appeared to 
ensure minority rule indefinitely. The British goverruilent argued that they could not submit 
information as the colony had been self-govemirg since 1923. However, the Committee of 
Seventeen on Decolonisation stated that Southern Rhodesia was not self-governing in terms of 
the Declaration on Ending Colonialism. 
48 Britain did not vote pending the arrival of the Foreign Secretary from London. 
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racist regime' and a week later adopted a compromise proposal which avoided 
a call for the use of force, sought by some African members and rejected by 
Britain, but which asked all members to sever econor. ·~ · c relations with 
Rhodesia and to impose an oil embargo.49 
On 16 November 1965, Prime Minister Menzies stated that Australia would not 
recognise the illegal regime but expressed grave reservations regarding 
sanctions.50 In line with UN resolutions and British sentiments, a ban was 
imposed on the export of arms to Rhodesia and the importation of tobacco, 
Commonwealth tariff preferences were suspended, and Australia's trade 
representation in Rhodesia was terminated.51 In the face of official empathy 
with the Rhodesian regime, Menzies implemented the sanctions to inc!uce 
Rhodesia to acknowledge the lack of support for UDI and to return to 
established channels of diplomacy.52 However, as Australian imports were 
valued at less than two million pounds annually, these sanctions did not 
impact upl n the Rhodesian economy. It seems the straining of traditional 
political ties had a greater effect. Possibly as a concession to the supporters of 
Rhodesia within the Liberal and Country Parties government who were linked 
with wheat growers and their advocates, Menzies continued to sell wheat to 
Rhodesia through the 'humanitarian' loophole in the UN resolution. 
The ~ct of unilateral independence by Rhodes; 1. was not recognised by any 
Commonwealth country. This issue was discussed at a meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in Lagos in January 1966. Menzies did not 
attend the meeting and publicly claimed to object in principle to the subject of 
49 Clark, op. cit., p. 147. See also Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 363. 
50 Menzies, Ministerial statement: Rhodesia, CPD, HR, vol. 49,16 November 1965, pp. 2770-1. 
On sanctions, see David Cox, Sanctions and white racist regimes: experience and possible 
action, Honours thesis, Flindt-~rs University, 1987, pp. 35-72. 
5l Menzies, CPD, HR, vol. 49, 16 November 1965, pp. 2770-71. See also Hasluck, CPD, HR, vol. 
49, 17 November 1965, p. 2852. 
52 See Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., p. 22 and Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 
op. cit., p. 364. Menzies explained that any action taken by Australia was to assist the United 
Kingdom to establish a constitutional government in Rhodesia. Menzies, CPD, HR, vol. 49, 16 
November 1965, pp. 2768-9,2770, also stated that two extreme views advanced in debate were 
not practicable: 
The first extreme view was that either immediately or within a few months there 
should be adult suffrage with, in consequence, an African majority. If this view 
were to prevail then, as I said to my friend, [Prime Minister] Mr. Smith, I could see 
all the elements of bad, because inexperienced, government, and possible 
economic disaster. The other extreme view was that the achievement of an 
African majority should be indefinitely resisted. This view, as I have repeatedly 
said, and, as I said to Mr. Smith, was, in the prevailing international political 
climate, quite impracticable ... What is needed in Rhodesia is a reasonable 
timetable, accompanied by a special educational campaign ... to fit the African 
votes for their ultimate a.nthority. 
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the meeting and presumably the location, alth~:.t1gh Menzies was actually on 
the point of retirement. Whatever the reason, the perception among those 
attending the Lagos meeting and others was that Australia was aligning with 
the minority regime in Rhodesia. 53 
At the United Nations in October 1966 and November 1967,, Australia abstained 
on strongly worded United Nations resolutions proposed by African and Asian 
countries on Rhodesia. 54 This appeared largely consistent with previous voting 
by Australia but these particular decisions may have been influenced by the 
forthcoming federal election in November 1966, the first since 1948 without 
Menzies as leader of the Liberal Party, and the half Senate election at the end of 
Novem~er 1.967. The government would P"\ve been anxious to avoid a possible 
foreign policy debate on Rhodesia at these \....mes and therefore the abstentions 
may have been the only options.ss 
In 1967 and 1968, the Holt and Gorton Liberal and Country Parties 
governm~nts directed the Australian ambassador in Pretoria to issue passports, 
valid for five years, to the secretary of the Rhodesian 'Department of External 
Affairs' and to the Rhodesian 'diplomatic representatives' in Portugal and 
South Africa. As Whitlam explained: 
Since no other governments recognised Rhodesia's purported 
passports and the British Government would not issue passports to 
the rebel residents of Rhodesia, the regime's contacts with the 
outside world had been conducted by courtesy of the Australian 
Government. 56 
In addition, the Liberal and Country Parties governments' tolerance of the 
Rhodesian Information Centre in Sydney was widely regarded as a breach of 
the sanctions demanded by the UN Security Council. While it was an explicitly 
political decision to permit this international point of publicity, it could be 
53 Coral Bell, Depende-at Ally, Oxford University Pre,•s, Melbourne, 1988, p. 93 and vVhitlam, op. 
cit., p. 68. For different reasons, both Ghana and Tanzania also refused to participate. An 
Australian diplomat was an observer at the public sessions of the conference. 
34 The UN GE".neral Assembly vote in November 1967 adopted a resolution 92 votes to 2 with 
18 abstentions, including Australia, calling on Britain to take 'all necessary measures, including 
the use of force' to end the rebellion. The Australian delegation consistently spoke against a 
call to arms on the grounds that Britain was not prepared to use force and it would be improper 
to make this request. See Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 364. 
55 Clark, op. cit., p. 147. In 1968, Australia cast negative votes on resolutions calling upon 
Britain to use force and asking the Security .-:::ouncil to impose sanctions against South Africa 
and Portugal for not complying with UN recommendations on measures again..[ Rhodesia. 
This situation arose due to the actions of South Africa in attempting to maintain mt overland 
link with Rhodesia in order to circumvent a British naval blockade of th€1 Mozambican port of 
Beira. See Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit, p. 364. 
56 Whitlam, op. cit., p. 68. 
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explained given the empathy for the minority population in Rhodesia among 
sections of the Australian community, especially among those who had lived in 
Rhodesia and South Africa. Apparently, a number of senior officials in the 
Rhodesian government were Australian-born and held Australian passportsP 
In order to avoid controversy at home, the Australian government consistently 
argued at the United Nations and elsewhere that Rhodesia was essentially a 
problem for the British government. In the end, Australia was one of the few 
countries to continue to support the regime in Rhodesia. The personal, political 
and economic links between the Liberal and Country Parties governments in 
Australia and the minority governments in Rhodesia sustained thE relationship 
amidst serious criticism and international isolation. 
However, there was considerable dissent from within the Liberal and Country 
Parties government on the set of issues emerging from southern Africa. As a 
representative of a progressive but 1ninority element within the Liberal Party, 
Neil Brovvn was openly critical of the government's foreign policies on South 
Africa and Rhodesia. Brown pointed to a lack of consistency between the 
declared abhorrence of the minority regimes and the actual policies, 
particularly the government's toleration of the Rhodesian Information Centre in 
Sydney.ss Importantly, BroV\n identified the context of Australia's position on 
southern Africa. This included the links with the United Nations attitude 
toward Australian trusteeship in Papua New Guinea, the extent of participation 
in new trade with African economies, and relations with some nations in Asia 
given Australia's identification with 'the reactionary forces in southern Africa' .59 
The disagreement on foreign policy issues within the government parties was 
expressed by Brown: 
What we must do is to move more into the mainstream of opposition 
to the minority forces in southern Africa, be more vocal in our 
condemnation of those forces where appropriate and refrain from 
acting as a nation in ways which could suggest that we are not 
genuine in our protestations of opposition to the minority forces in 
southern Africa and to apartheid in particular.6D 
This position was significantly distant from the established Liberal and 
Country Parties policies and emerged at a time of political debate led by the 
Labor Party on South Africa and Rhodesia. 
57 Oark, op. cit., p. 148. 
58 See Brown, CPD, HR, vol. 78, 23 May 1972, p. 2881. 
59 Brown, CPD, HR., vol. 78, 23 May 1972, p. 2881. 
60 Neil Brown, Africa and the-Indian Ocean Area, in Clark, op. cit., pp. 78-9. 
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Nevertheless, as a general impression, the Liberal and Country Parties 
governments of Australia prior to 1972 were strong and sustained supporters of 
the minority govermnents in South Africa and Rhodesia. Australia was seen to 
oppose all arguments and measures which were intended to place pressure 
upon the South African and Rhodesian regimes. Meanwhile, the Liberal and 
Country Parties governments encouraged t-rade with and offered other forms of 
support to South Africa and Rhodesia. Even in 1969-72, when Australia was 
more constructive in its relationship with Papua New Guinea, there was little 
movement within the Australian government on relations with the minority 
regimes of southern Africa. ~~s demonstrated the limited influence of 
--Ministm: Peacock on relations with South Africa and Rhodesia in contrast ¥.rith 
-th:e-Mi:rtister's constructive initiativt!s on PNG. This Slls6 indicated the relative 
importance placed upon the support for the minority regimes in Africa by the 
Liberal and Country Parties governments compared to the governments' 
interest in issues central to Papua New Guinea. 
The simple e:>..'Planation for the Liberal and Country Parties' close association 
with the minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia was a collective 
preference for dealing with similar peoples. The authority for this view might 
be Menzies' approach to the Commonwealth over time. It is not difficult to 
-eonclude- that the Liberal and Country Parties' overt support for the 
-governiR€nts of seuthem Africa was based on racist views. 
Australia's international image as a close supporter of South Africa and 
Rhodesia was a prime target for the Whitlam Labor Party government. 
I-Iowever, doubt remained whether the Labor Party would choose to reverse 
each part of the relationship with the minority regimes or baulk at losing some 
trade an:l economic benefits. Nevertheless, the long-standing approach of the 
Liberal and Country Parties governments from 1949 toward the minority 
regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia formed an important background to the 
foreign policies of the vVhitlam Labor government. 
Liberal and Country Parties policies for the 1972 federal election 
For the 1972 election campaign, Prime Minister McMahon continued to pursue 
a security agenda as the basis for foreign policy. Essentially, the Liberal and 
Country Parties decided to offer consistency in foreign policy rather than 
promote changes to Australia's international relationships. 
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As an aside, the Liberal Party policy speech in November 1972 reaffirmed the 
government's stance on immigration: 
[The policy] is to ensure that we have in Australian society a 
homogeneous and integrated community, not a community with 
enclaves of people who cannot be integrated. We are committed to 
the policy of attracting new settlers from traditional sources . . . It 
will remain a selective policy, based on the skills of the migrants and 
their ability to integrate.61 
This position was interpreted as selective on the basis of race and provided a 
direct contrast with the recently altered Labor Party policy an immigration. 
On foreign policy, McMahon explained that the Liberal Party would strengthen 
the close links with the United States, Britain and New Zealand.62 This 
predictable stance emphasised continuity in traditional ties for Australia. More 
interesting was the statement relating to China that the Liberal Party would 
'proceed at all times with care and prudence, bearing in mind that Australia's 
long-term interests are paramount'. 63 This was not a promise to recognise the 
People's Republic of China but these few words implicitly raised the question 
of the Liberal Party's understanding of Australia's interests, especially in terms 
of trade with China. 
Prime Minister McMahon supported self-government and independence for 
Papua New Guinea and the Liberal Party pledged to maintain aid for friends in 
the Asia Pacific region.64 While the policy speech did not mention relations 
with Africa, Foreign Minister Nigel Bowen had previously outlined the 
government's position on South Africa and Rhodesia: 
. . . we appreciate the resentment which is felt at the continued 
implementation of policies of racial discrimination and minority rule 
in southern Africa. Policies of apartheid, racial discrimination and 
severely restricted franchises ... have no support in Australia. At 
the same time, it is not our policy to encourage or support calls for 
the use of force to change the racial policies applied in southern 
Africa.65 
61 Rt. Hon. William McMahon, Liberal Party Policy Speech, Federal Election 1972, 14 November 
1972, p . .i4. 
62 ibid., p. 16. Foreign Minister Bowen also stressed the perceived Soviet naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean rather than regional cooperation. See Bowen, CPD, HR, vol. 78, 9 May 1972, pp. 
2220-1. 
63 Liberal Party Policy speech, op. cit., p.16. See also Bowen, CPD, HR, vol. 78,9 May 1972, pp. 
2222-3. 
64 Liberal Party Policy speech, op. cit, p. 20. 
65 Bowen, CPD, HR, vol. 78, 9 May 1972, p. 2224. See also response by Whitlam, pp. 2226-32. 
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This position had been advocated consistently by the McMahon government 
but earned sustained criticism from the Labor Party and from within the 
Liberal Party. 
In contrast to the Liberal Party policy speech, the Country Party statement for 
the 1972 election devoted considerable space to defence and foreign policies. 
While prioritising an agenda for Australia as an important trading nation, the 
Leader of the Country Party and Deputy Prime Minister Anthony advocated 
the objective of normalising relations with China. This departure from Liberal 
Party policy seemed to be driven by opportunities for agricultural exports but it 
was also tempered by a curious international concern: 
The Country Party believes our desire to extend our influence must 
spring from a concern for people. We want to build relations, not 
merely to serve the ends of politics or trade, but to bring people 
together. We want to advartce the thinking of Australians beyond 
the important but limited ~oncept of nationalism - which 
concentrates our thinking on our own nation - to the wider concept 
of internationalism - which stretches our thinking and our concern to 
embrace mankind. 
And then our feeling of concern must be translated in practical 
action. Australia has a record in the provision of aid for which we 
need not apologise. Bu2 as our understanding of our responsibilities 
grows, and as our capacity to rE>s:tJond grows, then the help we give 
to others must increase.66 
This policy position was significantly different from the Liberal Party 
statements and, over time, the Country Party position on China was adopted 
by the Liberal Party. 
The pivotal position of the Democratic Labor Party within the Parliament and 
the role played in distributing votes in the electoral process dictated some 
influence on policy issues. The Liberal Party leadership needed to be aware of 
the DLP agenda on foreign policy. Specifically, the Democratic Labor Party 
stated the need for strengthening Australia's Indian Ocean naval forces and the 
rapid completion of naval and air bases on the Western coastline. In agreement 
with the Liberal Party, the DLP argued for selective immigration and the 
screening of migrants. 67 
66 Australian Country Party, The Country Party's Policy, Federal election 1972, statement by the 
Rt. Hon. J.D. Anthony, Lismore'" 20 November 1972, p. 12. 
67 Australian Democratic Labor Party, Policy speech, 1972 House of Representatives election, 
delivered by Senator the Hon. V.C. Gair, ANZAC House, Sydney, 12 November 1972, pp. 10-
11. 
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Thus, at the time of the 1972 federal election campaign, the Liberal and Country 
Parties continued to advocate a security agenda for Australian foreign policy, 
with support from the Democratic Labor Party. In particular, the McMahon 
government argued for continued inaction on South Africa and Rhodesia. 
Conclusion 
The policies of the Liberal and Country Parties governments prior to December 
1972 provided a distinct inheritance for the Whitlam Labor government. In 
general terms, the Menzies government constructed Australian foreign policy 
on the basis of defence, security and anti-communism. This position was 
consistent with the foreign policies of Britain and the United States and caused 
Australia to become involved in conflicts in Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam. At 
the United Nations, the Liberal and Country Parties governments aligned with 
the colonial powers at the expense of relations with developing countries, 
particularly in the Asia Pacific region. Australia was vocal in opposing the 
entry of China to the UN and invoked the notion of domestic jurisdiction to 
oppose UN intervention in South Africa. Australia also defended the m.inority 
regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia in the Commonwealth. 
The Liberal and Country Parties governments understood that Papua New 
Guinea was an important component of defence policy and thus was slow to 
promote the independence of PNG within the UN trusteeship arrangements. 
Significantly, Minister Peacock hastened the move toward independence in the 
last year of government. Linked to the approach to PNG was Australia's aid 
policy which complemented the defence and foreign policies. Essentially, aid 
was allocated through the Colombo Plan to Commonwealth countries in order 
to oppose communism anc · to promote trade. Again, this linked with the 
general purpose of Austra1ian foreign policy and characterised Australian 
relations with countries in the Asia Pacific region. 
On Africa, the Menzies government maintained and promoted close relations 
with the minority populations in South Africa and Rhodesia and tended to 
neglect relations with the rest of Africa. Australia opposed UN sanctions 
against South Africa and continued to support the apartheid regime after the 
Sharpeville massacre which, for some countries, was the point of change in 
relations with South Africa. The Liberal and Country Parties governments also 
continued to support Rhodesia despite the implementation of UN resolutions 
designed to isolate the minority regime. 
page37 
The Liberal and Country Parties governments displayed a consistently 
conservative i+nage in international debates and demonstrated a decidedly 
conservative set of political objectives in foreign policy. The Liberal and 
Country Parties governments clung to the early edicts of Prime Minister 
Menzies on anti-communism, southern Africa, the UN and the Asia Pacific 
region and refused to alter these preconceptions as the basis of Australian 
foreign policy. This consistent approach on a range of issues contrasted with 
significant change in international relations. This explains the argument 
promulgated by the Labor Party that the policies of the Liberal and Country 
Parties were outdated and inappropriate by 1972. 
In the end, foreign policy debates combined with domestic issues to provide 
distinct images of the electoral protagonists for the 1972 federal election. The 
Liberal Party seemed tired, overcome by events and without effective 
leadership. The Labor Party was seen as invigorated, clear in objectives, and 
contemporary in ideas.68 For the Labor Party entering an election campaign, it 
was logical to highlight that it was time for change. 
68 Albinski, Australian External Policy ... ; op. cit, p. 57. 
chapter 2 
Domestic context of the Whitlam foreign policy 
Prior to the 1972 federal election, Gough Whitlam led the Australian Labor 
Party in the construction of foreign policy proposals that were clearly different 
from the established positions of the Liberal and Country Parties government. 
The Labor Party debated and drafted elements of the ALP Platform at each 
national conference and this document directly underpinned the policies 
outlined by Whitlam in the campaign speech. This chapter examines the 
domestic political environment in which Whitlam implemented changes to 
Australia's foreign policy. This examination revech$ that the personal influence 
of Whitlam was an important element in the establishment of an anti-racist and 
anti-colonial foreign policy for Australia. 
Following the 1972 federal election, Prime Minister Whltlam and L ""puty Prime 
Minist~r Barnard formed a duumvirate, a two person cabinet, to immediately 
implement changes to Australian foreign policy. Whitlam also assumed the 
portfolio of Foreign Affairs until November 1973 and directed the Labor Party 
foreign policy agenda with few limitations. Specifically, the implementation of 
foreign policy did not appear to be constrained by the Parliament, cabinet, 
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caucus, Parliamentary committees, the bureaucracy or the electorate. Prime 
Minister Whitlam ensured that Australia would adopt a new position in 
international debates. 
Whitlam and Labor Party foreign policy 
Whitlam was elected leader by the Parliamentary Labor Party on 8 February 
1967. This not unexpected move was seen as a generational change for the 
Lauor Party as Whitlam replaced the older and more conservative Arthur 
Calwell. The change in leadership signalled a move away from the old canons 
of the-ALP, such as a racist immigration policy, and the old battles of the Labor 
Party, such as the split in 1955.1 
Whitlam provided a new image for the Labor Party. As opposition leader, 
Whitlam was also the Labor Party's spokesperson on foreign affairs.2 Whitlam 
had the opportunity to gain information and contacts through many official 
overseas tours and this role provided new ideas and new strategies for the 
Labor Party foreign policy.3 The shape and direction of policy design under 
Whitlam was fashioned to suit specific international and regional issues. 
The ALP was also. the beneficiary of a revitalised debate in the Australian 
community about foreign policy. The debate emerged from a combination of 
groups protesting against the United States actions in Vietnam and the 
repressive nature nf apartheid in South Africa. \'\Thitlam kept a safe distance 
from the more dissonant elements of the anti-Vietnam protest movement in 
stark contrast to the activities of another Labor Member of Parliament, Dr. Jim 
C . 4 arms. 
1 See Ross :MCJ.\1ullin, The Light on the Hill: The Australian Labor Party 1891-1991, Oxford 
University Press, South Melbourne, 1991, pp. 256-89. On the split in the Labor Party, the most 
commonly cited work is the anti-communist expc\3ition by Robert Murray, The Split: Australian 
Labor in the Fifties, Cheshire, Melbourne, 197'0. See also Leslie Haylen, Twenty Years Hard Labor, 
Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1969 and Carol Johnson, The Labor Legacy: Curtin, Chifley, 
Whitlam, Hawke, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1989. 
2 Indeed, Freudenburg claimed that,. in terms of foreign policy initiatives, Whitlam 
demonstrated the power of the position as Leader of the Opposition, and stated that, whatever 
history makes of Whitlam as Prime Minister, Whitlam was 'unquestionably the greatest Leader 
of the Opposition'. Graham Freudenburg, • .1\spects of Foreign Policy, in Hugh Emy, Owen 
Hughes and Race Mathews, eds, Wlzitlam Revisited: Policy Development, Policies and Outcomes, 
Pluto with the Public Sector Management Institute, Monash University, Leichhardt, 1993, pp. 
201-2. 
3 HenryS. Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor, University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucia, 1977, pp. 60-1. 
4 ibid., p. 32 and Senator D. Willesee, Australian Foreign Poli1-y in the 1970s, chapter 1 in B.D. 
Beddie, Advance Australia- Where?, Oxford University Press with the Australian Institute of 
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From. this, Whitlam established a moderate position, appealing as an electoral 
option for the Australian voters, but also for the powerful elements of the 
domestic media and business groups, and toward the United States exoectation 
... 
of pragmatic allies.5 The cost of this position was the sustained criticism from 
within the ALP where vVhitlam was involved in a continual balancing act with 
more radical elements.6 A question remained over the extent to which Whitlam 
was simply manoeuvring for electoral success in order to implement a more 
extensive program of reforms once in government. 
Notwithstanding this approach by Whitlam, the Labor leader was seen to be 
offering, for the 1960s, a radical policy agenda for Australia. Whitlam 
expressed a desire to overcome the conservative framework of policy-making 
centred on the United States alliance and the containment of China. The 
McMahon government had been unable to deal with the significant changes in 
the international environment in 1971-72. The basis of Australia's foreign 
policy was undermined by President Nixon's visit to China, the United Nations 
acceptance of China, Nixon's shift on Vietnam, and the beginrt5ng of detente.7 
At the same time, Whitlam embraced these changes in providing a new vision 
for Australian foreign policy. 
Whitlam understood that new visions and new policies needed to be supported 
by the Labor Party through its formal structures. The authoritative source of 
Labor Party policy was the bi-annual federal conference at which delegates 
review and debate Labor policies. The ALP conference has often been the 
forum for intense battles over particular policies or indeed the direction of the 
Party, and has been used at other times to demonstrate a level of unity prior to 
a federal election. Thus, after the 1966 federal election loss and the installation 
of Whitlam as leader, the 1967 federal conference debated proposed reforms of 
the Labor Party structures.s In contrast, t..l-t.e 1971 federal conference was 
relatively quiet in preparation for the 1972 election. 
International Affairs, Melbourne, 1975, p. 1. Cairns was elected to the House of Representatives 
in 1955 in the electorate of Yarra (Victoria) and subsequently in the electorate of Lalor 
(Victoria). 
5 This relationship with the US was reirJorced on Whitlam's visit in 1967 where meetings 
included influential foreign policy figures and a favourable assessment from President Johnson. 
6 See McMullin, op. cit., pp. 315-37. 
7 E.G. Whitlam, Australia's Foreign Policy: New Directions, New Definitions, Twenty-fourth Roy 
Milne Memorial Lecture, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Brisbane, 30 November 
1973F p. 3 and Freudenburg, op. cit., p. 204. See also Coral Bell, Dependent Ally, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1988, pp. 115-16. 
8 See McMullin, op. cit., pp. 311-12, on Whitlam's criticism of tl1e ALP federal executive in 1966 
and the federal executive consideration of expulsion of Whitlam from the Labor Party, and pp. 
316-18 on reform of the ALP. 
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Ihe Platform of the Australian Labor Party, as reformed and agreed at the 1971 
federal conference, provided the base upon which Whitlam and the 
Parliamentary Labor Party designed policies for the 197~ federal election. The 
Platform included statements on international economic issues, the United 
Nations and the Commonwealth, a constructive plan for relations with Papua 
New Guinea, principles on anti-discrimination in immigration, proposed 
initiatives for Aboriginal peoples, resolutions condemning the governments of 
South Africa and Rhodesia, and several ideas for aid policy.9 
In detailing these elements, the Labor Party Platform recognised the links 
between international economic issues and the interests of developing 
countries: 
The Labor Party, as a democratic socialist and internatio.nalist Party, 
believes that every nation must share in the skills of mankind and 
the resources of the world according to its needs and must 
contribute to those skills and resources according to its capacity.1o 
This position on the production and distribution of resources was later 
translated into a working issue for the Labor Party in relation to proposals for 
restructuring the world economy and Whitlam's intention to align Australia 
wlth developing countries at the Uriited Nations. 
Several other elements of the Labor Party Platform demonstrated a clear 
contrast to the foreign policies of the Liberal and Country Parties, for example: 
• The Labor Party believes Australia cannot isolate herself from the 
struggles of the peoples of the world for economic development, 
security and self-government. 
• The Labor Party gives firm and unwavering support to the United 
Nations and its agencies and to the United Nations Charter and 
will make every effort to make the United Nations an effective 
instrument for justice and peace and political, social and economic 
advancement. 
• The Labor Party will foster t..'he Commonwealth of Nations as an 
instrum&""lt for peace and understanding and for political, social 
and economic advancement and will in particular seek close 
relations with the Commonwealth nations in South-East Asia and 
the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. 
9 See Australian Labor Party, Federal Platform and Policy, as approved by the 29th 
Commonwealth conference, Lau.Tlceston, 1971, N.S.W. edition, May 1973. 
10 ibid., Section XXI: Foreign Affairs, p. 15. 
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• The Labor Party will grant increasing financial assistance to 
Papua New Guinea. Labor will support an expanding social and 
economic development programme for Papua New Guinea to be 
administered by a joint Australia-New Guinea Commission. 
Labor will seek a defence treaty with Papua New Guinea.n 
These foreign policy principles linked with the sections of the Platform that 
were based on anti-discrimination and anti-racism. Specifically, the Platform 
stated that: 
Labor opposes any form of segregation or discrimination on the 
grounds o£ colour, race, sex, creed or politics and ·will insist on 
ending every form of suCJ.'l discrimination within Australia and in 
Australian administered territories. It supports action, including 
sanctions, through the United Nations to end suc.h segregation or 
discriminati011.12 
Also, on immigration, the Platform directed that a Labor government would 
avoid 'discrimination on any grounds of race or colour of skin or nationality'.13 
Significantly, it was reported that the personal commitment of Whitlam, as 
Leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party, led to an insistence at the 1971 federal 
conference that the narrow racist immigration stance must be opposed.14 
T11e Labor Party also demonstrated a commitment to the demands and interests 
of Aboriginal peoples. The Platforrr~ outlined a proactive position on land, 
housing, health, education, and administration, in the framework of equal 
rights. For example, the Platform stated that: 
Labor will evolve ways to regularly consult representatives of 
Aboriginal and Island people as to their wishes when policies are 
being developed and legislation prepared. 
That exclusive corporate land rights be granted to Aboriginal 
communities ... Aboriginal land rights shall carry with them full 
rights to minerals in those lands.15 
These elements of the ALP Platform demonstrated a strong commitment to the 
demands of Aboriginal peoples and to the notion of self-determination. This 
position was consistent with the statements on anti-discrimination and anti-
11 ibid. 
12 ibid., p. 16. 
13 ib"d -3 1 ., p.l . 
14 Vincent Matthews, Australia's emphasis on the Commonwealth's influence in the Third 
World, Commonwealth, April1973, pp. 27-8. 
15 ALP, Federal Platfonn and Policy, op. cit._, Section XIX, p. 14. 
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racism. This outline of principles was radically different to the established 
hostile position on Aboriginal peoples of the Liberal and Country Parties. 
The Platform did not include commitments in opposition to the regimes in 
South Africa and Rhodesia but the 1971 federal conference supported a 
resolution on southern Africa: 
a. Conference condemns the segregationist policies of South Africa 
and Rhodesia, because such policies are an affront to the dignit-y of 
man and a defiance of the Universal De1:laration of Human Rights. 
b. A Federal Labor government would support all U.N. measures to 
apply human rights throughout Africa and would seek more 
effective measures to enforce them.16 
This resolution at the federal conference provided a basis for the Labor Party 
membership to maintain pressure upon the Parliamentary leadership to 
actively oppose the minority regimes in southern Africa. 
Further, a new section of the Labor Party Platform was inserted at the 1971 
federal conference to outline principles on the quantity and quality of 
Australian aid, research, administration and trade: 
In accepting the United Nations programme to work towards a 
national contribution of one percent of gross national product, the 
Labor Party recognises that the quantity of aid is !IJ~ ~ae full 
measure of its effectiveness. In pursuit of a more mean.L.1.gf-d aid 
programme the Labor Party proposes-
( a) to establish an Institute of Development Studies for the 
overall examination of the problem of social and economic 
development; 
(b) to reorganise the administration of the various Aush·alian 
aid programmes and to establish a mutual co-operation agency; 
(c) to support an increase in the opportunities for less 
developed countries to sell their goods. 
A Labor government will be sensitive to the quality of aid and the 
impact of aid on social values.17 
Interestingly, the provision for an aid agency was instigated by Vvilliam 
Morrison, a. former senior officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs and then 
Member for St. George.18 Morrison had witnessed the implementation of aid 
l6 ib'd 25 1 ., P· . 17 ib'd 1-1 ., p. o. 
18 Morrison was elected in 1969 in the electorate of StGeorge (NSW). 
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programs and spent time in the aid branch of Foreign Affairs. This experience 
implied an awareness of the extent that developmental aspects of aid were 
ignored in the Department. Significantly, Whitlam offered support to the 
insertion of the aid section into the Platform, which suggested a commitment to 
the notion of a separate aid agency.19 
Thus, as stated in the Party Platform, the Labor Party embrau~~~ a .J.ear position 
on many important international issues. The Labor Party ~ected ths basis and-
-substance of the Liberal and Country Parties government's fereign polieies and 
explicitly advocated a new position on relations with developLllg countries, and 
Africa in particular. 
Whitlam and the Parliamentary Labor Party were obliged to base the 
construction of policy initiatives for the 1972 election campaign on the 
principles embodied in the Platform. The fact that the key players had been 
involved in each federal conference and thereby in the construction of the 
Platform minimised any potential conflict between the Party principles and the 
intentions of the Parliamentary leadership. 
On 13 November 1972, Whitlam launched the ALP campaign for the federal 
election: 
The decision we will make for our country on 2 December is a choice 
between the past and the future, between the habits and fears of the 
· past, and the demands and opportunities of the future. These are 
moments in history when the whole fate and future of nations can be 
decided by a single decision. For Australia, this is such a time. It's 
time for a new team, a new program, a new drive for equality of 
opportunities: it's time to create new opportunities for Australians, 
time for a new vision of what we can achieve in this generation for 
our nation and the region in which we live. It's time for a new 
government- a Labor government.2o 
Whitlam clearly delineated the need for policy reform and the opportunity for 
change under a Labor government. Whitlam differentiated the Labor Party 
policy agenda from the Liberal and Country Parties government through a 
creative projection of Labor's energy and commitment. The policy speech 
outlined many commitments which were drawn from the ALP Platform and 
which addressed key foreign policy topics. Specifically, the policy speech 
19 See Nancy Viviani and Peter Wilenski, The Australian Development Assistance Agency: A Post 
lvfortem Reportr Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration, mtmograph no. 3, 1977. 
20 Australian Labor Party, Policy speech, delivered by E.G. Whitlam on 13- November 1972 at 
Blacktown Civic Centre, N.S.W., p. 1. 
page45 
referred to relations with Papua New Guinea., China and the South Pacific, 
cooperation with the United States and New Zealand and the end of 
conscription. 
However, despite this range of important topics, Whitlam claimed that the 
central test of the Labor Party foreign policy agenda was the relationship with 
the Aboriginal peoples. Whitlam explained that: 
Australia's real test as far as the rest of the world, and particularly 
our region, is concerned is the role we create for our own 
Aborigines. In this sense, and it is a very real sense, the Aborigines 
are our true link with our region. More than any foreign aid 
program, n1ore than any international obligation which we meet or 
forfeit, more than any part we may play in any treaty or agreement 
or alliance, Australia's treatment of her Aboriginal people will be the 
thing upon which the rest of the world will judge Australia and 
Australians - not just now, but in the greater perspective of history.2I 
Whitlam promised to legislate to provide land rights for Aboriginal peoples, 
'not just because their case is beyond argument, but because all of us as 
Australians are diminished' while Aboriginal peoples are denied 'their rightful 
place in this nation'.22 More than other political statements, this exposition by 
W"'hitlam explained the links between the Labor Party's position in the United 
Nations, relations with developing countries, and approach on African issues. 
In offering an element of self-determination for the Aboriginal peoples, it 
followed that Whitlam committed the Labor Party to supporting the 
independence of Papua New Guinea. Whitlam promised to 'co-operate whole-
heartedly with the New Guinea House of Assembly in reaching successfully its 
time table for self-government and independence'.23 
In addition, the policy speech included support for the idea of military 
neutralisation in South East Asia and commitment to a leadership role in the 
South Pacific. This regional position involved taking the question of French 
nuclear tests to the International Court of Justice. Also, in terms of the region, 
21 ibid., futernational Affairs and Defence, p. 31. The policy speech, pp. 30-1, also committed 
the Labor Party to abolish discriminatory legislation against Aboriginal peoples, override 
Queensland's discriminatory laws, pay all legal costs for Aboriginal peoples in all courts, and 
establish a separate Ministry for Aboriginal Affairs, a Central Australian Aboriginal Reserve, 
and an Aboriginal Land Fund. 
22 ibid., p. 4. . 
23 ibid. See also Gough Whitlam, Australia and her region, in John McLaren, ed., Towards a 
New Australia, Oteshire, Melbourne, 1972, pp. 15-18. 
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Whitlam explained. that: 
The Australian Labor Party will foster close and continuing 
cooperation with the people of the United States and New Zealand 
~nd our other Commonwealth partners to make these associations 
instruments for justice and peace and for political, social and 
economic advancement throughout our region.24 
Significantly, this commitm.ent to ANZUS and the Commonwealh'l. highlighted 
notions of justice and develop.ment. rather than the priorities of security, 
defence and anti-communism. Related to this approach was Whitlam's 
promise to abolish conscription and to recognise the People's Republic of 
China.25 
Further, in a brief statement, the policy speech included a commitment that a 
Labor government would 'gi.ve no visas to or through Australia to racially 
sele:cted sporting teams'.26 This element of the critique of South Africa was an 
immediate concern for the electorate given the protests during the 1971 rugby 
tour. 
It was clear that the Labor Party Platform provided the basis for the policy 
speech, which established a set of foreign policy prjnciples prior to the 1972 
federal election. Wrutlam offered a vision for the Australian electorate which 
involved an energy and commitment to reform, including changes to foreign 
policy. In the Labor Party policy speech, Whitlam clearly rejected the foreign 
policies of the Liberal and Country Parties government and provided a new 
direction for the electorate. Significantly, Whitlam outlined an agenda for an 
anti-racist foreign polic.r. 
The nature of the Whitlam Labor government 
The Whitlam government had an immediate impact on policy in Australia. The 
Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister constituted an interim cabinet 
until the entire Ministry could be formed two weeks after the election. 
Whitlam was an active Foreign Minister, as well as Prime Minister, until 
November 1973 when Senator \-Villesee assumed the position of Minister for 
Foreign _.t\ffairs. Also, the implementation of foreign policy was relatively 
24 Policy speech, op. cit., p. 33. 
25 ibid., pp. 31 & 33. See also Whitlam; Australia and her region.~ op. cit . .~ pp. 12-14. 
26 Policy speech, op. cit., p. 33. 
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unobstructed by the Senate, the Labor Party caucus, the bureaucracy, or 
elements of the electorate. 
The federal election held on 2 December 1972 resulted in a majority of seats for 
the Australian Labor Party in the House of Representatives.27 The Senate was 
not due for election at the same time and therefore the Liberal and Country 
Parties, in conjunction with the Democratic Labor Party, maintained control of 
this chamber.28 This situation was to cause considerable difficulties for the 
domestic agenda, rather than the foreign policy direction, of the Whitlam Labor 
government. 
Following the election, Whitlan1 and Lance Barnard formed a cabinet of two. 
This interim arrangement was necessary because the new Labor Party caucus 
could not meet to choose Ministers until the results in marginal seats became 
known.29 Also, Whitlam and Barnard were immediately able to institute 
changes to policies which clearly signalled the election of the Labor Party 
government 
The 'duumvirate' was sworn in by the Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck, on 
Tuesday 5 December 1972.30 Whitlam provided a list of reasons to the 
Governor-General on why the two-Minister cabinet was required. The 
practical circumst_ances of the approaching holidays and administrative inertia 
was explained but, primarily, Whitlam argued that several policy matters 
needed urgent attention. Tnis included the abolition of conscription and 
changes to the voting pattern of Australia in the United Nations. In 
anticipation of criticism of the duumvirate arrangements, Whitlam stressed that 
the interim Cabinet would conduct the business of government under the 
impartial scrutiny of the Governor-General as part of the Executive Council: 
Although the description has passed into history, the duumvirate 
was in fact a triumvirate, with the Governor-General the third or, 
27 See Colin A. Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government Politics, 1965-1974, MTU Press, 
Canberra, 1977, pp. 87, 94 & 98. See also Colin A. Hughes, The 1972 Australian federal election, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol.19, 1, April1973. 
28 For the details of the number of seats held by each party in the Senate, see Parliamentary 
Handbook, Commonwealth of Australia, 18th edition, AGPS, Canberra, 1973. 
29 This was predicted to take at least two weeks. On the Labor Party process of selecting 
Ministers from the caucus, see C.J. lloyd and G.S. Reid, Out of the Wilderness, Cassell, North 
Melbourne, 1974, pp. 34-55. 
30 Whitlam recalled that arrangements were organised with the Governor-General for two 
Ministers, or three, to be sworn to the full range of portfolios until such time as a full Ministry 
could be presented. The alternative to the duumvirate was an interim or continuing Liberal 
and Country Parti(;;s government until the Labor cabinet could be formed. See Gough Whitlam, 
The TJolhitlam Government 1972-1975, Viking, Ringwood, 1985, p. 17. See also lloyd and Reid, op. 
cit., p.14. 
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rather, the first member. The administration thus formed was in fact 
the Executive Council. 31 
In the allocation of responsibilities, Prime Minister Whitlam held thirteen 
portfolios and Deputy Prime Minister held fourteen portfolios.32 It seems that 
Whitlam had intended to create a ministry of three with the Senate deputy 
leader Don Willesee who was to be appointed as Vice-President of the 
Executive Council. However, this would have bypassed the Labor Party Senate 
Leader Lionel Murphy and thus would have created friction among groups 
within the Labor caucus. When questioned about the two-Minister cabinet 
rather than a three or four member cabinet, Whitlam explained that others in 
the Labor Party were more senior than the Parliamentary leadership, notably 
Frank Crean and Clyde Cameron, and therefore many members of the 
Parliamentary Party could have been involved in an interim cabinet.33 
The two-Minister arrangement appeared to downgrade the roles of the Senate 
Leader and Deputy Leader within the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. The 
logical choice to form an interim cabinet appeared to be Whitlam, Barnard, 
Murphy and Willesee. Indeed, the four leaders worked together as a 
committee through the two weeks of the first Whitlam 1.1inistry. Nevertheless, 
personal considerations, that is, the history of conflict between Whitlam and 
Murphy, determined the exclusion of Senator Murphy.34 
In this context, it was significant that Murphy, as the designated Attorney-
General, made the first statement, apart from Whitlam, on Sunday 3 December 
1972 to announce that the new Labor government would free imprisoned draft 
resisters. Other Ministers-elect were involved with their prospective 
departments immediately following the election. Most senior Ministers had 
31 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 18. See also Lloyd and Reid, op. cit., pp. 15 & 
18. 
32 Whitlam accepted the portfolios of Prime Minister; Foreign Affairs; External Territories; 
Treao:;urer; Attorney-General; Customs and Excise; Trade and Industry; Education and Science; 
Shipping and Transport; Civil Aviation; Housing; Works; Environment; Aborigines and the 
Arts. Barnard was allocated Defence; Navy; Army; Air; Supply; Postmaster-General; Labour 
and National Service; Immigration; Social Services; Repatriation; Health; Primary Industry; 
National Development; and Interior. See Lloyd and Reid, ibid., p. 22. See also McMullin, op. 
cit., p. 338 and Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 750. Further, vVhitlam, ibid., p. 
18 explained that: 
The 'duumvirate' thus established was not only the smallest Government with 
authority over Australia since the brief Wellington Administration of 1834; it was 
undoubtedly the least expensive. Barnard and I were legally entitled to the 
salaries attached to each of the Ministries we held. We accepted only our existing 
salaries as Leader and Deputy Leader of the Opposition until the full Ministry was 
sworn. 
33 lloyd and Reid, op. cit., p. 16. See also Age, 5 December 1972. 
34 Lloyd and Reid, op. cit., p. 17. See also McMullin, O!J. cit, pp. 320-1, 342. 
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consulted with their departmental officers and had taken administrative 
decisions by the end of the first week of government. The duumvirate 
appeared to prioritise the roles of Whitlam and Barnard but it was a Ministry 
assisted by many Ministers without portfolio.ss 
Subsequently, on 18 December 1972, the Labor Party Parliamentary caucus 
elected 27 Ministers for the Labor cabinet.36 With regard to foreign affairs 
issues, the central characters were Whitlam as Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Barnard as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, 
Senator Willesee as Special Minister for State and Minister assisting the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Bill Morrison as Minister for External 
Territories. 
The size of the cabinet with 27 Ministers suggested an unwieldy decision-
making body. The Liberal and Country Parties governments had separated the 
Ministers into senior members of cabinet and junior members without cabinet 
rank. The Labor Party tradition was that all Ministers would participate in the 
cabinet and the caucus decided to maintain this tradition. 37 
It is clear that, as Prime Minister ru , Foreign Minister, Whitlam was central to 
the construction and implementation of Australian foreign policy. Wnitlam 
claimed that the superficiality of foreign policy decisions under the Liberal and 
Country Parties governments had arisen in part from the separation of the 
Prime Minister from foreign policy advice, primarily the External Affairs 
J?epartment. Whitlam's view that the Prime Minister should wield a 
commanding role over the details of foreign policy necessarily shifted greater 
power and responsibility to the position of Prime Minister. This led to 
Whitlam's merging of the two functions and thereby increased the Prime 
Minister's control over both domestic and foreign affairs. 
An additional factor in this auangement was the various positions within the 
Parliamentary Labor Paw; on key international issues. .PJbinski explained that 
To foreclose the possibility of conflict between himself as Prime 
Minister and a separate Foreign Minister, to keep control over a 
35 Lloyd and Reid, op. cit., pp. 19-21. 
36 This was the first Labor cabinet in 23 years. Not since October 1929 had a Labor government 
formed a new government as a result of an election. None of the Parliamtmtary Labor members 
had been ministers and only Kim Beazley Snr., Oyd~ Cameron and Fred Daly had been 
members of Parliament in the Curtin-Ch.ifley govem:ment of 1941-49. Whitlam, Trte Whitlam 
Government ... , op. cit., pp. 24, 750-4. However, most cabinet Ministers had experience in the 
relevant portfolios in opposition. McMullin, op. cit./ p. 339. 
37 See McMullin, ibid., p. 341. 
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fractious pa~ty, to insure that his conceptions of foreign policy 
would prevail, he found merit in assuming the portfolio him.sel£.38 
Direct control over foreign policy was seen to be vital in charting a new and 
important course after ; · :ars in opposition. 
Whitlam identified two other reasons for the efficient management of 
international affairs: first, the judgement that the essence of a sound foreign 
policy rested with the intelligent anticipation of change, and second, in foreign 
as in domestic matters, the programs had been thoroughly analysed and 
established in public acceptance.39 This reflection by Whitlam acknowledged 
the need to accept change as a part of international affairs and pointed to the 
lack of understanding about change that characterised the previous Liberal and 
Country Parties governments. 
One of the problems for Whitlam was the difficulty of performing as both 
P:ime Minister and Foreign Minister and the question was raised as to how 
long vVhitlam could combine the two jobs. As Altman commented in July =1:972-, \Cj13 
'even a man of his undoubted talents will find it hard to be another Chifley and 
Evatt at the same time' .40 Thus, Whitlam handed the Foreign Affairs portfolio 
to Senator Willesee on 6 November 1973. This seemed to be at a convenient 
time for Whitlam as the important foreign policy changes had been instituted 
and Willesee had gained sufficient standing within the Parliamentary Labor 
Party to assume a senior Ministerial role. The new Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had been the government foreign affairs spokesperson in the Senate and had 
assisted with the administrative elements of the portfolio as the Minister 
assisting the Foreign Minister and as Special Minister for State.41 It was clear 
that Whitlam would continue to exercise prominence over foreign policy as 
Willesee's predecessor and as Prime Minister. Whitlam's power on 
international affairs was also illustrated when acfmg as Foreign Minister, 
without great reluctance, whenever Willesee was overseas.42 
However, some unresolved questions remained about the transfer of the 
Foreign Mfairs portfolio to Senator Willesee. It seemed that Deputy Prime 
38 Albinski, op. cit., pp. 282-3. See also Owen Harries, Mr. Whitlam and Australian foreign 
policy, Quadrant, vol. 17, 4, July-August 1973. 
39 Whitl._ _, '. 'i.lze Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 25. 
40 D. Altman, The First Six Months, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 50, 2, July 1973, p. 7. 
41 Albinski, op. cit., p. 61. See also Patrick Weller, First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in 
Westminster Systems, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985, p. 182, on the employment of trusted 
colleagu.;s as Foreign Minister. 
42 See Gor.aon Bilitey, The Whitlam Goverlll!!ent Some personal reflections, in Fabian Society, 
The Whitl>tm Phenomenon: Fabian papers, McPhee Gribble with Penguin, Fitzroy, 1986, p. 18. 
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Minister Lance Barnard, the Minister for Defence, was expected to obtain the 
job, 'to whom it had been previously promised and who wished to undertake 
it. '
43 
The reason provided for overlooking Barnard was that the important 
government initiative of reorganising the Department of Defence was not yet 
completed. Further, Whitlam may have reassessed the options for the Foreign 
Affairs portfolio and preferred Willesee, but more importantly, Whitlam's 
failure to honour a pledge to a political ally and long-standing friend 
den1onstrated the importance the Prime Minister attached to foreign policy. 
Senator Willesee was seen as an even more trusted and dependable colleague 
able to work with Whitlam as a continuing decision-maker on foreign policy. 
In a key statement on foreign policy, Senator Willesee extended elements of the 
Labor Party policy speech with regard to foreign relations and Labor principles. 
The Foreign Minister deliberately set the Labor agenda against the 'selfish 
realism' of the previous ~overnment.44 It was made clear that the Whitlam 
government's opposition to underdevelopment, colonialism and racism could 
be understood with reference to the Labor Party principles of justice, peace and 
the promotion of political, social, and economic progress. The Labor Platform 
was explicitly linked with the Whitlam government's opposition to segregation 
and discrimination on the grounds of race, gender or ethnicity. 
Further, the Foreign Minister argued that Australia should reappraise the 
understandings of ai.d and trade with developing countries. Indeed, Senator 
Willesee offered the idea of marrying development aid with trade and financial 
reforms. It was acknowledged that the government's support for these 
arguments could lead to benefits for Australia in the world economy. Senator 
Willesee also linked this issue to A_ustralia's support for the United Nations as 
the appropriate forum for this type of debate and advocated the UN's role in 
facilitating these changes.45 
In sum, Whitlam conducted the work of the Prime Mi.rllliter and the Foreign 
Minister for the first eleven months of the Labor government. In effect, 
Whitlam was ensuring that the initiatives of foreign affairs, which were 
outlined in the Labor Party Platform and the policy speech, were implemented 
with minimal interference. Whitlam also determined that Senator Willesee 
would continue to implement the program on foreign affairs with a continuing 
influence for the Prime Minister. The personal authority of Whitlam on foreign 
43 Albinski, op. cit., p. 61. 
44 Willesee, op. cit., p. 7. 
45 ibid., p. 8. 
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affairs also implied that the Prime Minister was responsible for the coherence 
and direction of the Labor government's initiatives on international relations. 
While Whitlam was able to dominate foreign affairs issues, there were several 
forums where the Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, could have been 
challenged on, or might have faced opposition to, par'ticular international 
initiatives. These included the Parliament, cabinet, Labor Party caucus, 
Parliamentary committees, bureaucracy and the electorate. 
The Labor Party principles were able to be translated into policy initiatives 
because the Whitlam government was able to avoid the Parliament, particularly 
the hostile Senate, on questions of foreign policy. This was not possible on 
many domestic issues which required amendments to legislation or indeed 
new legislation. Nevertheless, as Collins explained, the Parliament at the time 
of the Whitlam Labor government was an important forum for debate c 
foreign policy if not for decisions.46 Moreover, Whitlam confirmed that the 
consideration and implementation of foreign policy was the area most free 
from obstruction by the Senate and as a result, was seen as the field in which 
the Labor government was most able to implement change.47 
As foreign policy was understood to be within the powers of the Prime 
Minister and the Fore~gn Minister, the Labor cabinet tended not to be closely 
involved in decisions on international issues.4B Whitlam, in consultation with 
Willesee, decided upon aspects of foreign policy, with due reference to the 
Labor Party Platform and policy speech, and subsequently Whitlam would 
inform the cabinet. Moreover, Albinski showed that the Prime Minister was 
driving the changes in foreign policy.49 For example, decisions regarding the 
Baltic states and South Africa's membership of the United Nations were taken 
independent of cabinet and in the face of misgivings on the part of senior Labor 
colleagues. However, Albinski also pointed to instances of cabinet intervention 
on key issues, for example in 1975, to approve stronger trade-related measures 
against South Africa. Whitlam was keen to avoid potentially heated debates 
within the cabinet on foreign policy issues. Thus, cabinet was relegated to 1le 
46 Hugh Collins, Australian Foreign Policy in the Era of Detente, Australian Outlook, vol. 29, 2, 
August 1975, p. 144. On the performance of the Parliament on foreign policy, see also B.L. 
Hocking, Parliament, parliamentarians and foreign affairs, Australian Outlook, vol. 30, 2, August 
1976. 
47 Whitlam, The vVhitlam Government ... ,. op. cit., pp. 25 & 738. 
48 See lloyd and Reid, op. cit., pp.l33-4; T.B. Mill;u-, The Making of Australian Foreign Policy, 
chapter 8 in Beddie, op. cit., p. 158;Albinski, op. cit., p. 283; and Weller, op. cit., pp.lll & 183. 
49 Albinski, op. cit., p. 68. 
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role of ratifying foreign policy initiatives rather than examining and deciding 
on proposals. so 
Within the Labor Party, the Parliamentary caucus traditionally held an 
important place in the process of debate and decision-makmg. The collective 
principles of the Labor Party determined that the caucus expected to be 
involved in decisions on both domestic and foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, 
the Labor caucus understood the tradition that foreign affairs remained within 
the power of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. This position was 
accepted to a point because the caucus also understood its role in needing to 
restrain the leadership of the Labor Party, especially Whitlam. 
In this context, two incidents are illustrative. First, caucus members presented 
a petition to withhold recognition of the new Chilean military regime which 
had overthrown the- elected government led by Salvador Allende. 
Unfortunately for the signatories, Australian recognition had been announced 
earlier and the caucus reluctantly supported this position in retrospect in order 
to maintain the impression of government unity.s1 Second, the caucus 
appealed to the cabinet to examine more closely the measures against the 
minority regime in South Africa. The resultant decision to close one consulate 
may have occurred without the pressure from caucus because senior ministers 
had been moving toward a more rigorous position.s2 In effect, the caucus 
needed to rely on the authority of the Labor Party Platform and the policy 
speech as the foundations of foreign policy because the Parliamentary Labor 
Party was not able to debate international topics nor contain the decisions of 
the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on particular foreign affairs issues. 
The Parliamentary committees related to foreign affairs completed some useful 
but ineffectual work as the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister decided not to 
employ the recommendations of various reports. :tvlillar noted that Whitlam 
50 ibid., pp. 286-7. Further, Whitlam established a cabinet committee on foreign affairs and 
defence, with Whitlam as chair, but this committee did not meet often and was not a factor in 
the construction of foreign policy. Indeed, at a meeting of this committee, Barnard presented a 
draft statement on the US military facilities in Australia, with the support of Whitlam. There 
was concern within the ALP about the US bases and the draft statement was moved through 
the cabinet committee to the caucus which referred it to cabinet. In the end, Whitlam ensured 
that the statement was not discussed within cabinet. See Lloyd and Reid, op. cit., p. 142. 
51 Albinski, op. cit., p. 314. 
52 ibid. Also, caucus power was severely restricted by standing party rules which stated that 
ministers would bring to the agenda items for discussion, thereby limiting debates to legislative 
matters and excluding the executive actions sw:::h. as foreign policy decisions. See also Weller, 
op. cit., p. 43 on the ALP caucus and Whitlam, and see generally D.J. Ball, Political constraints 
on defence and foreign policy making, paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies 
Association conference, Canberra, July 1975. 
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saw 'no mileage in increasing fr. ~2apacity of the Labor backbenchers or the 
Opposition to prop?se initiat1.Vt'.S or ask embarrassing questions'.S3 This 
account implied that Whitla1n discouraged the work of the Parliamentary 
committees in order to retain control over foreign policy. However, vVhitlam 
gave the impression of taking seriously the Parliamentary committees when 
outlln.ing the decision to broaden the terms of reference of the Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in March 1973.54 Nevertheless, 
similar to other Parliamentary structures, the committees had a negligible 
influence on foreign policy. 
The bureaucracy, in particular the Department nf Foreign Affairs, appeared to 
play a secondary role in policy development as vVhitlam direc'i:ed the 
implementahon of the Labor Party agenda. Further, there was little obstruction 
from the Department ~f Foreign Affairs, indeed Bilney claimed that the 
Department was keep. to change 'some of the nonsenses in Australian foreign 
policy'.55 As Foreign Minister, Wrutlam demonstrated a faith in the public 
service to provide impartial advice and built a personal rapport with the 
Foreign Affairs officers. Whitlam remained dose to the Department a · · .. ,,. 
relinquishing the Foreign Affairs portfolio which Freudenburg claimed r1ffected 
Willesee's relations with both Whitlam and the Department of Foreign Affairs. 56 
Also, the Whitlam government added a new element to the policy process by 
appointing personal staff to each Minister. The introduction of MinistQ;j;;.l ~~.caff 
suggested greater control of policy implementation by the Labor gove:tnment 
and less influence over policy decisions by the bur~c.tucracy.57 
On a wider scale, the electorate played an indirect role in supporting specific 
foreign policy objectives and deciding priorities through popular pressure and 
publicised expectations.ss Specifically, church-based groups campaigned at 
53 Millar, op. cit, p. 159. 
54 See Whitlam, The Whif.lam Government ... , op. cit., p. 45. 
55 Bilney, op. cit., p. 35. 
56 Freudenburg, op. cit., p. 201. See also Alan Renouf, New challenges in foreign policy 
administration, Austra1ian Outlook, vol. 28, 2, August 1974; F.A. Mediansky, New challenges in 
fcreign policy administration: a comment, Australian Outlook, vol. 28, 3, December 1974; 
Geoffrey Hawker, The bureaucracy under the Whitlam government- and vice versa, Politics, 
.. ~ol. 10, 1, May 1975; and R.F.I. Smith and Patrick \-veller, Learning to govern: the Australian 
Labor Party and the institutions of gcvemment, 1972-1975, Journal of Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, vol. 15, 1, March 1977. 
57 Millar, op. cit., pp. 154-5. See also Bilney, op. cit., pp.17-18 and 32-3, Weller, op. cit., pp. ~40-
1, and R.FJ. Smith, Ministerial advisers: the experience of the Whitlam Govc.rnrn.ent, Australzan 
Journal of Public Administration, vol. 36, 2, June 1977. 
58 See Albinski, chapter nine, Electoral Politics and External Policy, op. cit., pp. 321-54. See also 
Nigel S. Roberts, Foreign policy and Australian general elections, World Review, vol. 12, 2, July 
1973, Henry S. Albinski, The role of foreign policy in Australian electoral politics: Some 
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particular times to readjust policies regarded as morally untenable. Primarily, 
these related to denouncing racism in southern Africa and fitted with the 
causes of other political groups that argued for more vigorous Australian action 
against apartheid, such as halting air services with South Africa, discontinuing 
the activities of the trade commission and severing trade· with the apartheid 
economy. Moreover, the opposition to Australia's continuing relations with 
South Africa fitted with elements of the Labor Party at the branch level. This 
type of pressure may have moved the WPitlam government toward tightening 
its position on trade a."ld flights from Rhodesia and South Africa. 59 
It seemp that, on foreign affairs issues, the forums which may have placed 
limitations upon Wllitlam's policy agenda did not emerge as obstructions. Due 
to the influence of f ..... ~ Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the Parliament, 
cabinet, Labor Party caucus, Parliamentary committees and Department of 
Foreign Affairs did not ~ppear to restrict the foreign policy agenda. In part, the 
electorate, specifically sonte cornmunity and action groups, provided an 
element of influence on foreign affairs issues but this pressure seemed to 
support the Labor direction rather than challenge the policies. Again, this 
examination reinforces the position that the Prime MLn.ister, with the Foreign 
Minister, was an important factor in the construction of foreign policy 
initiatives, with little hindrance from the Parliament or the Labor Party. This 
\.~onclusion is predicated on the bi:se influence of the Labor Party Platform and 
the policy speech which provided a clear vision and some details on foreign 
policy. Thus, while Whitlam conformed to the Platform and policy speech, 
there were few reasons for the Labor Party caucus or cabinet to challenge the 
Prime Minister on foreign affairs. 
Conclusion 
The Labor Party was well-prepared for govermnent by 1972. Whitlam ar.d the 
Labor Party had analysed the domestic and international environments and 
had constructed a comprehensive set of policies. In particular, Whitlam had 
developed a critical understanding of many foreign policy issues. in contrast to 
the static policies of the Liberal and Country Parties, the Labor Party was able 
to demonstrate through the 1972 election campaign that it was time for change. 
explanations and speculations, Australian Outlook, vol. 28, 2, August 1974, and Jolm Dalton, 
Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics in Australia, Dyason House Papers, vol. 2, 2, October 1975. 
59 See Albinski, op. cit., pp. 110-11 & 304-5. 
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Following the election, the Whitlam Labor government immediately 
implemented many policy decisions which had been promised to the electorate. 
The image of change was facilitated by the duumvirate, the new cabinet ;md by 
Wlutlant as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. 1his analysis outlines the 
domestic context of Whitlam's agenda to change Australia's image in the region 
and in international forums. 
chapter 3 
Whitlam foreign policy and inte1-national relations 
In the initial days and weeks of government, Whitlam, as both Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister, initiated many changes to Australian foreign policy. 
Some of the changes were substantial, such as realigning Australia at the 
United Nations and starting discussions to recognise China, while others "\Vere 
more symbolic. Whitlam also ensured that Australia was seen by the 
internat'ional commlJ..rUty to oppose racial discrimination and colonialism. In 
this cheipter, I show that Whitlam made many changes to foreign policy but 
maintained the central assumptions of Australia's international relationships. 
In terms of relations with the United States, the Whitlam government was 
critical of US actions in Vietnam while simultaneously attempting to maintain 
the basis of Australia's alliance with the US. This alliance involved tht: US 
military facilities in Australia which seemed to shape Australia's ability to 
respond to issues in the Indian Ocean. The Whitlam government's position in 
the United !.Jations on the idea of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region 
and the development of the island of Diego Garcia was somewhat tainted by 
Australia's continuing support for the US bases, particularly the facilities at 
North West Cape. Nevertheless, Whitlam constructed a new position for 
Australia in the United Nations by aligning with the developing countries on 
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many issues. Similarly, the Commonwealth provided a forum for Whitlam to 
reinforce Australia's links with the developing countries, especially in relation 
to international economic reform and in opposition to the minority 
governments in southern Africa. In both places, Whitlam established an anti-
racist and anti-colonial foreign policy for Australia. 
From these gen~ral issues of Australian foreign policy, debates arose on the 
extent of change instituted by Whitlam. Various commentators raised 
questions on whether the Whitlam government changed the basis of Australian 
foreign policy, or whether Whitlam merely altered the perception of Australia 
through adjustments in style. Within this discussion, I argue that Prime 
!vlinister Whitlam initiated significant changes to Australian foreign policy that 
were more than alterations in style. These debates, and the content of 
Whitlam's foreign policy on the general international issues, remain important 
for the examination of the Whitlam government's relations with developing 
countries, in particular, relations with the Asia Pacific region and with Afri~a. 
Initial changes to foreign policy 
The immediate changes to Australian foreign policy instituted by Whitlam as 
both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister set the tone and approach of the 
Labor government's foreign policy. Following the 1972 federal election, 
Whitlam and the deputy leader of the Labor Party, Lance Barnard made many 
changes to foreign policy based on the Platform and policy speech. In 
summary, the decisions relating to foreign policy included: 
o reaffirmation of the intention to establish a more independent foreign policy 
for Australia; 
• reconfirmation of the promise to support the move toward independence 
for Papua New Guinea; 
• withdrawal of remaining Australian troops in Vietnam and the release of all 
draft resisters in Australia; 
• direction to the Australian Ambassador in Paris to open talks regarding 
Australia's recognition of China and the recall of the Australian 
Ambassador to Taiwan; 
• instruction to vote in favour of two resolutions at the United Nations on 
sanctioru:; against Rhodesia, direction to the New South Wales government 
to close the Rhodesian Information Centre.~ cancellation of the Australian 
page 59 
passport of the d.iploma~.tic representative of Rhodesia in South Africa, and 
halt to wheat exports to Jij,odesia; 
o exclusion of racially selected sporth1g teams fron1 Australia and prevention 
of these teams from travelling t."lrough Australia; 
• contribution to international birth control programs, grant of rice aid to 
Indonesia, and announcement of new contributions to the United Nations 
funds for Southen1 Africa; and 
o decision to ratify the international conventions on racial discrimination and 
nuclear arms. I 
Significantly, the change of voting pattern at the United Nations was the first 
nction taken at a meeting in the aftetnoon of Sunday 3 December 1972. This 
imperative emerged from the impending debate and vote on resolutions 
centred on sanctions against Rhodesia in the General Assembly, on which 
Australia's representatives had previously cast an unacceptable vote, that is, 
unacceptable in Whitlam's terms. Whitlam was determined that, on 7 
December, Australia would be among the supporters of the resolutions 
concerning Rhodesia.2 The decision to alter Australia's vote was a deliberate 
demonstration at the highest level of the change the position of Australia at the 
United Nations. 
These actions emphasised the Labor government's priority in opposing 
discrimination and started the broader policy approach of attempting to rid 
Australia of a racist hnage and establishing a new respectability for Australia in 
international forums.3 From this, Whitlam was seen to profes::; an ideology of 
internationalisin and anti-racism, not merely non-racist. 
1 See Australian,4-9 & 11-16 December 1972; Sydney Morning Herald, 4, 6-9 & 11-16 December 
1972; Age, 6-9, 11-12 & 14-16 December 1972; Financial Review, 6-8 & 13-14 December 1972; and 
Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975, Vil.dng, Ringwood, 1985, pp. 14-16 & 19-
22. On Whitlam's changes to Australian foreign policy, see generally, Philip Darby, Australia's 
changing perspectives of the world, World Today, vol. 29, 3, ~v1arch 1973; Ala.Tl Fitzgerald, 
Labor's Whitlam fashioning a new posture for Australia, International Perspectives, May-June 
1973; Gregory Clark, A new foreign policy for Australia?, Meanjin Quarterly, vol. 32, 2, June 
1973; W. MacMahon Ball, The foreign policy of the Whitlam government, Australia's Neighbours, 
4th series, no. 90, April-June 1974; and James L. Richardson, Australian Foreign Policy under 
the Labor Government, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 9, 1974. 
2 fu the Assembly in 1971, Portugal, South Africa and Britain had been the only nations to 
oppose the resolution, Australia. France, New Zealartd and the United States had been among 
the nine abstaining and 102 others had supported them. Whitlam, op. cit., pp. 15-16. See also J. 
Camilleri, fu Search of a Foreign Policy, Arena, nos 32-33, 1973, p. 67 and, for a personal 
interpretation from the liN in December 1972, see Gordon Bilney, The Whitlam Government 
Some personal reflections, in Fabian Society, The Whitlam Phenomenon: Fabian pape'?S, McPhee 
Gribble with Penguin, Fitzroy, 1986, pp. 27-8. See generaJl:', Claire Clark, Labor's p.licy at the 
United Nations, Australia's Neighbour£, no. 89, Februa1, -March 1974. 
3 E.G. Whitlam, Australia's Foreign Policy: New Directions, New Definitions, Twenty-fou,·th Roy 
Milne Memorial Lecture, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Brisbane, 30 N.Jvember 
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In addition, and more for domestic consumption, the Whitlam government 
announced the withdrawal of all Australia.."'l involvement in Vietnam. This 
entailed the immediate return of the remaining Australian Army Assistance 
group, the release of all draft resisters from jail, termination of selective 
national senrice and an end to all military aid to South Vietnam.4 These 
decisions had some basis in public expectations created by the Labor Party in 
opposition and during the election campaign. 
The immediate changes reflected an understanding that particular policy 
positions needed alteration without delay. Neverthekss, considering the 
powers available to Whitlam and Barnard, the record of initial change was 
modest. As Lloyd and Reid commented, 'nothing was done that was down-
right eccentric or excessively self-indulgent.'S 
The energetic new Labor cabinet elected by caucus on 18 December 1972 
initiated many reforms in the first months of govetmnent. The further changes 
to foreign policy included several significant reforms relating to Australia's 
relationship with the Asia Pacific region, developing countries, and Africa. 
These changes included: 
• recognition of, and establishment of diplomatic relations with, nations with 
communist governments, embracing North Korea, North VietrLam, East 
Germany and Poland; 
• at the same time, emphasising tb_e value of ANZUS and the importance of 
the alliance and close partnership with the United States; 
• regional focus in support of the ASEAN plan for a zone of peace in South 
East Asia, condemnation of French nuclear tests in the Pacific, an acceptance 
of financial responsibility for assisting the island states of Lhe South Pacific, 
and announcing a substantial contribution to the Asian Development Bank; 
• emphasis on the redirection of Australian foreign policy with the proposal 
of a new non-ideological and non-military regional association 
encompassing the nations of East and South East Asia, the South Pacific, 
ASEAN, China and Japan, but not the Soviet Union, or the United States; 
• relocation of Australia among the nations committed to ending colonialism 
and racial discrimination, especially L'>l southern .. Africa, and redirection of 
voting in the United Nations with indications of Australia not simply 
considering the opinions of the US and Britain, but seeking the views of 
1973, pp. 12-13. See D. Altman, The First Six Months, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 50, 2, July 
1973,p. 4. 
4 Camilleri, op. cit., p. 67. 
5 C.J. lloyd and G.S. Reid, Out of the Wilderness, Cassell, Nort..>-t Melbourne, 1974, p. 24. 
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nations such as Canada, India, Japan, Indonesia, and particular African 
states; 
• commitment to developing nations in concluding Australia's colonial role in 
Papua New Guinea and guaranteeing additional economic assistance, 
reassessing and increasing the aid program to ensure benefits to the 
intended recipients, and instituting preferential tariffs f!Jr exports from 
developing countries; and 
• promotion of the treatment of Aboriginal peoples in an attempt to abandon 
racist attitudes which could be judged internationally.6 
These early foreign policy changes were initiated in a short period of time and 
some were radically different from the previous Australian policy positions. 
These alterations were directly informed by the Labor Party Platform and 
policy speech, and set the tone for the Whitla1n foreign policy. With the 
immediate and necessary reforms of foreign policy completed or underway, the 
Whitlam Labor government was able to enter the Parliament in early 1973 with 
a new international image for Australia. 
the United States 
A significant achievement for the Whitlam government was to reject the 
rhetoric of the previous Liberal and Country Parties governments and to 
expand Australia's view of the world. One important question was whether 
Australia's new foreign policy was merely an adjustment within existing 
constraints or a reformulation which operated outside established 
relationships. The relationship with the United States was the key aspect of 
foreign policy which tested this question. While the Labor government was 
critical of the US in relation to the conflict in Vietnam, Whitlam chose to 
conform to the established strategic alliance on the issue of US bases in 
Australia. This selective analysis is developed further in relation to 
manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean, Australia at the United Nations and the 
debate on the extent of change in foreign policy. 
6 See D.J. Murphy, New Nationalism or New Internationalism, Australian Foreign Policy 1973-
74, World Review, October 1974, pp. 17-18, Claire Clark, ed., Australian Foreign Policy: Toward a 
Reassessment, Cassell, North Melbourne, 1973, p. 169, and Camilleri, op. cit., p. 67. See also 
Altman, op. dr., p. 6 and Hugh Collins, Australian Foreign Policy in the Era of Detente, 
Australian Outlook, vol. 2.9, 2, August 1975, pp. 133-47. On changes to domestic policies, see 
Henry S. Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor, University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucia, 1977, pp.lll-12 and Whitlam, The Wlzitlam C-overnment ... , op. cit., pp. 179 & 479-80. 
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There was little potential for conflict between Prime Minister Whitlam and the 
recently returned administration in Washington? Moreover, Whitlam's 
political outlook was not predicted to clash with the United States government 
over time and Whitlam was not one within the ALP to be suspicious of United 
States policy and purposes. For example, Whitlam had defended Australia's 
relationship with the United States in the 1966 Evatt Memorial lecture and this 
position was carried into government: 
The United States alliance is essential. Co-operation with the United 
States must be maintained . . . More than any other country in the 
area Australia is able and bound to interpret the United States to the 
countries of the region and to interpret those countries to the United 
States.8 
At the time of this statement, Whitlam may have been attempting to reassure 
the United States about the Labor Party leadership and trying to highlight the 
moderate elements of the ALP when anti-US sentiment was on the rise. 
Indeed, Whitlam attempted to establish a dose relationship between Australia 
and the United States. At the ALP National Conference in July 1973, Whitlam 
repeated the government's commitment to the ANZUS treaty in direct contrast 
to more radical Labor Party arguments for an independent foreign policy.9 
Significantly, Whitlam's address to the Labor Party delegates at the conference 
immediat~~ly preceded the Prime Minister's first visit to the United States. 
Whitlam received an interested welcome in Washington as measured by the 
number of hours accorded by the President, Secretary of State, and Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, a..lJlong others .to As one might have predicted on 
Whitlam's first visit to the US as Prime Minister, contentious issues were 
avoided and Whitlam may have tried to build confidence and rE:assure the US 
administration about the Australian Labor Party's more critical quarters. 
Only two weeks later, Prime Minister Whitlam commented that President 
Nixon's authority had been weakened by allegations surrounding the illegal 
7 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988, p. 118. On the position 
of the United States, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, US Foreign Policy: the search for focus, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 51, 4, July 1973, Michael J. Brenner, The problem of innovation and the Nixon-
Kissinger foreign policy, International Studies Quarterly, vol 17, 3, September 1973 and HenryS. 
Albinski, Perspectives on United States foreign policy, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 51, 5, 
October 1974. 
8 E.G. Whitlam, Australia- Base or Bridge?, H.V. Evatt Memorial lecture 1966, University of 
Sydney Fabian Society, 16 September 1966, p. 5. 
9 Camilleri, op. cit., pp. 69-70. 
10 David Goldsworthy, Foreign Policy Review, Australian Quarterlyr vol. 46, 1, March 1974, p. 
106. 
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entry into the Democrat Party Office in the Watergate building. Further, in 
December 1973, Whitlan1 agreed with Jim Cairns, who was in Hanoi, that the 
:United States would continue to seek control over the Saigon government and 
over Vicma.m. in general. Goldsworthy offered a credible analysis that Whitlam 
agreed with this position and possibly saw Cairns' comments as a 'useful way 
of signalling' particular attitudes to the United States without officially 
sanctioning this critique through Foreign Affairs channels.n 
Thus, the Whitlam Labor government appeared to be sending mixed messages 
within the established relationship with the United States. Indeed, the Nixon 
administration may have been confused by the variety of statements by their 
Australian friends. However, the overriding assumptions of the US leadership 
may have simplified any combination of signals to accord with their suspicions 
about the Australian Labor Party and the Whitlam government in particular. 
Notwithstanding the pre-conceived understandings of the Whitlam 
government by the United States, the Labor government appeared comfortable 
with the traditional 'narrow and unimaginative' security alliance with the 
United States.12 While instituting relatively independent initiatives on some 
international issues, the Labor government remained part of the US military 
system. A sound argument could be made that a more independent Australian 
foreign policy would have required a distancing from an automatic acceptance 
of United States foreign policy. In the end, Whitlam seemed to sustain a 
precarious balance between strategic alliance and targeted reform. 
This balancing act could be witnessed in relation to Vietnam. Australia's 
alliance with the United States was both defined and distorted by the 
intervention in Vietnam.13 The politics of war shaped the Whitlam 
government's perceptJ:on of Australia's relationship with the United States and 
cast US perceptions of the Whitlam government's role in the alliance. 
The central dilemma for the Australian Labor Party on foreign policy was 'how 
to oppose the US intervention in Vietnam without opposing the United States, 
and how to denounce the war wlthout denouncing the US'.14 As deputy leader 
and later leader of the Labor Party, vVhitlam had been consistent in valuing the 
alliance with the United States while appru.~ntly struggling with the insidious 
elements of the conflict in Vietnam. Whitlam allowed greater criticisrn. of the 
11 ibid. 
12 As described by Albnan, op. cit., p. 5. 
13 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit, p. 29. 
14 ibid., p. 36. 
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US once in government, when one can assume the imperative of winning an 
election had passed and the need for reassuring the Australian electorate was 
partially satisfied. 
At the time of the Whitlam goveiTh."TTent's election, Australia's military presence 
in Vietnam had been reduced to an embassy protection unit overshadowed by 
the deaths of five hundred Australian personnel. The new Labor Prime 
Minister acted swiftly to alter Australian policy toward Vietnam: 
Immediately on taking office, I instructed ot:, "U!l.bassador in Paris, 
Alan Renouf, to make contact with the Del.... ·ate-General of the 
'-Democratic Republic of Vietnan1, Vo Van Sung. On 26 February 
1973, I was able to announce the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Hanoi, at level of ambassador. Australia continued to 
recognise the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and did not 
alter its diplomatic relations with, or its representation in, Saigon.15 
While this diplomatic action appeared to demonstrate significant change with 
regard to relations with Vietnam, questions have been raised as to what extent 
this altered Australia's relationship with the United States. Camilleri argued 
that Australia was not embarking on a new conception of foreign policy but 
reacting against the policies of the previous governments, especially with 
regard to Vietnam.16 The withdrawal of Australian military personnel and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Hanoi, it was argued, were 
'symbolic gestures rather than elements in a re-orientation of Australian 
diplomacy.'17 Camilleri's argument represented a disappointment among some 
parts of the Australian electorate that wanted the Whitlam government to 
challenge the basis of the relationship with the US and embark on an 
independent foreign policy. 
A major :ssue for AustraliC) in the relationship with the United States was the 
bombing of Hanoi as ordered by President Nixon.1s On 20 December 1972, 
Prime Minister Whitlam sent a personal r11essage to President Nixon through 
the appropriate channel of the Australian embassy i.n Washington expressing 
concern at the course of events in Vietnam. This statement caused considerable 
conjecture regarding the tone and content as well as the extent to which the 
15 ib'd 42 1 ., p. . 
16 J. Camilleri, A New Australian Foreign Policy?, Arena, no. 31, 1973, p. 12. 
17 ibid. 
18 Over the 1972 Christmas period, more bombs were dropped on North Vietnam in three 
weeks than in the previous three years. Whitlam stated that the US decision was intended not 
to coerce Hanoi but to convince Saigon, presumably about t'he United States' commitment to 
the South Vietnamese regime. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 42. 
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new Australian Prime Minister was prepared to criticise the US adminish :ttion. 
The question whether Whitlam made a genuine attack on US policy in Vietnam 
or felt obliged to make polite comment is a matter of interpretation and remains 
unresolved. For this reason, and be~ause the message was only reproduced by 
Whitlam in 1985, I present the text at length here: 
I am deeply concerned by the breakdown in the negotiations with 
the North Vietnamese and the resumption of heavy and widespread 
bombing of North Vietnam. 
The breakdown of the negotiations has been a bitter blow to me, to 
the Australian governn :~nt and, I believe, to the Australian people as 
a whole. The election campaign that has just ended brought me into 
first-hand contact with public opinion in this country at every level 
and I know what hopes were pinned on reaching a cease-fire 
agreement. The disappointment caused by the recession of that 
prospect, coupled with anxiety about the resumption of the 
•. '~mbing, is producing a feeling of grave concern in this country. I 
continue to believe, as I am sure you do yourself, that the only 
practicable way to end the long-standing conflict in Vietnam is by 
means of negotiations. I question most earnestly whether the 
resumption of bombing will achieve the result that I know you 
desire, the return of the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table in 
a more forthcoming frame of mind. 
I am well aware of the difficulties and frustrations which Dr 
Kissinger and the other American negotiators have experienced in 
dealing with the North Vietnamese. We admire the patience and 
resolve that they have shown. I know that your Government wants 
a cease-fire on honourable terms. In these circumstances I believe 
that the best means open to me to convey to you the depth of my 
own feelings, and to assist you towards reaching the conclusion for 
which you have worked so hard and so long, is to approach the 
heads of government of some of our neighbours in the Asia/Pacific 
area to join me in addressing a public appeal to both the United 
States and to North Vietnam to return to serious negotiations. 
It is of particular concern to me that my first personal message to 
you on a matter of substance since assuming office as Prime Minister 
of Australia should not be misconstrued. I want to reassure you, 
therefore, that I look forward to a period of positive cooperation 
between our two countries on a wide range of matters in the years 
ahead and that, on this particular question of Vietnam, I am moved 
as much by a positive and, I hope, helpful desire to put negotiations 
back on the rails as by feelings of distress at one particular aspect of 
your Government's policy. 
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:!: do not intend to release the text of this message, but I may be 
obliged, in order to satisfy public orinion in Australia, to make some 
public reference to my having sent a message to you.19 
I 
From a distance, this perso:n.al statem~nt appeared to incorporate both words of 
·direct critk~"3m and phrases of generous reassurance. As for the lasting 
impressionb of a formal note between heads of government, Prime Minister 
Whitlam would have been aware that a rebuke on policy, especially the extent 
of concen ,:.~\'1. the bomring of North Vietnam, would em.erge immediately at 
first reading and last long<>.A in reflection. However, Whitlam chose to access 
the appropriate diplomatic channels for communication to ensure serious 
consideration of the cont~nt or to mollify the direct criticism of the text. Also, 
the acknowledged appropriate follow-up discussions with the Secretary of 
State and the US Arrtbassador in Auf:~ralia quelled immediate fears and 
provided a constructive environment for other issues relevant to the alliance. 
Further, these consultations may have warned of anticipated criticisms from 
various elements within Australia, including groups aligned with the Labor 
government. Nevertheless, the reassurances from Australia may have been 
more effective with another US President and now sEem only useful as 
historical qualifications of Whitlam's explicit critique. 
As one might expect, President Nixon was angry to receive a critical letter from 
Australia, a significant and consistent supporter of the United States in 
Vietnam. The criticism was escalated when Whitlam government Ministers 
Cairns, Cameron and Uren successively talked about 'murderei·s and maniacs 
in the White House'.20 Whitlam claimed to be successful in the short term in 
constraining these Ministers to issues related to their portfolio responsibilities 
but admitted that 'it was some time before the Government's view on Vietnam 
could be rationally considered by the US Administration'.21 Leaving aside the 
question whether any issue could be 'rationally considered' by the Nixon 
administration, the related concern was whether the suspicions of the United 
States leaders about th~ Whitlam Labor government were ignited prior to this 
incident and what impact this diplomatic skirmish had on the continuing 
political and strategic relationship. 
19 ibid., pp. 42-3. See also Sydney Morning Herald, 22 December 1972. 
20 See Sydney Morning Herald, 29 & 30 December 1972; Australian, 30 December 1972; Sydney 
Morning Herald, editoria1,4 January 1973; and Australian, 8 & 11 January 1973. Also, the 
maritime unions placed bans on United States ships in protest against the US bombing of Nort..h 
Vietnam. See Australian, 29 December 1972, Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, 5 January 1973, 
and Sydrzey Morning Herald, 9 January 1973. 
21 Whitlam. The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 43. 
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Part of the relationship with the United States was the issue of military facilities 
in Australia. The Whitlam government did not contemplate fundamental 
change in the defence relationship with the United States. · Indeed, Camilleri 
accused the Prime Minister and the Labor cabinet of political contortions on the 
question of the bases which reflected the contradictory premises on which 
Australian foreign policy was founded.22 
The Labor Party's formal opposition to all foreign-owned, foreign-controlled 
and foreign-operated bases on Australian territory contrasted with the polic::·~ 
of the Whitlam governrrtent.23 While the Minister for Defence and Deputy 
Prime Minister Ba.rnard had suggested the possibility of disclosing the 
purposes of the military installations, it was subsequently announced that the 
Australian government was precluded by existing agreements from divulging 
information on Pine Gap and Nurrungar. In response to pressurt~ from within 
the Labor Party, Barnard affirmed in Parliament the government's intention to 
renegotiate several agreements covering the bases with the United States.24 
Minister Barnard explained that Pine Gap and Nurrungar related to satellites, 
that these bases were not part of a weapons syste"U and they could not be used 
to attack any country.25 These narrow descriptions may have been accurate 
and sufficient for the Parliament but Barnard's exposition did not represt!'!lt the 
military significance of the bases to US strategic commu..-rrications systems. As 
Camilleri explained, the installations tied Australia 'more firmly than ever into 
the American defence perimeter'. 26 
Prime Minister Whitlam also mentioned the bases in a longer announcement on 
a range of international issues. Explained in the context of Australiars attitude 
to nuclear testing, Whitlam stated that the United States Air Force detach.ment 
at Amberley and the Joint Geological and Geophysical Research Station at Alice 
Springs collectively possessed technical facilities to monitor the testing of 
22 Camilleri, In Search of a Foreign Policy, op. dt., p. 70. 
23 SEe Australian Labor Party, Federal Platform and Policy, as approved by the 29th 
Commonwealth conference, Launceston, 1971, N.S.W. edition,. May 1973: Part XXI: Foreign 
Affairs; section 5, Bases and Facilities, p. 15. 
24 Barnard, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 82, 28 February 
1973, pp. 67-70. See also Camilleri, A New Australian Foreign Policy?, op. cit., p. 13. On the 
base~ see generally Des Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American installations in Australia, 
Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1980, Des Ball, A Base for Debate: the US satellite st~1tion at Nurrungar, 
Allen & Unwm, Sydney, 1987, and Des Ball, Pine Gap: Australia and the US geostationary signals 
intelligence satellite program, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988. 
25 Barnard, CPD, HR., vol. 82, 28 February 1973, p. 69. See also Camilleri, In Search of a Foreign 
Policy, op. cit., p. 70. 
26 Camilleri, ibid., p. 71. 
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nuclear devices in the atmosphere, on the surface and underground.27 Further, 
Whitlam asserted that the facilities at PL'"l~> Gap and Nurrungar related to 
satellites and were useful only for analysing data. 
The more difficult bases to justify .as part of Labor Party policy were the 
proposed Omega navigational installation and the North West Cape Nava1 
Communications Station. The Whitlam government was certainly consistent in 
committing to retain all US military facilities established by previous 
Australian governments and would rnove toward building the Omega station 
agreed in principle by the McMahon goverrunent.2s On this, Whitlam endured 
a celebrated rebuff from the Labor Party at the July 1973 Fecieral Conference. A 
move to allow the Parliamentary members, that is, Whitlam and the cabinet, to 
determine the issue was narrowly defeated, including four ministers voting 
against. The motion not to build the Omega station was easily defeated 
causing a compromise outcome. Agreement was reached that Om.ega should 
be built, subject to evidence that it could not be used for hostile acts without 
Australian consent.29 
However, the Labor Party conference failed to raise the more serious issue of 
the other US bases in Australia. To this extent, Whitlam successfully avoided a 
contentious debate on the role and future of Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North 
West Cape, among others. Also, the discussion on Omega seemed divorced 
from the general context of Australian military relations with the United States 
and served to deflect attention from the im?lications of Australia's defence 
1. . 30 po !£Ies. 
The ~nore sensitive issue was the facility at North West Cape. This was an 
established military base which was known to be in constant contact with 
Unit,ed States ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean.31 The importance of 
the North West Cape station was brought to notice during the 1973 Yom 
27 Whitlam, CPD, HR., vol. 84, 24 May 1973, p. 2648. 
28 Omega formed part of a proposed United States network of navigational systems to be used 
by ships and aircraft. Significant for later events, the opposition spokesperson for Defence in 
1971, Lance Barnm'd had attacked the McMahon Parliamentary statement by insisting that 
Omega had a major military purpose. See :McMahon answer to question from Barnard, CPD, 
HR., vol. 71, 18 March 1971, p. 1074 and Minister for Shipping and Transport, Nixon answer to 
question from Barnard, CPD, HR, vol. 72, 7 Apri11971, pp. 1547-8. See also Camilleri, In Search 
of a Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 71 and see generally, D.J. Ball, Some military uses for Omega, 
Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 3, 12, June 1977 and Alan Roberts_. The Case for Omega: Some 
critical comments, May 1973, unpublished paper. 
29 Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 107. The( decisions on the nature and function of the Omega project 
were left to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. 
30 Camilleri/ In Search of a Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 72. 
31 Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 107. 
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Kippur war when the base was put on emergency alert without reference to the 
Australian governme:.."l.t.. 32 The Wnitlam government could not or chose not to 
repudiate the North West Cape Agreement of 1963 whicil had been negotiated 
under the ANZUS Treaty. Whitlam settled for the need to renegotiate the 
agreement to provide for greater Australian control over the base. This 
accorded with the stated foreign policy objectives of a more independent stance 
coupled with a commitment to the United States security alliance. United 
States Ambassador to Australia, Marshall Green, obviously aware of the 
political context, was hinting as early as June 1973 that the United States 
considered that the agreement was negotiable.33 
In January 1974, Defence Minister Barnard visited Washington with the 
primary purpose of renegotiating the terms of agreement on the North ·west 
Cape facility. Concessions granted by the United States suggested an effort 
was made to placate the Australian government.34 However, there were 
significant qualifications to this initiative. At North West Cape, the 
fundamental structures remained unquestioned and unchanged. The 
Australian second-in-command would have no authorUy over the US staff and 
Australia would have no access to the US communications building. This 
implied that Australia would have no access to the information passing 
through the facility. The United States had conced~d tangential elements of 
responsibility while maintaining the vital aspects of military autonomy in 
Australia.35 The renegotiation demonstrated an ability by the Whitlam 
government to gain concessions from within the relationship with the United 
States but the amendments failed to enforce the extent of change demanded in 
the Labor Party Platform. 
Whitlam failed to explain how particular national interests were protected by 
Australia's increasing commitment to the United States' global security 
strategies~ The issue of the US bases in Australia demonstrated the Labor 
government's inability to modify the fundamental tenets of the strategic 
32 Whitla:.'!l, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 48. The government was advised of the alert 
'moments later', said US Ambas3ador Green, according to Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 107, but 
Whitlam did not acknowledge this qualification. 
33 Goldsworthy, ibid. 
34 Subsequently, North West Cape was to operate as a joint facility, enabling Australia to 
participate in its management, operation and tecl:mical control. An Australian Deputy-
Commander was to be appointed, along with thirty-five Australians in 'key supervisory 
positions' and a separate communicatia ... ts centre would be operated exclusively by the Royal 
Australian Navy. Further, the Amberley and Alice Springs facilities would come under sole 
Australian management. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 48 and Goldsworthy, 
op. cit., p. 107. See also W. MacMahon Ball, op. cit., p. 3. 
35 Goldsworthy, op. cit., pp. 107-8. See also Camilleri, A New Australian Foreign Policy?, op. 
cit., pp.13-14. 
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relationship between Australia and the United State'§'. The government could 
have adopted a stronger position pn the bases given a more sincere 
commitment to a progressive and ind~J~e1)dent foreign policy for Australia . 
• ~1 
Finally, Australia's relations with the United States were central to the foreign 
policy of the Whitlam Labor government. This,\selective analysis of the 
relationship shows that elements of change were often qualified by 
reassurances of alliance and support. Prime :Mi.ruster Whitlam was critical of 
the United States on the interv,~ntion in Vietnam and the bombing of Hanoi. 
However, Whitlam's attitude toward the United States bases in Australia 
demonstrated a continuing commitment to the strategic alliance. In total, a 
potentially difficult relationship appeared to operate effectively at the 
diplomatic level for both the Whitlam government and the United States 
administration. 
the Indian Qcean region 
Connected to the Whitlam government's relationship with the United States, 
and with particular relevance to the US bases in Australia, the Indian Ocean 
region was a key strategic issue in the 1970s.36 '!'he region was the focus of 
increasing military tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
For Australia, the region tested the relationship with the US and illustrated the 
Whitlam government's attitude on the Soviet Union. The Indian Ocean region 
was also an arena for Australia to build links with developing countries, often 
in the context of the international power struggle between the United States 
and the Sovie; Union. 
These relationships were connected to Australia's position in the United 
Nations on t.he idea of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region and the 
development of the island of Diego Garda. These issues illustrated the 
Whitlam government's ·difficult international position given the continuing 
alliance with the United States and the accommodation of strategic facilities, 
especially the US base at North West Cape. Within the complex web of 
international diplomacy which characterised the Indian Ocean region, this 
discussion begins to incorporate Australia's relations with developing countries 
and, in particular, involved the views of African nations with an interest in the 
Indian Ocean region. 
36 The Indian Ocean region was a loosely defined area which included the littoral states of 
Africa, South Asia, parts of South East Asia and Australia, and the island territories. 
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In terms of defence ancJ foreign policies, the Whitlam Labor government aimed 
to reduce the intervention of military powers in both the Indian and Pacific 
Ocean regions. While conceding that the United States and the Soviet Union 
would remain interested in the Indian Ocean region, Prime Minister Whitlam 
advocated a role for Australia in reducing tension and conflict. This could be 
described as a compromise position or more kindly, a gradual move away from 
conservative understandings of security and defence which relied upon 
defence alliances and military action.37 Certainly, Whitlam emphasised the role 
of the United Nations in the Indian Ocean region and attempted to use 
diplomatic channels on the issues of a zone of peace and Diego Garcia. 
In relation to the proposed zone of peace L."l the Indian Ocean, Whitlam became 
involved in the debate over the predicted and actual escalation of naval forces 
of the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. Whitlam supported a 
United Nations resolution to declare a zone of peace and advocated Australian 
partic:ipation on the UN ad hoc committee ·~n the Indian Ocean.3s Also, in early 
1974, Australia made representations to the US and Soviet governments 
encouraging serious dialogue on mutual restraint and a reduction in forces in 
the Indian Ocean. 
Whitlam would have been aware of a number of obstacles to these objectives. 
While endorsing the idea of a zone of peace, India conducted a nuclear test and 
Iran was engaged in rapid military acquisition. In principle, the United States 
and the Soviet Union were also opposed to escalation but blamed each other for 
the pace of naval activity and for destabilising the military balance in the Indian 
Ocean.39 
The Prime Minister restated the government's position at the United Nations 
General Assembly on 30 September 1974 that 'Australia is strongly opposed to 
37 Whltlam, Roy Milne Lecture, op. cit., p. 5. 
38 Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., p. 253. On 5 December 1972, the Prime 
Minister-elect instructed the Australian delegation to vote in favour of resolutions proposed by 
Malaysia, rather than abstain as it had done in Committee. Further, on 7 December 1972, the 
Australian ddegate voted in Committee and in plenary for a proposal by Sri Lanka calling for 
the establishment of a UN Committee to study the implications of declaring the Indian Ocean a 
zone of peace. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 16 and Claire Clark, 'P .e United 
Nations, chapter 6 in W.J. Hudson, Australia in World Affairs 1971-75, Allen & Unw..n, Sydney, 
1980, p. 127. See also Clark, Australian Foreign Policy ... , op. cit., pp. 16 & 129. 
39 Albinski, op. cit., pp. 253-4. See generally, T.G. Ramamurthi, Southe.."'ll Africa and the Indian 
Ocean, India Quarterly, vol. 28, 4, October/December 1972; D.B.G. McLean, The Soviet Navy in 
the Indian Ocean, Rusi, vol. 118, 4, Detember 1973; Richard Burt, Strategic Politics and the 
Indian Ocean, Padfic Affairs, vol. 47, 4, Winter 1974; Lawrence Griswold, A Sea of Troubles: 
United States allies o11r,~the Indian Ocean periphery are few but important, and ignored, Sea 
Power, vol. 17, 12, December 1974; and KP. Misra, futemational Politics in the Indian Ocean, 
10rbis, vol. 18, 4, Winter 1975 .. 
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the Indian Ocean becoming a ground for competition, much less confrontation 
between the great powers'.40 Whitlam explained that it would be difficult for 
the United States and the Soviet Union to consider questions relating to the 
deployment of their forces in the Indian Ocean in isolation from capabilities in 
other areas and from general issues of mutual balance and restraint. Rather, 
Australia expected discussion of the Indian Ocean to form part of the 
ccmtinuing bilateral exchanges on arms control. 
The position of the Whitlam government on the zone of peace appeared to 
create tension within the Australian relationship with the United States. This 
was particularly evident regarding the strategic and security elements of the 
alliance in the Indian Ocean region. Whitlam may have envisaged Australian 
support for a neutral, peaceful zone as a general aspiration rather than a 
specific commitment which could transform relationships in the context of the 
Indian Ocean. The problem remained how Australia would continue to co-
operate with the United States in establishing and maintaining military 
installations for broader security arrangements.41 
In critique of Whitlam's position on the Indian Ocean, Camilleri explained that 
the Labor government refused to challenge key aspects of the alliance with the 
United States.42 Camilleri also cast doubt on Whitlam's commitment to the 
creation of a zone of peace and neutrality in the Indian Ocean. Australia's 
support for the proposal in the United Nations and the region appeared to be 
neutralised by the accept.ed participation in the ANZUS Treaty, the retention of 
US strategic facilities in Australia, and involvement in the Five Power Defence 
arrangement linking Britain, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Australia.43 
This criticism of the Whitlam government needed to be tempered without 
detracting from the fundamental tension surrounding the proposal for a zone 
of peace. It seemed Whitlam and colleagues understood that the neutrality of 
the Indian Ocean was a noble and achievable goal distinct from the 
considerations of global security politics. Alternatively, Whitlam may have 
incorporated the zone of peace into a conception of the relationship with the 
40 Whitlam., Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 30 September 1974, in 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 45, no. 9, September 197 4, 
p. 578. See also Whitlam, answer to question, CPD,HR, vol. 91,22 October 1974, pp. 2714-15. 
41 See W. MacMahon Ball, op. cit., p. 2. 
42 Camilleri, In Search of a Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 74. 
43 ibid. See also Senator D. Willesee, Australian Foreign Policy in the 1970s, chapter 1 in B.D. 
Bed die, ed., Advance Australia - Where?, Oxford University P..ress ·with the Australian Institute of 
IntemationalAffairs:.Melboume, 1975, p.lO. 
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United States and the relations with h1dian Ocean regional nations, The . 
initiation of the proposal through a vehicle such as the United Nations 
suggested an international diplomatic perspective from the Australian 
government which preceded the strategic and security agendas of regional 
agreements and alliances. 
1be associated dilemma for the Whitlam government was the development of 
military facilities at Diego Garcia.44 This British island in the Indian Ocean had 
served as a base for the United States which proposed to upgrade the facilities 
to provide greater military support.45 In its last months, the Heath government 
in Britain agreed to the US plans, however the subsequent Wilson Labour 
government was unhappy about the commitment. The Australian Labor 
government apparently sided with the British Labour Party in opposition to the 
United States proposal.46 
Initially, the US Defence Department had asked the Congress for additional 
funds to transform Diego Garcia into a base capable of re-fuelling and servicing 
warships. This would facilitate a larger and more frequent naval deployment 
in the Indiar.: Ocean without weakening ihe forces in the Pacific.47 Interestingly, 
this plan appeared understated compared with the request to Britain. 
Permission was sought from Britain for an upgrading of facilities to the point 
where the United States could accommodate B-52 bomber aircraft and air 
tankers and could refuel and service warships and nuclear submarines. This 
position accorded with an aim to increase th-e overall US deployment in the 
area.48 
The proposed escalation of US military capacity in the Indian Ocean at this time 
emerged from contemporary inte-rnational events and from strategic 
44 Diego Garcia is situated 5100 kilometres north west of Perth. 
45 The information on Diego Garcia is inconsistent. Albinski claimed that it is a group of 
islands where the US had enjoyed air and naval privileges. Whitlam stated that Britain, 
without consulting other Commonwealth countries, had detached Diego Garcia from Mauritius 
and leased it to the US. One assumes this is connected to Ball's explanation that the British had 
granted the United States the right to build military facilities at Diego Garcia in 1966. Further, 
Goldsworthy offered that the British island was a US military communications station. Of 
course, none of this information is referenced in the texts. See Albinski, Australian External 
Policy ... , op. cit., p. 254; Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 157; W. MacMahon Ball, 
op. cit., p. 3; and David Goldsworthy, Foreign Policy Review, Australian Quarterly, vol. 46, 3, 
September 1974, p. 107. 
46 Ball, op. cit., p. 3, quoted Whitlam from !~arch 1974: 'I think I may say without any 
qualifications that every littoral state hopes. there will be 1:10 great power rivalry in the Indian 
Ocean'. Nevertheless,Albinski, op. cit., p.1ts5, stated that the Wilson Labour government 
acceded to the request in May 1974 allowing for 'modest' refurbishment. 
47 Ball, op. cit., p. 3. 
48 Goldsworthy, Foreign Policy Review, September 1974, op. cit, p. 107. 
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considerations 'with reference to the Soviet Union, the Middle East and South 
Asia:l. In particular, the United States were restricted to airfields at the 
Portuguese Azores for supplying Israel during the Yom Kippur War.49 Thus 
the proposed airfields in the Indian Ocean could have facilitated US action in 
the Middle East from the East and South East. 
The United States had increased its naval presence in the Indian Ocean region 
in response to small naval missions by the Soviet Union beginning in the late 
1960s. The military rivalry provoked anxiety amongst littoral states in 
anticipation of the United States deploying nuclear submarines capable of 
launching long-range missiles from the north west corner of the Indian Ocean. 
~o-.U ~ daimed that it was in the interests of the Soviet Union to seek the support 
of the littoral states to persuade the US to reduce military capacity in the Indian 
Ocean. so It was more likely that the Soviet Union would s ~ek to balance the US 
military presence in the region. 
The qu~stion of balancing forces in the Indian Ocean depended upon 
understandings of established patterns of Soviet and US naval movements in 
the region. Significantly, US Ambassador I\1arshall Green explained to the 
Australian press that the objective was balance not escalation because the 
Soviet navy was muc.h stronger than the US in the Indian Ocean. There was 
also an expectation that the Soviet presence would increase with the reopening 
of the Suez Canal. 51 Similar notions were expressed by Kissinger to Whitlam il"l 
Washington in May 1975.52 vVhitlam. was assured that, after gaining legislative 
support for the development of Diego Garcia, the United States would discuss 
the proposals with Indian Ocean littoral nations. 
The Whitlam government was in a dilemma on these issues. The Prime 
Minister had restated Australia's adherence to ANZUS and accepted 
continuing United States operation of the North West Cape facility. As the 
plans for Diego Garcia were part of the same strategic defence system as North 
West Cape, it was contradictory to baulk at the US proposal. However, 
Australia had agreed enthusiastically with India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Tanzania 
and other littoral states that the Indian Ocean should become a zone of peace. 
49 Whitlam,. The Wlzitlam Government .•. , op. cit., p. 157. The Azores islands are 1200 kilometres 
west of Portugal. 
50 W. Macmahon Ball, op. h\ "p. 3. 
51 Goldsworthy, Foreign Poll ·yReviewr September 1974, op. cit., p. 107. 
52 V\r1rltlam, The Wlzitlam Government ... , op. cit,. p. 49. 
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The combll[/ttion of initiatives demonstrated a tension vJithin Australian policy-
making '"1!~ich could be reduced to the juxtaposition between the Barnard-
Tange def,ence position favouring the United States and the Whitlam-Renouf 
foreign policy toward the region.s3 This variance was illustrated by the 
Department of Defence proposal to announce Australia's support for the 
United States on Diego Garcia in January 1974. The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Senator Don Willesee rebuked the Department of Defence headed by 
Minister Barnard and Secretary Tange with a statement on 8 February: 
While as we understand it the measures proposed for making Diego 
Garcia a support facility are not elaborate, it is clear that the building 
up of facilities by any Great Power in the Indian Ocean, or the 
introduction of additional naval forces, does not contribute to the 
achievement of the long term objectives which the Australian 
Government and Governments of other countries in the region have 
set for themselves.54 
Whitlam supported Foreign Minister Willesee in prioritising the foreign policy 
considerations rather than the defence policy aspects of the issues related to the 
Indian Ocean. 
In conclusion, relations with the United States improved over the period which 
suggested excellent work by Whitlam and Willesee in the face of criticism from 
within the Labor Party and from the Liberal Party. A closer examination leads 
to the conclusion that the Whitlam government managed events and 
relationships reasonably well because the alliance with the United States was 
not challenged. Indeed, this outcome showed the importance of Whitlam's 
view on the relationship with the US within the Labor government. 
the United Nations 
Prime Minister vVhitlam embraced the United Nations as an international 
forum in which to display the new policy approach of Australia. Within the 
UN structures, the Labor government supported the agendas of, and forged 
new relationships with, the developing countries. Australia was noticeable in 
53 Goldsworthy, Foreign Policy Review, September 1974, op. cit., p. 108. See Albinski, 
Australian External Polioj ... , op. cit., pp. 255-6 for further analysis of the Australian position on 
Diego Garcia. 
54 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 157. Whitlam explained that the Department 
of Defence could be obtuse in its attitude towards the countries of the region. The Diego Garcia 
incident was preceded by the Department arranging to participate in SEATO exercises in the 
South China Sea at the time of the Prime Minister's visit to China. The exercises had to be 
abruptly cancelled. 
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standing against the minority governments of South Africa and Rhodesia and 
in supporting resolutions on independence for colonial territories. Also, the 
Whitlam government attempted to resolve the difficult issue of self-
determination for the Cocos Islands. Essentially, the Australian stance at the 
United Nations was an important factor for relations with the United States, 
and with the nations of Asia, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and Africa. 
As mentioned, immediately upon attaining office on 2 December 1972, Whitlam 
issued instructions to the Australian delegation at the United Nations to switch 
from the cautious approach ·of the previous Liberal and Country Parties 
governments to a progressive and principled stance which emphasised 
Australia's identification with the states of Africa, Asia and the Pacific.ss On 3 
December 1972, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs suggested 
that Australia should abstain on several resolutions in the UN General 
Assembly during the week. Whitlam thought otherwise: 
To abstain would be to pass up the opportunity to demonstrate at 
the highest international level that there was indeed a new 
Government in Australia, with new policies and new attitudes. 56 
A number of issues were to be brought before the General Assembly to which 
Australia's representatives had cast an abstention vote at the committee stage 
and Whitlam was determined to change Australia's position. The impact of 
these changes was magnified due to the obvious shift in voting from committee 
to plenary in the one session which attracted greater attention than changes 
between sessions.57 
Thus, on 12 December 1972, Australia changed position to support a resolution 
on the right of peoples to self-determination and the granting of independence 
to colonial countries.ss Australia also voted in favour of a series of resolutions 
focused on decolonisation for non-self-governing territories. This included a 
resolution calling for a timetable to be established for the self-determination 
and independence of a number of small territories, including the Cocos 
55 Oark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 127 and Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., 
p.102. 
56 V'lhitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 14. 
57 Oark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 127. 
58 Australia had opposed the resolution in the General Assembly in 1971 and in committee in 
1972. In supporting the resolution, Australia joined with Fiji, members of ASEAN and India, 
and moved away from Britain, France and the United States. See Whitlam, The:: Vhitlam 
Govemment ... , op~,cit, p. 69. 
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(Keeling) Islands, which would cause some difficulties for the Wh,tlam 
government during 1973.59 )\ 
To supplement Australia's new position in the General Assembly, Whitlam 
announced new contributions to the UN Educational and Training Programme 
for Southern Africa, the UN Trust Fund for South Africa and the UN Fund for 
Namibia. 60 Australia again demonstrated a changed approach in rejoining the 
Committee on Decolonisation from which the previous government had 
withdrawn. Prime Minister Whitlam justified this 'because resumption of 
membership was consistent with the Gove~ent's policy of demonstrating 
Australia's continuing concern for the problems of decolonisation'.61 
The change in Australia's foreign policy was evident at the United Nations if 
not yet obvious at home.62 Whitlam explained that; 
When the Assembly rose on 19 December the whole world knew 
that henceforth in the UN Australia would no longer pay exclusive 
regard to the voting intentions of Britain and US but, while not 
disregarding their voting intentions, would also consider the views 
of countries in the fudian and Pacific Oceans such as Canada, Japan, 
Indon~sia, fudia and Tanzania.63 
For the Labor Party in Australia, the swift alterations in voting invoked a return 
to the last Labor government of the 1940s when H.V. Evatt championed the 
causes of small nations at the United Nations and provided support for 
decolonisation and self-determination.64 The Whitlam government also 
59 Clark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 128. See also Clark, Australian Foreign Policy ... , op. cit., 
pp. 16 & 129. On 14 December 1972, Australia supported resolutions, first, on the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Indeplilldence to Colonial Countries by 
the .~peeie!bc!d agencies; second, on Activities of Foreign Economic Interests impeding the 
implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples in 
Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and Territories under Portuguese Domination; and third, on Small 
Territories, which irr.duded American Samoa and Guam, Brunei, Gilbert and Ellice Islands and 
Solomon Islands, Ccx:os (Keeling) Islands and New Hebridies. Portugal, South Africa, Britain 
and the United States were the only nations to vote against the first resolution, France joined 
them in voting against the -second and France, Portugal, South Africa and Britain alone voted 
against the third. In plenary in 1971, and in committee in 1972, Australia had abstained on all 
three questions. 
60 Clark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 127. Whitlam also announced ct contribution to the 
UN Fund for Population Activities. See Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 21. 
61 Whitlam, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 86, 10 October 1973, p. 1923. Australia rejoined 
the Committee on25 January J973. SeeAlbinski,Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., p. 102 and 
Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit, p. 95. See also Clark, The United Nations, op. cit.t 
pp. 127-8 and D.J. Murphy, Problems in Australian foreign policy, January to June 1973, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 19, 3, December 1973, p. 340. 
62 Vincent Matthews, Australia's emphasis on the Commonwealth's influenee in the Third 
Worl:d,. Commonwealth, April1973, p. 27. 
63 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 69. 
64 Clark, Australian Foreign Policy ... ~ op. cit., p. 131. 
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provided explicit support for the United Nations similar to Evatt and dissimilar 
to the Liberal and Country Parties governments. Consequently, the Labor 
government utilised the United Nations General Assembly, and the committees 
and agencies, with energy and enthusiasm. Also, the Whitlam government's 
commitment to the United Nations was demonstrated through the ratification 
of international conventions and active participation in numerous UN bodies 
concerned with economic and social matters.65 
Prime Minister Whitlam showed a personal interest when addressing the 
United Nations General Assembly on 30 September 1974. Whitlam emphasised 
the loyalty of Australia and the Labor Party to the world organisation and its 
ideals. The Prime Minister highlighted the threats to international hopes of 
closing the gap between the developed and the developing nations.66 Whitlam 
restated the commitment of Australia to a progressive and activist role within 
the United Nations and other international forums. 
During the term of the Whitlam Labor government, the United Nations dealt 
with many difficult issues. Australia's position on the details of these matters 
illustrated the level of commitment toward topics of importance for developing 
countries, particularly the countries of Africa. The question of Guinea Bissau is 
a useful example. In mid 1974, the Minister for Foreign Affairs highlighted the 
vote by Australia to admit Guinea Bissau to the World Health Organisation and 
thereby treat this as recognition of the newly independent West African nation. 
Senator Willesee continued tl-"tat: 
we have given expression not only to the fact that Guinea Bissau 
possesses the attributes of statehood but to our support for the 
legitimate aspirations of black Africans still denied their inalienable 
right to self-determination and independence.67 
However, Australia's response in the United Nations a year earlier had been 
markedly more guarded. Following a unilateral declaration of independence 
65 Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., p. 161 and Oark, The United Nations, op. cit., 
p. 158. The content of these activities coincided with the Labor Party agenda for domestic 
reform. Within the United Nations, Australia was active in the Economic and Social Cotmcil, 
the Governing Cotmcil for Environmental Programs, the preparatory committee for the World 
Food Conference in 1974, and the consultative committee for International Women's Year in 
1975. 
66 Prime Minister Whitlam, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 30 September 
1974, in Department of Foreign Affairs, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 45, 9, September 
1974, pp. 576-83. See Age~ 2 October 1974. See also Willesee, answer to question, CPD, Senate, 
vol. 57, 22 Augu-st 1973, pp. 103-7, Whitlam, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 86, 10 October 
1973, pp. 192Q-2, and Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., p. 103. 
67 Willesee, op. cit., PP· 5-6. 
. .. : ·. . . ;. : . . . .... : ~ . ·. -; ~ • ... · . 
page 79 
from Portugal, on 24 Septembep, 1973, the self-proclaimed liberation'government 
of Guinea Bissau had gaiped recognition from approximately half the members 
of the United Nations,lncluding all the African states. The subsequent 
resolution in the General Assembly welcoming the ind~R~ndence of Guinea 
Bissau was adopted, notwithstanding Australia's abstenti~:t!'L with 29 others and 
seven against.68 Australia supported the discussion of claims by Guinea Bissau 
but abstained from voting so as not to imply recognition. Australia argued that 
Guinea Bissau did not fulfil the criteria for determining sovereign status.69 
It was not until after the coup in Portugal in April 197 4 and the: commitment 
from the new govenunent that the Portuguese territories could determine their 
own future that Australia. implied recognition through the World Health 
Organisation and announced formal recognition in August 197 4. The process 
conformed to the recognition practice among the nations of South East Asia 
and was unlike the procedure adopted by the United States and European 
nations.70 The dilemma remained that the Whitlam govern..~ent was not 
prepared to join with the African state3 jn immediate recogJ r 'ton of a liberation 
government, instead preferring to be guided by the formal rules of recognition 
as stated by the United Nations. This prioritising of the international 
diplomatic path over the political principle of solidarity with the African 
nations signalled a tension in the diplornatic outlook of the Whitlam 
government. 
The perception of policy difficulties also arose over fhe Cocos Islands. As 
mentioned, the Whitlam government supported a United Nations resolution 
which called for the establishment of timetables for the self-determination and 
independence of a number of small territories, including the Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands.n The Prime Minister defended the decision to vote in favour of the 
resolution as part of the changed approach of Australia at the United Nations. 
Whitlam declared in the Parliament that: 
it is true . . . that the Australian Government . . . took a different 
attitude on all colonisation and colour questions from that taken by 
68 Clark, The United Nations, op. cit, p. 143. 
69 Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , 0?· cit, p. 103. 
70 Clark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 143 and Albinski, Australian External Policy ... ~ op. cit., 
p.103. 
71 UN General Assembly Resolution 2984 (XXVll) incorporated into CPD, HR, vol. 84, 17 May 
1973, pp. 2262-3. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands are si~ated in the Indian Ocean 2400 kilometres 
north west of Perth with an area of 13 square kilometres and a population under 1000. The 
Islands were ceded to Australia by Bri~ in 1955. For nver a hundred years, the Clunies-Ross 
family had enjoyed special privileges on. the islands and there was an exceptional 
inrerdependence between the Malay community and the Clunies-Ross administration. 
Albinski, ibid., pp. 104-5. 
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its predecessor ... the overall intention of these resolutions was one 
which Australia should support as all her neighbours do and as ti,.e 
great majority of the countries of the world do.n 
The issue of the Cocos Islands should have remained inconsequential given the 
context in which AustraH~ had developed a more constructive approach in the 
United Nations. However, there was some interest from the Padiamentary 
oppositio:1 and from critics else:where in the anticipated contradiction§ in the 
Whitlam government's decolonisation policy. 
Whitlam's approach on the issue of the Cocos Islands confirmed the Labor 
government's commitment to the welfare of dependent people and their rights 
of self-determination. Meanwhile, the Liberal and Country Parties used the 
involvement of the United Nations in the future of the Cocos Islands as a 
source of criticism of the Whitlam government. Prime Minister Whitlam did 
not envisage independence as an appropriate option for the small island 
territory but decided to review the status of the Cocos Islands through the 
United Nations Committee on Decolonisation.73 
At the General Assembly session in late 1973, the Cocos Islands and the 
Tokelau Islands were considered separately from the other small territories.74 
For the Cocos Islands and the Tokelau Islands, the General Assembly agreed to 
dispatch a Visiting Mission and requested the UN Committee on 
Decolcnisation to seek the most appropriate methods of implementing the 
Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 
1960.75 The consensus adopted by the committee did not specify a Hmetable for 
self-determination and independence. This provided an important distinction 
in relation to the 1972 TJN resolution on establishing timetables for the 
independence of small t~rritories. 
72 Whitlam, CPD, HR., vol. 84, 17May 1973; pp. 2255-6 in answer to a question by Peacock. See 
also Oark, The United Na~ 0't1S, op. cit., p. 128, T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External 
Relations 1788-1977, Australian National University Press, Canb('Jrra, 1978, p. 415, and Albinski, 
Australian E.xternal Policy ... , op. cit., p. 105. 
73 See Albinski, ibid., p. 104. 
74 New Zealand was responsible for the Tokelau Islands. The Cocos and Tokelau Islands were 
also considered with the encompassing resolution in 1972. 
75 Oarkf The United Nations, op. cit., p. 145. Cla-use 2 of the Declaration refers to the right of 
self-determination and Cause 5 refers to 'the transfer of all powers to the people of non-self-
governing territories without any conditions or reservations ... in order to enable them to enjoy 
complete independence and freedom'. 
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In August 1974, a delegati(>n representing the Committee on Decolonisation 
visited Australia and the Cocos Islands.76 The Australian Prime Minister 
indicated that the Labor government intended to honour the relevant UN 
resolution and fully supported the right of the people to determine the future of 
their islands. Whitlam also canvassed the possibility of the government of 
Australia remaining responsible for the Territory's international relations 
following self-governmen~r similar to a system agreed between New Zealand 
and the Cook Islands.77 
The report of the Visiting Mission to the Cocos Islands highlighted the feudal 
relationship between the Cocos Malay community and the landowner Clunies-
Ross. However, the relationships between the Australian government and the 
community, and with Clunies-Ross, :remained unclear. The report made 
specific recommendations, including the need to change the practice by which 
Clunies-Ross was able to designate the members of the Island Council. The 
report of the Mission stressed that this authorit'"f should be replaced by free 
elections, which: 
are the only means to 'enable the people to express freely their 
wishes and to advance towards self-determination in accordance 
with the Un.ii:ed Nations Charter and relevant resolutions of the 
General .Assembly.7S 
The Visiting Mission also advocated changes to the relationship between 
Clill'ies-Ross and the community regarding issues of sovereignty, land-
ownership, justice, education, and the currency system. These constituted 
major reforms for the organisation of the community on the Cocos Islands.79 
In ~Aay 1975, the WPitlam government created the position of Administrator in 
place of the Official Representative. Also, the Special Minister of State, Senator 
Douglas McClelland visited the Cocos Islands in August 1975 but was unable 
to persuade Clunies-Ross to initiate significant reforms. so Upon return, and in 
line with the recommendations of the UN Mission, Senator McClelland 
introduced legislation which would limit the power of the Clunies-Ross family 
and inctease the official Australian presence on the islands, providing the 
76 ibid., p. 146. The delegation was composed of representa~ves from the Ivory Coast, 
Indonesia, and Trinidad and-Tobago. 
77 ibid., quoted from Unite..~ Nations, Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the 
Implementation of the Declcb:-ation on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Cocos (Keeling) Islande, November 
1974. 
78 ibid., from the Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, 1974. 
79 ibid. 
80 Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit., p. 105. 
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community with more opportunities for consultation and soda~ reform.s1 
However, early inde~!S;,,,.~,.~nce for 'the Cocos Islands would have been 
inappropriate for reasm'i.;1 "'~~ ~ntemal power structures, a li:mited economy and 
the wishes of the people. 
In addition, the Australian government recognised that the Cocos Islands were 
valuable for a number of reasons. The islands wel;'e important as an 
international stock quarantine facility and were significant tor security and 
surveillance purposes. Their location in the Indian Ocean situated the Cocos 
Lc;,lands in an area of increasing naval rivalry and international attention. The 
major landing strip on the Cocos Islands was regularly used by Australian, 
British, New Zealand and US military aircraft.S2 
Despite the work of the United Nations and Minister McClelland, the Liberal 
and Country Parties maintained their criticism of the Labor government on this 
issue and were able to establish an inquiry in September 1974. The Senate 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence investigated the role and 
involvement of Australia and the United Nations in the affairs of sovereign 
Australian Territories.83 Somewhat surprisingly, the Committee's report was in 
agreement with the approach adopted by McClelland and the Labor 
government. The chair of the Committee highlighted an additional element to 
the issue. 
Throughout the inquiry the Committee has paid considerable 
attention to the welfare of the Cocos Islanders and it is clear to us 
that substantial changes are required to allow the Cocos Island 
community adequate opportunity to develop socially, economically 
and politically as an entity independent or the Clunies-Ross Estate. 
Mr Clunies-Ross informed the C0mmittee that, as a result of 
economic and governmental pressures, he had decided to sever the 
family's connections with the Isiands and to negotiate the transfer of 
his assets to a Cocos Island Community Co-operative. The 
81 ibid. In September 1975, the Minister tabled a Lands Acquisu:ion Ordinance to enable the 
compulsory acquisition of land on the Cocos Islands ar ~~ appointed an Interim Advisory 
Council until it could be replaced by an elected Council. Despite opposition from Clunies-Ross, 
the Interim Council met in October 1975. Also in October, the Minister gazetted ordinances 
giving the Administrator power to determine the conditions of workers and to take 
responsibility for education, the sale of food and drugs, and other matters. Clunies-Ross was 
also dir•ected not to continue the use of plastic tokl:!llS as currency. Clark, The United Nations, 
op. cit., pp. 146-7. 
82 Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit, pp. 105-6. See also Willesee, answer to 
question, CPD, Senate, vol. 60, 1 August 1974, p. 694. For more, see Canberra Times, 14 February 
1974; Sydney Morning Herald, 8 August1974;Nationa1 Times, 2 September 1974; and Australian, 4 
September 1975. 
83 Inquiry referred by Senator Sim, Western Australia. See CPD, Senate, vol. 62, 3 December 
1974, p. 3013. 
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Committee believes .that serious consideration should now be given 
to acquisition of the entire estate for this purpose. We believe that 
the establishment of an, jsland co-operative would assist significantly 
in the creatioi) of an integrated communitv with a sense of 
responsibility and purpose, and concur W'ith the view that 
acquisition of the estate is the most practical means of giving effect 
to the reforms which are desired for the benefit of the Cocos Island 
people.B4 
The United Nations General Assembly noted that the Australian government 
had initiated particular administrative and legislative changes in the light of the 
Visiting Mission's report.85 The subsequent effectiveness of reforms on the 
Cocos Islands and the position of Clunies-Ross with regard to the community is 
a separate matter. 
To return to the United Nations forum, in early 1975, Australia announced the 
candidacy of Senator Willesee for the presidency of the UN Ge)neral Asserrtviy's 
30th (1975) session. Apparently, the idea arose from the Department of Foreign 
Affairs with enthusiastic support from Whitlam and somewhat less excitement 
from Willesee.s6 The Liberal Party suggestions of Labor aggrandisement at the 
UN appeared to be baseless as members of the 'Western European and Other' 
group, which included Australia and whose turn it wm1id be to provide an 
Assembly President, were not 'lobbied for support. Also, the argument that 
some countries such as Britain and the United States were unhappy about 
Australia's new approach at the UN, and thus failed to endorse the nomination 
of Willesee, appeared to be false.s7 If successful, Australia would he<.ve been the 
first nation to be elected to the post twice, following Evatt's inaugural 
Presidency in the 1940s. Willesee's candidacy emerged from a largely 
disinterested 'Western European and Others' group which, as individua>l 
members, were preoccupied with other matters. However, the Australian 
nomination was withdrawn in mid-1975 when the Prime Minister of 
Luxembourg became a candidate.ss 
84 Senator Primmer (ALP, Victoria), chair, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence, CPD, Senate, vol. 65, 30 September 1975~ p. 780. The Committee's report was 
presented on 30 September 1975. The Committee also included Senators Cormock (LP, 
Victoria), Devitt (AU', Tasmania) [from 3 October 1974}, Drury (LP, South Australia) [to 3 
October 1974], Mcintosh {ALP, Western Australia), Maunsell (CP, Que..ensland), and Sim (LP, 
Western Australia). 
85 Oark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 147. 
86 See Albinski, Australian External Policy ... , op. cit .. P· 162. See also Nation Review, 27 
September- 3 October 1974. 
87 Oark, Tite United Nations, op. cit., p. 129. 
88 Australian, 20 February 1975. 
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In total, the Whitlam governm.ent clearly signalled a change uin Australia's 
position at the UN with significant alterations in voting on decolonisation in 
the first days of office. More generally, Australia aligned with developing 
countries in ~ votes rather than adhere to the voting pattern of the US and 
Britain. Specifically, the Whitlam government supported the self-
determination of the peoples of the Cocos Islands and acted in a constructive 
manner within this UN relationship. Importantly, the efforts of the Whitlam 
government at the UN resulted in a perception that Australia was moving 
toward an anti-racist and anti-colonial foreign policy position. This stance 
within the UN General Assembly sent signals to the nations of Asia, the Pacific 
and Africa. that Australia was now an ally. 
the Commonwealth 
In comparison 1.vith the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations was a 
less opportune forum for the expression of the Whitlam government foreign 
policy. Yet, the Labor government embraced the Commonwealth as a diverse 
international institution which offered formal lines of communication with 
many developing countries.B9 Also, the structure and purpose of the 
Commonwealth suited the Labor Party agenda and objectives. The forum 
provided the opportunity for smaller powers such as Australia ~<) be easily 
noticed, and possibly to exert influence beyond their international standing. 
For Whitlam, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings in 1973 and 
1975 were the obvious points of contact with other leaders. Through the 
Commonwealth forum, Whitlam was able to demonstrate that the Labor 
government was committed to opposing discrimination and injustice, 
especially in southern Africa. 
The Whitlam government invoked the Labor Party Platform to announce that 
the Commonwealth was important as an 'an active instrument for justice and 
peace and for political, social and economic advancement throughout our 
region and also in Africa and the Caribbean'.90 Based on the network of 
diplomatic contacts within the Commonwealth, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Senator Willesee, made a successful goodwill tour of seven African 
countries in June and July 1973. This was the first time that an Australian 
89 Matthews, op. cit., p. 28. 6ee al.so Millar, op. cit._, p. 4Q8. 
90 Governor-General's speech at the Openirtg ofParJ.ianlent on 27 February 1973, CPD, Senate, 
vol. 55, p. 7. See ALP, Federal Platfonn and Policy,, op. cit., p. 15. 
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Minister had conducted a tour of East and West Africa. This trip also 
reinforced the Whitlam government's anti-racist international position.91 
Subsequently, Prime Minister Whitlam attended the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting in Ottawa in August 1973. At this meeting, Aw~tralia 
cultivated links with, and provided support for, the leaders from Africa and the 
Caribbean. Moreover, Whitlam set out to demonstrate the diversification and 
new regional emphasis of Australian foreign policy.92 Further, the most 
significant issue to emerge from the conference was Australia's overt attack on 
the role of multinational corporations. This fitted the Labor government's 
nationalist agenda for resources industries and aligned Australia with the 
developing countries as commodity exporters.93 
Following the Ottawa conference, Whitlam explained Australia's role in the 
Commonwealth to the Parliament and detailed Australia's support for various 
Commonwealth agencies. These included the Commonwealth Fund for 
Technical Co-operation and the Commonwealth Foundation, the new 
Commonwealth Youth Program, and the proposals for a Commonwealth 
Development and Export Bank and an institute for the applied study of 
government.94 Whitlam was criticised by the Liberal and Country Parties for 
encouraging contacts with the leaders of developing countries at the expense of 
Australia's relationships with 'true and trusted friends'.95 This debate merely 
demonstrated the dist::mce between the government and the opposition on 
foreign policy issues in 1973. 
91 Albinski, Au~tralian External Policy ... , op. cit., p. 112; Millar, op. cit., pp. 415 & 420; David 
Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa: New Relationships?, Australian Quarterly, vol. 45, 4, 
December 1973, pp. 63-4; and Goldsworthy, Foreign Policy Review, March 1974, op. cit., p. 112. 
Senator Willesee, as Special Minister for State, visited Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ke.t•ya, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Mauritius. Whitlam, Roy Milne Lecture, op. cit., p. 13. Prime Minister 
Whitlam also embarked upon a tour of Malaysia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Singapore and the 
Philippines in January-February 1974 to improve relations. These visits involved registering a 
distinctively Australian presence and explaining the Labor govemme:nt's more independent 
and anti-racist position. See also Willesee, CPD, Senate, 1 June 1973, p. 2235 and Australian, 6 
July1973. 
92 Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., p. 64. Whitlam's official dinners during the 
conference did not include Britain, instead there was one dinner for the Pacific leaders, one for 
the Caribbean leaders and another for the African leaders. 
93 Goldsworthy, Foreign Policy Review, March 1974, op. ci~., p. 112 and Owen Harries, Mr 
Whitlam and Australian Foreign Policy, Quadrant, vol. 17, 4, July-August 1973, p. 63. 
94 Whitlamr CPD, HR, vol. 85, 22 August 1973, p. 201. See also Gordon Goundrey, The 
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, Round Table, vol. 62,245, January 1972 and 
Pierre Trudeau, The Con..monwealth after Ottawa: Looking to the future, Round Table, no. 253, 
January 1974. 
95 See Sinclair, CPD, HR, vol. 85, 22 August 1973, p. 208. See also debate, CPD, HR, vol. 85, 22 
Augus~ 1973,~ pp. 199-212, including Peacock, and CPD, Senate, vol. 57,22 August 1973, pp. 79-
92, includjng Murphy in defence of Whitlam. 
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Whitlam also participated at the CHOGM iln Kingston in May 1975. The 
meeting was dominated by the interests of th~;1African and Caribbean leaders. 
The Commonwealth resolved that violence was inevitable in Rhodesia while 
the minority regime remained and that sanctions were needed to place greater 
pressure upon both South Africa and Rhodesia. On this, Whitlam suggested 
that the Commonwealth Secretariat should investigate the further restriction of 
flights to and from South Africa.96 Whitlam also agreed to assist with fiitancial 
aid to Mozambique in compensation for the costs incurred in implem.enting 
sanctions against Rhodesia.97 
At the Kingston meeting, the African and Caribbean leaders focused on the 
need for a 'new economic order' which entailed threats of more commodity 
producer cartels to control the price of exports. Prime Minister Whitlam 
cautiously aligned Australia with these demands, both as a commodity 
exporter and an ally of the developing countries.98 Linked to the economic 
questions, Whitlam again argued that multinational corporations should be 
brought under the same government controls as national companies.99 This 
idea was incorporated into the terms of reference for an expert committee of the 
Commonwealt.lt to examine methods of transferring resources and technol<.>gy 
from industrial nations to the developing countries.1°0 
It was clear that Whitlam provided support for the leaders of the developing 
countries through the Commonwealth and this placed some diplomatic 
distance between Australia and Britain. The Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meetings provided brief opportunities to discuss international 
issues while offering a network of contacts for further consultation. 
Significantly, the work of the Whitlam government through the 
Commonwealth reinforced the change in Australian foreign policy on issues of 
discrimination and racism. That is, Whitlam opposed the minority 
governments of South Africa and Rhodesia, and supported the demands of 
developing countries in the Asia Pacific region through the Commonwealth. 
96 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 May 1975 and Age, 8 May 1975. See also Australian, 5 & 8 May 
1975; Financial Review, 2 May 1975; Age, 30 April & 2 May 1975; and Age, editorial, 8 May 1975. 
97 Tiris was the first time that the Commonwealth had resolved to assist a non-Commonwealth 
country. Age, editorial, 8 May 1975. 
98 Australian, 7 May 1975, Australian, editorial, 5 May 1975, and Financial Re-oiew, 29 April & 6 
May 1975. See also Emeka Anyaoku, Involving peoples and societies in developing a new era 
in Commonwealth history after Ottawa, Commonwealth, vol. 17, 4, August-September 1974 and, 
on the Kingston CHOGM, see Commonwealth, vol. 18, 2, April-May 1975. 
99 See Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May 1975. 
100 The expert committee was to examine a !5eries of ideas to reform international financial 
institutions, increase food production, and review commodity agreements in an effort to strike 
a new halance between consumer and producer nations. Australian, 7 & 8 May 1975. 
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As an adjunct to the Whltlam government's position in the Urrited Nations, this 
was important for the projection of a new image of Australia in international 
debates. 
the question of change 
During the tenure of the Labor government, political debate focused on the 
style of the Whitlam foreign policy and raised questions about the extent to 
which Australia's external relations had changed from the previous Liberal and 
Country Parties governments. As one might anticipate, particular 
commentators described the Whitlam foreign policy as a complete rejection of 
established relationships while others argued that Whitlam had changed only 
in style and not substance. On the question of change, the issues were more 
complicated than suggested by this dichotomy. 
lhe point of departure for this debate was the public announcements by Prime 
Minister Whitlam and subsequently by Foreign Minister Willesee. Whitlam 
made a sharp distinction in the 1973 Roy Milne Memorial Lecture when 
outlining the preoccupations of the Liberal and Country Parties governments' 
foreign policy. In the dominant environment of the conflict in Vietnam, 
Whitlam explained, foreign policy was debated within the framework of the 
alliance with the United States and the attempt to contain China. Thus, 
Whitlam placed a high priority on the need for change: 
Clearly, the foreign policy debate and foreign policy decisions can 
never again be so limited, so restricted, so distorted. In that 
liberation, I find the chief distinction of :tY"Y Government's foreign 
policies - and the greatest challenges ar-..J opportunities for the 
future.101 
Willesee also chided the previous era of foreign policy when 'unreasoning fear' 
dictated Australia's perception of international events}02 At that time, Willesee 
claimed, Australia sought not to appear to differ with allies, attempted to deny 
the existence of the People's Republic of China and retained forces in a 'remote 
civil war in Vietnam')03 Willesee derived some satisfaction that this era had 
passed and that debate on the future course of foreign policy could operate in a 
'more rational way, less oriented to narrow political advantage' ,104 Willesee 
101 Whitlam, Roy Milne Lecture, op. cit., p. 3. 
102 Willesee, op. cit., P· 3. 
103 ibid. 
104 ibid.,-pp. 2-3. 
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believed that Australian foreign policy had gone through a period of important 
and substantial change since the December 1972 federal election. 
\ ) 
The Prime Minister also advocated the notion of change by illustrating the 
increased efforts with ,nations of the South East Asia region, the United 
Nations, the Commonwealth, and with China, and the attention and effort 
committed to Australia's previously neglected relations with New Zealand and 
the South Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America_los Whitlam 
engaged some government critics by emphasising the association between 
gesture and substance as the hallmark of Australia's new foreign policy. The 
process of deliberately strengthening, updating and developing political 
connections was a signal for the new aspect of foreign policy.to6 
A key statement of qualification to this perceived change in foreign policy style 
was the Prime Minister's explanation of structural constraint, and therefore 
policy restraint: 
On 2 December the nation changed its government, but did not and 
could not by that act change the essential foundations of its foreign 
policy. Australia's national interests did not change. Australia'o:> 
international obligations did not change. Australia's alliances and 
friendships did not change. Nonetheless, the change is real and 
deep because what has altered is the perception and interpretation of 
those interests, obligations and friendships by the elected 
government.107 
Whitlam seemed to have an understanding of these 'essential foundations' and 
'national interests' but did not explain the content of these concepts. 
Presumably, Australia's 'international obligations' involved the alliance with 
ti~e United States, the position in the United Nations and the Cmnmonwealth, 
and role in the Asia Pacific region. Whitlam's emphasis of 'national interests' 
was held out as indicative that change in foreign policy would be minimal. 
Alternatively, this type of statement by Whitlam was devalued by others 
arguing that change would be significant and destructive. 
As early as 1973, Camilleri argued that the substance of Australian foreign 
policy had not changed under the Whitlam Labor government. The updating 
of policy on China and the critical relationship with the United States could be 
lOS Whitlam ... Roy Ivfilne lecture ... op. cit., pp. 12-14. 
l06 ibid., p. 14-
107 Prime Minister Whitlam, Australian foreign policy, address in opening the Australian 
Institute of Pclitical Science Summer School in Canberra on 27 January 1973, in Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 44, no. 1, January 1973, p. 30. 
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seen as relatively uncomplicated and expected reactions to the excessively 
conservative foreign policies of the previous Liberal and Country Parties 
governments.108 Camilleri also highlighted the contintitit"<:f of acquiescence to 
the United States on the military facilities in Australia. This argument 
dampened expectations of change from the Labor government. The significant 
qualification in L'hls ..malysis was an acknowledgment of the changes on issues 
of racism and the realignment of Australia's position at the United Nations.109 
Camilleri expres~ ·ed the radical yet realistic view that fundamental change 
would be required in the domestic economy and society of Australia before 
substantial change could be expected in foreign policy.no 
Building on the argument of Camilleri, Bull's view of the Whitlam government 
became a dominant position among academic commentators. Bull focused on 
the new perception of Australia's role in the world and distinguished between 
the means through which policy was pursued and the interests which formed 
the foreign policy. Further, Bull argued that change was clear regarding the 
means and modalities of Australian foreign policy but not obvious in the 
Whltlam government's perception of basic interests and obligations.n1 
Essentially, Bull argued that the Whitlam government made no substantial 
change to Australian foreign policy. This position conceded that necessary 
adjustments had been made in an altered international environment with 
reference to the critical views of Catley and McFarlane.112 On the United States, 
Bull emphasised the compliance of the Labor government on the US 
installations while downplaying the protests over the US bombing of 
Cambodia. Also, on China, this explanation drew upon the changing 
international environment and the acceptance of Australia's new policy toward 
108 Camilleri, A New Australian Foreign Policy?, op. cit., pp. 11-12. See also Camilleri, In 
Search of a Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 65. 
109 Camilleri, In Search of a Foreign Policy, ibid., pp. 66-7. 
lliJ Camilleri, A New Australian Foreign Policy?, op. cit., pp. 14-15. On a similar point, see 
comment by Professor G. C. Duncan following W.R. Crocker, Australia and the Region, in 
Beddie, op. cit., pp. 92-6. 
111 H. Bull, The Whitlam Government's Perception of Our Role in the World, chapter 3 in 
Beddie, ibid., p. 29. 
112 Bull, ibid., pp. 31-2, stated that 
if one focuses upon ends rather than means it is difficult to find fault with the thesis of 
two Marxist critics of the Labor gcvEmUD.P.nt -Bruce McFarlane and Robert Catley - that 
there has been no essential change ... Australia's role in the world under the rule of the 
'technocratic Laborites' and 'capitalist renovators' has been to assist in the 
implementation of President Nixon's 'Pacific Rim Strategy' by serving as a springboard of 
neo-imperialism in South-East Asia. 
See also Robert Catley. and Bruce McFarlane, From Tweedledum to Tweedledee: The New Labor' 
Government in Australia - A Critique of its Social Model, Australia and New Zealand Book 
Company, Sydney, 1974. 
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China by the Liberal and Country Parties in the Parliament.113 Further, Bull 
sustained this argument by devaluing the publicly proclaimed changes in 
Australian foreign policy. 
On Australia's relations with developing countries, both Bull and Camilleri 
conceded that Whitlam had made a significant change in policy. It was claimed 
that this aspect of Whitlam's foreign policy, more than other elements, 
expressed the Labor Party's distinctive ideology and divided the Labor 
government from the Liberal and Country Parties.l14 Bull explained that: 
Our geographical circumstances [:ive us a special stake in the 
development of a global order that can accommodate the demands 
of the 1hird World for justice and change. Mr Whitlam's attempts to 
remove 'the racist taint' and to demonstrate support for Third World 
aspirations in the U.N. are an essential part of the working out of 
this special relationship. us 
Moreover, the determination with which Whitlam condemned racism, 
particularly as manifested in southern Africa, could be seen as a significant and 
independent shift. However, Bull and Camilleri questioned the nature of this 
new relationship by stating that the rhetorical commitments of t.l-te Whitlam 
government in criticising Rhodesia and South Africa did not involve an 
economic contribution.116 Indeed, as concluded by Goldsworthy: 
An anti-colonialist and anti-racist stance by the new Australian 
government is meaningless unless attitudes towards Africa are 
rapidly a..11.d firmly enunciated and acted upon.ll7 
Nevertheless, in critique of misplaced expectations, MacCallum asked in June 
1973 whether Camilleri, for example, proposed that Whitlam should 'sever 
diplomatic relations with South Africa and Rhodesia, cut off all trade, and start 
a war of liberation'?llS 
113 Bull, op. cit., p. 32. 
114 ibid., pp. 32-3. 
115 Bull, Age, 30 July 1973. See also Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., p. 60. 
116 Bull, The Whltlam Government's Perception ... , op. cit, pp. 32-3 and Camilleri, A New 
Australian Foreign Policy?, op. cit, p. 12. Sub<i2quent to this debate, additional funds were 
distributed to Africa and elements of trade were altered to bolster the diplomatic manoeuvres. 
See also Richard Higgott, Australia and Africa 1970-80: A Decade of Change and Growth, Africa 
Contemporary Record, vol. 14, 1981, p. 221. 
117 Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit, p. 60, added that this connection of ideas was 
iniplicit in Whltlam's statement on Senator Willesee's tour of Africa, in Australian Foreign Affairs 
Record, May 1973, pp. 365-6. 
us Mungo MacCallum, Nation Review, 22 June 1973. 
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The alternative argument that the change in foreign policy under Whitlam was 
significant and substantial linked several distinct interpretations. Barclay 
announced that: 
Australian foreign policy since 1972 had undergone an alteration in 
style and direction probably unprecedented in the experience of any 
sovereign state which had not been subjected to a demestic political 
revolution.ll9 
This understanding reflected an enthusiasm for the changes implemented by 
the Whitlam government. 
Adopting a similar line on the extent of change but from the conservative side 
of politics, B.A. Santamaria claimed that 'we [Australia] have not even become 
neutral. We have simply changed sides'.l20 This crude analysis was dismissed 
in academic debates of the time but it was a position espoused by many 
x reactionary commentators wishing to inflame the dangers of allowing the 
Labor Party to govern. 
Owen Harries offered a more sophisticated conservative critique of the 
Whitlam foreign policy which attempted to be balanced in criticism ·while 
concluding in ruinous tones. Harries explained that the Whitlam foreign policy 
may be seen as an 'eccentric interlude' which served a 'useful function in 
breaking up the rigidities' established during the previous Liberal and Country 
Parties governments. J:21 This uncharacteristically considered view emerged 
from the political environment when the Labor goven1ment was under siege 
from all sectors in late 1975 and the prospects of political survival were rapidly 
diminishing. 
A somewhat ignored, yet useful, analysis by Murphy alsc claimed that 
signifkant changes were undertaken by the Whitlam govemment.122 This 
argument for change was close to the criticisms of Bull and Camilleri in 
outlining Whitlam's ability to alter the perception of Australia in the region and 
promote the image of Australia as an independent nation. Murphy stated that 
Australian foreign policy did change substantially through a transformation of 
Australian perceptions about international relations and external 
understandings about Australia. 
119 G. St.J. Barclay, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, JulY.-December 1974, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, voL 21, 1, April1975, p. 1. 
120 B.A. Santamaria, Point of View, in News Weekly, 2 May 1973, p. 16 and television broadcast 
Thanks to Gillian Evans for locating this reference. 
121 Owen Harries, Australia's Foreign Policy under Whitlam, Orbis, Fall1975, p. 1100. 
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The primary issue of debate remained whether the foreign policy of the 
Whitlam government wLs limited to image and style, and thereby lacked 
substance. This debate centred on the perceiv ~d discrepancies between the 
rhetorical structuring of image by the Whitlam goverrur.ent and the substantive 
changes in foreign policy. As Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Whitlam 
reiterated the Labor Party vision to create a new style for Australian foreign 
policy which would project an image of independence: 
The change of Government provides a new opportunity for us to 
reassess the whole range of Australian foreign policies and attitudf>s. 
I shall be reassessing these polkies with the general intention of 
developing more constructive, flexible and progressive approaches 
to a nurnber of issues. Our thinking is towards a more independent 
Australian stance in international affairs and towards an Australia 
which will be less militarily oriented and not open to suggestions of 
racism; an Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a 
distinctive, tolerant, co-operative and well regarded nation not only 
in the Asian and Pacific region but in the world at large.123 
This statement could be understood in terms of a more sophisticated 
relationship with the United States, including a termination of the dependent 
military and economic position of Australia within the alliance. However,. the 
actions of Prime Minister Whitlam were perceived by some as establishir.lg a 
closer identification with US diplomacy.124 As part of the same foreign policy 
agenda, Whitlam was attempting to project a new image for Australia in the 
Asia Pacific region, in international forums, ~l.d with particular developing 
natlons. The statements on independence were not divorced from the 
contint"'ing link with the US, and this understanding of Australian foreign 
policy was not separate from the task of improving relations with developjng 
countries through the United Nations and the Commonwealth. 
The initial changes in foreign policy could also be seen as an incoherent, even 
reactionary set of policy modifications. Howev~r, an accusation of a 
fragmentary ap~ roach to foreign policy by Whitlam implies a lack of clear 
objectives, which was not the case. Prime Minister Whitlam operated with a 
comprehensive policy statement which was based on a detailed Labor Party 
Platform. In terms of a reactionary approach, immediate alterations Wf~re 
122 D.J. Murphy, New Nationalism or New Internationalism. .. , op. cit., p. 17. 
123 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 841" 24 May 1973, p. 2643, repeating a statement made when sworn 
into office on 5 December 1972. 
124 Camilleri, In Search of a Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 69. Students nf conspiracy theories may 
analyse this Labor tactic as an attempt to rt:!assure the United States military e.:>tablishment for 
the purposes ofWhitlam's desire to remain in power. These advocates claim vindication in the 
d.~sal of the Whitlam government by extraordinary political means. 
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required in specific areas in response to the policies of the Liberal and Country 
Parties governments. The Whitlam agenda ori. foreign policy was coherent but 
the implementation of changes was impa¢ted upon by more practical 
considerations. One constraint may have been the frenzy of government and, 
thereby, the desire to produce a coherent foreign policy may have been 
subsumed by the volume of work. 
The problem of unfulfilled image was resolved in part with the appointment of 
Senator Willesee to the posfition of Minister qf .Foreign Affairs in November 
1973. The watchful SenatoJ: Willesee continued to advocate the foreign policy 
principles as documented in the Labor Party Platform and policy speech.12s 
However, changes under Willesee were not highlighted to the same extent <lS 
the initial reforms implemented by Whitlam. The image of the Labor foreign 
policy was established early ln the administration. of policy and this 
understanding of the direction of government remained l ~ing Willesee's term 
as Foreign Minister. 
At a different level, the Labor government attempted to claim that foreign 
policy was operating in an atmosphere of bipartisanship. Senator Willesee 
flaunted the reasonableness of the Labor position in ,;; gesture of incorporation 
of the Liberal Party ·in opposition.126 However, Andrew Peacock as 
spokesperson on foreign affairs was a11Xious to differentiate the Liberal and 
Country Parties from the vVhitlam gu · ·ru:nent position. Peacock's foreign 
policy statement of April 1974 reje"·r$ 1 the Labor vision of a flexible 
international ~vie for Australia in the era of detente, the assumption of regional 
leadership, and the developn1ent of alliances with developing countries as 
resource producers.127 The Lit·.;:·.ral Party endorsed the evolution of elements of 
foreign policy, particularly the recognition of China, North Vietnam, and East 
Germany. Howe-ver, within a largely consensual debate, Peacock highlighted a 
considerable difference of ~mphasis.128 Specifically, it was r.!:aimed that Labor's 
relations with the United States included a hostile component which reflected 
disunity within the Whitlam government. Also, new relationships with China 
and North Vietnam suffered from unacceptable compromises in political 
125 See Goldsworthy, Foreign Policy Review, September 1974, op. cit., p. 104. 
126 See Willesee quoted in Australian, 24 April1974. See also Cairns quoted in Sydney Morning 
Herald, 25 April1974. 
12 .. Peacock in Goldsworthy, Foreign Policy Review, September 1974, op. cit., pp. 111-12. On 
the Liberal Party foreign policy position, see National Times, editorial, 22 Apri1197 4; Australian, 
24 April1974; Age, editorial, 24 April1974; Financial Review, 24 April1974; and Sydney Morning 
Herald, editorial, 24April1974. 
128 Andrew Peacock, Opposition Foreign Policy: Alternative:..: .or Bipartisanship, in Beddie, op. 
cit., pp. 174-5. W. MacMahon Ball, op. cit, p. 4, supported this analysis. 
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principles. The Liberal Party was critical of the inconsistent manner in which 
the leven-han.ded' policy was implemented regarding nuclear testing and the 
Middle East. Peacock concluded that the continuity in some areas of fon~ign 
policy should not diminish the 'essential incompatibility between the 
Government's and the Opposition's approach to foreign policy'.129 
In conclusion, the question of change was answered in many different ways 
which tended to relate clos~ly with the hQstile political debate during the 
Whitlam government. Certainly, Whitlam and Willesee advocated the need for 
change and indeed claimed that the Labor government had shifted Australian 
foreign policy in both, substance and style. Some commentators suggested that 
this position was an exaggeration in terms of the extent of change while others 
warned of ·the dire consequences of such radical change. Most analyses 
conceded that the improvement in relations with developing countries, 
especially in the Asia Pacific region, and the recognition of the demands of 
developing countriesF especially on southern Africa, was an important change 
in Australian foreign policy. 
There are four issues to be highlighted in concluding the question of change. 
First, expectations of ref~rm reached a high point with the election of the 
Whitlam ~ ... abor govemrr·,ent: The range of anticipated alterations to Australia's 
foreign policy could not be completed and indeed, with the expectations of an 
independent Australia, would not be initiated by 0-e Whitlam government in 
its political ·context of parliamentary and bureaucratic constraints. On this, 
Camilleri conceded that an independent path would take political courage, 
clarity of objectives and a diplomatic approach to the political education of the 
Australian citizenry,130 Thus, some expectations for change in Australian 
foreign policy were unfulfilled. 
Second, the international political environment offered the Whitlam 
government an opportunity to transform Australia's foreign relations. The 
diplomatic strategies employed by the United States with regard to Chl.11a and 
the Soviet Union provided the context for an image of change in foreign policy. 
129 Peacock, op. cit., p. 175. Peacock had highlighted the 'grandstanding and empty 
symbolism' of Labor policy and stated that the Liberal Party did not accept the 'vague 
internationalism and the spirit of international brotherhood of socialists as espoused by this 
Government'. Peacock, CPD, HR., vol 88, 14 March 1974, p. 455. See ensuing debate, CPD, HR., 
vol. 88, 14 March.1974, pp. 428-39 & pp. 442-58 involving Morrison, Peacock, Sinclair, Barnard, 
Fraser, Snedden, and Kerin. See also Albinski, Australian Exte111.al Policy ... , op. cit., pp. 163-4. 
130 Camilleri, In Search of a Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 79. 
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As stated by Bell, the Whitlam approach to international politics 'owed a good 
deal to atmospherics'.131 Thereby, Whitlam was able to implement change in 
Australian foreign policy due, in part, to the altered global strategic 
environment. 
Third, the interpretation of political history without sufficient distance tended 
to distort analysis of policy decisions. In explanation, conservative critiques of 
the Whitlam foreign policy, which focused upon the politicising of Australia's 
international position, ignored the previous policies which demonstrated a 
greater extent of overt political opportunism and political narrowness in 
decision-making. The hostility displayed toward Whitlam on domestic 
political. issues precluded an ac~owledgment that the Labor government had 
transfm·m.ed debate on foreign policy away from ideological contests and 
toward informed discussion. 
Fourth, without the benefit of hindsight and in the q:mtext of world politics in 
the early 1970s, it appeared inconsistent for the new Australian government to 
affirm the importance of the alliance with the United States while offering 
robust criticism of US policy in Vietnam,132 However, this position was 
consistent with the Labor Party Platform and fitted Whitlam's longstanding 
approach to foreign policy. 
For its time, the Whitlam government introduced significant change to 
Australia's position in internationa] debates. Where expectations for fu--:ther 
change in foreign policy were unrealistic, these expectations were not fulfilled. 
Notwithstanding the domestic debate on the extent of ~change, the Labor 
government was able to refocus the perception of Australia in international 
forums and within international relations. 
Conclusion 
The general foreign policy issues co-ordinated by the Whitlam Labor 
government offer an illustrative context for analysis of policies relating to 
developing countries and in particular African nations. The Whitlam foreign 
policy explicitly rejected the fears of the previous Liberal and Country Parties 
governments and attempted to forge a new approach to Australia's foreign 
relations. There was swift change in specific elements of foreign policy 
131 Bell, op. cit., p. 117. 
132 See Harries, Australia's Fot\~ign Policy under Whitlam, op. cit, pp. 1090-1. 
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immediately upon election of ~e Labor government in December 1972. This 
initial set of actions set the tone, for, therWhltlam foreign policy. 
The Whitlam government formulated a reliant while critical relationship with 
the United States. This balance was occasionally unsettled by the continuing 
conflict in Vietnam and Australia's role in global security arrangements. In 
total, Australia's relations with the United States were founded in an overt 
commitment to the alliance with sporadic attempts to reform this historic bond. 
Moreover, the Indian Ocean region proved illustrative of tensions within the 
Whitlam government foreign policy. In the context of the proposal for a zone 
of peace and the plans for Diego Garcia, th~ Whitlam government appeared to 
manage the potential conflicts in policy with considerable skill. 
At the United Nations, Prime Minister Whitlam sent a clear signal that 
Australia would be adopting a new voting pattern and a different international 
position. Australia aligned. with the developing countries in the UN to support 
decolonisation issues. Also, w~thin the Commonwealth, the Whitlam 
government reinforced Australia's commitment to recognising the interests of 
developing countries. In essence, Whitlam made many significant changes to 
Australian foreign policy while maintaining the fundamental tenets of 
Australia's international relationships. 
The general discussion on Whitlam's initiatives in foreign policy provide a 
background for the analysis of Australia's relations with developing countries. 
Again, the wider context of foreign policy is vital for the analysis of distinct 
parts of international relations and the understanding of Australia's policy 
formulation on specific questions. 
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chapter4 
Whit lam foreign policy and developing countries 
The Whitlam government made significant changes to Australia's foreign 
policy in order to forge more constructive relationships with developing 
countries. This approach was based on the anti-colonial and anti-racist 
principles embodied in the Labor Party Platform. In this chapter, I ~alyse 
Whitlan1's approach on the Asia Pacific region, in particular the proposal 
for an Asia Pacific forum. I examine Australia's recognition of China, the 
diplomatic struggles on Cambodia, and the debate on Vietnam. It is also 
important to discuss the Whitlam government's response to the situation 
in East Timor through 1975 and the changes to Australian aid 
administration and aid policy, especially in reference to Papua New Guinea. 
In total, I argue that Whitlam aligned Australia with the interests of the 
developing countries and that this shift was central to the Whitlam 
government's position on Africa. 
Immediately upon assuming government, Whitlam made several changes 
to domestic and foreign policy which moved Australia closer to the interests 
of developing countries. Symbolically, Whitlam instructed the Australian 
delegation at the United Nations to change Australia's vote on key 
resolutions to oppose the minority regime in Rhodesia. With immediate 
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impact, '~'Whitlam relocated Australia in the General Assembly to align with 
the nations committed to ending colonialism and racial discrimination. 
Whitlam reaffirmed the Labor Party intention to establish a more 
independent foreign policy for Australia, withdrew Australian troops from 
Vietnam, moved toward recognising China, prioritised the Asia Pacific 
region for Australian foreign: policy and promised to end Australia's 
colonial role in Papua New Guinea. In addition, the Labor Party policy on 
immigration was implemented which meant non-European New Zealand 
immigrants would be admitted to Australia without restriction and 
Aboriginal peoples would no longer be required to obtain a permit to leave 
Australia.l While these changes seemed sensible, even perfunctory in 
updating Australia's position, t.he speed and commitment to change on 
these issues was vital in constructing a different approach for Australia with 
developing countries. Indeed, as Higgott commented, Whitlam's strength 
was to 'realise the amount of goodwill to be gained from supporting the 
developing nations in their battle against racial discrimination and 
colonialism'.2 For Whitlam, the most important aspect of Australian 
foreign policy was the relationship with the Asia Pacific region. 
Asia Pacific region 
Whitlam described Australia as outside of South East Asia.3 This statement 
indicated an understanding that Australia has a different colonial history to 
the neighbouring countries. Whitlam seemed to defer to the sensitivities of 
the Asia Pacific region by not regarding Australia as a natural member of 
Asia and by not automatically situating Australia within South East Asia. 
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Whitlam promoted the idea of an Asia Pacific 
forum for greater cooperation in the region. 
In terms of regional structures, the Whitlam government was opt:.. ""llt 
downgrading the importance of the South East Asia Treaty OrgaP >n 
which was based on anti-communist defence objectives. The r· · ~ -· · al.l.d 
economic Asian and Pacific Council was also character; .ically anti-
1 Claire Oark, ed., Australian Foreign PoliCJ:f: Toward a Reassessment, Cassell .. North 
1{elbour.ne,1973,p.17. 
2 Richard Higgott, Australia and Africa 1970-80: A Decade of Change and Growth, Africa 
Contemporary Record, vol. 14, 1981, p. 224. 
3 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975, Viking, Ringwoodr 1985, p. 123. See 
generally, Nancy Viviani, The Whitlam Government's Policy towards Asia, chapter 7 in 
David Lee and Christopher Waters, eds, Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian 
Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1997. 
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communist with membership including South Korea, South Vietnam and 
Taiwan. Neither forums fitted Whitlam's vision for regional cooperation.4 
In preference, the Whitlam government supported the Association of 
South East Asian Nations. Given that this organisation included Indonesia, 
ASEAN was an important avenue for the Whitlam government in 
developing closer relations with the region in generaLS ASEAN 
demonstrated the possibilities for regional co-operation and for close 
economic links among neighbours. Moreover, Whitlam understood that 
ASEAN provided the potential for a larger regional association. 
From the early days of government, Whitlam advocated the establishment 
of a regional Asia Pacific forum. The Prime Minister promoted this idea of 
a wide association of states within 'an organisation. genuinely 
representative of the region, without ideological overtones'.6 Whitlam was 
careful to indicate that an Asia Pacific grouping would not imply absorbing 
or abandoning ASEAN.7 Further, Whitlam used the analogy of the 
Comma: ;ealth as a relatively unstructured forum. 'where it is possible for 
heads of government regularly to exchange views which are of mutual 
interest'. s 
The Whitlam government offered a number of ideas for the construction of 
an Asia Pacific regional forum. It was suggested that the membership could 
include the ASEAN countries, other South East Asian countries such as 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma, with China and Japan, and Australia 
and New Zealand. The group would not include the Soviet Union or the 
United States, while the position of countries in South Asia remained 
4 See Henry S. Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor, University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia, 1977, pp. 94 & 246-48 and Whitlam, op. cit., p. 94. 
5 The members of ASEAN were Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the 
Philippines. On the Australia-Indonesia-ASEAN connection, see J.A.C. Mackie, Australia's 
Relations with Indonesia: Principles and Policies I, Australian Outlook, vol. 28, April1974, 
pp. 11-13. On ASEAN, see Canberra Times, 19 April1974, and Age, 10 & 16 October 1975. 
6 E.G. Whitlam, Opening Address, in G. McCarthy, ed., Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices 
for the Seventies, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1973, p. 6. For an overview, see J. Knight, 
Australia and Proposals for Regional Consultation and Co-operation in the Asian and Pacific 
Area, Australian Outlook, vol. 28, 3, December 1974 and see generally, Michael Leifer, 
Regional order in South East Asia: an uncertam prospect, Round Table, no. 225, July 1974. 
7 Australia was Vigorous in supporting ASEAN within the debate on a wider regional 
association. For example, in 1974, Australia was the first nation to support collective all-
ASEAN economic development projects in addition to con tim :ing economic and technical 
assistance to ASEAN's members on a bilateral basis or thxough international aid agencies. 
Later in 1974, Canberra was the site of the first ASEAN Secretarie::;-General Conference held 
outside the ASEAN capitals. Albinski, op. cit., p. 95. 
8 Whitlam quoted in Albinski, ibid., p. 92. 
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unclear. Importantly,· Whitlam argued that the construction of the forum 
s~ould proceed slowly and that the impetus needed to emerge from the 
countries of Asia rather than from Australia.9 
Prime Minister Whitlam claimed that a regional community could break 
down long-standing preoccupations with ideological conflicts.lo This fitted 
with the Labor Party's approach on international issues and emerged from 
the Labor Party's philosophical oud~Jok as explained in the Platform. The 
investment of time and energy by Whitlam on the notion of an Asia Pacific 
forum demonstrated Australian initiative in building a more independent 
foreign policy and attempting to advance Australian credibility and 
influence in the region. Potentially, the Asia Pacific forum might have 
become a springboard for declaring a zone of peace and for facilitating 
greater economic co-operation in the region.ll 
Before Whitlam had the opportunity to promote the grouping in the 
region, ASEAN Ministers rejected the idea.12 The members of ASEAN were 
resistant to Australian initiation of an idea for cooperatiO!J. in the Asia 
Pacific region, suspecting that Australia's intentions were to promote 
relations with Japan and China rather than to emphasise the region as a 
whole. Not surprisingly, China was officially supportive of the Whitlam 
idea wr..ich could extend the influence of China into South East Asia. Japan 
was more circumspect on a regional grouping which could delay the 
development of bilateral relations with China. New Zealand was 
supportive of the forum while trying to claim the idea for themselves.13 
The Whitlam government continued to promote the idea of an Asia Pacific 
forum in a reassuring manner. Prime Minister Whitlam confirmed that 
the forum would not supersede ASEAN and that Australia would not act 
9 Whitlam, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 86, 9 October 1973, pp. 1811-12. See also 
Canberra Times, 4 April 1973. 
10 E.G. VV.hitlam, Australia's Foreign Policy: New Directions, New Definitions, Twenty-
fourth Roy Milne Memorial Lecturt:!, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Brisbane, 
30 November 1973, pp. 11-12. 
11 Albinski, op. cit., pp. 93-4. See also Peter King, Wither Whitlam?, International Affairs, 
vol. 29, Summer 1974, p. 434. 
12 See Albinski, op. cit., pp. 96-7 and Laurie Oakes and David Solomon, Grab for Power: 
Election '74, Cheshire ... Melbourne, 1974, p.104. See also Geoffrey Fairbairn, The 
neutralisation of South East Asia: reflections on a new concept, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 
50, 1, June 1973 and Michael Leifer, The ASEAN states: no common outlook, International 
Affairs, vol. 49, 4, October 1973. 13 Albinski, op. cit., pp. 97-8. See also Australian,. 20 June 1973. 
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for China in South East Asia.14 After the initial reaction, ASEAN became 
more favourable to the idea but remained guarded. Also, as the most 
powerful state within ASEAN, Indonesia was aware that a larger forum 
implied less influence in the re.gion.15 
Camilleri was critical of the Whitlam government for advancing the idea of 
a regional organisation without ideological influence while Australia 
remained in military alliance with the United States.16 This was a valid 
criticism because the Whitlam government had not moved to. change the 
basis of the relationship with the United States. However, the security 
alliance with the United States may have provided a reason for the 
members of ASEAN to support the regional grouping, with no objection 
from Japan on this issue, and an emerging relationship between China and 
the United States. 
In sum, the idea of an Asia Pacific grouping was discussed in the region but 
the shape of the forum was not decided. The Whitlam government relied 
upon the members of ASEAN to provide the initiative for the idea and to 
continue to promote the value of the forum. h1 the end, Whitlam's 
proposition for an Asia Pacific forum lapsed for want of sufficient support 
in the region at the time. 
China 
Whltlam had displayed a longstanding interest in China and recognised the 
importance of China in the Asia Pacific region. The Labor Party's support 
for China had been assisted by the United Statesjreproachmem with China 
in 1971-72. The Whitlam government's relations with China changed 
Australian foreign policy and this new position had implications for 
Australia's relations with ASEAN. 
Within days of the 1972 election, Whitlam directed the Department of 
Foreign Affairs to begin negotiations for diplomatic recognition of the 
People's Republic of China through the Australian and Chinese 
14 See Whitlam, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 96, 2 September 1975, p. 897. See also 
Werner Draguhn, ASEAN: Relations with the People's Republic of China, Intereconomics, no. 
6, June 1974. 
15 Albinski; op. cit., pp. 99-100. See also Knight, op. cit, pp. 263-70. 
16 See J. Camilleri, A New Australian Foreign Policy?, Arena, no. 31, 1973, p. 14 and J. 
Can)iUeri, In Search of a Foreign policy, Arena, nos. 32-33,1973, pp. 75-6. 
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Ambassadors in Paris. Mutual recognition with China was achieved with 
remarkable speed by 22 December 1972. Whitlam announced that: 
The Australian Government recognises the Government of the 
People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, 
acknowledges the position of the Chinese Government that 
Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China, and has 
decided to remove its official representation from Taiwan before 
25th January 1973.17 
This was stronger than the Canadian formula of 1970 which 'took note' of 
China's position on Taiwan but not as strong as that adopted for some other 
states which acknowledged Taiwan to be 'an inalienable part of the territory 
of the People's Republic of China'.18 This action was not unexpected given 
the clear policy statements of the Australian Labor Party prior to the 
December 1972 election. Also, recognition of Chin~ was a clear rejection of 
the racist basis of the Liberal and Country Parties' foreign policy.19 As 
Albinski explained, the normalisation of relations with China showed that 
the 'nasty past lay behind, a good and sensible future ahead. At last, things 
had been set right.'20 
It was clear that the early recognition of the People's Republic of China by 
the Whitlam government helped to build the emerging trading 
relationship with Australia. Minister Cairns led an official trade mission to 
China in May 1973 which translated into the signing of the Australia-China 
Trade Agreement in July 1973 on long-term commodity arrangements. This 
was the first Chinese contract with Australian iron ore suppliers.21 
Australian relations with China were clarified at the time of Whitlam's 
official visit in October-November 1973. There were substantial points of 
agreement on a diverse range of issues, with some predictable differences, 
notably on Cambodia. A cen~al outcome of the visit was a further trade 
17 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 58. Further, Whitlam announet~d the 
appointment of Dr. Stephen Fitz§erald, a scholar :in Chinese and a former External Affairs 
officer, who, as an academic, had accompanied Whitlam to China in 1971, as Australia's 
first Ambassador to the People's Republic of China. 
18 See Oark, op. cit., pp. 16 & 20. 
19 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 26. Whitlam explained that 'the 
foundation of the Liberal policies was fear of foreigners; its focus was fear of communism; and, 
because these fears in tum focused so sharply on China and the Chinese version of communism, 
they were rooted in racism'. 
20 Albinski, op. cit., p. 151. 
21 Comprising a cross-section of Australia's leading business interests, the mission had an 
almost exclusively economic purpose. See ibid., pp. 152, 213-14 and Whitlam, The Wliitlam 
Government .•. , op. cit, pp. 245 & 275. See also Cairns, CPD, HR, vo186, 15 October 1973, p. 
2056. 
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agreement on new long-term arrangements for the sah of Australian sugar 
and wheat to China.22 Also, there was productive discussion on 
immigration to Australi~,~ cultural and scientific exchanges, and a role for 
Australian diplomacy between ASEAN countries and China. Symbolically, 
Whitlam was able to speak at length with Zhou Enlai, Deng Ziaoping joined 
these discussions, ~nd it was arranged for Whitlam to meet with Mao 
Zedong.23 
Further, China appeared to value the diplomatic connections with Australia 
which offered greater contact with the United States and other nations. This 
was reflected in the seniority of China's Ambassador to Australia, Wang 
Kuo Ch'uan who matched the rank of the US A1nbassador Marshall 
Green.24 In addition, Whitlam was critical of the anti-China rationale of the 
SEATO military alliance and had withdrawn Australia frorri naval exercises 
scheduled for the time of the visit to China.2s 
On a separate issue, the Labor government was silent on China's nuclear 
testing agenda while bringing France before the International Court of 
Justice over nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean. As China did not 
acknowledge the jurisdiction of the ICJ, Australia did not joiP. China to the 
action. This technical distinction fuelled the impression that the Whitlam 
government was less critical of China. Certainly, China was seen to be more 
22 Camilleri, In Search of a Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 68-9 argusd that the t..'u'ee year trade 
agreement was in keeping with Australian vested economic interests as interpreted and 
promoted by previous Liberal-Country Parties governments for more than a decade. Further, 
David Goldsworthy, Foreign Policy Review, Australian Quarterly, vol. 46, 1, March 1974, p. 
110, explained that the trade deals favoured China as Australia had offered prices for the 
wheat and sugar below current market levels. Goldsworthy also noted that there were 
reports that the Australian wheat and sugar marketing authorities had not been consulted on 
these deals, thought them unnecessary in a period of high demand,. and felt that the cost of 
the concessional terms should be borne by the foreign aid program. 
23 Whitlam, The Whitlam Govenzment ... , op. cit., pp. 59-60, recalled the visit with Mao: 
In discussing our political philosophies I ventured the opinion that his party 
advocated revolution and mine evolution. He said 'Ah, Darwinism!'. I agreed 
and he asked, 'Is Port Darwin named after Darwin?' I thought so. He then asked 
'Did Darwin visit Australia?' I thought not. He could not have planned nor I 
expected such an exchange. On return home I checked that Charles Darwin had 
visited Sydney and gone as far inland as Bathurst in 1836 in the course of his 
voyage around the world in HMS Beagle and that Darwit\ was named by the 
captain of the Beagle on its visit there in 1839. I sent a s~;l£-criticism to Mao. 
24 Also, the Chinese Ambassador to Australia technically outranked China's Ambassador to 
Japan. Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 111. 
25 ibid. See also Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ••• , op. cit., pp. 56 & 157. 
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important within Australian foreign policy than France, which was not 
disputed by Whitlam.26 
In sum, Whitlam needed to balance Australia's position on China with 
policies toward ASEAN. This was a difficult task given the animosity 
among countries in the Asia Pacific region. It could have been predicted 
that Australia's stance would cause difficulties on specific issues, notably 
Cambodia. 
Cambodia 
The Whitlam government's position on the recognition of Cambodia was 
part of the complex diplomatic web of relations between the United States, 
China, ASEAN, and the competing forces in Cambodia. Whitlam was 
determined to shift Australia's support away from the Lon Nol government 
in Cambodia and toward the alternative leader, Sihanouk, but this would 
have been contrary to the United States' position. Australia was challenged 
again when this issue was discussed at the United Nations. By 1975, it 
appeared that the diplomatic debates had achieved little as Pol Pot and the 
Khmer Rouge were about to take control in Cambodia. 
After meeting with Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1965 and again in 1968, 
Whitlam constructed Labor Party policy on the recognition of Cambodia: 
I was outraged at the American support for the usurpation by Lon 
Nolin March 1970 and the invasion by the forces of South Viet 
Nam the following month. I resolved that when we came to 
government we would distance ourselves from Lon Nol.27 
Nevertheless" the Whitlam government maintained Aust:\:tli.a's 
recognition of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia. Whitlam decided to 
wait until the political situation in Cambodia became more clear.28 
Certainly" there was a difficulty in continuing to recognise the 'impotent 
and farcical regime of Marshal Lon Nol' which retained control of less than 
26 Albinski, op. cit, pp. 144-7 and Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., pp. 611-13. 
In political terms, the distinction was made that France tested the nuclear devices in the 
Pacific O.:ean whereas China at least used their own territory for the tests. 
27 Whitlam, ibid., pp. 49-50. Whitlam's views on Cambodia hardened when, as a guest of 
Sihanouk, 1Nhitlam ascertained that 'the Australian Secret Intelligence Service was acting 
as a surrogate for the US Central futelligence Agency'. 
28 Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 110. 
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ten per cent of Cambodian territory in spite of enormous US support.29 It 
appeared that Whitlam did not want to antagonise the United States on this 
particular diplomatic issue. Notwithstanding this position, Australia 
withdrew from. an intemal.ional aid program for Cambodia on the grounds 
that the real purpose: of this scheme was to bolster the Lon Nol 
government.30 
Simultaneously, Australia was faced with the complex problem of the 
representation of Cambodia at the UN General Assembly. In 1973 and 1974, 
member states supporting Prince Norodom Sihanouk -::~.nd the Royal 
Government of the National Union of Cambodia challenged the credentials 
of the delegation of the Government of President Lon Nol. To the surprise 
and perhaps annoyance of countries in South East Asia which supported the 
Lon Nol re~e, Australia abstained on a vote to defer the item.31 Whitlam 
was caught between the desire io support Silianouk and the pressure from 
the US and ASEAN to maintain support for the Lon Nol government. 
However, at the UN in 1974, Australia supported a successful ASEAN 
resolution which avoided the issue of representation and called for 
conciliation between the two parties in Cambodia. Australia's vote 
effectively opposed efforts to displace the Lon Nol regime and may have 
reflected some successfu.llobbyi..""lg by Indonesia and Japan}2 Prior to this, 
the Lon Nol government had fallen and Prince Sihanouk had been 
reinstalled, albeit temporarily, as Head of State.33 
In a reflection on the complex diplomatic negotiations, Whitlam explained 
that 'Lon Nol had fled and Kissinger1s clever policy on Cambodia was about 
to end in genocide under Pol Pot'.34 The position of Whitlam in preferring 
to support Sihanouk appeared to be vindicated against the failure of the 
United States policy of support for Lon Nol in Cambodia. However, 
Australia had not supported Sihanouk at the UN and Whitlam was 
29 Camilleri, In Search of a Foreign policy, op. cit., p. 68. 
30 Goldsworthy, op. cit, p. no_ Previously, in the 1973 bucig:et, the Whitlam government 
discontinued Australia's un~{l~;·v~iting of Cambodia's currency while continuing to insure the 
currency of Laos. See Whi!}<'"'.t., The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. SO and Albinski, op. 
cit., pp. 130 & 181. 
31 Oaire Clark_. The United Nations, chapter 6 in W.J. Hudson, Australia in World Affairs 
1971-75, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1980, pp. 133-4. 
32 Albinski, op. cit., p. 131. The argument was that the abandonment of the Lon Nol 
government would assist the cause of insurgent movements h"1 the region and delay a 
negotiated settlement in Cambodia. See also Whitlam, CPD, HR, 2 August 1974, pp. 1107-8. 
33 Oark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 134. 
34 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 50. 
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criticised for the distance between rhetoric and action on Canlbodia. In 
particular, the contrast could bf~ drawn between the Labor government's 
immediate recognition of China''and the reluctance to openly recognise the 
Sihanouk forces in Cambodia. 
Vietnam 
Another key issue for the Whitlam government was the policy on South 
Vietnam, and thereby on North Vietnam. There was considerable debate 
on issues of recognition and aid to both countries. The Whitlam 
government struggled with this foreign policy issue and, in the end, 
changed Australia's position. 
Immedie.teiy upon gaining office, Whitlam withdrew the remaining 
Au:?>tralian troops and criticised the actions of the United States in 
Vietnam. 35 While Australia r~cognised the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam in North Vietnam and the Govern~ent of the 
Republic of Vietnam in South Vieb1am, there was a debate on whether 
Australia should also formally recognise the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government in South Vietnam. As an early ir~dication in this debate, 
\\Thitlam was firm in opposing the PRG at the 1973 Labor Party federal 
conferen~e and thus the move toward recognition was initially defeated .. 36 
Within the government, Cairns claimed that the maintenance of 
diplomatic arrangeme11.ts with the Thieu government in South Vietnam 
meant the preservation of a discredited regime and postponed a political 
settlement which would include the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government. It was argued by Cairns and similar critics that the Paris 
Agreements had recognised the governm~nt in South Vietnam and had 
also recognised the PRG as an established administrative and political force 
in the region. Thus, as a start to reconstructing relations, Prime Minister 
Whitlam was pressured from within the Labor government to extend 
diplomatic -recognition to the Provisional Revolutionary Government in 
South Vietnam.37 
35 See ibid., pp. 21 & 42-3. 
36 See Albinski, op. cit., p. 127. 
37 ibid., pp. 127-8. ~e Whitlam, CPD, HR_. vol. 89, 2 August 1974, p. 1114. It was argued that 
Australia should support the participation of the PRG at an International Committee of the 
Red Cross Weaponry Conference, and thereby recognise the standing of the PRG as the 
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Whitlam rejected these criticisms and, in respon~e, argued that the Paris 
Agreements did not imply that the PRG wa~ ~ntitled to diplomatic 
recognition. Minister Willesee explained that the Paris Agreements 
included an illustrative statement whereby 'signature of the Act did not 
constitute n:cognition of any party in any case in which it had not 
previously been accorded'.38 Thus Australia would not recognise the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam but would 
maintain informal contacts with the PRG. While the Whitlam 
government was critical of the Thieu regime, vVillesee argued that 
maintenance of relations with the South Vietnam government could 
influence the movement toward free elections and a political settlement in 
South Vietnam.39 
To complicate this issue, members of ASEAN preferred that Australia did 
not ,change diplomatic relations with South Vietnam. The dilemma for 
Whitlam was that to recognise the PRG would feed into the criticisms of the 
Liberal and Country Parties that the Labor government was succumbing to 
radical pressures, but to maintain policy would incur further pressure from 
the proponents of PRG recognition such as Cairns. Indeed, the 1naintenance 
of policy threatened to invoke a formal Labor Party demand for recognition 
of the PRG which could have involved an electorally damaging factional 
debate on the issue.4o By late 1974, about half of the Labor Party caucus, 
including several Ministers, supported the argument for PRG recognition. 
The Whitlam government did not appear to be inflexible on the issue and 
proceeded to loosen the policy without launching into recognition. 
At the ALP federal conference in February 1975, the Labor Party's Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committee, which Whitlam chaired, recommended 
that resolutions proposing PRG recognition be discharged. Nevertheless, a 
motion proposed by Cairns on the floor of the conference that favoured 
recognition was passed by a single vote. Not to be dissuaded, the opponents 
of recognition were able to pass amendments to the Cairns motion and, 
with some procedural..4.&ight of hand by presiding chair Hawke, the original 
alternative government of South Vietnam. See also Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 61,16 August 
1974, p. 1066. 
38 This was an important provision, required by North Vietnam, the PRG, USSR and China, 
(U; these parties did not recognise the South Vietnam regime, and by the US, France, Britain 
and Canada, which did not recognise the PRG. Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 61, 16 August 
1974, p. 1066. 
39 Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 61,16 August 1974, p.1066. 
40 Albinski, op. cit., pp. 128-9. At this time, Committees for the Recognition of the 
Pro·visional Revolutionary Goven' t1ent began a systematic campaign of lobbying ALP 
Members of Parliament. 
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motion was negated.41 This was not an exemplary display of how the Labor 
government formulated policy on complex isst\es. 
Apart from the issue of recognition, Australian relations with Vietnam 
centred on the provision of economic as5~stan!ce. Where th-2 previous 
Australian governments had distributed a significant aid program to South 
Vietnam, the Labor government wanted to allocate aid on a more even 
basis, which implied a substantial improvement in the level of assistance to 
North Vietnam. Indeed, the Whitlam government was pressured from 
within the Labor Party to stop aid to South Vietnam.42 
With reference to a proposed mulhtateral aid operation for South Vietnam 
under the aegis of the World Bank, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
demonstrated the new policy that: 
Australia would not be attracted by a consultative group for South 
Vietnam alone, but that we should also need to be satisfied that a 
parallel arrangement could be organised for North Vietnam.43 
As this situation was unlikely, Australia would not join in preferential 
treatment for South Vietnam when, as ·explained by Minister Willesee, 'we 
are trying to establish some balance in aid allocations between North and 
South' .44 Subsequently, the Whitlam government allocated economic 
assistance to North Vietnam in 1973-74. However, in this first year, 
Australian aid to South Vietnam totalled $3.5million while aid to North 
Vietnam was $0.6million.45 Further, in October 1975, Australia sent aid 
valued at $2.4million to communist South Vietnam. Despite clear 
Ministerial direction, little progress was made on further aid flows to North 
Vietnam during the Whitlam government.46 
41 ibid., pp. 129-30. See Sydney Morning Herald, 7 February 1975 and Australian, 8 February 
1975. 
42 ~e Albinski, ibid., p. 127. See also Whitlam, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 89,2 
August 1974, p.1114, and Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 61,16 August 1974, pp. 1066-7. 
43 Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 61, 16 August 1974, p. 1066. North Vietnam had resisted most 
forms of multilateral and United Nations aid, and specifically criticised the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank as 'tools of American imperialism'. See also Willesee, 
CPD, Senate, vol. 60, 1 August 1974, p. 695 and Crean, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 90,23 
August 1974, pp. 1189-90. 
44 Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 61,16 August 1974, p.1066. 
45 Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 60, 1 August 1974, p. 695. 
46 See Albinski, op. cit., p. 180, Australian Development AssU'.tance Agency, First Annual 
Report, 1975, p. 23, and Nancy Viviani and Peter Wilenski, ~the Australian Development 
Assistance Agency: A Post Mortem Report, Royal Australian Institute of Public 
Administration, monograph no. 3, 1977, p. 24. 
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The debates within the Labor government on North and South Vietnam 
revealed serious tensions but also demonstrated Whitlam's influence over 
foreign policy. The debates on recognition and aid seemed inconsequential 
given the effective reunification of Vietnam from 30 April 1975. 
Nevertheless, the changes to policy placed Australia in a favourable 
position to improve relations with Vietnam after 1975. 
East Timor and Indonesia 
While the Whitlam government was enthusiastic in promoting relations 
with Indonesia, the shifting conflicts within East Timor caused considerable 
difficulties for this alliance. The Labor Party, and particularly Whitlam, 
were caught between support for Indonesia, including a recognition of 
Indonesia's interest in East Timor, and support for the principle of self-
determination for East Timor. This difficult issue had implications for 
Australia in the Asia Pacific region and for Australia's relationships with 
developing countries, especially in the United Nations. 
Whitlam had cultivated friendly relations with Indonesia through the 
1960s. In discussing Australia's relations, Whitlam wrote in 1967: 
The new Government of Indonesia is well disposed towards this 
country. It is our obligation and in our interest to see that we 
render all the political, diplomatic and economic support we can. 
If the coup of 18 months ago had succeeded, as it nearly did, we 
would have had a country of 100 million dominated by 
communists on our border. 
We can only imagine the additional and crippling sums we 
would now be spending on defence.47 
This reflected Whitlam's preference for a non-communist government in 
Indonesia and intimated Whitlam's energy for Australian relations to focus 
on the Asia Pacific region. As Prime Minister, Whitlam visited Indonesia 
in February 1973 'to demonstrate the political and economic interest which 
Australia would now take in the region'.48 The visit built upon the frank 
47 See Whitlam, as the new leader of the ALP, statement :in Australian, 18 February 1975. 
48 ·vvhitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 107. Also, Whitlam agreed to continue 
the bonus export system with Indonesia knovvn as the Devisa Kredit scheme. Albinski, op. 
cit., pp. 209-10. 
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relationship between President Suharto and Whitlam and foreshadowed 
regular meetings between the two leaders.49 
The Portuguese colony of East Timor was not a prominent issue until 25 
April 1974 when the Caetano regime in Lisbon collapsed and was replaced 
by a new government committed to decolonisation.so This had obvious 
implications for Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Sao 
Tome and Principe. East Timor was not expected to be one of the difficult 
territories in which to establish an administration compared to the internal 
problems of the other colonies. 
Political parties quickly emerged in East Timor based on quite different 
understandings of the political transition to independence. The significant 
groups were UDT, which favoured Timorese rule in association with 
Indonesia, Fretilin, which argued for independence, and Apodeti, 
advocating integration with Indonesia.sl The option of East Timor's 
integration with Australia was also raised. 
Australia attempted to assist with the political development of East Timor. 
Prime Minister Whitlam, Foreign Minister Willesee and acting Foreign 
Minister Morrison had discussions with various representatives of 
Portugal, Indonesia, and the East Timor parties from mid-1974 into 1975. In 
addition, Cairns ·~;isited Jakarta in January 1975 and six Labor Party Members 
of Parliament visited East Timor in March 1975. Importantly, Prime 
Minister vVhitlam and President Suharto agreed that Portugal should be 
encouraged to maintain its authority in East Tinior in order to provide 
additional time to prepare for independence. Despite a brief collaboration, 
UDT and Fretilin competed for control of East Timor during 1975.52 ·On 10 
49 Suharto invited Whitlam for discussions in Wonosobo on 5-7 September 1974 and Whitlam 
replied with a meeting in Townsville on 3-5 April 1975. See generally, Mackie, Australia's 
Relations with Indonesia: Principles and Policies I, op. cit., J.A.C. Mackie, Australia's 
Relations with Indonesia: Principles and Policies IT, Australian Outlook, vol. 28, 2, August 
1974, and Philip Eldridge, Australia's Relations with Indonesia: An alternative approach, 
Australian Outlook, vol. 29, 1, Apri11975. 
50 During the 1960s, the question of Timor was seldom discussed. The western half of Timor 
formed part of Indonesia and the eastern half had been controlled by Portugal since the 
sixteenth century. At the United Nations, the General Assembly and the Committee on 
Decolonisation mentioned East Timor as part of the annual review of all territories under 
colonial administration. Clark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 147. 
51 The groups were Ur.iao Democratica Timorense, Frente Revolutionaria de Timor Leste 
Independente, and Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense. 
52 In January 1975, UDT and Fretilin had formed a coalition. However, UDT ended the 
partnership in May due to perceived radical influences within Fretilin. Relations between 
the parties deteriorated quickly as Fretilin associated with the Frelimo :Marxist govemment 
... · .... • .. ··. : . . ·· . : ·· ... · .. ··~. ~ .. _ • .. ·. :~· . ..... _ ·~.; '· .. · .. - -:~·ft 
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August, UDT attempted to gain control, occupying the police headquarters 
and ordering the arrest of Fretilin leaders. This signalled the start of a civil 
war in East Timor, with the last remaining Portuguese presence, the 
Governor, transferring administration off-shore to the island of Atauro. 
Separate talks were initiated between representatives of Australia, 
Indonesia, and the East Timorese groups without success. On 28 November 
1975, Fretilin, which seemed to be the dominant party in the civil war, 
issued a unilateral declaration of independence and proclaimed the 
Democratic Republic of East Timor. Immediately, UDT, Apodeti and others 
proclaimed integration with Indonesia. A simple democratic solution was 
not conceivable in the short term. 
The debate within Australia focussed upon two central tenets of the 
Whitlam government's foreign policy. A balance had to be reached 
between constructive relations with Indonesia and the principle of self-
determination in East Timor. The elements were not in conflict until late 
1975. Indonesia had insisted that there was no claim over East Timor but 
had also displayed signs of concern about an independent East Timor which 
would create an unacceptable security risk. The Indonesian problem with 
East Timor linked with popular secessionist movements on other fronts of 
Indonesia.s3 The Whitlam government's position in 1974 and into 1975 was 
challenged from within the Labor Party, criticised by the Liberal and Country 
Parties, and confused by conflicting advice.54 Whitlam seemed to retreat 
from an 'Indonesian solution' and tended to emphasise the requirement of 
self-determination. 
In the Parliament on 26 August 1975, the Prime Minister explained the state 
of affairs in East Timor and outlined the options for Australia. Whitlam 
informed the House that the Portuguese Governor in East Timor and the 
government in Lisbon had issued appeals for international forces to end the 
fighting, including suggestions that Australia and Indonesia might help 
with the evacuation of foreign workers from East Timor. The Prime 
Minister was prepared to offer humanitarian assistance but restated that the 
Labor government remained opposed to Australian military involvement. 
Further, Whitlam distanced Australia from the debate over East Timor, 
understanding the principal actors in the territo~y to be Portugal and the 
of Mozambique and UDT maintained contact with Portugal and Taiwan in preferring 
integration with Indonesia. 
53 Albinsld, op. cit., p. 107. See also Oark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 147. 
54 For more, see Albinski, op. cit., pp. 108-9. See also Nation Review, 13-19 September 1974 . 
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East Timorese people in terms of future resolutions and Indonesia as an 
important observer with sig;:1ificai1.t interests in East Timor.ss 
Whitlam also alluded to a set of options for East Timor which included 
Indonesia. The first line of argument explicitly excluded Australia from 
assuming a role in East Timor. Understandably, the Labor government did 
not want to adopt a colonial position in the context of other efforts to 
devolve Australia from former territories. Whitlam stated that the 
immediate responsibility rested with Portugal and this required active 
intervention.56 Unfortunately for \rVhitlam, Portugal had relinquished 
responsibility for East Timor which raised questions over the roles of 
Indonesia, Australia and others. 
This led to the Prime Minister's second line of argument that the Labor 
government recognised Indonesia's interest in East Timor. To this end, 
Whitlam stated that: 
We understand Indonesia's concern that the territory should not 
be allowed to become a source of instability on Indonesia's border. 
Portuguese Timor is in many ways part of the Indonesian world 
and its future is obviously a matter of great importance to 
Indonesia.s7 
This statement was tempered by Whitlam's reassurances that Indonesian 
policy respected the right of self-determination of the people of East Timor 
and reiterated Indonesia's denials of territorial ambition toward Portuguese 
Timor. Indeed, Indonesia agreed only to intervene at the request of 
Portugal and then only to restore conditions which would allow an orderly 
process of self-determination to begin. Whitlam committed Australia to 
practical help in mediating and assisting Portugal to end the conflict in East 
Timor.ss 
For some, this was interpreted as Australia's endorsement of action by 
Indonesia in East Timor. A number of Pacific nations were apparently 
concerned about substituting Indonesia for Portuguese colonial rule, and 
55 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 96,26 August 1975, p. 492. See response by Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 
96, 26 August 1975, pp. 508-11. 
56 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 96, 26 August 1975, p. 492. See also Albinski, op. cit., p. 109. 
57 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 96, 26 August 1975, p. 493. See also T.B. Millar, Australia in 
Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977, Australian National University Press, 
Canberra, 1978, p. 376; Albinski, op. cit., pp. 179-80; Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit., p. 24; 
ADAA, op. cit., pp. 16-18; and Australian Development Assistance Agency, Annual Report 
1975-6, 1976, pp. 8-9. 
58 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 96,26 August 1975, p. 493. 
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the combination of these elements was not helpful for Australia in 
advancing regional co-operation. Also, there were serious diff~rences of 
opinion on East Timor within the Australian bureaucracy. The Department 
of Foreign Affairs advocated self-detennination with possible association 
with Indonesia. At the same time, the Department of Defence hesitated to 
encourage Indonesia in any way and the Australian intelligence services 
worried that their warnings about Australian support for an Indonesian 
solution were consistently ignored.S9 
Australian relations with Indonesia through 1975 were unsettled by 
particular events. First, parts of the Labor Party openly supported the 
agenda of Fretilin in East Timor, particularly members of the federal 
Parliamentary Labor Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. Second, 
Australia's credibility with Indonesia was diminished due to the activities 
of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service in East Timor. On 16 October 
1975, Senator Willesee announced to the Parliament that an Australian 
citizen in East Timor, Frank Favaro, was not acting for Australia in any 
capacity. Favaro owned a hotel in Dili and had provided transport to a 
visiting Australian Parliamentary delegation known to support Fretilin. A 
few days later, Willesee learnt that Favaro had been recruited by ASIS 
earlier in the year. Whitlam was concerned that the Indonesian 
government almost certainly knew this role. 60 
At the end of October 1975, Senator Willesee again addressed the Parliament 
on Portuguese Timor. By this time, Indonesia had established a military 
presence in East Timor, albeit without attempting to take control. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs was critical of most actors involved in East 
Timor, demonstrating the intransigence of the situation and the frustration 
of the Whitlam goveJ ...ment. Willesee was critical of Portugal in escaping 
responsibility for East Timor but was positively scathing of the East 
Tirr.orese leadership: 
That the situation in Portuguese Timor has come to its present 
pass is, of course, cause for deep regret. It reflects, above all, the 
immaturity of Timor's own aspiring political leaders, who in less 
than eighteen months have succeeded in wrecking Portugal" s 
decolonisation program, sharply polarising political opinions 
59 Albinski, op. cit., pp. 107-8. 
60 Whitlam, The WhitTam Government ... , op. cit., p. 111. A.s a result, the head of ASIS was 
replaced. 
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through the territory, and finally plunging the territory into 
violent civil war.61 
Willesee reiterated the importance of the principle of self-determination for 
the people of East Timor. This was followed by an obvious warning to 
Indonesia that their military presence in East Timor was not warranted and 
that Indonesia should pursue any perceived interests through diplomatic 
means. _Again; this was qualified by a recognition of Indonesia's particular 
concern for East Timor. 62 
In the last weeks of government, Whitlam maintained a distant but 
concerned position while Indonesia continued to infiltrate more directly 
into the East Timor conflict. The Labor Party caucus urged Whitlam not to 
sanction the Indonesian intervention which may have caused the Prime 
Minister to be more cautious in public pronouncements on East Timor.63 
Further, it seems that, by October 1975, the Whitlam government was 
simply hoping for a negotiated settlement between the parties in East 
Timor. 
At the end of the Whitlam Labor government, there was an increasing 
Indonesian presence in East Timor with little prospect of a democratic 
outcome. Indonesia may have reacted to the dismissal of the Whitlam 
government in November 1975 by more seriously considering a swift 
solution to the conflict in East Timor. This speculation suggests that the 
position of the Whitlam government on East Timor may have been a 
deterrent to Indonesia deciding to occupy the territory earlier in 1975. 
Papua New Guinea 
The role of Australia in the independence process of Papua New Guinea 
was an important element of the Labor Party agenda and the international 
perception of the Whitlam government. The conclusion of the territorial 
relationship with Papua New Guinea equated with South Africa and 
Rhodesia as the primary issues of colonialism through which the Whitlam 
government demonstrated a new foreign policy for Australia. Importantly, 
the negotiations with Papua New Guinea were subject to United Nations 
61 Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 66,30 October 1975, p. 1609. 
62 See Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 66,30 October 1975, pp. 1609-10. See also Willesee, CPD, 
Senate, vol. 66, 4 November 1975J p. 1680. 
63 See Albinski, op. cit., p. 314. 
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resolutions and were of considerable interest to members of the United 
Nation§ General Assembly.64 
The Whitlam government accepted the timetable of 1 December' 1973 for 
self-government for Papua New Guinea. The next stage of indepeLdence 
was projected for December 1974 and thus various administrative functions 
were devolved to the PNG government.65 However, Australia faced some 
problems with the autonomy of Papua New Guinea, including a 
postponement of the independence date. The PNG House of Assembly 
could not agree on the terms of the constitution and, subsequently, the 
Australian government was rebuked by PNG officials for promoting 
independence with undue haste.66 Nevertheless, the UN General Assembly 
was able to adopt a resolution for the termination of the trusteeship 
agreement for New Guinea and was further informed that Papua New 
Guinea would accede to independence on 16 September 1975. 
At a personal level, Prime Minister Whitlam visited Post Moresby and 
Goroka as a guest of the PNG Chief Minister on 18-20 February 1973. This 
early visit to Papua New Guinea was a clear demonstration of Whitlam's 
commitment to the independence process and a distinct promise of support 
from the Australian government. Whitlam declared that: 
Papua New Guinea will have the first call on our substantially 
increased foreign aid program. We shall be working with the 
Papua New Guinea Government through a specific and 
64 On Papua New Guinea, see generally J.D.B. Miller, Papua New Guinea in World Politics, 
Australian Outlook, vol. 27, 2, August 1973; James Griffin, Papua New Guinea and the British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate: Fusion or Transfusion(, Australian Outlook, vol. 27, 3, Dece~ber 
1973; N. Ebia Olewala, The Attainment of Self-government in Papua New Guinea, Objective: 
Justice, vol. 6, 1, January /February /March 1974; Hedley Bull, Australia's involvement in 
independent Papua-New Guinea, World Review, vol. 13, 1, March 1974; Michael Somare, 
Building Papua New Guinea, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 50, 12, May 1974; Hugh Smith, 
Internal conflict in an independent Papua New Guinea: Problems of Australian involvement, 
Australian Outlook, vol. 28, 2, August 1974; J. Camilleri, Internal con£111. .. : in an independent 
Papua New Guinea: a rejoinder, Australian Outlook, val. 28, 3, December 1974; Robert Mott, 
J:.'apua New Guinea builds nationhood through development, Contemporary Review, vol. 226, 
1311, April 1975; Bill Standish, Papua New Guinea review, Australian Quarterly, vol. 47, 3, 
September 1975; and Robert O'Neill, The defence relationship; aid - when, where, how much 
and for how long?, New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and South East Asia, vol. 10, 4, 
1975-76. • 
65 Oark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 145. The UN resolutions at this time noted the steps 
towards independence although these pronouncements .also stressed the need for continuing 
localisation and political education and the preservation of cultural heritage. 
66 Albinski, op. cit, p. 103. On the views of some PNG officials, see Australian, 10 January 
1973 & 15 January 1973., Age, 19 February 1973, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 May 1973, Age, 17 
August 1973, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 April1974, and Canberra Times, 21 January 1975. 
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guaranteed program ... Australian aid will be allocated solely 
through the Central Government of Papua New Guinea ... 67 
Whitlam assured Papua New Guinea that the plan for independence coUld 
proceed based upon the. Australian commitment of at least $500million m 
economic and social aid over the three year period commencing 1974-75. 
This promise was linked to Australian support for the Papua New Guinea 
aim to move quickly toward self-reliance.6s 
A significant interruption to the maturing relationship between Australia 
and Papua New Guinea was the dispute over the border. In the Torres 
Strait, the designation of several small islands located nearer the PNG 
shores was in dispute. The inhabitants preferred Australian citizenship but 
the issue needed to be resolved through negotiations between PNG, 
Australia and the state of Queensland. However, while the islands were 
notionally controlled by the Queensland government, Premier Bjelke-
Petersen believed that talks were unnecessary, even when the government 
of PNG and Prime Minister Whitlam ·wanted to organise discussions. 69 The 
intransigence of the Bjelke-Petersen government was also based on the 
continuing conflict over domestic issuet-> with the Whitlam government.7D 
Rather than pursue the border problem in the International Court of Justice, 
where Queensland would have no standing, Whitlam and Chief Minister 
Somare resolved to discuss a Torres Strait Treaty. Nevertheless, members 
of the PNG House of Assembly became disgruntled with the difficulties 
created by the Queensland government and thus a settlement of the border 
issue was postponed.71 
67 Whitlam speech in Port Moresby, in v\Thitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 96. 
See also Clark, Australian Foreign Policy ... , op. cit., p. 21, ADAA, First Annual Report, op. 
cit., p. 11 and David Evans, Australia and Developing Countries: Contradictions of 
Capitalism, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 2, 1972, pp. 146-50. 
68 Albinski, op. cit, p. 179 and ADAA, ibid., p. 10. See ADAA, Annual Report 1975'-6, op. cit., 
p. 5. There was some resistance to independence for PNG, especially in the Highlands, due to 
a fear that Australian aid would be reduced and particular groups would dominate the 
territory. See also Liberal and Country Parties criticisms, CPD, HR, vol. 88, 14 March 1974, 
pp. 428-38. 
69 Bjelke-Peter5en was resting on the established boundary of Queensland which had been set 
within three miles of the Papuan coast. 
70 See Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 97, 9 October 1975, pp. 1995-2002, and Peacock, pp. 2002-4. 
71 Albinski, op. cit., p. 104. See ru ~o D.J. Murphy, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, 
January to June, 1973, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 19, 3, December 1973, pp. 
336-7; Financial Review, 12 December 1974; Canberra Times, 13 August 1975; and Age, 11 
~ovember 1975. Whitlam reflected that the border dispute 'highlighted the fact that in 
relations between Australia and any other country, a State Government can only play a role to 
the extent that the Australian Government allows.' Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , 
op. cit, p. 95. The issue was resolved in 1978. See Peacock, Australia and Papua New Guinea: 
Ministerial statement, CPD, HR, vol. -;.12, 23 November 1978, pp. 3300-1. 
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While the aid allocation to PNG remained a large percentage of the 
Australian aid budget, attention focused on the nature and effectiveness of 
this program.72 Australian aid to PNG included general budget support and 
a development grant to support sectors of the government such as 
agricultural development, education and health. Australian aid as a 
proportion of total PNG public expenditure steadily declined from 52 
percent in 1970-71 to 40 percent in 1974-75.73 By 1975-76, the relationship was 
based on a new five-year commitment to provide a minimum of 
$180million per year in aid from Australia.74 The Whitlam government 
also began to transfer Australian assets in Papua New Guinea to the PNG 
government with the costs met from special aid grants totalling 
$48.6million. Australians working in the PNG public service, teaching 
service and police force transferred to direct contract employment with the 
PNG government.75 
With the achievement of self-government and subsequently independence, 
the relations between Papua New Guinea and Australia required a 
fundamental change. The objectives of the new aid relationship were to: 
facilitate and promote the economic and social development of 
Papua New Guinea; to assist that country to achieve its goal of 
self-reliance; and to enable it to plan its own development on the 
basis of resources available to it including those provided from 
Australia.76 
This would entail a transformation of the structures that represented the 
previous colonial administration. . 
72 From 1960 to 1970, the share of Australian official economic aid allocated to Papua New 
Guinea rose from approximately 50 percent to 70 percent. Associated with the relative 
increase in aid to Papua New Guinea was a shift away from South Asia in favour of South 
East Asia. Evans, op. cit., p. 131. See also Anthony Clunies-Ross, Foreign Aid, chapter 6 in 
Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, eds, Australia in World Affairs 1966-1970, Cheshire 
for Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 1974, pp. 3-4 & 8, Millar, op. cit., 
pp. 374-5 and ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 7. 
73 ADAA, ibid., p. 10. 
74 In addition, Australia would provide a contribution to the Wabo hydro-electric feasibility 
study, an independence gift, payment of termination benefits to former Australian employees 
of the Papua New Guinea government, the cost of completing airport construction works at 
Port Moresby and Nadzab, and continued educational assistance under the Australia-Papua 
New Guinea Training and Education Scheme. ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
See also Millar, op. cit., p. 375. 
75 In order to meet PNG's need for skilled labour, the Australian government had employed 
persons on transfer or secondmf'.nt from public employment in Australia. These employees 
comprised the Australian Staffing Assistance Group (ASAG) and the Australian government 
undertook to provide sufficient financial assistance to meet the costs of employing former 
members of ASAG unti130 June 1978 on equivalent conditions. ADAA, First Annual Report, op. 
cit., p. 10. See also ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, op. cit., p. 5. 
76 ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, ibid., p. 4. 
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The changing relationship with Papua New Guinea was important for the 
Whitlam goverfu-nent in demonstrating an appreciation for appropriate 
initiatives for a constructive and supportive relation,1:1hip with a newly 
independent country. Both countries were atten1pting to adjust from a 
colonial relationship to a partnership between sc."'!ereign states. For the 
Australian government, this provoked thfJ foundation of the Australian 
Development Assistance Agency at the time of self-government in Papua 
t<tl3 New Guinea on 1 December~. Discussions began on how the aid 
relationship might operate in the long-term.77 
In the end, Whitlam introduced the Papua New Guinea Independence Bill 
into the Parliament on 20 August 1975. The transitiod in PNG was assisted 
by Australian staff and the Whitlam government was seen to facilitate a 
smooth process for independence. On PNG independence day, Australia's 
membership of the Trusteeship Council was formally terminated. As 
promised, Whitlam had acted to end Australia's colonial relationship with 
PNG and provided support for the independence process. 
Aid policy 
The Whitlam government attempted to reform the administration of 
Australian aid and tried to alter the basis for aid policy. While the Labor 
Party policy speech for the 1972 election did not mention development 
assistance, there were several actors within the Whitlam government who 
were aware of the important issues related to Australian aid. The aid profile 
was part of the Whitlam government's plan to build more constructive 
relationships with developi..~g countries. In relation to the administration 
of the aid program, the Labor Party supported the notion of a separate aid· 
agency and L'lere was an associated argument that stressed the need to 
separate aid policy from foreign policy. An aid agency was established by the 
Whitlam government but this structure was frustrated by bureaucratic 
manoeuvres, especially by the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Prior to the election of the Whitlam government, the Australian aid 
program was conceived and administered ,Nithin the Department of 
Foreign Mfairs. The aid program was used by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs as an instrument and adjunct of international diplomacy while 
77 Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit, p. 21 and ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 12. 
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Treasury, the Department of Education, and the Department of Trade and 
Industry made contributions to specific elements of the programme.78 
In April 1972, a sub-committee of the Parliamentary Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs was established to examine Australia's aid 
policy. The committee was chaired by H.B. Turner with William Morrison 
acting as chair in the final weeks of the inquiry. In the October 1972 report 
of the committee, the influence of Morrison and L."'le mh1.ority Labor Party 
members was demonstrated with recommendations on the need to increase 
the evaluation and review of Australian aid, and improve many aspects of 
aid including quality, representation, tariff preferences, expertise, and 
education.79 While not recommending the establishment of a separate aid 
agency, the report was a clear critique of the administration of aid by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. · 
As advocated by the Labor Party, the argument for a separate aid agency 
focused on the need to combine the delivery of aid in one administrative 
unit while creating some distance between aid policy and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. Whitlam showed enthusiasm for the notion of a separate 
aid agency. Indeed, Whitlam highlighted the role of Morrison within the 
government as a key to C:l')ordinating policy advice on aid issues.so 
However, the Department of Foreign Affairs remained opposed to a 
separate agency, claiming to be concerned abouf the potential for aid policies 
78 The relationship with Papua New Guinc:?a was admlllistered separately by the 
Department of External Territories. The Foreign Affairs aid programs amounted to only 27 
percent of aid expenditures. The Treasury maintained general control of the economic 
responsibilities associated v..dth the aid program and had direct responsibility for 
Australia's relations with the international financial institutions related to aid policy, 
pc:.rticularly the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Also, the Department of 
Education administered the Commonwealth Co-operation in Education Scheme and retained 
the authority for sponsored trainees under all aid schemes. The Department of Overseas 
Trade, among others, provided specifically skilled staff for aid programs. The Department 
of Trade and Industry, among others, provided staff for aid programs. See Millar, op. cit., p. 
376, T.B. Millar, The Making of Australian Foreign Policy, chapter 8 in B.D. B~ddie, r.~d., 
Advance Australia - Where?, Oxford University Press with the Australian Institute of 
International A..tfairs, Melbourne, 1975, p. 152, and Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 
79 Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Australia's Foreign Aid, 
October 1972, pp. vii-x. 
so Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., p. 95 Throughout the years of the 
Whitlam government, Morrison had the prL-nary ministerial responsibility for carrying out 
b.l.e government's policy on PNG. Namely, Morrison was Minister for External Territories, 
then Minister assisting the Minister for Foreign Affairs in matters relating to PNG, with this 
title later altered to 'matters relating to the Islands of the Pacific', quoting the Australian 
Constitution. In June 1975, Morrison was appointed as Minister for Defence. See also Viviani 
and Wilenski, op. cit., p. 6. 
page 120 
to deviate from foreign policy advice and arguing that aid policy should 
remain in the control of those concemed with foreign policy.81 
Rather than immediately establishing a separate agency, Whitlam opted for 
an inquiry into aid administration. A taskforce of officials, drawn from the 
four departments responsible for elements of Australian aid, was instructed 
to report on the options for a unified aid administration.82 After 
considerable debate, the taskforce identified five different administrative 
options which extended from a mere expansion of the Aid Branch within 
the Department of Foreign Affairs to a separate Department with its own 
Nlinister.83 The 1\rfin.ister for Foreign Affairs continued to oppose a separate 
aid agency and the only active support for the agency emerged from the 
relatively unimportant Department of External Territories, led by Minister 
Morrison. Indeed, the plans for an aid agency may have been discarded if 
not for the commitment in the Labor Party Platform and the efforts of the 
Prime Minister's office.s4 
Prime Minister Whitlam sought the advice of former public servant and 
international aid expert, Sir John Crawford, who had been critical of 
Australia's aid program. Crawford favoured a statutory authority and 
provided the Prime lvlinister with further legitimacy for the separate agency 
proposal. However, Whitlam made concessions to (. :, ,_!epartmental views, 
presumably to gain their co-operation, and these compromises became 
important in the subsequent operations of aid administration. First, the 
Director of the agency would be subject to the direction of the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and second, Treasury would remai:n responsible for 
representation and relations with the World Bank.85 
81 See Viviani and Wilenski, ibid., p. 7. 
82 The concept of a taskforce was intended to gain the experience of individuals rather than 
departmental positions. However, the taskforce operated with representatives of the 
departments, similar to the intractable method of inter-departmental committees. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs nommated two senior career diplomats as chair and deputy 
chair of the taskforce. Inevitably,. the process of discussion resembled a contest between the 
interests of department'). Viviani and Wilenski described the taskfor!:e report as 'a barren 
work, left waste by the internecine ·warfare stirred by the territorial imperatives of the 
Departments concerned'. Viviani and Wilenski, ibid., pp. 8-9. 
83 Report of the Task Force on a Unified Aid Administration, Canberra, May 1973. The Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration studied the issues more closely but did 
not resolve the major questions. See Hugh Collins, The 'Coombs Report': bureaucracy, 
diplomacy and Australian foreign policy, Australian Outlook, vol. 30, 31 December 1976. 
84 Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit., pp. 10-11. Peter Wilenski in the office of the Prime 
:Minister continued to promote the idea of a separate aid agency against a tide of bureaucratic 
resistance. 
85 ibid., p. 11. 
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The Prime :Minister's position was reinforced through a change in the Labor 
Party Platform at the July 1973 federal conference. Whitlam had initiated an 
amendment through the Labor Party Foreign Affairs Policy Committee 
which inserted a more specific statement on aid administration into the 
Platform: 
The Labor Government will establish a statutory Development 
Assistance agency responsible to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and responsible for Australia's project, training and similar 
activities and relations with international development 
institutions.86 
After approval by cabinet in September 1973, the Australian Development 
Assistance Agency Bill was introduced in the Parliament on 12 March 1974 
and was not passed by both Houses until December 1974. Although no 
longer responsible for the area, Prime Minister Whitlam presented the 
second reading speech. This statement was intended to clarify the issues in 
dispute and resolve continuing tensions between departments. The speech 
was unequivocal that the Agency 1.Nas to have responsibility for all of 
Australia's bilateral and multilateral aid programs and reiterated the Labor 
government's intention of upgrading and improving all aspects of aid 
policy.87 The Primf Minister also explained that the actions of the Director-
General would be subject to the directions of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and this meant that the Agency would be required to consult with 
the Department of Foreign Affairs. 88 The compulsory liaison and reporting 
to the Department of Foreign Affairs placed limits on the work of the aid 
Agency. 
In a constructive tone, the Prime :Minister concluded the speech in the 
House with an outline of expectations for the Agency: 
The Government believes that the Agency wilJ contribute to the 
achieven1ent of a more efficient aid adrrdnistration, to a 
comprehensive and systematic approach towards the increasingly 
complex range of Australia's aid activities, and not least to the 
formulation of aid policies which will take up the challenges of 
the future. The Government will look to the Agency for the 
development of innovative policies responsive to the needs for 
economic self-reliance and social justice in developing countries. 
It will expect the Agency to maintain the high standards set by 
Australia in some fields of cur aid and to develop expertise in 
86 Australian Labor Party, Platform, Constitution and Rules., opproved by the 30th Federal 
conference,1973,p.44. 
87 vVhitlam, CPD, HR., val 88,12 March 1974, p. 278. 
88 Whitlam, CPDf HR, vol. 88, 12 March 1974, p. 279. 
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other fields appropriate to our resources. We look to an aid 
pro_gram in which the community will feel involved, and of 
which the community will be proud.89 
This statement dearly envisaged a change from the Foreign Affairs 
approach to the administration of aid. 
The Australian Development Assistance Agency Bill was passed with 
bipartisan support in both the House of Representatives and the Senate in 
1974. The gen~ral support for the Agency implied a gradual resolution of 
bureaucratic tensions but the conflicts merely reduced to a continuing battle 
between the new Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs.9o 
An interim office of the Australian Development Assistance Agency was 
establish~d as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs.91 During the 
establishment period, distinct sections of the Agency were developed based 
on the origins of the staff and, while located in different buildings, the 
bureaucratic separation of Foreign Affairs officers from the External 
Territories staff caused serious internal conflict.92 The tenuous relations 
between the Agency and the Department of Foreign ~Hairs further 
deteriorated over the proposed direction of Australian aid policy. The new 
Agency distributed a policy paper which discussed aid and development 
while ignoring the connection between aid and foreign policy, and did not 
examine the relationship between aid policy and commercial policy. On 
these points, the Agency was criticised by the Departments of Foreign 
Affairs, Trade and Treasury. However, the Agency staff had the support of 
the Development Assistance Advisory Board in arguing for an extensive re-
exan1ination of aid policy.93 Despite the high level from which the 
89 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 88, 12 March 1974, p. 279. See also McClelland, CPD, Senate, vol. 
61, 22 October 1974, pp. 1841-2. 
90 See Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., pp. 376-7. At the point of legislative 
establishment of the aid Agency, Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit., p. 15, observed that various 
government departments 'seemed determined to strangle the agency at birth'. 
91 The Agency incorporated the former Foreign Affairs aid branch and sections of the former 
Department of External Territories. Officers involved in aid activities in the state offices of 
the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Education and Labour and Immigration were transferred 
to the ADAA. Some aid responsibilities were transferred from the Treasury. ADAA, First 
Annual Report, op. cit., p. 41. 
92 The continuing conflict focused on the staff, with regard to how many staff and from where 
should the st&ff be recruited, and thereby control of the Agency. It seems that bureaucratic 
opportunism dictated that Foreign Affairs became a strong proponent for more staff for the 
Agency. Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit, pp. 13-15. See also H.W. Arndt in response to Millar; 
The Making of Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 171. 
93 The Board was established in early 1975 to provide advice to the Minister and t..~e Agency 
on matters related to Australia's development assistance. ADAA, First Annual Report, op. 
cit., p. 42. The Board was chaired by Sir John Crawford and included Alan Renouf (Secretary, 
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government recruited members, the Board was relatively ineffective in 
combating the persuasive and persistent arguments of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs on the direction of aid policy. 
The Agency can be credited with one significant bureaucratic victory on aid 
policy toward Papua New Guinea.94 A dispute arose over the balance 
between continued budgetary assistance and the level of project aid to PNG. 
Morrison, as the Minister assisting the Mi'l.ister for Foreign Affairs in 
matters relating to Papua New Guineu, initiated the debate by advocating 
the need for project aid which. would provide greater control over the 
expenditure of aid funds. The Agency preference for budgetary support 
endured over the view of the Department of Foreign Affairs thereby 
avoiding the imposition of an expanded project aid program. The Prime 
Minister announced that Australian aid to the new government of Papua 
New Guinea would continue as direct budgetary assistance in grant form.95 
In the end, the intransigence of the Department of Foreign Affairs, assisted 
by the Treasury, caused bureaucratic delays in the implementation of the 
Labor Party plo.n for aid administration. It was not until mid 1975 that the 
new Agency ·was beginning to develop a coherent aid policy and this was 
expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Senator Willesee seemed to 
adopt the Agency's position in offering a new perspective on aid which 
significantly demoted the influence of foreign policy considerations. The 
Minister stressed the positive elements of Australian aid and suggested the 
need for reform in the quality of aid, the volume, and the social welfare 
effects of aid.96· 
Further, the aid Agency re-examined the place of aid in Australia's foreign 
relations and reconsidered the basic purposes of aid, including the volume 
and distribution of aid, funds to multilateral agencies, links between aid and 
trade, and tied or grant aid. Specifically, the first report of the ADAA 
Department of Foreign Affairs) and Dr. Peter Wilenski (Secretary, Department of Labour and 
Immigration). 
94 Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit., p. 21. Australian assistance to PNG continued to occupy a 
separate position within the ADAA. This was due to the quantitative and qualitative 
difference from other aid. The aid program to PNG was almost haJi of the total Australian 
aid and was allocated on a block grant basis as untied budget support assistance. 
95 Whitlam made this announcement at a meeting in Sydney in February 1974. See ibid., r· 
22. 
96 Senator Don Willesee, Minister for Foreign Affairs, New Directions in Australia's 
Development Assistance, address at the Australian Institute of International Affairs 
conference on Australia, Papua New Gull.1ea and South East Asia, Melbourne, 9-11 May 1975. 
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explained that: 
policies have been formulated which are aimed at increasing the 
quality, quantity and effectiveness of our aid, and which reaffirm 
the Government's belief that aid, properly directed, can make a 
worthwhile and effective contribution to development in 
recipient countries.97 
It was proposed that aid policy should concentrate upon development 
strategies which benefited the poorest groups. The implications for policy 
change were significant with different methods of aid delivery being 
employed to raise productivity and living standards of the poor, particularly 
in rural areas, and with emphasis on health, education and employment. 
This philosophical change required a dialogue with the developing 
countries to reach agreements on aid and, coupled with the restructuring of . 
aid administration, reflected the agenda of the Labor government to 
emphasise the social and economic elements of foreign policy. 
A central aspect of the debate was the total volume of aid. This ·element was 
affected by the push for a developmental philosophy and the dominance of 
foreign policy considerations. The,. ¥lhitlam government rhetoric for a 
greater level of development assistance did not eventuate. Indeed, it was 
argued that Australia was able to be more generous toward developing 
countries but had consistently maintained a low level of aid, even at times 
of success within the domestic economy.9s The Labor Party was committed 
to the UN target of 0.7 percent of Gross National Product for official 
development assistance but Viviani and Wilenski claimed that Treasury 
did not accept this goal and was careful to distance the political statements 
on aid from the budget process.99 ADAA officials sought to ensure an 
expansion of aid allocations and to reinforce the commitment to the UN 
target at every opportunity. 
In fact, the vVhitlam government made significant increases in the level of 
aid in total dollar terms: 
97 AD.AA, First Annual Report, op. cit., p: 2. See also Albinski, op. cit., p. 178. 
98 Aim Renouf, A Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1979, p. 521. 
99 Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit., p. 23. 
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Australian development assistance summary, 1972 to 1976 1oo 
total aid budget $m %change %of GNP 
1971-72 200.5 0.55 
1972-73 218.8 9.1 0.53 
1973-74 260.8 19.2 0.52 
1974-75 328.1 25.8 0.56 
1975-76 346.9 5.7 0.50 
However, the stagnant levels of GNP percentage over the period of the 
Whitlam government did not reflect the acclaimed dollar increases for each 
year. 
An example of the difficulties encountered in attempting to increase the 
levei of aid was the debate on the 1975 budget. The aid Agency, supported by 
the Department of Foreign Affairs, engaged in the 1975 budget negotiations 
with the aim of securing a substantial increase in the aid allocation. This 
argument was based on projected steps toward the UN target, an allowance 
for inflation, and the need to increase the component for Papua New 
Guinea. The position of the ADAA was opposed by Treasury, which gained 
support from the Prime Minister and the new Treasurer, Bill Hayden, who 
sought to restrain government expenditure. The change of outlook for the 
1975 budget was precipitated by difficulties with the domestic economy, 
uncertainties in the international economy, and to some extent, a shift in 
the economic objectives of the Whitlam Labor government. Indeed, the 
level of Australian aid was reduced due to the explicit economic choices by 
the Whitlam government. 
Separate from the contest over the level of aid, debates continued within 
the aid program over the distribution of assistance. Bilateral aid, as opposed 
to multilateral aid, dominated the Australian aid profile.101 Significantly, 
100 Figures from ADAA, Annual Report 1975-76, op. cit., p. 34. While there were dollar 
increases in aid in 1972-73 and 1973-74, the level of inflation deteiiiiined that these increases 
did not translate into increases in the percentage of GNP for aid. This table represents actual 
figures which differ from the allocated amounts used by Albinski, op. cit., pp. 178-9. On 
particular elements of aid, see also .ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., Millar, Australia in 
Peace and War, op. cit., pp. 375-6, and Evans, op. cit., p. 138. 
101 Bilateral aid amounted to $278.6million in 1974-75, accounting for 84.9 percent of total aid 
expenditure, and $303.4million in 1975-76, representing 87.5 percent of Australian aid. 
ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 6 and ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
' ·.. . . ·. ~ . · .. ': ~ : 
•. ··:.· .: : .'·:-.· .t t: 
page 126 
Australian bilateral aid was distorted by a regional concentration on Papua 
New Guinea, Indonesia and the other members of ASEAN: 
Bilateral Aid by Region $m 102 
PNG South East Asia South Asia Pacific Africa 
. 1973-74 177.1 35.6 19.5 3.4 1.1 
1974-75 168.8 47.7 40.5 5.6 2.6 
1975-76 211.9 48.2 27.6 6.3 1.3 
Little effort was expended to justify the geographic distortions of the aid 
profile. Clearly, the historical ·relationship with PNG would contin~e to 
dominate the Australian aid program. The prevailing argument remained 
that Australia should confine aid to countries important to the defence a""'1.d 
economy of Australia. Similar to the position of previous Liberal and 
. Country Parties governments, this view necessarily opposed aid allocations 
to the poorest people in the poorest countries of the Pacific and Africa. The 
official justification for the profile of Australian aid was that the limited size 
of the aid budget necessitated regional concentration to achieve a perceived 
level of effectiveness.103 
The narrow distribution of Australian aid was mollified to some extent by 
the allocation of funds to multilateral agencies. Indeed, the balance between 
bilateral and multilateral funding within the aid program was an issue of 
debate in the Labor government. Whitlam and colleagues had been 
enthusiastic about the notional target of twenty percent for multilateral aid 
within the aid program. However, it seemed that Whitlam was influenced 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs argument that the government had 
greater control over bilateral aid.104 Also, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
may have instilled doubts about the administration of aid through the 
World Bank and similar organisations in order to maintain a large 
percentage of bilateral funding in the aid program. 
102 Derived from table on bilateral aid, ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6~ ibid., pp. 35-38. These 
amounts may be marginally higher when adding the small aid allocations. For example, 
African countries tended to be allocated small amounts, for example $0.lmillion, which 
would increase the low level of aid to Africa by a significant amount. The increase in aid in 
1974-75 to South Asia did not represent a shift in regional concentration, rather the increased 
funds were food aid to Bangladesh and India through a UN fund, which was disbursed by 
bilateral means. 
103 ADAA, First Annual Report, op. dt., p. 5. 
104 See comments following W.R Croker, Australia and the Region, chapter 5 in Beddie, op. 
cit., p. 97. 
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fu. contrast, the aid Agency advocated the allocation of funds to multilateral 
agencies which could mobilise capital and expertise on a scale which 
Australia could not attempt. Also, Australian contributions to multilateral 
agencies coula provide assistance to developing countries beyond the 
regions of concentration of bilateral aid.tos fu. the end, the Whitlam 
government made large increases in the proportion of aid funds channelled 
through multilateral institutions. 
Substantial funds were channelled to the lending facilities of the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Australia also endorsed the 
establishment of the Development Committee of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which sought spec~1c initiatives to 
improve the channelling of multilateral funds.1D6 Further, during 1975, 
Australia agreed to contribute to two new multilateral initiatives, namely 
the World Bank Intermediate Financing Facility and the IMF Oil Facility 
Interest Subsidy Account which was established to reduce the cost of 
borrowing finance by those developing countries most seriously affected by 
the oil cr~sis.to7 Australia also supported various United Nations agencies 
through multilateral assistance, including $150000 to a UNICEF project in 
Zambia as humanitarian assistance to African liberation movements.tos 
In addition, Australia contributed to the Commonwealth Fund for 
Technical Co-operation and the Special Commonwealth Program for 
Assisting the Education of Rhodesian Africans.1D9 Further, the Whitlam 
government continued to support the activities of the South P·t··ific 
Commission, including voluntary contributions for special projects irt the 
economic, social and health fields. 
105 ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 5. Australian contributions to multilateral 
organisations almost trebled in 1974-75 to over $50million, representing 15 percent of official 
development assistance. A similarly proportioned increase for 1975-76 again demonstrated a 
greater flexibility in aid policy and a continuing recognition of the value of consortially 
organised aid efforts. Albinski, op. cit., p. 182. See also Evans, op. cit., p. 134, for a critique of 
multilateral aid· in general, and Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 375, on the 
balance of bilareral and multilateral aid. 
106 ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 37. 
107 ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, op. cit., p. 24. 
108 Other agencies to gain funds included the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund 
[UNICEF), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UN.KWA); a_11.d United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFP A). See ADAA, First 
Annmll Report, op. cit., p. 37 and ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, op. cit., p. 25. 
109 ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, ibid., p. 28. 
page 128 
A related issue was the question of trade access by developing countries into 
the Australian economy and the influence of trade objectives within the aid 
program. Similar to the Liberal and Country Parties, the Labor Party clearly 
linked trade with aid policy.110 Important for developing countries was the 
Labor government decision in 1973 to implement a 25 percent reduction in 
tariffs on all imported goods. This was a significant change in policy for the 
Australian economy. The tariff reduction seemed to have a positive effect 
upon the level of imports from developing cotU"1.tries.lll Specifically, an 
increase in the level of imports from ten independent African countries in 
1973-74 could be attributed to the new system of tariff preferences.112 
Linked to the reduction of tariffs was an export promotion schem.e, created 
by the Department of Overseas Trade, to assist developing countries in 
utilising the Australian market.113 However, this scheme was under-
utilised because the value of goods from developing countries did not reach 
the available quota. Further, the Whitlam government needed to deal with 
difficult domestic economic conditions, which led to arguments for greater 
protection for Australian industries and thus an argument for import 
quotas. Treasurer. Cairns favoured the protectionist measures and, in the 
end, the Labor government chose options which accorded with the appeals 
of the manufacturing industries and trade unions.114 
In addition to the issue of trade was the debate on aid in grant form in 
preference to loans or tied aid. The established policy of the Australian 
no See Albinski, op. cit., p. 208. 
111 In 1972-73, the share of Australia's total imports from developing countries rose to 9.1 
percent, in 1973-74 to 12.4 percent, and for the first half of 1974-75 the share was 18 percent. 
ibid., p. 210. See also Whitlam, The Whitlam Government ... , op. cit., pp. 190-96, for an 
outline of the events surrounding the decision to reduce tariffs. 
112 David Goldsworthy, The Whltlam Government's African Policy, Dyason House PapPrs, 
vol. 1, 3, January 1975, p. 3. 
113 Albinski, op. cit., p. 209. A Trade Preference Scheme was introduced in 1965 to assist 
develeping countries but the exceptions list was long because no imports were permitted if an 
Australian industry was threatened. There was considerable overlap of labour-intensive 
industries in textiles, clothing and consumer goods between Australia and the relevant 
cleveloping nations. Thus the initiative was unhelpful in its original form. Evans, op. cit., 
pp. 139-40. See also P.J. Lloyd, Tite Australian Tariff Preference Scheme for Developing 
Countri.es, Journal of World Trade Law, May-June 1970, P.J. Lloyd, The Value of Tariff 
Preferences for the Developing Countries: Australian Experience, Economic Record, vol. 47, 
117, March 1971, and P.J. Lloyd, Australian Tariff Preferences for LDCs, Intereconomics, no. 
11, 1972. Also, in 1973-4, provisions were constructed to enable developing countries to 
purchase Australian wheat on specially extended credit terms. In addition, the government 
assumed liability for credit sales to developing countries. 
114 See Cairns, address to the ALP Conference, Terrigal, 4 February 1975, quoted in Albinski, 
op. cit., pp. 210-11. 
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government was to provide aid in grant form.ll5 The preference for grant 
aid, however, tended to constrain the growth in total aid funds. The 
Treasury's desire to control increases in volume seemed to be a trade-off for 
using grant aid which was favoured by the Department of Foreign Affairs.116 
Australian multilateral aid was largely untied and the Whitlam 
government was moving to progressively release parts of bilateral aid. 
However, proposals to untie further aid encountered opposition from the 
Department of Trade which argued that aid should assist exports.n7 In the 
case of Papua. New Guinea, the aid remained tied through the large 
component spent on salaries for Australian staff and the purchase of 
equipment in Australia. The aid Agency favoured untied aid as a quality 
issue in the transfer of resources to developing countries. However, by late 
1975, there had been little movement to untie elements of bilateral aid. 
Overall, the Whitlam government made substantial changes in aid policy 
notwithstanding the considerable contest on the details. The bureaucratic 
struggle for control over the administration of aid demonstrated the 
importance of the aid program within the foreign affairs structures. In 
practice, the Whitlam government moved aid policy some distance from 
foreign policy by reviewing the basis for aid allocations. Specifically, the 
volume of ai-d. increased but most aid was concentrated on South East Asia, 
especially Papua New Guinea. Australia's commitment of multilateral aid 
provided a wider distribution of funds and demonstrated the Whitlam 
government's engagement with developing countries through the United 
Nations and the Commonwealth. Whitlam was partially successful in 
facilitating greater trade from developing countries which was particularly 
important for relations with the Asia Pacific region. As an element of 
foreign policy, Australia's aid profile was reshaped to support the 
international agenda of the Whitlam government. 
115 ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 5. Tied aid mea..."lt that the recipient country must 
purchase goods from Australia. 
116 Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit., p. 25. 
117 Evans, op. cit., p. 137. The effectiveness of aid was significantly lower when tied as 
Australia was not the cheapest soutce of supply on the world market. The loss of purchasing 
power was estimated at over twenty percent with tied aid. See ADAA, First Annual Report, 
op. cit., p. 5, Albinski, op. cit., p. 182 and Viviani and Wilenski, op. cit., p. 25 . 
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Conclusion 
The Whitlam government attempted to build constructive relationships 
between Australia and developing countries. In pursuit of this objective, 
Whitlam developed the Labor Party principles to adopt an anti-colonial 
approach to international issues. The initial changes to foreign policy 
instituted by Whitlam, such as the change in Australia's voting pattern at 
the United Nations, provided an immediate indication of the direction of 
the Labor government's foreign policy. 
Whitlam invested considerabJe energy in forging new relations with the 
countries of the Asia Pacific region, including a proposal for an Asia Pacific 
forum for greater cooperation. A ceniTal component of Whitlam's agenda 
was the recognition of China and thereby the building of a constructive 
relationship with the People's Republic. This act was not unexpected but it 
did cause further diplomatic problems for Whitlam in relation to the 
struggles over recognition in Cambodia. On this, Australia seemed to be 
influenced by the United States and ASEAN to maintain recognition of the 
Lon Nol regime. Whitlam also struggled to lead the Labor government on 
recognition issues in Vietnam and notably the Prime Minister did not 
acknowledge the position of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of 
South Vietnam. Simultaneously, Australia provided aid to North Vietnam 
for the first time. 
In a difficult balancing act, Whitlam offered support to Indonesia while 
advocating self-·determination for East Timor. Australia's position on East 
Timor was overwhelmed by events in the territory and by the shifting 
Indonesian position. Also, Whitlam promoted the independence of Papua 
New Guinea and supported the transition process with a long term aid 
commitment. The Australian aid program was collated i3nd revised to 
underpin the emerging relations with developing countries, although the 
shift in aid policy involved considerable administrative debate. 
In total, the Whitlam government made significant changes to Australia's 
foreign policy toward developing countries and, in terms of the Asia Pacific 
region, China, and Papua New Guinea, altered Australia's fundamental 
approach. The new relationships with developing countries were part of 
Whitlam's attempt to establish an anti-racist and anti-colonial foreign 
policy. Australia's improved relations with developing countries in general 
provided a crucial context for Whitlam's foreign policy toward Africa. 
. . .·. . . ::. . . ~ . ... . . :. . . 
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Whitlam foreign policy and Africa 
The shift in Australian foreign policy to support the interesl:s of developing 
countries was central to the Whitlatn government's relations with Africa. 
The link between these foreign policy issues was Whitlam's aim to establish 
an anti-racist and anti-colonial position for Australia. In this chapter, I 
analyse the Whitlam government's strong diplomatic opposition to 
apartheid while Australia continued to trade with South Africa. I examine 
Whitlam's action to reverse Australia's voting pattern in the United 
Nations to act against the minority regime in Rhodesia. Also, I highlight 
Australia's aid to Africa which supported Whitlam's diplomatic efforts, 
including the decision to provide aid to African liberation movements. 
This chapter is central to the thesis in showing the extent of change in 
Australia's relations with Africa from the Liberal and Country Parties 
governments to the Whltlam government. Also, this chapter offers the key 
points of comparison with Fraser's foreign policy on Africa. 
The basis· for the \r\Thitlam government position on Africa was the Labor 
Party Platform, which opposed the minority regimes in South Africa and 
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Rhodesia and supported the notion of sanctions) In additbn, Whitlam 
promised in the policy speech that the Labor government would not allow 
racially selected sporting teams to visit or transit through Australia.2 This 
brief promise was primarily aimed at South Africa in the context of 
controversial tours by racially exclusive sporting teams to Australia and 
New Zealand in 1970-72. 
Immediately after the 1972 election, Whitlam changed Australia's position 
in the United Nations General Assembly debate on Rhodesia. On 7 
December/ Australia voted in favour of resolutions, with Britain and the 
United States opposed, to demand majority government in Rhodesia, to call 
on Britah. to take stronger measures against the minority regime in 
Rhodesia, to advocate more stringent sanctions, and to request the Security 
Council to consider sanctions against Portu.gal and South Africa.3 
Furthermore, Whitlam instructed the New South Wales government to 
close the Rhodesia Information Centre in Sydney and cancelled the 
Australian passport of Air Vice-Marshal Hawkins, diplomatic 
representative of Rhodesia in South Africa. Whitlam subsequently 
reiterated that racially selected sporting teams would be excluded from 
Australia and that Australian wheat exports to Rhodesia would cease.4 New 
contributions to the United Nations funds for Southern Africa were 
announced along with the appointment of the next Australian High 
Commissioner to Tanzania.s 
1 Australian Labor Party, Federal Platform and Policy: Resolutions, as approved by the 29th 
Commonwealth Conference, Launceston, 1971, NSW edition, May 1973, p. 25. 
2 Australian Labor Party, Policy speech, delivered by E.G. Whitlam on 13 November 1972 at 
Blacktown Civic Centre, N.S.W, p. 42. 
3 Australia also supported the right of self-determination for the Portuguese territories in 
Afrk:, and deplored the illegal occupation of Namibia by :3outh Africa. David 
Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa: New Relationships?, Australian Quarterly, vol. 45, 4, 
December 1973, p. 61 and Department of Foreign Affairs, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 
January 1973, pp. 12 & 60-1. 
4 Claire Clark, ed., Australian Foreign Policy: Toward a Reassessment, Cassell, North 
Melbourne, 1973, p. 16, exphtined that these exports had been prevJously exemp~ from 
sanction on humanitarian grounds but Whitlam stated that the exp0rts were no longer 
justifiable on this basis. 
5 Gough Whitlam, Tlze Whitlam Government 1972-1975, Viking, Ringwood, 1985, pp. 16 & 
20-2 and Clark, op. cit., p. 16. In accordance with a UN resolution, the Y\i'hitlam govemmellt 
did not allow a :·eplacement for the retiring South African military of.ficer in Australia. 
Henry S. Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor, University of Queensland Press, 
St Lucia, 1977, p. 116. Also, the Whitlam government refused to act for South Africa at the 
International Moneta>.-y Fund. Oaire Oark, The United Nations, chapter 6 in W.J. Hudson, 
Australia in World Affairs 1971-75, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1980, p. 151. See generally 
Richard A. Higgott, Australia's changing African relations? Australian/ African relations 
under the Labor government,. paper presented at Australasian Pohr.~cal Studies Association 
conference, Canberra, July 1975. • 
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The initial changes to Australian foreign policy set the tone for the 
Whitlam government's relations with Africa.· As an inC.ication of the 
degree of change, the Rhodesian Prime IVlinister Smith deplored the 'new 
climate of hostility' from Australia and the South African Prime Minister 
Vorster declared that the National Party would still be in power in South 
Africa 'when Whitinrn was only an unpleasant memory in Australia'.6 On 
the other hand, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister Malecela, the Nigerian 
Head of State Gowan, and a visiting judge from Ghana approved of 
Australia's new outlook, describing Whitlam's policies as 'very helpful' 
and 'very progressive' .7 The shift in policy centred on Australia's 
relationships with South Africa and Rhodesia, and on Australian aid to 
Africa. 
South Africa 
The Whitlam government's opposition to the apartheid system was tested 
in relation to South Africa's membership of the TJnited Nations and 
Australia's trade relationship with the apartheid ec~..; .. 1omy. Prime :tviinister 
Whitlam acted in accordance with the Labor Party Platform and public 
expectation in offering firm opposition to the rrdnority regime in South 
Africa. However, this strong international, anti-racist position was 
undermined by Australia's peculiar pattern of voting at the UN and by 
Australia's continuation of trade with South Africa. 
At the United Nations, Whitlam pursued a deliberate agenda to change 
Australia's position, including Australia's stance on South Africa's 
con tin .. ,ed participation. Some members of the United Nations argued that 
expulsion was warranted given South Africa's persistent violations of the 
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In response, 
it was argued that international exclusion should be avoided because this 
option "\vould exacerbate p . ..:litical conditions in South Africa and set a 
serious precedent for the United Nations.s 
6 Smith in W.J. Hudson, Foreign Affairs Review, Australian Quartzrly, vol. 45, 2, June 1973, 
p. 125 and Vorster in Australian, 21 September 1973. 
7 See Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 59. See also Australian, 9 August 1973. 
8 See David Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's African Policy, Dyason House Papers, 
'\ nt 1, 3, January 1975, p. 4 and H. Bull, The Whitlam Government's Perception of Our Role in 
the World, chapter 3 :in B.D. Beddie, ed., Advance Australia- Where?, Oxford University 
Press with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 1975, p. 35. Whitlam 
provided an early signal of AU5tralia's ~ew in this debate by dispatching two senior 
officials to an international confere:<\ce on support for victims of colonialism and apartheid in 
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At the UN session in late 1974, the question of expulsion of South Africa 
was considered in the Credentials committee, General Assembly, Security 
Council and again in the General Assembly. In the first instance, on 30 
September 1974, the UN Credentials committee, which included strong 
African representation, ruled against the credentials of South Africa. This 
meant that South Africa would be denied membership of the United 
Nations. This view was endorsed by the General Assembly in a vote of 98 to 
23.9 
Australia voted against this move in the General Assembly on the technical 
grounds that the Credentials committee should simply determine the actual 
form of credentials. Thus Australia was s~en to support the participation of 
South Africa, or at least prefer an alternati•:e method for exclusion. 
However, Australia supported the subsequent proposal to refer the question 
of South Africa to the Security CounciJ.lO At the time, Prime Minister 
Whitlam foreshadowed that Australia would vote in the Security Council 
to expel South Africa.u 
In Parliament}' the· Labor government explained its position in the face of 
criticism and questions from the opposition. Foreign Minister Willesee 
outlined an African draft resolution calling for the expulsion of South 
Africa from the United Nations that had been lodged with the Security 
Council. At first, Senator Willesee argued that South Africa had 
persistently violated the principles and resolutions of the United Nations 
and that, on balance, the 'Australian delegation should support the 1nove 
because of the moral considerations involved'.12 However, it seemeti that 
Senator Willesee expected the veto to be employed by one or more members 
southern Africa organi_sed by the UN hltd the Organisation of African Unity in Oslo in April 
1973. Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., p. 61. 
9 See Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's African Policy, op. cit., p. 4, Clark, The 
United Nations, op .. cit., p. 153 and Albinski, op. cit., p. 116. 
10 Goldsworthy, The vVhitlam Government's African Policy, op. cit., p. 4 and Clark, The 
United Nations, op. cit., p. 153. The motion to refer the matter to the Security Council was 
carried 125 votes to 1, South Africa, with 9 abstentions. 
11 Clark, ibid., p. 153. See also Age, 2 October 1974; Australian, 25 October 1974; Nation 
Review, 25-31 October 1974; and Australian, 31 October 1974. 
12 Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 62, 29 October 1974, p. 2028 in response to question from Senator 
Webster. T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977, Australian 
National University Press, Canberra, 1978, pp. 415-16, explained that Australia's position in 
the Security Council was justified on three grounds: 1. South Africa for twenty-five years by 
its 'unbending policy of apartheid' had consistently violated the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 2. It had refused to comply 
with UN resolutions over Namibia; and 3. It had openly assisted the illegal Smith regime in 
Southern Rhodesia, including military support in violation of S~ty Council and General 
Assembly resolutions. See also Clark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 153. 
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of the Security Council which made it easier for Australia to adopt a strong 
position against South Africa. 
Subsequently, Foreign Minister Willesee utilised the adjournment debate in 
the Parliament to argue against the views by the Liberal and Country Parties 
which aupported South Afrka's continued participation in the United 
Nations. The Labor government did not accept the argument that 
expulsion would worsen the conditions of apartheid but anticipated that 
this position would be argued in the Security Council. Willesee explained 
tho-t the \Vhitlam government remained consistent in its anti-racist stance 
and this linked directly to the vote to expel South Africa. Senator Willesee 
also rejected claims that Australi~ could not exclude South Africa given the 
poor policy record on Aboriginal peoples. Again, Willesee explained that 
the Labor government was attempting to present a consistent position 
against racial discrimination both within Australia and abroad and thus 
would continue to condenm South Africa in the United Nations.13 
Albinski suggested that Australia's vote on the questi0n of South Africa in 
the Security Council was primarily decided by Whitlam with some 
misgivings from Willesee. The Prime Minister determined that Australia 
would not compromise on the issue and therefore would not abstain.14 At 
the time of the vote, the key question remained whether Australia would 
vote to exclude South Africa simply because the veto of permanent 
members of the Security Council would be invoked. Albinski argued that 
this was not the overwhelming factor in Australia's decision as a veto was 
not guaranteed.1s In effect, the conviction of the Whitlam government 
against the apartheid regime was the most in1portant factor in determining 
Australia's vote in the Security Council. 
The Security Council voted ten to three to expel South Africa. While 
Australia had voted in favour, the veto of the United States, Britain and 
France allowed South Africa to remain a member of the United Nations.16 
With this vote, Australia gained considerable support from the developing 
13 See Willesee, CPD, Senate, vol. 62, 29 October 1974, pp. 2098-2100. 
H See Albinski, op. cit., p. 116. 
15 ibid., pp. 116-7. 
16 Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's .African Policy, op. cit., p. 4 and Clark, The 
United Nations, op. cit., p. 153. Permanent members~'. ,ve veto over any question in the 
Security Council and it would require only one permanent member to cast a negative vote for 
the motion to be rejected. 
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nations of Africa and Asia but lost support from some European nations.17 
The issue was pursued in the United Nations General Assembly on 12 
November 1974 where the President, Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika 
ruled that the 'repeated rejection of South Africa's credentials signified that 
the members of the United Nations refused to allow the participation of the 
delegation of South Africa'.18 This reversed the decisions of previous 
General Assembly Presidents on this matter and was overwhelmingly 
supported 92 votes to 22 with 19 abstentions. Thus, after several attempts, 
South Africa was excluded from the United Nations. 
Interestingly, Australia voted against the ruling of the General Assembly 
President on the procedural point that challenging the credentials of a 
member country in this manner was insufficient grounds to deny 
participation in the forum. While providing a consistent approach on the 
procedural questions in the United Nations, Australia voted against the 
expulsion of South Africa in the General Assembly after voting in favour of 
the proposition in the Security Council. On the fundamental question of 
South African participation in the United Nations, one might have 
expected the Whitlam government to ignore the technical processes on an 
issue which was forcefully articulated within the Labor government and 
strongly argued among members of the UN General Assembly. 
It was also interesth~g that the United States advised South Africa not to 
withdraw from the United Nations because the next Assembly President 
was likely to be an Australian and therefore more sympathetic to the 
participation of South Africa.l9 This implied that the changes initiated by 
Whitlam to Australia's international position, especially on issues of racism 
and discrimination, were not seen as significant. Alternatively, the United 
States n1ay have been confident in its capacity to inr1uence the Australian 
government to the point of supprrting South Africa in the General 
Assembly. Also, the US ur..derstood that Australia, even with a Labor 
government, would uphold the procedural traditions of the UN and 
thereby not act to exclude South Africa thro~gh a ruling of the President of 
the Assembly. 
17 Millar, op. cit., p. 416. See also Hugh Collins, Australian Foreign Policy in the Era of 
Detente, Australian Outlook, vol. 29, 2, August 1975, p. 138 and Cla~l~. The United Nations, 
op. cit, p. 152. For domesti(; criticism of the Labor government's stanl.:.'. see Webster, CPD, 
~te, vol. 62, 29 Octobf'r 1974, pp. 2091·Cl5 and Peacock, CPD, House c.f Representatives, vol. 
91, 30 October 1974, pp. 3033-35. 
18 Clark, The United Nations, op. cit., pp. 153-4. 
19 See Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's African Policy, op. cit.., p. 5. 
1r: 
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Australia's position at the United Nations in opposition to apartheid was 
undermined by the continuing trade relationship with South Africa. . This 
economic. connection was important for some of the Labor Party 
constituency in order to maintain employment in Australian industries 
which exported products to South Africa. For Whitlam, this was a difficult 
situation because the Labor Party's anti-racist principles clashed with the 
imperative to promote Australian economic interests.2o Moreover, Cairns, 
as Minister for Overseas Trade, was placed in the awkward situation of 
following the Labor Party Platform in opposition to racism while charged to 
'assist Australian exporters and manufacturers to ffud markets abroad' .21 L.1. 
July 1973, Minister Cairns atte1npted to explain the position of the Labor 
government: 
You can't stop trade with countries just because you don't like 
their policies. If we did that, we would stop trading with just 
about eve1y country except Sweden and Switzerland.22 
Prime Minister Whitlam clarified that Australia would not unilaterally 
prohibit trade with South Africa but would support economic sanctions in 
the United Nations or elsewhere which would place pressure upon the 
minority government of South Africa.23 The support for sanctions 
depended upon agreement by South Africa's other major trading nations.24 
Australia had become a significant e)_Cporter of cars, spare parts, and 
machinery to South Africa and an importer of industrial diamonds and 
asbestos materials. The level of imports was overshadowed by the 
20 The British Labour government's United Nations representative was highly critical of the 
contradictory positions of "Whitlam. See speech at the British High Commi.ssion, Canberra 1 
November 1974, quoted in Goldsworthy, ibid. This attack attempted to justify the position of 
the British Labour government in support of South Africa in the Security Council. On trade 
with South Africa, see also Richard Higgott, Australia and Africa 1970-80: A Decade of 
Change and Growth, Africa Contempoi·ary Record, vol. 14, 1981, p. 223 and see generally, D.L. 
Gadiel, Australia's Commercial Policy and South Africa's Economic Isolation, Economic 
Record, vol. 54, 1974. 
21 Goldsworthy, The vVhitlam Government's African Policy, op. cit., p. 2. For a different 
time period on similar issuesr see D. Cox, Profitr; and Principles: The Hawke government's 
South Africa policy, Ph.D. thesis, Flinders University, 1994. 
22 Cairns quoted in Australian, 27 July 1973. :tv!inister Cairns continued to explain that 'the 
Government was reviewing trade with South Africa because of its apartheid poL.cies. We 
may withdraw Government support for trade with South Africa'. 
23 See Whitlam in Millar, op. cit., p. 415 and Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., 
p.62. 
24 Crean, CPD, HR., vol. 93, 25 February 1975, p. 698, in response to question from Peacock. See 
also Albinski, op. cit., p. 117. The same attitude was expressed by the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions. See generally Richard Bissell, South Africa and international ostracism, 
World Affairs, vol. 137, 3, Winter 1974/75. 
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significant growth in exports between 1971 and 1973.25 Further, the 
dilem1na of principles and practice was illustrated by Australia's 
opportunity to influence the International Wool Secretariat. Financed by 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, but largely controlled by 
Australia, this international organisation offered the point at which the 
vVhitlam government could have applied pressure on vital South African 
interests. However, it was understood that any disruption to South African 
trade in wo?l would weaken the industry as a whole, which would have 
created disquiet within Australia.26 Alternatively, Australia could have 
capitalised upon the exclusion of South Africa from the international wool 
market by expanding exports to replace the South African trade. Indeed, this 
course was suggested by some African leaders.27 
The Australian Department of Overseas Trade continued to promote 
economic links with South Africa by retaining two Trade Commission 
offices in South Africa.2s Minister Cairns intimated that the recall of the 
Trade Commissioners was a possibility. However, .in 1974, the government 
decided simply to limit the role of the Trade Commissions to exclude 
promotional activity. In the following year, one Trade Commissioner was 
withdrawn from Cape Town while the same position was retained in 
Johannesburg.29 
Linked to the trade issues, the Whitlam government understood that 
significant national economic interests rested with Australian investment 
in South Africa, particularly as Australian investments in South Africa 
25 Australian exports to South Africa grew from $79million in 1971-72 to $95million in 1972-
73. Also significant was the growth in imports from $20million in 1972-73 to $36million m 
1973-74. See answer to question from Crean, CPD, HR, 12 February 1975, pp. 243-4. See also 
Ron Witton, Australia and Apartheid, the Ties that Bind, Australian Quarterly, vol. 45, 2, 
June 1973 for details of trade and investment links between Australia and South Africa during 
the 1960s. 
26 See Albinski, op. cit., pp. 117-18 and Goldswortl':.y, The Whitlam Government's African 
Policy, op. cit., p. 2. Both quote at length from J.D.B. Miller, Australian Foreign Policy: 
Constraints and Opportunib.es - II, International Affairs, no. 50, July 1974, pp. 433-4. 
27 See Higgott, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., p. 231. 
28 During 1973, the official journal of the Department of Overseas Trade promoted the South 
African investment and trade region, and advanced the economic opportunities m the 
disputed Portuguese colony of Angola. Witton, op. cit., p. 29. 
29 Albinski, op. cit., p. 118 and Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's African Policy, op. 
cit., p. 2. Minister Crean, CPD, HR, vol. 93, 25 February 1975, p. 698, stated that the 
government had decided to discontinue all government promotion of trade and investment in 
~outh Africa. Consequently, there would be no more officially sponsored trade missions, 
trade displays, exhibitions or fairs. See also Age, 10 & 22 April19/5 and see generally, Brian 
Noone, Australian economic ties with apartheid, Development News Digest, voL 2, 2, 
October 1973 and Trade Development Council, Mission to Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and the 
Sudan, for the Department of Overseas Trade, AGPS, Canberra, 1976. 
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were hj,ghly profitable. The problem remained that this investment assisted 
the apartheid economy and regime while utilising regulations which 
exploited the African labour force.3o Eventually, the Labor government 
discontinued the practice of subsidising investment by Australian 
companies in South Africa. Also, Senator Willesee wrote to all Australian 
companies with subsidiaries or associates in South Africa with proposals for 
improving the working conditions of employees. The Whitlam 
government may have been influenced by similar initiatives enacted by the 
British and Canadian governments. The correspondence attempted to apply 
moral pressure alone in the absence of legislation or other action.31 
These gestures on trade and investment reflected the interests of business 
groups in Australia. Whitlam was under pressure from Australian 
business to guarantee continued trade with South Africa but more 
importantly, the Prime Minister needed the support of business groups 
within the domestic econon1y.32 The Labor government was struggling to 
contain inflation and unemployment and required the active assistance of 
business groups in Australia. vVhile the government seemed to confront a 
strike of capital and investment from the day of election, the attempt to 
incorporate the interests of business on some topics was important for 
1Nhitlam to the end. 
Similarly, the Labor government considered the licence of South African 
Airways flights to Australia which was due for renewal in July 1974. At this 
point, there was some discussion between the Departments of Foreign 
Affairs and Transport. The argument against continued air links focused on 
the contribution to the South African tourist and business trade in addition 
to the implicit recognition of companies operating under the apartheid 
regime. Conceivably, the rights of Qantas in South Africa would have been 
revoked if the Whitlam government were to ban SAA in Australia. This 
would have damaged a profitable Qantas route. The Labor government 
repeated the stance that there were no United Nations prohibitions on 
international air links with South Africa and many carriers operated in 
South Africa. Australia would conform to UN resolutions on this but was 
not prepared to initiate a unilateral shift.33 Thus, the SAA licence was 
30 See Whitlam, 30 Apri11974, interviewed by Albinski, op. cit., p. 118. 
31 Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's African Policy, op. cit., p. 3. See also Age, 21 
52ptember 1974 and Nation Review, 27 September- 3 October & 7-14November 1974. 
32 See Witton, op. cit.; p. 29. 
33 See Albinski, op. cit., p. 118. 
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renewed and thereafter, the case for terminating the link became 
significantly more difficult.34 
Simultaneously, the Whitlam government was criticised by community 
groups for· the continuing trade and economic connections with South 
Africa. In 1974, for example, the Campaign Against Racial Exploitation 
began coordinating information for various organisations opposed to 
apartheid. CARE produced a comprehensive information kit which 
advocated direct action to draw attention to the apartheid system, attempted 
to raise awareness in the media and public forums, and implemented a 
strategy for changing the policies and practices of governments, individuals 
and companies in relation to trading with South Africa.35 Through CARE, 
student organisations, church groups and aid bodies actively discouraged 
purchases of South African imports in Australia. 
In addition, community groups supported the Whitlam governn1ent's firm 
position to restrict sporting contacts with both South Africa and Rhodesia. 
Racially selected sporting teams were excluded from Australia and their 
transit through Australia was not permitted. Conversely, individual 
sporting players were not denied access to Australia nor individual 
Australians from competing in South Africa. However, in early 1974, the 
Lawn Tennis Association of Australia decided not to send players to South 
Africa. Also the Labor government argued with the Australian Cricket 
Board over sending a team to South Africa and the government's position 
prevailed.36 Given the historical sporting rivalries between Australia and 
South Africa in cricket and rugby, the sporting restrictions implied a 
substantial impact upon the" colonial sporting communities.37 
In sum.- the Whitlam government rejected arguments for substantial 
change in Australia's economic relationship with South Africa. The 
government argued that unilateral action would have been ineffective or 
34 Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's African Policy, op. cit., p. 2. See also Albinski, 
op. cit., p. 119. 
35 See Canberra Times, 30 November & 2 December 1974. Also, groups such as the South 
African Defence and Aid Fund, the Southern African Liberation Centre, and the campaign to 
Halt All Racial Tours sought to influence the government and the public. Goldsworthy, 
Australia and Africa ... , op. cit, pp. 6', ~ 69-70. See also Neville Curtis, Australian 
opposition to Apartheid, United Nations Centre against Apartheid: Notes and documents, 
no. 1/77, January 1977. 
36 See Albinski, op. cit-~ p. 115. See also Whitlam, op. cit., p. 20 on the initial decision to 
exclude the sporting teams, and Australian,21 March 1974. 
37 Indeed, Higgott, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., p. 219, explained that challenges to 
South Africa's sporting relationship with Australia had a 'profoundly unsettling effect' on 
South Africa's minority population. 
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singularly damaging to the Australian economy. The Department of 
Overseas Trade initiated and reinforced this position, supported by Minister 
Cairns. The Whitlam government encouraged a move by the United 
Nations on trade sanctions but also recognised that sanctions would not 
eventuate in the short term. Stronger action against South Africa would 
rely upon significant change from Britain and the United States.38 
On the other hand, Whitlam directed that Australia would vote to expel 
South Africa from the United Nations. This position was directly opposite 
to the views of Britain and the Un1 d States and was a reversal of 
Australia's position prior to 1972. Whitlam also acted to limit sporting 
contact with South Africa which was significant in demonstrating a political 
comn1itment to oppose racial discrimination. Nevertheless, the 
combination of initiatives on South Africa provided a mixed outcome for 
the Labor government and, in the end, Whitlam could have strengthened 
Australia's opposition to apartheid. 
Rhodesia 
The Whitlam govern1nent's policies on Rhodesia were more rigid than 
those on South Africa. With an immediate change in voting on Rhodesia 
at the United Nations, the Whitlam government demonstrated an obvious 
change in foreign policy to oppose the minority regime in Rhodesia. Also, 
in line with the Labor Party Platform and policy speech, the Whitlam 
government attempted to sever ties with Rhodesia with mixed results. The 
clear change in direction on Rhodesia was crucial for Australia's 
international image and for the Whitlam Labor government's credibility in 
the Asia Pacific region. 
Immediately followil:~g the 1972 election, Prime Minister Whitlam 
instructed the Australh1n delegation in the UN plenary session on 7 
December 1972 to vote .~n favour of two draft resolutions which were 
strongly critical of the minority regime in Rhodesia and called for the 
strengthening of sanctions against the Rhodesian government.39 The 
advice to Whitlam from the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
was to abstain on both resolutions but Whitlam regarded these arguments 
as too 'legalistic' and instead instructed the delegation to vote in favour of 
38 See Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's African Policy, op. cit., p. 3. 
39 Clark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 127 and Whitlam, op. cit., p. 14. 
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both resolutions.40 Whitlam gained the desired im.pact as Australia's 
representatives in New York could 'scarcely believe the warmth of the 
welcome which other delegates gave to Australia's switch'.41 
In January 1973, Austraiia began an elected term on the UN Security 
Council and one of the first issues to be discussed was Rhodesia's closure of 
its border with Zambia. This course of action by Rhodesia was pursued in 
order to dissuade Zambia from supporting guerrilla forces which were 
operating in Rhodesia. In the Security Council debate in February, Australia 
expressed sympathy with Zambia on this issue and supported the Council 
decision to assist 1n alleviating 'the special economic hardships confronting 
Zambia' as a result of the Rhodesian blockade.42 This symbolic action by the 
Australian representative in the Security Council further demonstrated the 
anti-racist credentials of the new Whitlam Labor government to the 
international commt1nity. 
Subsequently, Whitlam attempted to restrict the contact between residents 
of Rhodesia and Australia. From 1 October 1973, Rhodesians were required 
to gain a visa to enter Australia and, in effect, these were rarely granted. To 
the frustration of the government, Rhodesian access to Australia was 
facilitated through South African contacts and other agencies. Indeed, 
Australian military officers were recruited for service with the Rhodesian 
armed forces.43 
Despite clear instructions to the New South Wales government that the 
Rhodesia Information Centre in Sydney should be closed, the Whitlam 
government was frustrated on this issue. The Centre was a substitute for 
official representation of the minority regime in Australia and it was 
advising Australian businesses on methods of commercial gain in 
Rhodesia. 44 On 7 December 1972, in a letter to the NSvV Premier Sir Robert 
40 See comments of Sir K 2ith Waller, recorded from a meeting on 5 December 1972, discussed 
in Whitlam, ibid., pp. 14-15. See also Oark, The United Nations, op. cit, p. 127 and Clark, 
Australian Foreign Policy ... , op. cit., pp. 16 & 129. 
41 Whitlam, op. cit., p. 69. 
42 See Clark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 152 and Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa ... , 
op. cit., p. 61. See also United Statf>.s Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Hearings: Future direction of US policy toward 
southern Rhodesia, February-March 1973 and Michael Williams, Britain and Rhodesia: the 
economic background to sanctions, World Today, vol. 29, 9, September 1973. 
43 Albinski, op. cit., p. 114. See also Oark, The United Nations, op. cit., p. 152. 
44 See Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa. .. , op. cit.;- p. 66. 
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Askin, Whitlam wrote: 
The [Rhodesia Information] Centre's existence under its present 
name . . . creates the impression in the minds of other 
governments, and of the public generally, that the Australian 
Government tolerates the existence in Australia of an agency of 
the r'<' )me in Southern Rhodesia.45 
The Askin Liberal Party governinent co-operated in applying to the 
Supreme Court of NSW for the cancellation of the business registration of 
the Rhodesia Inform&.t!.on Centre. The application was granted but 
subsequently overruled by the NSW Court of Appeal in June 197 4. In 
preference to an appeal to the Higl-_ Court, the Whitlam government 
decided to introduce legislation to implement the United Nations 
resolutions on Rhodesia which would provide authority to close the Centre. 
This course was blocked by a full and often disrupted Parliamentary 
schedule.46 Therefore, the Rhodesia Information Centre continued to 
operate throughout the term of the Whitlam government. 
In the end, the early action in opposition to Rhodesia in the United Nations 
provided a clear policy direction for the Whitlam government. Australia 
was aligned with the majority of nations in halting contact with Rhodesia 
and applying diplomatic pressure by· attempting to close the Rhodesia 
Information Centre. Australia was fervent in opposing the minority 
government in lUlodesia while inconsistent on South Africa. 
Aid to Africa 
The Whitlam government's aid policy on Africa complemented the 
international and domestic actions against the minority governments in 
South Africa and Rhodt=sia. Australia allocated food aid to various regions 
45 Whitlam, op. cit., p. 70. Efforts to sever postal and telephone services to the Rhodesia 
Information Centre and to delete the Centre's entry from Sydney telephone directories were 
stopped by an application to the High Court. See .Albinski, op. cit., p. 114 and Murphy, 
answer to question, CPD, Senate, vol. 57, 12 September 1913, p. 439. 
46 Wfdtlam, ibid., p. 70. Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., p. 66, explained that 
a group knmvn as the Alternative Rhodesia Information Centre was important in publicising 
fue activities of the Rhodesia Information Centre and in approaching Members of 
Parliament. See also Albinski, op. cit., p. 114; Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's 
African Policy, op. cit, p. 2; Oark, Tne United Nations, op. cit., p. 152; Bull, op. cit., p. 49; 
and see generally, United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Subcommittee on Africar Hearings: Implications for US international legal 
obligations of the presence of the Rhodesia Infonnation Office in the United States, part 1., 
May 1973. 
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in Africa, provided monies to multilateral funds for targeted assistance, 
increased project aid which included the Magarini project in Kenya, and 
offered aid for specific political purposes in opposition to Rhodesia. The 
level of Australian aid to Africa increased during the tenure of the Whitlam 
government, mostly through multilateral disbursements. Nonetheless, the 
political significance of Australian aid to Africa was more important than 
the economic amounts.47 For example, in May 1973, the Whitla·.··, 
government contributed $250000 to assist Zambia develop alternative trade 
routes through southern Africa in response to a visit from Zambian 
officials.48 
The focus of the Australian economic assistance program to Africa was 
emergency humanitarian relief in the form of food aid. In response to 
problems related to famine in 1974-75, Australia sent milk powder to 
Ethiopia and purchased 1naize to be used partly for distribution in food 
deficit areas and partly for the establishment of food security stocks. The 
Whitlam government delivered wheat, ghee, "'nd milk powder to feeding 
camps established by the Somali government following severe 
repercussions from drought in 1974. Wheat was shipped to Maurit:j::ti:a, 
Mali and Senegal in February-April1975 and a further cash allocation was 
made to the Sahelian Relief Operation of the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation. In June 1975, the Australian government shipped wheat to 
Tanzania, Mozambique and the Sudan which were experiencing food 
shortages due to the combination of drought and floods. Also, during 1975-
76, wheat was allocated to Egypt and flour shipped to Mauritius.49 
In conjunction with the food aid allocations, the Whitlam government 
provided aid to Africa through multilateral channels. Targeted multilateral 
~~·:,:t '~.Hduded the United Nations Educational and Training Programmes for 
Southern Africa, UN Trust Fund for South Africa, UN Fund for Namibia, 
47 Richard Higgott, Australia and Africa, chapter 15 in P.J. Boyce and J.R. Angel, eds, 
Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-30, Allen & Unwin and the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, 1983, p. 256, Nancy Viviani and Peter 
Wilenski, The Australian Development Assistance Agency: A Post Mortem Report, Royal 
Australian Institute of Public Administration, monograph no. 3, 1977, p. 24 and Higgott, 
Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., p. 220. See also Australian Development Assistance Agency, 
First Annual Report, 1975, p. 29. Bilateral aid to Africa remained low w.hile multilateral 
aid levels to Africa increased, for example, bilateral aid for 1973-74 totalled $1.1million, 
with $2.6million in 1974-75, and $1.3million in 1975-76. See Australian Development 
Assistance Agency, Annual Report 1975-6, 1976, pp. 35-8. 
48 Goldsworthy, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., p. 62. See also Higgott, Australia and 
Africa ... , op. cit., p. 222. 
49 ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., pp. 29,46-7 & 52 and ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, 
op. cit., p. 16. 
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Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan, Special Commonwealth 
Programme for Assisting the Education of Rhodesian Africans, and 
Humanitarian Assistance to National Liberation Movements in Africa.so 
Contributions to these visible international funds was important in 
demonstrating Australia's shift on .African political issues in the United 
Nations and the Commonwealth. 
There were also less visible allocations that strengthened particular 
relationships with African countries. These contributions included training 
awards, study visits and scholarships under the Commonwealth 
Cooperation in Education Plan and the Commonwealth Scholarship and 
Fellowship Plan. While the totals of this aid remained smallr representing 
less than one percent of Australia's aid expenditure, these new aid 
initiatives reflected a growing financial and political commitment to 
Africa.51 
Also, increased attention was given to longer term rehabilitation aid and 
specific projects. In 1973, Australian assistance was requested in developing 
water resources in the arid Singida region of Tanzania. Australia sent two 
drilling units and a team of experts for an initial three-year period to 
develop water supplies for don1estic and stock purposes. Windmills and 
storage facilities were supplied and local drillers and mechanics were 
trained to operate and maintain equipment.52 Further, funds were provided 
in 1974 for a Food and Agriculture Organisation Sahelian pasture 
rehabilitation Froject with further assistance anticipated for 1975-6. At the 
request of th\~ government of Ghana in 1975, a feasibility study was 
cow~"lissioned on the Bui Hydro-electric Project on the Black Volta River.53 
The Whitlam government was also involved in the early stages of a large 
aid project m Kenya which became known as the Magarini Settlement 
Project. This project involved 'the investigation and development of water 
supplies, the establishment of settlers, and the development of agricultural 
~. production.'54 Initial studies were conducted by representatives of the 
50 See Goldsworthy, The Whitlam Government's lifrican Policy, op. cit., p. 3. 
51 ibid. 
52 ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 29-30 and ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, op. cit., p. 
16. 
53 ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, ibid. 
54 ibid., pp. 16-17. As early as 1972, it was suggested that Australia provide Kenya with an 
expert in dry-land £aiming. At the 1973 CHOGM in Ottawa, the Whltlam government made 
an offer of aid in the form of technical advice to the Kenyan Vice-President and reiterated 
the proposal for an irrigation engineer or an arid-zone agronomist through the High 
~ -. . : .... z ·. . . :~. ,: . 3 · ... 
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Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation and the 
Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation.ss In critique of the 
commitment of a large amount of ::tid funds into one project in Kenya, 
Porter, Allen and Thompson claimed that: 
Magarini initially existed only as a desire of tne Australian 
Whitlam Labor government for a 'project somewhere in Africa' 
to deflect charges by African Commonwealth leaders that 
Australia was a bastion of white racilsrn.s6 
This harsh interpretation of the motives for involvement in the project 
assumed that the Whitlam government had a simplistic attitude tow-ard 
relations with Africa and that Whitlam needed to convince 
Commonwealth leaders about Australia's commitment to Africa. The 
Whitlam government was operating at various levels to support the 
interests of African countries and the accusation that the Magarini project 
was an empty gesture seems misplaced. 
In linking aid and Australia's political position, the Whitlam government 
allocated economic assistance to liberation forces in Africa and to 
Mozambique. These decisions fitted with the Whitlam government's 
policies in opposition to South Africa and Rhodesia. Specifically, the 
President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, visited Australia in March 1974 and 
requested funds to acquire weapons for forces opposed to the apartheid 
regime.s7 The Whitlam government was prepared to offer assistance but 
baulked at the notion of supplying arms to the liberation movements. 
Following a submission from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the 
government decided to allocate $150000 in 1974-75 for humanitarian 
assistance to African national liberation movements. The funds were 
channelled through established networks such as the Organisation of 
African Unity and UNICEF, and were allocated as aid for women and 
children of liberation movements who had ""emporarily settled in Zambia.ss 
Commission in Nairobi. See Doug Porter, Bryant Allen and Gaye Thompson, Development in 
Practice: Paved with Good Intentions, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 34. 
55 On th'.! role of SMEC, see T.A. Murphy, The Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation as 
an Lns~.rument of Australian Foreign Policy, M.A. thesis, Department of International 
Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1985, which 
examines hvo SMEC projects, the Serayu River Basin project in Indonesia and the Zambocw.ga 
del Sur Development project in the Philippines. 
56 Porter, Allen and Thompson, op. cit., p. 4. Compare Rowan Callick, Australian Society, 
July 1991, p. 12. 
57 See D. Goldsworthy, Australia's Southern African Policy, World Review, vol. 17, June 
1978, pp. 53-65. See also IIiggott, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit, p. 222. 
58 Albinski, op. cit., p. 102 and Higgott, Australia and Africa ... , op. cit., p. 222. Several other 
nations had previously committed funds for humanitarian purposes to liberation movements 
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These funds for food and housing for displaced and exiled families allowed 
other monies to be spent on weapontJ by the liberation groups. The visit by 
President Nyerere also signalled the Whitlam government's 
acknowledgment of a respected African leader and reinforced the collective 
action against the minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia. 
The Whitlam government also allocated $1million in food aid to 
Mozambique. This assistance emerged from the 1975 CHOGM decision to 
provide aid to the Frelimo government in Mozambique to compensate for 
the costs incurred in enforcing sanctions against Rhodesia.s9 This allocation 
of aid was significant in demonstrating the Whitlam government's 
opposition to the minority regime in Rhodesia. 
Through the new Australian Development Assistance Agency, the 
Whitlam government also made longer term plans for aid to Africa. This 
began with an Australian aid mission, which included specialist advisers on 
water resources and agricultural development, visiting Ghana, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Kenya in June-July 1975. The purpose of the mission was to 
discuss priorities and requirements for aid with a view to assisting the 
forward planning of the aid program to Africa. On this basis, programs of 
assistance were being developed by the aid Agency late in the term of the 
'%itlam government. It was planned that the Australian aid program 
would focus on the need for increased food production and the 
development of water resources.6o 
In total, th~ aid allocations to Africa demonstrated that the Whitlam 
governrnent was committed to the interests and demands of the African 
~ 
states. Australian aid to Africa also compljmented the Whitlam 
government's international and domestic initiatives in opposition to the 
minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. In particular, the different 
elements of the Australian aid program to Africa assisted the Whitlam 
government's position in the United Nations and the Commonwealth. 
Overall, while the level of aid from Australia to Africa was low, these 
allocations had considerable political significance. 
and the Australian contribution was seen as a modest amount. The aid assisted families 
linked to the Zimbabwe hberation groups ZMTU and ZAPU, SW APO and MPLA from 
Angola, and the African National Congress.}. See .als&petitions presented t(J the Parliament 
by Members of the Liberal Party in support of greater assistance for national liberation 
movements in Africa, CPD, Senate, vol. 62, 30 October 1974, pp. 2105-6. 
59 Age, 8 May 1975 and Sydney Morning Herald, 8 May 1975. See also Australian, 8 May 1975 
and Age, editorial, 8 May 1975. 
60 ADAA, Annual Report 1975-6, op. cit., p. 16 and ADAA, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 30 . 
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Conclusion 
In contrast to the support provided by the Liberal and Country Parties 
governments to South Africa and Rhodesia prior to December 1972, the 
Whitlam government demonstrated the Labor Party's opposition to racial 
discrimination in southern Africa. In addition, Whitlam showed support 
for the interests of African countries in conjunction with new relationships 
with developing countries in general. Specifically, Australia argued for the 
expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations but also continued to 
trade with the apartheid economy. While restricting sporting links with 
South Africa, Whitlam delivered ·a mixed record in opposing apartheid, 
reflecting the range of views in Australia about the appropriate relationship 
with South Africa. 
Whitlam initiated immediate changes i:... Australia's approach to Rhodesia 
in the UN which established the anti-racist credentials for the Labor 
government with the international community, especially with the 
developing countries. However, Whitlam was frustrated in attempting to 
close the Rhodesia Information Centre. The content of Australian aid to 
Africa during the Whitlam government tended to complement the high 
profile changes in policy on South Africa and Rhodesia. Notably, Whitlam 
showed a level of political commitment to Africa in allocating economic 
assistance to liberation forces and southern African countries opposing the 
minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. 
The Whitlam government's position on Africa was central to Australia's 
relations with developing countries, particularly for Australia's policies in 
the Asia Pacific region. The changes initiated by the Whitlam government 
emerged from the domestic political context and the international debates of 
the early 1970s. In total, a significant achievement of the Whitlam Labor 
government was to place Australia in opposition to the minority regimes in 
South Africa and Rhodesia and in alliance with many developing countries. 
This outcome was a substantial shift from the position adopted by the 
previous Liberal and Country Parties governments in relation to A t-.dca and 
reflected Whitlam's determination to establish an anti-racist and anti-
colonial foreign policy for Australia. 
chapter6 
Domestic context of the Fraser foreign policy 
In the previous chapters, I established the foreign policy position of the 
Liberal and Country Parties governments prior to December 1972. As 
initiated by Prime Minister Menzies, Australian foreign policy was based on 
security concerns and anti-communism, ·alliances with Britain and the 
United States, and support for South Africa and Rhodesia. I introduced the 
nature of the Whitlam Labor government to show the domestic context in 
which Whitlam played an important role in relation to Australian foreign 
policy. I subsequently examined Whitlam's critical relationship with the 
United States, the tensions in Australia's policy on the Indian Ocean, and 
the new position adopted by Whitlam in the United Nations. On these 
international issues, I concluded that Whitlam had instituted significant 
changes to Australian foreign policy while maintaining the basis for 
Australia's international alliances. Whitlam also built constructive 
relationships with developing countries through an anti-racist and anti-
colonial approach toward the Asia Pacific region. This change in foreign 
policy was an important context for Whitlam's policies on Africa. The 
Whitlam government changed Australia's voting position at the UN to 
oppose the minority regime in Rhodesia and limited political and sporting 
contacts with the South African government. 
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The analysis of these issues provides a basis for comparison with the foreign 
policy of the Fraser Liberal and Country Parties government. Also, this 
discussion. is structured to examine the continuity or change in foreign 
policy f1om the Whitlam government to the Fraser goverrunent. Further, 
the comparison creates links between issues over time to present a clear 
picture of Australian foreign policy. 
To resume the examination of foreign policy from the dismissal of the 
Whitlam government on 11 Nove1nber 1975, Malcolm Fraser was installed 
as caretaker Prime Minister prior to the federal election scheduled for 13 
December 1975. Meanwhile, the Australian government was confronted 
with the movement of Indonesian troops into East Timor. Subsequently, 
the overwhelming victory of the Liberal and Country Parties in the federal 
election provided an important power base for Fraser. The unique 
combination of views held by Prime Minister Fraser were important in the 
construction of Australia's international agenda, particularly in providing 
links between different elements of foreign policy, which in turn was 
important for understanding Australia's relations with Africa. In the 
foU,Jwing chapters, I analyse the international relationships of the Fraser 
government, relations with developing countries, and finally Australia's 
policy toward Africa. 
Caretaker government and East Timor 
As caretaker Prime Minister, Fraser selected an interim ~1inistry to 
maintain the administration of government departments prior to the 
double dissolution election.l Th~~~ caretaker government, including the 
Prime Minister, could not initiate changes to policy prior to the federal 
election. Thus, between 11 November an.d 13 December 1975, the political 
parties were concentrating on the election campaign and Australia was in 
the unusual position of operating through a limited caretaker government. 
The election carnpaign was dominated by reactions to the dismissal of 
Whitlam and domestic issues from the term of the Labor government. 
However, on 7 December 1975, L"'ldonesian armed forces invaded East Timor 
1 Related to foreign policy, the caretaker Ministry included Andrew Peacock in the position 
of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Doug Anthony as Minister for Overseas Trade and Jim Killen 
as Minister for Defence. See Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, vol. 98, p. ii. 
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to ·restore order' .2 This move ensured that Fretilin would not control East 
Timor and implied eventual integration of the territory with Indonesia.3 
The timing of this manoeuvre coincided with the state of parliamentary 
and governmental flux in Australia which may have produced an 
expectation in Indonesia that the caretaker Fraser administration would not 
be able to organise a coordinated response to the invasion. Indeed, the 
caretaker Australian government, and the former Labor government 
Ministers, were preoccupied with domestic electoral issues and chose not to 
provide public reactions to the annexation of East Timor. 
In fact, Fraser's policy options immediately after the invasion were limited. 
The choices ranged from silent acquiescence to the encouragement of an 
active role for the United Nations. Similar to the di~emma faced by the 
Whitlam government, Fraser needed to balance Australia's relations with 
Indonesia and support for self-determination in East Timor. Fraser also 
needed to offer a critical response for the consumption of the domestic 
electorate and provide a measure of reserve toward Indonesia for long-term 
contingencies, such as increased tension between Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia.4 
The immediate response to Indonesia's action in East Timor was provided 
by the United Nations Committee on Decolonisation and the UN General 
Assembly. Two draft resolutions emerged for debate. The first, sponsored 
by Guyana, Sierra Leone and others, expressed deep concern about the 
situation in East Timor and strongly deplored the military intervention. 
The resolution called upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor and 
urged the Security Council to take urgent action to protect East Timor's 
2 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977, Australian 
National University Press, Canberra, 1978, p. 422. See also W.J. Hudson, Problems in 
Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1975, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
vol. 22, 1, April1976, p. 4, for more details on Indonesia's actions in East Timor. 
3 Henry S. Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor, University of Queensland Press, 
St Lucia, 1977, p. 109 and Claire Clark, The United Nations, chapter 6 in W.J. Hudson, 
Australia in World Affairs 1971-75, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1980, p. 147. The date of 
invac;ion coincided with me visit the previous day to Jakarta of US President Ford and 
adviser Henry Kissi1'1ger. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975, Viking, Ringwood, 
1985, p. 111, added that Presidents Suharto and Ford both denied ~.hat they discussed the 
situation in East Timor but Foreign Minister Malik and Kissinger did not deny that they 
discussed the issue. 
4 J.L. Richardson, Problem. in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1976, Australian 
Journal of Politics and Histo: ,,, vol. 22, 3, December 1976, p. 333 and J.A.C. Mackie, Australian 
Foreign Policy: From Whitlam to Fraser, Dyason House Papers, vol. 3, 1, August 1976, p. 5. 
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territorial J.ntegrity and the 'inalienable right of its people to self-
determination' .s 
The alternative draft resolution, sponsored by India and members of 
ASEAN, among others, did not specifically refer to Indonesia but called 
upon all states to 'refrain frmn any action which might prejudice the free 
exercise by the people of Portuguese Timor of their right to self-
determination'. 6 This resolution was an attempt to assist Indonesia and to 
maintain constructive relations in ASEAN and other forums. 
During the UN debates, the Australian delegation actively sought a text 
which would be acceptable to all nations. In the end, the Indian and 
ASEAN draft was withdrawn and the critical Guyanan draft in original 
form was adopted. Australia had expressed reservations about the direct 
references to Indonesia and, in the General Assembly, abstained on a 
separate vote on this element.7 However, Australia voted for the resolution 
in both committee and plenary, and thus joined the condemnation of 
Indonesia's military intervention and called upon the Security Council for 
urgent action. In sum, the caretaker Fraser government advocated self-
determination for East Timor but did not actively oppose the Indonesian 
invasion. It seemed that Australia yielded to long-term economic and 
security interests in maintajning friendly relations with Indonesia.s 
Prime Minister Fraser and foreign policy 
The federal election on 13 December 1975 provided a substantial majority of 
seats for the Liberal and Country Parties government in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.9 This significant electoral victory 
entrenched the personal power of Fraser withln the government. As Prime 
5 See Oark, op. cit., p. 148. 
6 ibid. 
7 The resolution was adopted iir committee with 69 in favour, 11 against and 38 abstentions, 
and subsequently adopted in the General Assembly 72-10-43. Formal amendments to the 
Guyanan draft from Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Saudi Arabia and Mauritania to 
delete the direct reference to Indonesian military action all failed. See ibid. 
8 P.J. Boyce, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 23, 1, April1977J' p. 5. See also Mackie, op. cit., p. 5. 
9 There was a 7.4 percent swing to the Liberal a.."ld Country Parties from the previous election. 
See Australian Parliamentary Handbook, Nineteenth edition, Supplement no. 1, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1976. For the purpose of clarity, I continue to employ the nomenclature of the 
Country Party through the period of the Fraser government while the Country Party changed 
its name to the National Country Party in May 1975 and to the National Party of Australia 
in October 1983. 
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Minister and leader of the Liberal party, and in contrast to the Labor Party 
process, Fraser was able to construct a Ministry with few constraints. There 
was an expectation that members of the Country Party would be appointed 
to particular pnrtfolios as part of a coalition government and some 
expectations from long-serving Liberal Members of Parliament for senior 
portfolios. Thus, as established in the caretaker Ministry, Andrew Peacock 
was confirmed as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jim Killen gained the 
Defence portfolio, and the leader of the Country Party and Deputy Prime 
Minister, Doug Anthony was appointed to the position of Minister for 
Overseas Trade.1° Nonetheless, the formulation of foreign policy centred on 
the complex ideological position of Prime Minister Fraser. Indeed, Fraser 
led the members of the government on many issues, especially in opposing 
the minority regimes in southern Africa. 
The family experience of Malcolm Fraser instilled a conservative 
philosophy which was linked with a background of public service and an 
outlook of international proportions.11 The establishment country life 
shaped Fraser's character, which was reinforced at Melbourne Grammar 
School. At Oxford University in the 1950s, Fraser learned of the threat of 
communism and this preoccupation remained in different forms 
throughout a long career.12 In 1955, aged twenty-five, with relatively little 
experience, Fraser was elected as the Liberal Party Member for the seat of 
Wannon, a marginal electorate in Western Victoria. Significantly, the 
Country Party chose not contest the seat. In the Parliament, Fraser 
demonstrated an individual set of ideals by criticising established authority, 
strongly supporting the rural sector and aligning with the Country Party 
more than with the urban-based Liberal Party led by Prime lviinister 
Menzies.13 
Fraser developed an internationalist theme through many speeches in the 
Parliament. This interest was manifest in Fraser's statements on the United 
10 See CPD, HR, vol. 98, p. iii. 
11 Malcolm Fraser was influenced by the ideas and reputation of his paternal grandfather Sir 
Simon Fraser, member of the Victorian parliament, representative to the National 
Australian Convention which drafted the Federal Constitution, and Victorian Senator. 
Simon Fraser passed on a belief in the British Commonwealth and an international 
perspective on Australia's role in world affairs. Alan Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian 
Foreign Policy, Australian Professional Publications, Sydney, 1986, 7-9. See generally, 
Patrick Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: A study in Prime Ministerial Power in Australia, 
Penguin, Ringwood, 1989, pp. 8-18 and Philip Ayres, Malcolm Fraser: A Biography, 
Heinemann, Richmond, 1987, pp. 1-49. 
12 See Renouf, op. cit., pp. lQ-12 for details. 
13 ibid., pp. 12-13. See for interest, Max Piggott, Portrait of a not-so-common farm~r, Western 
Farmer and Grazier" vol. 4, 25, October 1977. 
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Nations, the United States, South Africa, the CommonweaVh, 
communism, and Vietnam.14 Following the retirement of Menz:.es in 
January 1966, Fraser was appointed as Minister for the Army, which 
involved respol'l:sibility for administration rather than personnel.lS Fraser 
was active in this portfolio at a difficult time given the commitment of 
Australian troops in Vietnam.16 Following the disappearance of Prime 
Minister Holt, Fraser helped launch Gorton to the leadership of the Liberal 
Party and was promoted to the position of Minister for Education and 
Science. Fraser again assisted Gorton against McMahon after the 1969 
election and was subsequently promoted to the Defence portfolio. However, 
by early 1971, Fraser had clashed with Prime Minister Gorton on several 
occasions and thus resigned through a vitriolic speech in the Parliament.17 
Following the 1972 election defeat, Snedden was elected to the leadership of 
the Liberal Party in a ballot against Bowen and Fraser. In opposition, Fraser 
performed the duties of spokesperson on primary industries and later, 
industrial relations. After the April 1974 election, Fraser challenged the 
leadership of Snedden and was convincingly defeated. Nonetheless, 
tensions grew within the Liberal Party and Fraser successfully attained the 
leadership in March 1975. Fraser ensured that the Senate would not pass 
the Whitlam Labor government's Supply bills in October-November 1975 
and thus provided the conditions for the Governor-General to dismiss 
Whitlam and to call elections. 
14 See Fraser's Parliamentary speeches on foreign policy, for example: 
CPD, hK, yol. 9, 15 March 1956, pp. 860-3 on the Commonwealth and international affairs; 
CPD, HR, vol. 16, 5 September 1957 on trade; 
CPD, HR, vol. 18, 25 Februa.ry 1958, pp. 22-5, address in reply to Governor General's speech; 
CPD, HR, vol. 20,7 August 1958, pp. 214-17 on the Middle East; 
CPD, HR, vol. 30, 12 Apri11961, pp. 769-73 on South Africa; 
CPD, HR, vol. 36, 9 August 1962, pp. 251-4 on the European Common Market; 
CPD, HR, vol. 38, 21 May 1963, pp. 1583-90 on the United States and North West Cape; 
CPD, HR, vol. 41,5 March 1964, pp. 297-301, address in reply to Governor General's speech; 
CPD, HR., vol. 43, 13 August 1964, pp. 193-7 on Vietnam; 
CPD, HR, vol. 44, 21 October 1964, 2176-9 on communism; 
CPD, HR, vol. 45, 23 March 1965, pp. 243-6 on Indonesia; and 
CPD, HR, vol. 46, 6 May 1965, pp. 1247-51 on Vietnam. 
15 Australian Parliamentary Handbook, 1976, p. 69. Fraser was appointed on 26 January 1966 
by Prime Minister Holt. 
16 Renouf, op. cit., p. 15. 
17 See Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 71, 9 March 1971, pp. 679-84. Fraser disagreed with Gorton's 
approach on the state issue of control over resources on the seabed and the Leader of the 
Country Party M<:Ewm intervened to quell the conflict. Later, Fraser clashed with Gorton on 
the role of the Army in Vietnam which led to Fraser's accusations of disloyalty in the 
Parliament. See also Renouf, op. cit, pp. 15-16. 
page 155 
As Prime Minister, Fraser embodied a mixed Parliamentary experience with 
a significant personal interest in Australia's international relationships. 
Fraser also brought a strong leadership approach which implied, from the 
outset, a dominant role in foreign policy. Prime Minister Fraser argued that 
Au::.tralia could make a contribution in world affairs through a constructive 
foreign policy. This understanding also stressed the alliance with the 
United States and displayed a fervent opposition to Soviet communism. 
Fraser linked these general aspects of Australian foreign policy with a 
personal commitment to southern African issues, primarily, criticisms of 
the minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. The simple 
explanation for this mixture was that Fraser opposed communism in 
southern Africa and therefore advocated the need for moderate African, 
democratically-elected governments in South Africa and Rhodesia rather 
than Soviet-supported socialist regimes. There seemed to be more to 
Fraser's advocacy on southern Africa than offered by this explanation. 
Nonetheless, the views of Fraser as Prime Minister outweighed the 
traditional support for the colonial communities in South Africa and 
Rhodesia within the Liberal and Country Parties.lB 
The dominance of Fraser within the government shifted the ideological 
focus from the political parties to the views of the Prime Minister. Rather 
than diminish the role of ideology in government policy, it was the 
personal ideology of Fraser that influenced the construction of AustraHan 
foreign policy.19 Fraser led the government with a unique combination of 
conservatism and liberalism, clearly tempered by strong anti-communist 
views. Within this approach, Fraser foreign policy was universalist, that is, 
internationalist in perspective. This implied that Fraser was not 
preoccupied with a particular region or alliance in constructing foreign 
policy. Indeed, Fraser was different from most Liberal Party Members of 
Parliament in adopting an active stance against discrimination and racism 
18 See David Goldsworthy, Australia's Southern Africa Policy, World Review, vol. 17, June 
1978, p. 54. 
19 Richard Leaver, Australia and the Indian Ocean Region, chapter 16 in P.J. Boyce and J.R. 
Angel, eds, Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80, Allen & Unwin 
and the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, 1983, p. 263. See also S.C. 
Ghosh, The ideological world of Malcolm Fraser, Australian Quarterly, vol. 50, 3, September 
1978, Graham Little, Fraser and Fraserism, Meanjin Quarterly, no. 3, 1982 and T.B. Millar, 
Changes in the formal structure of foreign policy consideration, Australian Outlook, vol. 37, 1, 
April1983. The Liberal Party had been established by Robert Menzies and the ideological 
position of the Party tended to follow the lead of Menzies and subsequent leaders. Thus the 
ideology of the Liberal Party was not dontinated by one form of liberalism in the theoretical 
tradition. On the Liberal Party, see Dean Jaensch, The Liberals, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 
1994 and Marian Simms, A Liberal Nation: the Liberal Party and Australian politics, Hale 
& Iremonger, Sydney, 1982. 
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which was connected to Fraser's positive approach toward the interests of 
developing countries.2o Thus, Fraser broke from the conservative traditions 
of Liberal Party foreign policy and, on southern Africa, ~lppeared to move 
Australian foreign policy further than the Whitlam government. 
In addition, Fraser appreciated the value nf Whitlam's changes on several 
key iss1...1es in providing considerable distance from the reactionary rhetoric 
of the previous Liberal and Country Parties governments. Austr:alia's new 
relationship with China, for example, and the improved relations with 
developing countries act~:n:ded with Fraser's view of foreign policy 
priorities.21 However, this cEd. not mean that there was a convergence on 
foreign policy from the Labor Party and the Liberal Party. Ideological 
perspectives remained an important difference between the political parties 
and the personal ideology of Prime Minister Fraser was central to the 
contrast in foreign policy. 22 
In critique of Fraser's position, Camilleri argued that the Prime Minister's 
view on foreign poJicy merely represented a return to 'the orthodoxies of 
the past'.23 Millar suggested that there was an element of the past with 
Fraser's anti-communism and appeals to national interests while Bell 
showed that Fraser alysed international politics in pessimistic and 
traditional terms.24 lnt:!Se arguments failed to capture the distinctive aspect 
of Fraser's position which was an insistence on Australia's independent 
interests. Fraser's sense of independence and view that Australia should 
play a constructive role in international affairs illustrated a 'more mature 
and measured quest' for an Australian identity in world politics.25 As Prime 
Minister, Fraser combined old and n~w perspectives to produce a complex 
foreign policy outlook. 
20 Renouf, op. cit., p. 190. See also Coral Bell, Dependent Ally, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1988, p. 143. 
21 See Hudson, op. cit., p. 2, Richard Higgiltt, Australia and Africa, chapter 15 in Boyr·~ and 
Angel, op. cit., pp. 245-6 and Alan Renouf, Australian Diplomacy 1976-1980, chapter 20 in 
Boyce and A.."l.gel, ibid., p. 321. 
22 Leaver, op. cit., p. 263. See also Alan Renouf, A Frightened Country, Macmillan, 
Melbourne, 1979, pp. 24-5. 
23 Joseph Camilleri, Foreign policy, chapter 15 in Allan Patience and Brian Head, From 
Whitlam to Fraser, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1979, pp. 282. 
24 T.B. Millar, Australian Foreign Policy: More of the same in a colder world, Current Affairs 
Bulletin, vol. 57, 12, May 1981, p. 4 and Bell, op. cit., p. 145. See also F.A. Mediansky, The 
Conservative Style in Australian Foreign Policy, Australian Outlook, vol. 28, 1, April1979. 
25 P.J. Boyce, Preface, in Boyce and Angel, op. cit. On this, see Leaver, op. cit, p:264 and 
Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 66, 10 March 1970, pp. 232-47. 
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V\Thile the power of Fraser was obvious after the events of 1975, there was 
an expectation thut foreign policy would be influenced by various actors. It 
was not unreasonable to anticipate that the Parliament and the bureaucracy 
would shape the directio~t of Australian foreign policy and attempt to alter 
specific elements of international relationships. Central to this process was 
the role of che Minister for Foreisn Affairs. In the formation of Fraser's. first 
Ministry, Andrew Peacock was the obvious choice for the Foreign Affairs 
portfolio. Peacock had been Minister for the Army and then Minister for 
External Territories under Prime Ministers Gorton and McMahon.26 In 
opposition, Peacock was responsible for matters relating to manufacturing 
industry and then foreign affairs and external territories. With relevant 
experience and strong views on some issues, Peacock was expected to 
prevail on some occasions during foreign policy debates. 
Peacock and Fraser differed in style, approach, and views on foreign policy 
questions which emerged from variant personal perspectives. While Fraser 
combined aspects of conservative and liberal philosophies, Peacock 
displayed a more predictable liberal ideology and held a more optimistic 
view of the world. From this position, Peacock had less reason to fear the 
Soviet Union but appeared to accord with Fraser's general approach.27 
Indeed, Peacock and Fraser complemented each other in the execution of 
foreign yolicy. Peacock's professional diplomatic style proved effective in 
international forums which reduced the need for Fraser's more abrasive 
approach.28 Moreover, Peacock adopted a public relations role which 
included issuing statements which 'corrected, clarified or tempered the 
Prime Minister's more sweeping or enigmatic pronouncements' without 
criticising or questioning these views.29 Also, Peacock's emphasis on equity 
in international relations complemented Fraser's concern w.1.th security. 
Peacock allocated substantial time to the North South debate, and other 
economic issues concerning developing countries, which promoted the 
international cr,edentials of the Fraser govenunent.30 
26 Peacock was Minister for the Army from 12 November 1969 to 2 February 1972 and Minister 
for External Territories from : February 1972 to 5 December 1972. Australian Parliamentary 
Handbook, op. cit ... pp. 129-30. 
27 R.J. Lim, Problet.'llS in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1980, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History. vol. 27, 1, 1981, p. 7 and Renou£, Malcolm Fraser and Australian 
Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 73 .. 
28 P.J. Boyce, The Foreign Policy Process, chapter 1 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 11. 
29 Boyce, .. .Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., p. 1. See also Leaver, 
op. cit., p. 263. 
30 Coral Bell, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 24, 3, 1978, p. 299. See also Ralph Harry, Australian 
Multilateral Diplomacy, chapter 5 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., pp. 83-6, Glen St.J. Barclay, 
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However, the Prime Minister was the central decision-maker on foreign 
policy. Peacock was perceived as Fraser's main rival for the leadership of 
the Liberal Party which may have reduced Peacock's effectiveness as a 
member of the cabinet. This rivalry meant that Fraser consistently 
attempted to maintain control of the direction of foreign policy and the 
structures which implemented foreign policy. Given the potential for 
conflict with Fraser, it was somewhat surprising that Peacock's tenure as 
Foreign Minister lasted five years. A disagreement arose in 1979 when 
· Vietnam intervened in Kampuchea. Fraser decided to cancel aid to 
Vietnam without consulting Peacock who was out of Australia and was 
opposed to this change in policy. Also, Fraser and Peacock held opposing 
positions on the proposed boycott of the Mosc~w Olympic Games.31 Thus, 
in November 1980, Prime Minister Fraser decided to shift Peacock to the 
Industrial Relations portfolio and appoint Tony Street to the position of 
Foreign Minister.32 Street's main qualification for this promotion was 
personal loyalty to Fraser.33 Tony Street had no background in foreign 
affairs and, as a consequence, adopted a low profile as Minister while Fraser 
increased personal control over foreign policy.34 It was a c<;mvenient time 
for a change in perE~onnel as the international political environment was 
shifting with conflicts in Iran and Afghanistan, and with the election of 
Reagan in the United States. 
Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July-December 1978, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, vol. 25, 1, April1979, p. 9 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign 
Policy, op. cit., pp. 74-5. 
31 Ren(Juf, ibid., p. 75 and J.M. McCarthy, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to 
June 1977, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 23, 3, December 1977, p. 301. 
32 Peacock resigned from the Ministry in April1981 citing irreconcilable differences with 
Fraser. See Peacock, Resignation speech, CPD, HR, vol. 122, 28 April1981, pp. 1607-14 and 
debate, pp. 1614-49. 
33 Lim, op. cit., p. 16. Similar to Fraser, Tony Street ;,·:as a primary producer representing an 
electorate in sot<.th-western Victoria. 
34 Street held the positions of Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations from 22 
December 1975 to 5 December 1978 and Minister for Industrial Relations from 5 December 1978 
to 3 Noveml::er 1980. Parliamentary Handbook, Twenty-first edition, AGPS, Canberra, 1982, 
p. 182. See Parliamentary statements by Street as Minister for Foreign Affairs, especially: 
CPD, HR, vol. 121, 24 March 1981, pp. 829-34 on Australian foreign policy in general; 
CPD, HR, vol. 120, 4 December 1980, pp. 427-8 on disarmament; 
CPD, HR, vol. 122, 9 April1981, pp. 1558-62 on ASEAN; 
CPD, HR, vol. 123,26 May 1981, pp. 2537-42 on the Sinai Peacekeeping Force; and 
CPD, HR, vol. 124, 20 August 1981, pp. 616-22 on overseas aid. 
Compare Richardson, op. cit., p. 337 on concern about the role of Fraser in foreign policy. See 
also Tony Street, Australia's role as a middle power, speech to the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs, national conference, Journal for Students of H. S.C. Politics, vol. 10, 3, 
August 1982, Tony Street, Alliances, threats and the world around us: no. 1 -Why Australia is 
aligned, Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 9, 8, February 1983 and Tony Street, Alliances and 
forE!ign policy today, Australian Outlook, vol. 37, 1, April 1983. 
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The Parliament did not h·;~·/t;: ),l significant impact on foreign policy. Renouf 
argued that Fraser atte~pt.;:;J to limit parliarnentary debate on international 
issues in order to control foreign policy.3s Alternatively, Fraser seemed to 
allow some latitude with the relevant parliamentary committees, wbich 
produced a variety of reports on foreign policy questions.36 The committees, 
and thereby backbench Members of Parliament, attempted to exert some 
influence over issues related to the Soviet Union in the IPrli.an Ocean, the 
New International Economic Order, ASEAN, Zimbabwe and Namibia.37 
However, these significant reports had little impact on the Prime Minister's 
view of Australian foreign policy. 
At a different level, the bureaucracy had substantial power and discretion to 
implement political directives on foreign policy. However, during the 
Fraser government, the Department of Foreign Affairs endured severe 
financial restrictions, sustained administrative pressure from various 
inquiries, and lost influence in an atmosphere of greater executive control 
over foreign policy.38 Foreign Minister Peacock advocated the retention of 
Alan Renouf as Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
notwithstanding Renouf's declared preference for Labor Party policies anc1 
public criticism of the Liberal Party in 1975. Renouf was able to work with 
35 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. dt., p. 80. 
36 Boyce, The Foreign Policy Process, op. cit., pp. 19-20. The !<.>int Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence and the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence assumed upgraded investigatory roles and ',vere characterised by a new spirit of 
bipartisanship. See also P. St J. Dawe, The Committee system of the Australian Senate, 
Interparliamentary Bulletin, 58, 3, 1978, Martin :ndyk, Making government responsible: the 
role of Parliamentary committees, Politics, vol. 15, 2, November 1980 and Brian Hocking, 
Patronage, pleasure-trips or para-diplomacy? Australian parliamentarians at the United 
Nations, Australian Outlook, vol. 36, 2, August 1982. 
37 See Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defenr~. Reports: United Nations 
Involvement with Australia's Territories (regarding the Cocos Keeling Islands), tabled on 30 
September 1975; Australia and the Indian Ocean Region, 30 November 1976; Australia and 
the South Pacific, 13 April1978; The New International Economic Order, 19 February 1980; 
and Australia and ASEAN, 4 December 1980. See Joint Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, Reports: The Torres Strait Boundary, tabled on 9 December 1976; Human 
Rights in the Soviet Union, 8 November 1979; Zimbabwe, 20 May 1980, Power in Indo-China 
since 1975, 11 June 1981; Namibia, 24 August 1982; and The ANZUS Alliance, 25 November 
1982. 
38 Treasury attempted to constrict the spending of Foreign Affairs, especially on aid, where 
the Department of Foreign Affairs was dominant and worked in conjunction with Treasurj. 
See Philip Eldridge, Diplomacy, Development and 'Small Government': Conflicting 
Directions in. Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AustrCllia-Asia Paper, no. 23, Centre for the 
Study of Australian-Asian Relations, Griffith University, January 1983. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs had never been the subject of a comprehensive public review but, between 1975 
and 1978, four committees of inquiry focused on the Department. 
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Peacock and maintained amicable relations with Fraser. However, Renouf 
was dismissed in August 1976 after the Prime Minister's visit to China.39 
Significantly, Owen Harries was recruited to an advisory role in Foreign 
Affairs which included writing speeches for both Peacock and Fraser.4o 
Harries' position on international relations accorded more comfortably with 
the Prin1e Minister's view than with the Foreign Minister's perspective, 
which led to an invitation to join Fraser's office as an adviser and speech-
writer. Moreover, the increase in expertise in the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, coupled with the interest of Fraser, shifted the focus 
of decision-making away from the Department of Foreign Affairs.41 
In total, the complex personal philosophy of Prime Minister Fraser had a 
significant impact on Australian foreign policy. Fraser directed tL _ 
construction and implementation of foreign policy in the context of limited 
influence from Foreign Ministers Peacock and Street, the Parliament, 
including the committees, and the bureaucracy. Moreover, the role of 
Fraser as Prime Minister was central to the direction of Australia's 
international relationships. 
Conclusion 
From the moment of appointment, Prime Minister Fraser operated with a 
substantial power base which was constructed in the context of the dismissal 
of the Whitlam Labor government. Whilst caretaker Prime Minister, Fraser 
was confronted with the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and chose to 
display Australia's position at the United Nations rather than during the 
domestic election campaign. The 1975 election result strengthened Fraser's 
position within the Liberal and Country Parties and provided a large 
Parliamentary majority. 
39 Boyce, The Foreign Policy Process, op. cit., p. 13. Renouf was accused of an embarrassing 
leak of a conversation involving the Prime Minister in China. Renouf was moved from the 
position of Secretary to replace Nicholas Parkinson as Ambassador to the United States, and 
Parkinson was appointed Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs. See also Alan 
Renouf, The Champagne Trail: experiences of a diplomat, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1980. 
40 Boyce, The Foreign Policy Process, op. cit., p. 16. Apparently, Harries was responsible for 
Fraser's June 1976 foreign policy statement. 
41 See ibid., pp. 16-17. For more on the influence of Fraser's personal staff, see Patrirk 
Weller, First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in Wes!minster Systems, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, 1985, p. 140. See generally, James Nockels, Malcolm Fraser's bureaucracy, Australian 
Quarterly, vol. 53, 4, Summer 1981 and Alan Renouf, The public servant, Australian Journal of 
Public Administration, vol. 40, 4, December 1981. 
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Subsequently, the combination of Fraser's personal views and experiences 
played an important part in creating the cmnplex foreign policy agenda of 
the Liberal and Country Parties government. Indeed, Fraser's 
understandings of international issues appeared contradictory at times, but 
the different elements of Austra~an foreign policy were intimately linked 
in terms of the Prime Minister's agenda. This was particularly evident in 
the links between Fraser's positions on international relationships, alliances 
with developing countries, and views on Africa. 
chapter 7 
Fraser foreign policy and international relations 
The Fraser government's J?OSition on key international issues and events 
formed the context for Australia's relations with developing countries, 
particularly for Fraser's policies on Africa. This chapter provides the initial 
links between the general direction of Fraser's international relationships 
and the specific aspects of Australia's foreign policy. Through this analysis, I 
show that Prime :Minister Fraser established an anti-racist and anti-colonial 
foreign policy for Australia. 
This chapter examines Fraser's foreign policy statement to the Parliament 
on 1 June 1976 as the point of departure for the Fraser government's 
international outlook. As the central issue in the government's position, 
Fraser attempted to strengthen the alliance with the United States in 
response to a perceived failure of the Whit}.:lm government in this 
relationship. As a result, the Fraser government encouraged the United 
States to adopt an active role in the Indian Ocean and condemned the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In addition, Fraser supported the 
United States in placing sancticr,J on Iran following the revolution in 1979 
and offered strong support for President Reagan from 1980. 
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Prior to examining the key international issues, it is important to raise the 
question about continuity or change in Australian foreign policy. That is, 
whether the Fraser government adopted the for,eign policy agenda of the 
Whitlam government or moved away from this position. In the context of 
the acrimonious domestic political atmosphere, the Fraser government was 
expected to change many policies, thereby distancing the Liberal and 
Country Parties government from the previous Labor government. 
However, particularly in foreign policy, Fraser found some advantage in the 
changes initiated by Whitlam and valued the shift in international 
environment. These factors implied a need to accept central elements of 
'Nhitlam's foreign policy agenda.l 
Indeed, the reforms implemented by \.vhitlam made it easier for the Fraser 
government to inherit an 'updated' foreign policy without the need for 
lengthy debates on the reappraisal of policy within the Liberal and Country 
Parties. For example, the friendly relationship with China was maintained, 
albeit from the new premise of a necessary ally against the Soviet Union 
Fraser also displayed a willingness to talk with developing countries and 
upheld the Whitlam government's policies in opposition to discrimination 
and oppression in Rhodesia and South Africa.2 
Further, Fraser welcomed many Whitlam government initiatives in 
foreign policy because this extent of chr.nge could not have been achieved by 
the Liberal and Country Parties without straining their credibility with the 
electorate.3 On this, Millar claimed that Fraser's successes in foreign affairs 
emerged from the groundwork prepared by Whitlam and that the Fraser 
government had merely changed the emphasis of p•:>licy while relying on 
the legacy of the Whitlam government.4 Tllis argument centred on the 
question of style in foreign policy and devalued the changes in content.5 
1 T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977, Australian 
National University Press, Canberra, 1978, p. 423 and Richard Higgott, Australia and Africa 
1970-80: A Decade of Change and Grr vth, Africa Contemporary Record, vol. 14, 1981, p. 219. 
See also J.A.C. :Mackie, Australian foreign policy - from Whitlam to Fraser, Dyason House 
Papers, vol. 3, 1, August 1976. 
2 Millar, op. cit., pp. 425-6, Alan Renou£, Australian Diplomacy 1976-19~0, chapter 20 in P.J. 
Boyce and J.R. Angel, eds, Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80, 
Allen & Unwin and the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, 1983, pp. 322-3 
and Richard Leaver, Australia and the Indian Ocean Region, chapter 16 in Boyce and Angel, 
ibid., p. 262. 
3 W.J. Hudson, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1975, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 22, 1, April1976, p. 2. 
4 T.B. Millar, From Whitlam to Fraser, Foreign Affairs, 55, 4, 1977, p. 864 and Millar, 
Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., pp. 423-4. 
5 Millar believed that Whitlam's foreign policy was only marginally different from i:he 
previous Liberal and Country Parties governments and thus concluded that little change 
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Alternatively, Leaver argued that Fraser's personal views were pivotal to 
Australian foreign policy, rather than any apparent legacy from the 
Whitlam government.6 This position was supported by Fraser's 
independent stance on Australian interests when compared to previous 
Liberal and Country Parties governments. In the end, the test for this debate 
is contained in the details of the Fraser government's foreign policies on 
both general and specific international issues. 
June 1976 statement on foreign policy 
On 1 June 1976, the Prime Minister addressed the House of Representatives 
on 'Australia and the World Situation? This statement set the agenda and 
tone for the Liberal and Country Parties government foreign policy. 
Significantly, the June statement was not delivered by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. Fraser was determined to frame the government's foreign 
policy with a personal outline. Foreign Minister Peacock was relegated to 
the secondary role of clarifying and defending the Prime Minister's 
statement in the ensuing Parliamentary debate.s 
In sum, Fraser explained to the Parliament that the Soviet Union was a 
threat to international security, particularly in relation to activities in the 
Indian Ocean. This view was linked to Australia's alliance with the United 
States. Fraser also focused on the Asia Pacific region which included an 
acceptance of China. In addition, Fraser detailed policies on Australia's 
relations with developing countries and Australia's attitude on southern 
Africa. 
The June statement displayed several images of the Fraser government. 
First, the Prime Minister provided an impression of significant change in 
foreign policy as the government sought to redefine Australia's role in 
international affairs. Second, and in contrast, Fraser offered a measure of 
reaction to contemporary events which suggested at least smne continuity 
occurred at any time within the parliamentary system due to the domL"lance of external forces 
in foreign relations. T.B. Millar, Australian Foreign Policy: More of the same in a colder 
world, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 57, 12, May 1981, p. 4. See also Mackie, op. cit., p. 3. 
6 Leaver, op. cit., p. 264. 
7 Fraser, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 99, 1 June 
1976, pp. 2734-44, and responses by Whitlam, pp. 2744-7, Peacock, pp. 2747-50, and Hayden, 
pp. 275()-3. 
8 See also Leaver, op. cit., p. 263 and Alan Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign 
Policy, Australian Professional Publications, Sydney, 1986, pp. 73-5. 
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with the Whitlam government on particular policy issues.9 Third, parts of 
the statement seemed to return to a Libera: Party tradition by highlighting 
Australia's security and concerns about communism. In simple terms, the 
Prime Minister's stateme?lt demonstrated an amalgam of the old and the 
new. However, Renouf argued that: 
... as time went by, the old would take pride of place over the 
new. In part, external developments would be responsible but in 
part, the government would not live up to the expectations 
which its own words had aroused.lO 
The overused theoretical position of the June statement was Fraser's 
understanding of 'realism'.11 This redirection of assumptions acted as a 
direct criticism of the perceived idealisrn of the Whitlam Labor 
government. The 'enlightened realism' of the statement was intertwined 
with Liberal Party interpretations of 'democracy, freedom and the 
individual'.12 Fraser's realism also extended to the notion of Australia as a 
small to medium power in the international arena and the focus upon 
security for Australia, the region and between all nations.13 From this, 
Fraser leapt to the position that Australia should pursue a 'flexible, alert and 
undogmatic' external policy within the constraints of an international 
environment dominated by power politics.14 
This position was the background to Fraser's alarmist views on Soviet 
expansionism and critique of detente.1s Without qualification, the Prime 
Minister stated that the Soviet Union sought to 'expand its influence 
throughout the world' in order to achieve military supremacy.16 Fraser 
elaborated through the exs.mples of Soviet provocation during the 1973 
9 See J.L. Richardson, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1976, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 22, 3, December 1976, p. 327. 
10 Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 323. See also Andrew Peacock, New directions 
in Australian foreign policy, Review of International Affairs, vol. 27, 637, October 1976, J. 
Camilleri, Fraser's foreign policy: the first twelve months, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 53, 
8, January 1977 and Andrew Peacock, Dr Camilleri and Australian foreign policy, Current 
Affairs Bulletin, vol. 53, 10, March 1977. 
11 See Mackie, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
12 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2735. Compare Robert W. Cox, On thinking about 
future world order, World Politics, vol. 28, 2, January 1976. 
13 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, pp. 2735-6, and see reiteration by Peacock, CPD, HR, 
vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2748. See also J.M. Fraser, National security- one of the principal 
concerns of the government, Pacific Defence J{eporter, vol. 3, 3, September 1976. 
14 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2736. 
15 Leaver, op. cit, p. 265, expressed a more startled position regarding Fraser's picture of 
superpower balan~e. See also Coral Bell, Mr Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, World 
Today, vol. 35, October 1979, p. 418. 
16 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2737. See also Coral Bell, Dependent Ally, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1988, pp. 145-6 and Richardson, op. cit., pp. 327-9. 
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Middle East war, assistance to North Vietnam in the take over of South 
Vietnam, facilitation of Cuban troops in P...ngola, and the substantial growth 
of the Soviet armed forces.17 This assessment fitted with Fraser's view that 
detente had not reduced political and military tensions and the 'realities of 
power had now to be reasserted'.ts The June statement, and primarily the 
government's attitude toward the Soviet Union and detente, pre-empted 
the Prime Minister'A first overseas tour to Tokyo, Peking and Washington, 
thereby fixing the agendas for discussion. 
It was significant that, in the June statement, Fraser emphasised the Soviet 
threat and need for greater United States activity in the Indian Ocean. From 
an analysis of power in the Indian Ocean region, Fraser criticised the notion 
of a zone of neutrality and stated the need for 'balance and restraint' ,19 This 
implied a more active role for the United States and an imperative for 
upgrading the US facilities at Diego Garcia. Further, Fraser emphasised the 
need to re-establish close relations with the United States but included a 
significant qualification: 
The interests of the United States and the interests of Australia 
are not necessarily identical. In our relations with the United 
States, as in our relations with other great powers, our first 
responsibility is independently to assess our own interests. The 
United States will unquestionably do the same.2o 
This intimation of independence in the context of Fraser's realist 
assessment of the world suggested a break from traditional Liberal Party 
patterns of international alliance. Indeed, Fraser appeared to be some 
distance from the language of Holt or Menzies on the United States.21 This 
somewhat independent position on the US, albeit within an important 
alliance with the US, seemed to emerge from Fraser's experience as Minister 
for the Army, and then Defence, during the Vietnam war. 
Also, the importance associated with the South East Asia region in the June 
statement demonstrated the government's ability to respond to 
international change in conjunction with Fraser's view on Australia's role 
in the region. Particularly, Fraser showed a rapid change in accepting the 
17 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2737. 
18 Leaver, op. cit., p. 265, paraphrasing the position of Fraser from the June statement. 
19 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2741. 
20 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2738. 
21 For more, see Belir Dependent Ally, op. cit., p. 146 and Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , 
op. cit., p. 328. 
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People's Republic of China.22 The Prime Minister's analysis of the global 
power balance and associated priority on security in the region overtook any 
historical considerations when designing Australia's new policy toward 
China. In the simplest terms, Fraser saw China as a useful ally against the 
Soviet Union.23 The justification, however, signified problems for the 
Fraser government in the assessment of international relations and 
inconsistency in policy-making. The Prime Minister explained Australia's 
approach to China such that: 
constructive relations do not depend on agreement on all aspects 
of relations but on the development of those areas where there 
are common interests.24 
The same could have been argued for improving relations with the Soviet 
Union with reference to trade, agriculture, research and allied issues. 
Fraser's pronouncements in the June statement caused some confusion 
among interested nations. Both Japan and the United States, from different 
perspectives, were engaged in delicate diplomatic balances with China and 
the Soviet Union and were not enthralled by Fraser's position.25 Also, 
Australian alignment with China aroused suspicion within ASEAN, 
particularly with Indonesia.26 The adverse reaction to the June statement 
illustrated Fraser's la•.::k of understanding about Australia's role in the 
region and inexperience in dealing with the complex set of trading partners, 
neighbouring countries and powerful allies. 
The most immediate critiques of the PrL-rne Minister's statement emerged 
from the subsequent Parliamentary debate. Foreign Minister Peacock spoke 
22 See Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2746, for an outline of Fraser's alarmist 
stance on the intenSions of China in 1964 and contirauing fearful remarks ac late as 1973. 
23 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2740 stated that: 
China is clearly concerned at the Soviet role on her northern and southern 
frontiers. Australia and China have a like interest in seeing that Soviet power 
in the Pacific and South East Asia is balanced by the power of other major states 
or by appropriate regional arrangements. We can therefore expect Chinese 
support for our own views on the need for an effective American presence in the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans. Such support has, in fact, been given. 
See also Richardson, op. cit., p. 331. 
24 Fraser, CPD, FIR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2740. 
25 Leaver, op. cit., p. 265. Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. ::19, 1 Ju..'le 1976, pp. 2739-40, stressed the 
importance of relations with Japan in terms of security and trade, and welcomed the 
expression of the Japanese government to conclude a treaty of friendship and co-operation. 
See also T.B. Millar, Japan and Australia, Pacific Community, vol. 8, 1, October 1976. 
26 The Indonesian government was puzzled and concerned by the position of the Australian 
government. While Indonesian leaders could understand the Labor government's commitment 
to the recognition of China in 1972, it WdS more difficult to comprehend why the Liberal and 
Country Parties government should suddenly move closer to China. Mackie, op. cit., p. 4. 
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in defence of Fraser's position between hostile attacks from Whitlan1 and 
Hayden.27 The Labor critique focused on the return to a rhetorical foreign 
policy of a conservative tradition. To some extent, the tone of Fraser with 
regard to security, defence and powerful allies invited the first point of 
criticism from the Labor Party.28 Fraser was not aided by several errors of 
fact regarding the superpower military balance and the consequent notions 
of threats to security.29 Whitlam observed that the Fraser foreign policy was 
acutely linked to domestic economic policy, and both were dominated by the 
perceived need for fundamental ideological change away from the 
assumptions of the previous Labor government.3D Further, the pre-emptive 
tactic of presenting the statement immediately prior to the first overseas 
tour by the Prime Minister restricted debate but also fixed the government's 
position on foreign policy for a considerable time. 
On Fraser's view of the Soviet Union, the internal protests seemed to 
emerge from all quarters. The Joint Intelligence Organisation were 
vigorous in attempting to correct the exaggerated position on the build-up 
of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops in Europe.31 Fraser was also pressured 
after the speech to qualify the alarmist view of the Soviet Union by a 
'combination of Foreign Affairs bureaucrats, academic experts and 
prominent backbenchers' .32 These points raised the question of whether the 
Prime Minister took advice prior to the statement, and whether Fraser had 
sufficient input during the drafting of the statement by Owen Harries. 
The most virulent criticisms converged on Fraser's understandings of the 
Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean region. Whitlam's colourful attack 
contained sentiments of surprise, anger and disappointment in reaction to 
the Prime Minister's perceived move backward in rhetoric: 
The Prime Minister has now discovered a threat from the 
Russian navy. Russian naval activity in the Indian Ocean is the 
idee fixe about which the whole of the Fraser Government's 
foreign and defence policies revolve. This phobia about Russian 
ships is presumably the justification for [an increase in] defence 
27 For the limits of the debate, see Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1June 1976, p. 2748 and 
Hayden, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2750. 
28 See Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1 June 1976, pp. 2744-7 and Hayden, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1 
June 1976, pp. 2750-3. 
29 Hayden, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2751 explained, with assistance from statements 
by Henry Kissinger, the relative military balance between tl1e United States and the Soviet 
Union and the unjustified nature of Fraser's alarmist position. 
30 Whitlam, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2744. 
31 See Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit, p. 146, & note 4, p. 215. 
32 Bell, Mr Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit, p. 418. 
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expenditure ... at the expense of funds for health, cities, roads, 
the environment, child care, education. It is the justif:cation for 
the resurgence of cold-war rhetoric and communist can-kicking 
. . . It is the justification for offending one of thf' tnost powerful 
.nations on earth and discrediting the honest and painstaking 
efforts of the Western powers to improve the climate of 
in"'ernational relations. It is an issue which has brought the 
hawks from their nests in numbers unseen since the early days of 
the Vietnam war. 33 
Whitlam continued in this vein to embarrass the Prime Minister by 
correcting the assertions of fact regarding the strength of the Soviet fleet in 
the Indian Ocean.34 Prime Minister Fraser was aware that the presence of 
Soviet shipping was inevitable as the Indian Ocean remained the shortest 
warm ·weather route linking the eastern and western sections of the Soviet 
Union. In fact, the Liberal Party in 1969 acknowledged the realities of Soviet 
naval power in the Indian Ocean without raish1.g undue alarm.3s 
It was recognised that the alarmist policies were used to incite the United 
States to increase the military capacity of the Diego Garcia base in the Indian 
Ocean.36 It seemed that the Prin1e Minister and the government's policy 
advisers were overly optimistic that uncritical support for the United States 
would generate greater assistance from Australia's key ally. 
33 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 Jnne 1976, pp .. 2744-5 .. 
34 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 Jnne 1976, p. 2745. The Minister for Defence, Jin.:. ¥ilieti, 
provided information to the Parliament a month prior to the Jnne statement which showed 
that the number of Soviet combatant vessels in the Indian Ocean in 1975 was no greater than 
the previous year. Whitlam explained that: 
the total Russian fleet deployed in the area in 1975, including those on harbour 
and mine-clearing operations, numbered 19, compared with 26 in 1974, 24 in 1973 
and 24 in 1972. There was, in other words, a slight decline in overall numbers of 
Russian ships in the Indian Ocean between 1972 and last year [1975]. The myth 
of a sudden recent upsurge in Soviet naval strength was exploded oy the United 
States Adminis<.i.'ation itself in a statement to Congress [on 22 April1976] ... 'over 
the past two years the naval deployments of the United States and the Soviet 
Union have remained relatively stable' ... The Americans themselves refuse to be 
panicked on this issue. They see no threat to themselves or anyone else. Dr 
Kissinger states on 22 March [1976} .... 'We will not be deflected by contrived and 
incredible scenarios, by inflated versions of Sovie~ srrength'. 
35 In August 1969, Gordon Freeth as :Minister for External Affair~ acknowledged the realities 
of Soviet naval power and was vilified by colleagues in the Liberal and Country Parties and 
the Democratic Labor Party. See Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2745. 
36 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2745, utilised the statement of the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agent:y, William Colby, of Juiy 1974: 
If there is no substantial increase in United States naval presence in the area, w~ 
believe the Soviet increase will be gradual ... Should the United States make a 
substantial increase in its presence in the Indian Ocean, a Soviet build-up faster 
and larger than I have described would be likely. 
See also Hayden's attack on Fraser's policy, C..PD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2752. 
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The focus of the critiques of Fraser's statement, particularly on the fear of 
the Soviet Union, the military threat in the Indian Ocean, and the new 
Liberal Party policy on China, ignored some progressive elements of the 
June statement which centred on relations with developing countries and 
Australia's relationship with Africa. Significantly, ·i:he Prime Minister 
mentioned the 'appalling widespread problems of poverty, hunger and 
disease' in the same introductory context as the grand international issues 
facing Australian foreign polit::y.37 The only qur.F~\cation in this acclaim was 
Fraser's linking of developmtmt issues with security considerations. 
Nonetheless, th~ Prime Minister admonished the industrial nations, 
implicitly including Australia, for the pursuit of a policy of tied loans and 
tied aid in addition to the implementation of barriers ta domestic markets 
that restricted terms of trade with developing countries.38 lso, on primary 
products, Fraser warned of the influence of the European Economk 
Community's trading policies in relation to Australia and developing 
countries. While the position of Australia remained central, this 
recognition of the significance of international economic relations for 
developing countries added to Fraser's credibility on d>:velopment issues. 
In addition, the Liberal Party position on aid in the June statement 
emphasised the dependent relati.onshi:t· between domestic and foreign 
policies. Fraser explicitly connected =1~ ~ with security and domestic 
prosperity, and fu.rtiter, Fraser seemed to advocate the provision of aid only 
when the Australian economy could afford such an expense.39 
In a clarification of the Prime Minister's position, Peacock explained that the 
notions of 'enlighten€d realism' and generosity were often connected. This 
wao... recognised, Peacock cl~imed, as 'both defence and ~id have been 
37 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2736. 
38 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2736, continued this criticism, stating that 'the 
developed countries are regrettably more interested in trade between themselves than they 
are in facilitating the progress of nations poorer than themselves. They can take no pride in 
their actions in this area'. This type of comment was more likely to be associated with 
radical leaders of developing countries in arguing for fundamental structural change in the 
world economy, not normally with a Liberal Party Prime Minister of Australia. See also 
Franer, CPD, HR., vol. 99, J June 1976, p. 2742. 
39 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2743, called for national unity and economic 
harmony in attempting to link domestic and international issues: 
Only out of [soundly based] growth can higher real wages and salaries and 
improved social welfare provisions be paid, without inflation and 
unemployment. Without such growth we cannot meet as we might the 
requirements o.f security and aid. We will not achieve th._e objectives unless all 
sections cf the Austr~lian community are prepared to work together in the 
commot1 inter.:st. 
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essentially exempt from the cuts we have been forced to make in almost 
every other area' .40 The Foreign Minister amplified the new Liberal Party 
philosophy with unqualified support for the aspirations of developing 
countries for a new international economic order.41 The tension between 
Liberal Party ideology and a form of radical internationalism was 
demonstrated by both Fraser and Peacock but was not well explained by 
either. 
Another element of the June statement which was overlooked was the 
Prime Minister's approach to the nations of the South East Asia region, 
multilateral forums and Africa. These issues combined to offer links within 
Fraser's foreign policy. Although security considerations appeared primary 
in the Asia Pacific region, attention was drawn to the constructive nature of 
Australia's proposed role as an understanding neighbour and supporter of 
development needs.42 This was accentuated by the stated value of relations 
with Papua New Guinea and the priority for Australian aid programs in 
PNG.43 
Fraser's com..:.-nitment to multilateral co-operation could be seen as a more 
progressive element of tb:2 government's foreign policy. Strong support 
was expressed for 'the United Nations, its Charter, and the work of its 
various specialised agencies'.44 A qualification was added, however, to the 
effect that problems still existed in the deliberative process and rights of 
participation in the United Nations.45 Further, the Commonwealth of 
Nations was endorsed as a distinctive, indeed unique, framework for co-
operation and consultation in many varied areas.46 
The Commonwealth was also seen as the setting where Australia would 
seek a constructive role to 'help achieve a reasonable solution' to the 
40 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2749. 
41 See Peacor~, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2749. 
42 The Prime Minister did not acknowledge the contradiction between this constructive role in 
the region and the government's overriding attitude toward the Soviet Union, the United 
States and China in the regional context. However, the Prime Minister allocated time to 
speak of relations with new governments in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, continued support 
for ASEAN governments, and close relations with Indonesia, which included a tortuous policy 
on East Timor. See Fraser, CPD, HR., val. 99, 1 June 1976, pp. 2738-9. 
43 Fraser, CPD, HR, val. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2739, reminded the Parliament of the previously 
agreed five-year aid program to Papua New Guinea which represented a substantial increase 
in Australian assistance. 
44 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2741. These words were reminiscent of Whitlam's 
statements on the United Nations. 
45 Fraser did not expand on these comments, CPD, HR, vol 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2741. 
46 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2742. 
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problems in South Africa. From what was a well-thought out position, the 
Prime Minister denounced the policies of apartheid while implicitly 
arguing for a negotiated settlement. On Rhodesia, Fraser again advocated 
majority rule but prioritised security as the key issue for future stability.47 
In the heat of Parliamentary debate, Whitlam accused the Fraser 
government of 'scorrdng the Third World' and 'turning its back on the 
needs of a third of the world's people'.48 This comment was excessive 
unless the immediate impression of Fraser's words was to be overwhelmed 
by the return to antagonistic relationships and 'to everything that was 
servile, insular and craven in the discredited foreign policies of past Liberal 
governments' .49 
In total, the June statement displayed Fraser's view of the world and was 
not the consensus view of the Liberal and Country Parties government. 
Fraser clearly prioritised the need for security in international affairs which 
was linked to Australia's alliance with the United States, the intentions of 
the Soviet Union, activities in the Indian Ocean, and Australia's 
relationships in the Asia Pacific region. Also, the June statement signalled 
Fraser's agenda on support for developing countries, especially t~1rough the 
United Nations and the Commonwealth, and explicit opposition to the 
minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia. The complexities of 
Fraser's foreign policy would emerge from the combination of policv 
initiatives relating to both the general and specific aspect... of Australia's 
international relationships. 
the United States 
Prime Minister Fraser seized the opportunity provided by the more critical 
Whitlam government approach to con§tr .... ~t a new relationship with the 
United States. Fraser blended the traditional Liberal and Country Parties 
stance on the alliance with a personal view which promoted a more 
independent position. The Prime Minister was significantly different to 
President Carter in terms of international issues but there was some 
common ground in relation to the developing countries and Africa. 
47 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2741. See also Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 
1976, p. 2750. 
48 Whitlam, CPD, .iiR, vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2747. 
49 This was Whitlam's final sentence when the time limit pressured an indignant close. 
Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2747. 
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Subsequently, Fraser relished the opportunity to strengthen the military and 
political alliance with the United States given the election of President 
Reagan. Australia's relationship with the United States was also central to 
the Fraser government's policy on the Indian Ocean and in the context of 
issues surrounding the revolution in Iran and the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan. 
The Liberal and Country Parties government's initial approach to the 
United States and related matters was outlined in the Prime Minister's June 
1976 statement. Fraser e'mphasised the vital position of the United States in 
providing a balance to the power of the Soviet Union. Indeed, without this 
important international role played by the US, Fraser believed that peace 
and security would be threatened. Also, Fraser explained that, while 
maintaining an independent perspective, the Australian government 
would ensure that 'the ANZUS alliance with the US and New Zealand did 
not fall into disrepair and disrepute'.50 This obvious critique of the 
Whitlam government's approach to the United States fixed the position of 
the Fraser government which incorporated Fraser's view of independence 
within the alliance.51 
Subsequently, a preliminary review of foreign policy issues was presented to 
the Parliament by Foreign Minister Peacock on 15 March 1977.52 This so-
called March statement proved a useful guide to the government's outlook 
on global and regional affairs, and on policy priorities. Peacock expressed a 
secure and stable future for the Australian alliance with the United States. 
For example, Peacock stated that the Liberal and Country Parties 
government would: 
pursue Australia's interests, express our disagreement with 
American policy where it exists, but the fundamental importance 
attached to the alliance and the general relationship are no longer 
in question.53 
50 Fraser, CPD, fiR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2738. 
51 On the relationship between Australia and the United States in general, see T.B. Millar, 
Two new worlds: the United States and Australia, Round Table, no. 263, July 1976; Glen St J. 
Barclay, The future of Australian-American relations, Australian Outlook, vol. 30, 3, 
December 1976; Henry S. Albinski, American perspectives on the ANZUS alliance, 
Australian Outlook, vol. 32, 2, August 1978; Hugh Collins, Australia and the United f 1tes: 
assessing the relationship, Australian Outlook, vol. 32, 2, August 1978; and Henry S. 
Albinski, American-Australian security policies: the current phase, Pacific Affairs, vol. 51, 
4, Winter 1978-79. 
52 Peacock, CPD, fiR, vol. 104, 15 March 1977, pp. 197-210, & debate, pp. 210-34. 
53 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 104, 15 March 1977, p. 199. 
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Again, Peacock was c.r~ncising the Whitlam government's approach toward 
the United States but was also endorsing Fraser's element of independence 
within Australia's most importance strategic alliance. 
However, an element of unpredictability entered the relationship with the 
United States when the Democrat candidate Jimmy Carter was elected 
President in late 1976 for office beginning in early 1977. Prime Minister 
Fraser had established good r~lations with caretaker President Gerald Ford, 
primarily when visiting Washington shortly after the tour of China in July 
1976. The trip had focused on economic issues but included the cultivation 
of key members of the Congress and a telephone conversation with the then 
Democrat candidate Carter.54 
The inauguration of President Carter sent mixed signals on foreign policy. 
There was an expectation that little would change given the limited room 
for manoeuvre in international relations policy and Carter's lack of 
experience at the national level. Also, the appointment of Cyrus Vance as 
Secretary of State suggested a continuation of Kissinger style foreign policy 
and that US allies would have little cause to object on this issue.ss 
However, the Fraser government had misgivings about the initial Carter 
foreign policy which declared human rights to be a major foreign policy 
objective, restored the policy of detente, and threatened a reduced presence 
in the Asia Pacific region. Further, President Carter's attempts to reopen the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks through far-reaching reductions in nuclear 
weapons and determination to demilitarise the Indian Ocean demonstrated 
substantially more faith in the Soviet Union than displayed by the Fraser 
government.56 
54 It was Carter's policy to avoid meetings with foreign heads of government until after the 
November poll. Foreign Minister Peacock and Australian Embassy staff in Washington had 
carefully cultivated links with the Carter campaign orgarusers in the months leading up to 
Fraser's trip in order to secure the invitation for discussions. Peacock's friendships with key 
Democrats proved useful at various points during the Fraser government. P.J. Boyce, Problems 
in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, vol. 23, 1, April1977, pp. 2-3. On other visits by Fraser to the United States, see J.M. 
McCarthy, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1979, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, vol. 25, 3, 1979, p. 305 and HenryS. Albinski, Problems in Australian 
Foreign Policy, January to June 1982, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vo128, 3, 
1982, p. 325. 
55 J.M. McCarthy, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1977, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 23, 3, December 1977, pp. 337-9. Some strain was placed 
-.~\-.o e\sl.,...,.J.W 0n the alliance with the revelations of Christopher Boyc€7{ See Bell, Dependent Ally, op. 
~ ~ .._. cit., pp. 153-4, Financial Review, 29 April 1977 and Age, 30 April1977. 
, "' ~ ~ 56 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 109. On Carter's foreign 
-_""'~...... Jl...... policy, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The United States versus human rights in ~~ the Third World, Monthly Review, vol. 29, 3J July/August 1977; David Rudnick, The winding 
lA~~ 
. ·""'"'· aov«"'--· 
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The Carter foreign policy, in pursuit of world peace through moral example 
rather than military power, was expected to be constrained by the 
Presidential office. However, Carter had soon halted foreign aid to 
countries not judged as extending human rights to their citizens and 
warned South Africa not to expect assistance from the United States in the 
event of a civil war.57 President Carter showed that the moral approach to 
foreign policy would not to be stifled. 
Specifically, Prime Minister Fraser and President Carter were closely aligned 
in their positions on conflicts in Africa, particularly the central issue of 
Rhodesia. Carter's clear stance on human rights within foreign policy and 
the influence of expectations from the African American constituency 
shaped an attentive and accomrrwdating United States approach to African 
issues. The President's policy seemed to be driven by the newly appointed 
US Ambassador to the UN and Carter campaigner, Andrew Young, who 
provided an .effective channel of communication for the United States 
administration to developing countries, in particular, with nationalists in 
Africa.ss The input of Young and others from a more progressive 
intellectual position produced a policy toward Africa more radical than the 
mainstream Democr;.2t opinion represented by Carter.s9 The process of 
formulating this allied approach was different in the US and Australia with 
non-elected advice guiding the moderate US President and the Australian 
Prime Minister dragging the Liberal and Country Parties government 
toward a radical position on Africa. 
In sum, the political points of departure for President Carter and Prime 
Minister Fraser were quite different but were not incompatible. The 
complementary policies on some issues emerged from Fraser's ability to 
offer progressive views from within a conservative foreign policy. The key 
elements of Australia's alliance with the United States were demonstrated 
through the debates on the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean, the 
road of good intentions, Round Table, no. 268, October 1977; Noam Chomsky, The Carter 
Administration: myth and reality, Australian Quarterly, vol. 50, 1, March 1978; Thomas T 
Hughes, Carter and the management of contradictions, Foreign Policy, no. 31, Summer 19... , 
and Coral Bell, Virtue unrewarded: Carter's foreign policy at mid-term, Internationt.. 
Affairs, vol. 54, 4, October 1978. 
57 See McCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1977, op. cit., p. 337. 
58 Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., pp. 154.-5. While the 'African Americc.r. vote' had normally 
supported the Democrat Presidential candidate, it was the civil rights campaigner Andrew 
Young who directed this electorate toward Carter who was from the South. 
59 ibid., p. 154. On the United States and Africa, see Julius K Nyerere, America and 
Southern Africa, Strategic Digest, vol. 7, 8, August 1977, Richard E. Bissell, United States 
policy in Africa, Current History, vol. 73,4322 December 1977 and Valentine J. Belfiglio, 
Strategic importance of Southern Africa to the United States, Africa Insight, vol. 10, 2, :qso. 
: • • • : ··~. ~ ~. • • .. • •• •• ':.,.. • ' •• • p : • • • ••• •• • 
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response to the Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan, and the position of 
President Reagan on the revolution in Iran. 
the Indian Ocean region 
Australia's position on the strategic naval balance in the Indian Ocean was 
central to the alliance with the United States. This issue also revealed 
Fraser's view of the Soviet Union and contributed to relations with 
developing countries, particularly the African littoral states. Australia's 
policy on the Indian Ocean was debated within the Fraser government and 
this exchange of views caused a modification of Australia's position. 
Further, the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean involved an argument to 
upgrade the military facilities at Diego Garcia and a proposal for a zone of 
peace for the region. 
The Fraser government policy toward the Indian Ocean in the June 1976 
statement was cu.rsory yet laden with implications: 
The Indian Ocean is of considerable political and strategic 
importance to Australia ... The objective of a neutral zone in the 
Indian Ocean, while admirable, has little chance of success with 
the U.S.S.R. significantly increasing its permanent presence in the 
vital north west sector of the Ocean. It is clearly contrary to 
Australia's interests for the balance in this area to move against 
our major ally, the United States. 
It is also against our interests for both superpowers to embark on 
an unrestricted competition in the Indian Ocean. We seek 
balance and restraint. We. have supported the United States 
development of logistic facilities at Diego Garcia so that the 
balance necessary to stability in the area can be maintained. It 
cannot be maintained without those facilities. We also strongly 
support the recent appeal by the United States Adrrtinistration for. 
restraint so that the balance can be maintained at a relatively low 
level.6° 
In this statement, Prime Minister Fraser emphasised the importance of the 
Indian Ocean in response to a perceived domination by the Soviet Union in 
the region. 61 As such, the proposed zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was 
not seen to be viable by Fraser. 
60 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976., p. 2741. 
61 See Leaver, op. cit., pp. 261-2 and Coral Bell, Australia m a World of Powers, chapter 2m 
Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 25. This concern may have been substantiated with reference to 
support for Soviet activity in Egypt, Iraq, Somalia and South Yemen compared with a 
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The emphasis on 'balance' in the region was a.n attempt to distance the 
Fraser government from the policies of the Whitlam government. Fraser 
analysed the Soviet presence as a threat to the flow of trade around 
southern Africa or, more importantly, a menace to transport of oil from the 
Persian Gulf. More than this, Defence Minister Killen, in support of 
Fraser's stance in the June statement, claimed that the activity of the Soviet 
Union in the Indian Ocean was a direct military threat to Australia.62 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of strategic foreign policy statements, the 
language of 'balance' linked with the Australian desire for a greater US 
commitment to the Indian Ocean region and with the Carter objective of 
lowering the level of commitment from all parties. For example, a 
communique issued by Prime Minister Fraser after talking with President 
Suharto said that 'pending the achievement of a zone of peace ... a balance 
in the Indian Ocean at as low a level as possible should avoid a competitive 
escalation of forces'.63 Australia in contrast preferred a 'balance' which 
represented an advantage for the United States. This was den~onstrated in 
Australia's eagerness to provide assistance to United States forces operating 
in the Indian Ocean region. 
The Prime Minister's alarmist statements on the Soviet presence in the 
Indian Ocean continued to be criticised from various sources. While the 
Labor Party critiques at the time of the June statement were dismissed, it was 
perceived decline in the ability of the United States to match the Soviet Union in the Indian 
Ocean. Renou£, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 112 and Leaver, op. 
cit., p. 265. See also A.W. Grazebrook, The Indian Ocean and Australian strategy, Navy, vol. 
38, 2, May /June/July 1976. 
62 See Richardson, op. cit., p. 328 and Renou£, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, 
op. cit., p. 111. At a press conference on 30 June 1976, the .Minister for Defence, Jim Killen, was 
asked whether the 'Soviet military build-up posed a military threat to Australia?' The 
Minister replied: 'Well, frankly, I do'. Three hours later, Minister Killen released a 
statement that clarified that 'the Government did not regard the Soviet Union as posing a 
direct military threat'. See Hayden, CPD, HR, vol. 100, 25 August 1976, p. 534 and Killen, 
Personal Explanation, CPD, HR, vol. 100,25 August 1976, pp. 536-7. See also Owen Wilkes, 
Australian involvement in US militarisation of the Indian Ocean, Australian Left Review, 
nos. 55/56, December 1976 and D.J. Killen, Australia's defence responsibility in a changing 
environment, Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 3, 10, April1977. 
63 Communique issued by Fraser and President Suharto quoted in McCarthy, ... Australian 
Foreign Policy, January to June 1977, op. cit., p. 338. See also Peacock, answer to question, CPD, 
HR, vol. 105, 25 May 1977, pp. 1905-6, Peacock, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 106, 14 
September 1977, p. 1081, and HenryS. Albinski, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to 
December 1977, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 24, 1, April1978, p. 2. See 
generally, J.J. Poulose, Indian Ocean: prospects of a nuclear-free, peace zone, Pacific 
Community, vol. 5, 2, January 1974; Ali Moertopo, The Indian Ocean: strategic and security 
problems, Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 5, 2, April1977; M. Zarkovic, Converting the Indian 
Ocean into a zone of peace and cooperation, Review of International Affairs, vol. 30, 682, 
September 1978; and William T. Tow, ANZUS: a strategic role in the Indian Ocean?, World 
Today, voL 34, 10, October 1978. 
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difficult to ignore an assessment by the United States that the degree of 
concern expressed by Australia was unwarranted. Also, the Senate Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, chaired by the Liberal Senator 
for Western Australia Peter Sim, presented a report on the developments in 
the Indian Ocean.64 The report, widely advocated by Sirn, found that the 
government's alarm was not fully warranted.65 
Senator Sim, in promoting the Committee's view, warned that 'we should 
not appear, by an over-reaction, to stimulate an escalation of naval power'. 66 
Leaver added that a 'bold ideological posture was counterproductive in so 
far as it might encourage the politicisation of the region that it was intended 
to prevent.'67 This position tended to echo the Labor critique but, of course, 
carried considerably more credibility within the Liberal Party. Senator Sim 
64 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and the Indian 
Ocean Region, Canberra, May 1976. The committee had been inquiring into developments in 
the Indian Ocean region since 1971. See also Leaver, op. cit., pp. 265-6 and generally, A.W. 
Grazebrook, Indian Ocean round up - the naval point of view, Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 3, 
13, June 1977 and Denis Warner, Another look at the Indian Ocean, Pacific Defence Reporter, 
vol. 3, 12, June 1977. 
65 See Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, op. cit., pp. 204-5. In 
providing an altema.tive view to the Prime Minister, the Senate Standing Committee 
utilised the information contained in the submission to the inquiry by Geoffrey Jukes. This 
submission explained that Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean consisted of four warships 
whiC'h were designed for anti-submarine activity, not for intercepting shipping. Further, 
Jukes argued that the overall size of the Soviet navy had been declining for sixteen years and 
would continue to decline. See Jukes submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, 10 August 1976. See also Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to 
December 1976, op. cit., p. 3. Richardson, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1976, 
op. cit., pp. 329-30 provided the details: 
[T]he average number of Soviet combat ships in the Indian Ocean has increased 
from four in 1971 and six in 1972 and 1973 to ten in 1974 and 1975 ... In 1974 and 
1975 the total number of 'ship days' was approximately 7000, of which 
approximately half referred to combat ships. In the same years, United States 
'ship days' were only approximately 2000, but these were principally combat 
ships. The Soviet ships deployed in the northwest section of the Indian Ocean 
included typically one cruiser, two destroyers, two frigates, two minesweepers 
and one or two landing ships and submarines. The United States ships included 
three combat ships based in Bahrain and a task-group entering from time to time 
from the Seventh fleet in the Pacific, the latter sometimes including an aircraft 
carrier, and then a more formidable force than the larger Soviet one. 
Both the Soviet and United States presence appeared marginal to global strategic security 
and both maintained the capacity to reinforce these detachments. See submission by the 
Department of Defence to the Committee and Appendix 1 & 2 to Annex A of the Senate 
Committee's report. See also G. Jukes, Soviet-Australian relations, World Review, vol. 19, 2, 
June 1980, Graeme J. Gill, The Soviet Union, detente and the fudian Ocean, Australian 
Outlook, vol. 31, 2, August 1977 and W.G. Hayden, The Soviet Naval Presence in the fudian 
Ocean: Implications for Australian Defence Policies, Australian Outlook, vol. 31, 1, April 
1977. 
66 Senator J.P. Sim, The So"Viet Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean, Australian Outlook, vol. 
31, 1, April1977, p. 187. See also Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, 
op. cit., p. 3 and Leaver, op. cit., p. 266. 
67 Leaver, ibio , p. 266 commenting on the argument of Senator Sim. 
: . : ·~· .·· ... -. .· ·:·: .... ·. . .: .-~ .· .. ·•· . 
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explained that the Soviet presence was not large and, indeed, the size of the 
fleet was carefully adjusted by the Soviet Union to demonstrate a level of 
power to the littoral states while not to be perceived as a threat to the United 
States.68 Significantly, Senator Sim stated that the Soviet presence did not 
pose a direct threat to Australia.69 
As a Senator from Western Australia, Sim was pleased to outline that the 
debate on the Soviet presence had provoked the government to recognise 
that Australia was not only a Pacific Ocean continent, but also part of the 
Indian Ocean region. Thus, Sim argued for an acceptance of greater 
responsibility for the protection of Western Australia by increasing naval 
and maritime aerial surveillance in the Indian Ocean region.7o Also, closer 
cooperation with the littoral states was advocated to demonstrate 
Australia's intentions. Sim understood that this cooperation should 
involve assistance to the developing countries to export goods into 
Australian markets through tariff preference schemes.n Thus, Senator Sim 
clearly linked thE": economic development of the Indian Ocean region with 
future political stability. This expansion of the debate prepared the path for 
a more moderate policy on the Indian Ocean to be outlined by Foreign 
Minister Peacock. 
As early as August 1976, and without suggesting any criticism of the Prime 
Minister, Peacock explained that the Soviet Union was 'an authentic world 
power with legitimate interests extending beyond its own region' .72 The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs was confident that the Soviet Union would 
appreciate the basis of Australian concern and proceeded to tmderline the 
common cultural, trade and diplomatic links.73 In November, Peacock 
noticeably softened government policy on the Indian Ocean by arguing that 
support from developing countries for the zone of peace could contribute to 
a climate of restraint in the region, thereby re-admitting the proposals as a 
long-term strategic goal.74 However, Peacock explained that the most 
appropriate path toward this goal was through a balance of forces 'at the 
68 Sim, op. cit., pp. 186 & 191. 
69 ibid., pp. 186 & 188-9. 
70 ibid., p. 191. Sim urged that permanent units of the Australian Navy should be based at 
HMAS Stirling at Cockburn Sound and that maritime air reconnaissance units should be 
stationed in Western Australia. 
71 ibid. 
72 Peacock, Australia's relations with the Soviet Union, address to Kooyong public meeting, 
20 August 1976, in Department of Foreign Affairs, Backgrounder, no. 54, 27 August 1976, p. 12. 
73 See Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit, p. 4. 
74 Peacock, Age, 13 November 1976. 
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lowest practical level' .75 The exciting rhetoric of the Prime Minister was 
replaced by Peacock's reassurancer.s but there were few other concessions. As 
Leaver pointed out, there was n~.:> attempt to incorporate the more flexible 
concept of a 'matching presence' which figured in the Senate Committee 
report as a means to advocate the reduction of United States and Soviet 
forces.76 
Th~ disadvantage of Australia's operating position within the regional 
power struggles was demonstrated soon after Peacock had clarified the 
government's position at the end of 1976. The newly inaugurated President 
Carter undermined the Australian stance with the comment on 11 March 
1977 that the Indian Ocean should be completely demilitarised.77 This 
proposal can1e as a surprise to many in the United States as this option was 
only one part of an ongoing debate over the Indian Ocean.7S Prime Minister 
Fraser obtained an assurance from the Carter administration that the 
declaration was intended to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union and 
should not be taken in a literal sense.79 
Not surprisingly, Peacock explained to the Parliament that the Car~er 
proposal was not in variance with the Fraser government's po~ition.&o The 
argument was restated that the idea of a zone of peace was aligned with the 
governmert's cornmitment to a strategic balance in the region. In practical 
terms, however, this episode demonstrated a lack of consultation by the 
75 Peacock, opening address to conference on Defence and Diplomacy in the Indian Ocean, 
Canberra, 12 November 1976, in Backgrounder, no. 66, 19 November 1976, p. 15, quoting from 
the white paper on Australian Defence presented to Parliament on 4 November 1976. See 
Killen, CPD1 HR, Ministerial statement: Australian Defence, vol. 101, 4 November 1976, pp. 
2343-4 and Hayden response, pp. 2344-7. Also, the Soviet naval activity was redesignated as 
a destabilising element in the region rather than a direct threat. The Minister reiterated the 
argument of balance before peace in the Foreign Affairs statement, CPD, HR, vol. 104,15 
March 1977, esp. pp. 201-2. See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. 
cit., p. 112 and. Leaver, op. cit, p. 266. 
76 Leaver, ibid., p. 266. See also Senate Sta...Ttding Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
op. cit., p. 187. 
77 McCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to Jt:rte 197/, op. cit., p. 337. See also 
Leaver, op. cit., p. 267 and Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1977, op. 
cit., p. 2. Carter had proposed to the Soviet Union that the ;Indian Ocean become completely 
demilitarised', among other radical initiatives such as significant movement toward arms 
control and a proposal for the withdrawal of US ground-forces from Korea. Needless to say, 
the Australian government had serious reservations about these objectives, and in particular, 
was concerned about the issue of Korea and attempted to lobby the US administration to 
maintain some presence. Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., pp. 148-50. 
78 See Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 424 and Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., 
p.148. 
79 Renouf, lvfalcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 112 and Albinski, 
... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1977, op. cit., p. 2. 
80 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 104,15 March 1977, p. 205. See also McCarthy, ... Australian 
ForeWl Policy, January to June 1977, op. cit, p. 337. 
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United States with the concerned Australians and brought into question the 
value of the relationships cultivated by the Fraser government with the 
Carter administration. This particular incident provoked Australian 
representatives into more vigorous action in an attempt to secure the Fraser 
government's interests in the Indian Ocean. The Prime Minister reaffirmed 
Australia's right to consultation during a visit to the United States.81 
Subsequently, Fraser announced that President Carter gave assurances that 
the views of the Australian government would be takeri. into consideration 
in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and re-
examined before any eventual agreement.82 No doubt the Australian 
position could have been used by the United States as a bargaining tool in 
the negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
The United States had arranged with the Soviet Union to form a working 
party to discuss avenues to achieve a stabilisation of forces in the Indian 
Ocean. 83 These negotiations began in 1977 but stalled in February 1978. 
During this brief time, Australia was consulted and kept informed by the 
Carter administration.84 The United States halted the talks claiming that the 
Soviet Union had violated the understanding that both parties would 
preserve the level of forces in the region. Bell provided evidence of an 
increase of Soviet strategic influence in the Horn of Africa-Red Sea area 
with the shift of alliance between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977, the 
successful cultivation of South Yemen, and thereby acquisition of facilities 
at Aden.85 In fact, the United States was also involved in these manoeuvres 
which suggested a broader power struggle during 1977-78 than the 
negotiations over the Indian Ocean. Thus, the tensions surrounding the 
talks seem to have caused the end of discussions. 
Subsequently, the Soviet Union reduced the level of commitment to the 
Indian Ocean region but relations with the United States had deteriorated to 
81 Leaver, op. cit., p. 267. 
82 Fraser, Address to the nation, 3 July 1977, in Backgrounder, no. 96, 8 July 1977, p. 23. See 
also McCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to Jur!e 1977, op. cit., p. 338. 
S3 See Peacock, answer to question, CPD, HR., vol.105,25 & 26 May 1977, pp. 1905-6. 
84 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 112-13, explained that, 
'Indeed, Australia was even made privy to an incident of some embarrassm8.tt to the United 
States. An early topic in the discussions concerned the true limits of the Indian Ocean. The 
US argued that the easte.."''l. boundary was the west coast of Australia. Russia contested this, 
claiming that the Ocean stretched to the east coast of Australia and produced an official 
American map (albeit out of date) to prove the point!'. 
85 Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., pp. 148-9. See also Bell, Australia in a World of Powers, op. 
cit.,. pp. 28-9 and see generally, Steven David, Realignment in the Hom: the Soviet 
advantage, International Security, vol. 4, 2, Fall1979 and S.M. Makinda, Conflict and 
accommodation in the Hom of Africa, Australian Outlook, vol. 37, 1, April1983. 
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the extent tnat further talks seemed useless. The issues on which there had 
been some agreement tended to favour the United States, and thus the 
Fraser government.86 While Australian diplomacy had some influence on 
elements of the negotiations, further discussions could ha"ve rest"ticted the 
capacity for the United States to assist Australia and may have limited 
Australia's ability to establish a naval base in Western Australia. In the end, 
the collapse of the talk® was the best result for PrLrne !vlinister Fraser. 
Throughout the debate, the Australian government prioritised the ANZUS 
relationship and attempted to extend this arrangement at various points. 
Moreover, the Prime Minister's interpretation of the power balance 
included the need for a closer political and military alliance with the United 
States.87 The Australian input consistently attempted to highlight the 
ANZUS related functions in the Indian Ocean to capture US interest and to 
divert attention from a possible regional agreement between the major 
actors. Some success was demonstrated following the 1977 ANZUS Council 
meeting at which close links were expressed between the Indian Ocean and 
the alliance.ss The United States provided an assurance that the 
negotiations would 'not qualify or derogate from the US commitment to 
Australia'.B9 The diplomatic efforts were supported by the Australian 
government's offers of facilities and active assistance for the US forces 
allocated to the Indian Ocean.90 
Following the arms stabilisation talks, the Australian efforts to link ANZUS 
with the Indian Ocean continued unabated.91 This strategy was 
demonstrated in proposals for facilities at Diego Garcia and in the pattern of 
Fraser for~ign policy in offering Australian bases and services to the United 
86 The negotiating parties had come to accept the limits of the Indian Ocean region and 
agreed that current levels of forces and facilities should be preserved and not increased. The 
United States had an advantage because submarines were not included and there would be no 
limitation on land-based strike aircraft. Also, the United States maintained the right to 
hold exercises '\"lith allies in the Indian Ocea..'l and, ?..t the insistence of the Fraser 
government, the draft agreement included a 'supr<>.me national interests' clause which 
permitted non-observance when such interests were judged to be involved. Renouf, Malcolm 
Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, O!!- t<it .. p. 113. 
87 Richardson, op. cit., p. 330. 
88 Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., p. 150 ~::·., · Leaver, op. cit., p. 268. 
89 Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., p. 150. See a!_c;o Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 1978. 
90 The government encouraged the use of Australian facilities on Cocos Islands by United 
States surveillance flights and initiated an informal arrangement where Australian ground 
personnel in Singapore would handle US reconnaissance flights. Leaver, op. cit., p. 268. See 
also H.S. Albinski, Australia and the Indian Ocean, paper presented at the International 
Conference on Indian Ocean Studies, Perth, August 1979. 
91 Leaver, op. cit., pp. 268-9. See also H.S. Albinski, American Perspectives ... , op. cit., esp. 
pp.142-8. 
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States. On Diego Garcia, the Fraser goveJ.nment supported the development 
of the US naval facilities in the June statement, signalling an early 
com.mitment to a physical presence in the region under the banner of 
'balance' and contradictory to the idea of peace.92 Fraser's prompt support 
for facilities at Diego Garcia fitted with an earlier decision to permit nuclear-
powered and nuclear-armed US naval vessels to access Australian ports and 
an invitation for the United States Navy to use facilities at Cockbtun Sound 
in Western Australia.93 
Australian support for US forces in the Indian Ocean was offered prior to 
Carter's announcement of demilitarisation in the region. However, the 
input of force reduction discussions into the debate heightened Fraser's 
commitment to a strong US presence at Diego Garcia as a necessary counter 
to the Soviet naval strength based at Berbera in Somalia.94 Certainly this 
was an argument used by advocates in the US Congress for upgrading the 
capability of Diego Garcia.95 Further, President Carter's determined attitude 
toward the arms negotiations over the Indian Ocean appeared to be 
undermined by the simultaneous construction of additional facilities at 
Diego Garcia.96 
92 Richardson, op. cit., p. 328. See also Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 424 
and Leaver, op. cit., p. 265. 
93 Richardson, op. cit., p. 330 and Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 
1977, op. cit., p. 2. See also Financial Review, 14 & 15 January 1976, and editorial16 January 
1976, Australian, 27 January 1976 and A';tstralian, 5 June 1976. See generally, F.A. Mediansky, 
United States interests in Australia, Austra.Uan Outlook, val. 30, 1, Ap:;:il 1976 and Desmond 
Ball, US bases -implications for Australia's security, Pacific Defence Reporter, val. 5, 12, 
June 1979 and val. 6, 1, July 1979. 
94 McCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1977, op. cit., p. 337. See also Bell, 
Australia in a World of Powers, op. cit., p. 29, on the shifting alliances of Ethiopia and 
Somalia with the United States and the Soviet Union. 
95 The well established debate in the US t::ongress had become muted by 1979 due to a 
perceived escalation of Soviet activity and the subsequent conflicts in Iran and Afghanistan. 
Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., p. 148. See also Hugh Smith, Defence Policy, chapter 3 in 
Boyce and Angel, op. cit., pp. 50-1. 
% V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, Australia and Eastern Europe. chapter 11 in Boyce 
and Angel, ibid., p. 179 and Albinski, ... Australian Fgreign Policy, July to December 1977, op. 
cit., p. 2. Glen Barclay, A~.:~stralia and North America, chapter 9 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., 
p. 146, attempted to illustrate the political linkages between the conservatives in the US and 
in Australia with a description of President Ford in response to a question stating that United 
States policy in the Indian Ocean was that 'we should have a minimal military capability 
on the island of Diego Garcia ... This objective of our Government,' Ford continued, on learning 
that the questioner was an Australian, 'is strongly supported by the new Fraser government in 
Australia. It was opposed by the Whithrun [sic] goven1m.ent that was just thrown out in the 
last election.' It was not surprising that President Ford could not remember the name of the 
previous Austr.alian Prime Minister but did remember a dislike for Whitlam's policies. The 
supplementary question should have been how much Ford knew of the process by which the 
Labor government was 'thrown out' in fue President's words. 
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As an upgrade of facilities at Cockburn Sound approached ':ompletion in 
1978, Foreign Minister Peacock sought assurances that the United States 
would continue to conduct naval exercises in the Indian Ocean region.97 
The Western Australian base was poteni:ially importa~t at a time of 
increasing international conflict around the Horn of Africa and the African 
littoral, including South Africa. The Cockburn Sound facilities continued to 
be important as a point of contact on the southern route to the Indian Ocean 
if naval shipping needed to avoid the Lombok Straits.98 
The pattern of Australian offers to the United States culminated in 1980 
with the suggestion t..~at the facilities at Cockburn Sound could be used as a 
home-port for US naval forces in the Indian Ocean.99 In contrast to 
previous offers, this arrangement would have provided a permanent base 
for US nav~l forces in Australia. Further, this offer represented a 
substantial shift in Australian foreign policy.too There had not been United 
States bases in Australia since the second World War. The facilities at Pine 
Gap, North West Cape, Nurrungar and elsewhere were organised as 'joint 
facilities' and fitted the intelligence gathering and signals relay functions 
rather than providing a permanent depository for US forces.1o1 MIJlar 
argued that the provision of home porting facilities at Cockburn Sound 
'must affect our diplomatic stance and nati..Jnal image',l02 This new 
arrangement implied a further integration of Australia into the United 
States security axis. Such a definite move would have reduced the flexibility 
of Australian foreign policy in multilateral and bilateral discussions. 
97 Coral Bell, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 24, 3, 1978, pp. 295-6. Peacock posed this question at the annual 
ANZUS meeting in May 1978 as the base, to be commissioned as HMAS Stirling, was about to 
host a taskforce of the US Navy. The construction of facilities at Cockburn Sound had been 
subject to unique delays as the base had been projected before the first World War. 
98 ibid., p. 296. The route from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean around the south of Australia 
would have been vital for all US naval vessels including nuclear-powered submarines in the 
event that normal routes were obstructed. 
99 See Age, 11 January 1980. 
100 Millar, ... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 8 and Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 
325. See also Smith, op. cit., p. 52. 
101 The distinctions here are more marginal than suggested. The defence related functions of 
Pin~ Gap have continued with little Australian knowledge of operations and the United 
States is able to use this base to exchange goods and personnel into and out of Australia. 
Moreover, it is feared that the US could use the facilities for unknmvn purposes which may be 
detrimental to the interests of Australia. Smith, ibid., p. 51. However, the designated 
relationship between the United States and Australia over Pine Gap and the other bases is 
different from the offer to provide a conventional military base at Cockburn Sonnd. Renouf, 
Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 325. See also Des Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: 
American installations in Australia, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1980 and Des Ball, Pine 
Gap: Australia and the US geostationary signals intelligence satellite program, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 1988. 
102 Millar, ... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 8. 
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The Australian offer of Cockburn Sound was open to a number of 
objections. Foreign military bases had become obstru.ctions to effective 
international diplomacy and were actively disliked by most developing 
countries. Also, this offer was not consistent with a strategy of becoming 
more independent of the United States, nor did it recognise that Australia 
was becoming more able to provide its own defence requirements. Further, 
the United States base would make Australia more susceptible to attack.103 
Fraser saw these objections as outweighed by the possibility that the United 
States would defend Australia. This arrangement intimated that Australia 
would not need to spend as much money 01~ defence. For Fraser, it was a 
compelling argument in an international co. · ~xt of increasing aggTession in 
Afghanistan, which threatened the stability of the Indian Ocean region, and 
therefore exposed the vulnerable western coast of Australia.l04 
The Fraser government was encouraged by the warm reception of the idea 
by the United States. The Carter administration recognised the need to keep 
open the options at Cockburn Sound at a time when similar arrangements 
with Oman and Kenya remained unsatisfactory.1os The potential 
obstruction to the home port proposal appeared to be the allocation of costs 
in increasing facilities at Cockburn Sound for the accommodation of a 
carrier task force. By 1980, the issue remained at the level of discussions 
and, in the end, the home port option did not eventuate. 
These issues clearly impacted upon the government's position on a 
proposal for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.IOG In the June 1976 
statement, the Prime Minister described the objective of a neutral zone as 
admirable and proceeded to focus on the increasing presence of the Soviet 
Union in the Indian Ocean. This position led to Fraser's aim of balance and 
restraint of forces in the Indian Ocean.107 In critique, Hayden argued that the 
Liberal and Country Parties government had never considered the concept 
of the zone of neutrality in the Indian Ocean. In the context of refuting the 
:::'rime Minister's claim on the Soviet presence, Hayden highlighted the 
103 Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 325. See also Smith, op. cit., p. 51. 
104 Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 326. Also, Smith, op. cit., p. 52, outlined that 
the facilities at HMAS Stirling m Cockburn Sound were developed to support higher levels 
of Royal Australian Navy activity m the Indian Ocean. 
105 For more, see Leaver, op. cit., p. 274. See also Bell, Mr Fraser and Australian f'-:-reign 
Policy, op. cit., p. 419. 
106 The reference to a zone of peace mcorporated two notions: the Zone of Peace, Fr~dom and 
Neutrality (ZOPF AN) sponsored by the ASE..t\N countries, and the Zone (•£ Peace approved 
by the United Nations, both in 1971. See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and AMtralian Foreign 
Policy, op. cit., p. 111. 
107 Fraser, CPD, HR, voL 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2741. 
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'nervous rhetoric' of the government, particularly on the Indian Ocean, 
which represented a return to the conservative foreign policy and defence 
debates of the 1960s_Ios 
Nevertheless, the Fraser government did not withdraw from the United 
Nations committee examining the proposal for a zone of peace in the 
Indian Ocean. The established Australian membership of this committee 
provided a welcome opportunity for the Fraser government to influence 
the direction of the discussions.l09 However, Fraser's stated support for the 
zone of peace in the long term appeared hollow given the continuing 
Australian support for the development of Diego Garcia by the United 
States. 
Issues related to the zone of peace proposal continued to be discussed in 
international forums and continued to be undermined by strategic 
manoeuvres and particula:r bilateral disputes. The Australian government 
supported the zone of peace in the communique which emerged from the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Melbourne in 1981. 
The agreed position from the CHOGM expressed that increases in military 
presence in the Indian Ocean undermined the zone of peace concept and the 
proposed UN conference en the Indian Ocean could contribute toward 
progress on this idea. In contrast, Fraser retained the view that an increase 
in US forces in the Indian Ocean should be supported and had attempted to 
cancel the conference through the United Nations. The Prime Minister 
appeared to endorse the CHOGM communique in the spirit of co-operation 
of the Commonwealth while pursuing a different set of objectives.llO 
In sum, the Indian Ocean region was an integral element of Australia's 
alliance with the United States. The Fraser government was energetic in 
encouraging a greater presence by the US in the Indian Ocean and, thereby, 
US defence of Australia. Also, Fraser's position on the Indian Ocean was in 
direct contrast to the equivocation of the Whitla:m government on this 
issue. Fraser pursued a distinct position in support of United States action 
in the region which translated into strong opposition to the Soviet Union's 
actions in Afghanistan. 
108 Hayden, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, pp. 2752-3. See also Leaver, op. cit., p. 266 and 
Canberra Times, 13 November 1976. 
109 Millar, Australian in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 426. 
110 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit.r p. 144. 
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the Soviet Union and Mghanistan 
The hostile position toward the Soviet Union outlined by Prime Minister 
Fraser in the June 1976 statement seemed to be vindicated with the Soviet 
intervention into Afghanistan in December 1979. Fraser publicly opposed 
the action of the Soviet Union and attempted to gain international support 
for this position. In alliance with the United States, the Fraser government 
implemented a series of measures to demonstrate opposition to the actions 
of the Soviet Union. This reaction focused on trade, the Olympic Games in 
Moscow, and defence arrangements in the Indian Ocean. Australian foreign 
policy toward the Soviet Union was also linked to relations with, and 
among, the United States, China and ASEAN. 
In the June statement, Prime Minister Fraser had expressed concern about 
the perceived military expansionist approach of the Soviet Union.lll 
Apparently, the first draft of the speech was even more vitriolic in critique 
of the Soviet Union and could have caused ~ breach of diplomatic relations 
or a reduction of Australian exports to the Soviet Union.n2 Specifically, 
Fraser highlighted the ambitions of the Soviet Union by extending analysis 
of the 1973 Middle East war and the conflict in Vietnam.113 Thus, the Prime 
Minister's initial statement set the tone and agenda for Australian relations 
with the Soviet Union. 
While Foreign Minister Peacock was attempting to soften the Prime 
Minister's statements on the Soviet Union in late 1976, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Overseas Trade, Doug Anthony, and the Minister 
for Trans.r)ort, Peter Nixon, visited the Soviet Union. Upon return, 
Anthony raised the possibility of selling uranium to the Soviet Union and 
Nixon presented Soviet intentions as non-aggressive.114 Subsequently, 
Peacock attempted to reconcile the hostility of the Prime Minister with the 
views of Anthony and Nixon. The Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasised 
111 See Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, pp. 2737-8. 
112 See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 84. 
113 Richardson, op. cit., pp. 328-9. Indeed, the Fraser government attempted to instil the 
perception that serious action needed to be initiated to defend against the tactics of the 
Soviet Union but decided not to increase spending on defence. Prior to the June statement, the 
Minister for Defence Killen warned of the inadequacy of the Australian armed services in the 
context of heightened international instability. Despite the recoiD.mendations for increased 
expenditure for defence, the Fraser government did not substantially stre..11gthen the armed 
forces citing the need for financial stringency. Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign 
Policy, op. cit., pp. 88-9. See Killen, Ministerialstateme..'lt, CPD, HR, vol. 99,25 May 1976, 
PP· 2384-6. 
114 See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 87. 
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the govern:rnent's sound bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, 
including agreements on scientific, technical and cultural cooperation.llS 
Peacock also highlighted the increases in Australian beef and mutton sales 
to the Soviet Union and explained that both countries were actively 
promoting trade within the bilateral relationship, as evidenced by the visit 
of Anthony and Nixon. However, Peacock stressed the Australian 
government's concern on the Soviet Union,'s increase in military capacity 
and the implications of this arms build-up for the strategic balance with the 
United States.116 Minister Peacock appeared to be providing additional 
analysis through which the government could sustain the trading 
relationship with the Soviet Union while continuing to express concern 
about Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean region.117 
Australian relations with the Soviet Union were fundamentally altered 
with the Soviet military intervention into Afghanistan in December 1979. 
The President of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin had been replaced by 
Babrak Karmal in a violent transfer of power which was accompanied by an 
infusion of Soviet forces into Afghanistan in the last days of 1979. In a key 
statement to the Parliament in February 1980, the Prime Minister explained 
that the world was facing a dangerous international crisis.ns Seemingly in 
vindication of an earlier prediction, Fraser explained the situation in simple 
terms: 
The crisis has come about because, and only because, in the last 
week of 1979 the Soviet Union sent thousands of its troops across 
the border into Afghanistan. Since then it has continued to put 
men and arms into that country until today there are something 
in the order of 85,000 Russian troops there- over twice as many 
men as there now are in the disintegrating Afghan army. There 
is no indication that they will be withdrawn in the foreseeable 
future. In the English language the accepted and proper words for 
this kind of action are not interference or intervention but 
invasion, occupation and suppression. 
115 Peacock, Ministerial statement Government Foreign Policy, CPD, HR, vol. 104, 15 March 
1977, p. 201. 
116 Peacock, CPD, HR., vol. 104,15 March 1977, pp. 201-2. See also Kubalkova and 
Cruickshank, op. cit., pp. 169-87, for a general discussion on Australian relations with the 
Soviet Union. 
117 See also Peacock, Ministerial statement The Geo-Political Situation, CPD, HR, vol. 113, 
27 February 1979, pp. 361-6, & debate, pp. 366-99. 
118 Fraser, Ministerial statement: Afghanistan, Australia's Assessment and Response, CPD, 
HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, pp. 17-28 & debate pp. 28-66. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser 
and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 91, J.A.A. Stod-win, Problems in Australian Foreign 
Policy, January-June 1980, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 26, 3, 1980, p. 339 
and Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit., p. 183. 
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The Soviet Union is engaged in propping up an unstable and 
unpopular Marxist regime, which is internally divided and which 
is bitterly opposed to the people of Afghanistan. To say that it has 
acted, and is acting, brutally is not to engage in rhetoric. It is 
merely to state the facts.l19 
The Australian Prime Minister adhered to the previously stated analysis 
which described Soviet expansionism within the narrow bipolar 
understanding of international power. Fraser also focused upon the Soviet 
Union's attempt to increase its influence over developing countries, in 
particular, Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea.12o Fraser argued that the 
Soviet agenda was of particular concern to Australia given the '&ubsidising 
of Vietnam to the hme of $3m a day' while occupying Kampuchea.121 
In addition to the expansionist argument, Fraser outlined the strategic 
implications of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister 
explained that the Afghanistan crisis had 'profound implications for the 
stability of global order' and had 'substantially changed the strategic order 
underpinning Australia's security'.122 Fraser explicated that the Soviet 
strategy provided further options in the region, specifically an abilily to exert 
pressure upon the Gulf oil states, the Indian sub-continent and the Indian 
Ocean region. This strategic advantage threatened the world's supply of oil 
at a time of nuclear parity and Soviet superiority in conventional 
weapons.123 For Australia, the implication of heightened tensions in the 
Indian Ocean posed the most immediate threat. 
This interpretation of events and implications emerged from Fraser's 
understanding of international relations with some input from the Prime 
Minister's personal staff. When the Office of National Assessments 
provided an alternative and less alarmist analysis of the Soviet Union 
intervention in Afghanistan, Fraser dismissed this advice and publicly 
119 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 17. See also Australian, 20 February 1980 
and Age, 20 February 1980 and see generally, Dev Murarka, The Russian intervention: a 
Moscow analysis, Round Table, no. 282, Apri11981 and Seth Singleton, The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, Atlantic Community Quarterly, vol. 19, 2, Summer 1981. 
120 This connection relied on the Soviet Union's support for Vietnam in expansionist activities 
in the Asia Pacific region. Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 117,19 February 1980, p. 18. See also 
Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 99 and Kubalkova and 
Cruickshank, op. cit., p. 182. 
Ul Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 19. 
122 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, pp. 18 & 23. 
123 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, pp. 17r 19 & 23. 
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criticised the ONA,l24 The Office of National Assessments understood the 
events in Afghanistan in more narrow terms of regional stability and as an 
issue of border security for the Soviet Union. The conflict between the 
Soviet Union and China was also a factor but, again, this was confined to 
border disputes and territorial manoeuvring. Obviously, the Prime 
Minister wished to analyse the events in Afghanistan in a more 
international strategic context which matched the reaction of the United 
States and suited Fraser's previously stated views on the Soviet Union. 
Fraser argued for a 'firm and sustained response' to the 'crisis 1n 
Afghanistan' _12s This position illustrated the basis of the Fraser foreign 
policy which was that international aggression should be met with forceful 
replies, including military action. By comparing the Soviet move into 
l~3'b Afghanistan with Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia inJ i-939, Fraser 
projected the Soviet Union as the new aggressor which intended to expand 
at the expense of neighbouring countries and international stability.126 This 
analysis further confirmed Fraser's doubts about the value of detente and 
the continuing need to contain Soviet aggression. Fraser argued that the 
Soviet Union should be told that expansionist tactics would not be tolerated 
and that the United States and allies had the responsibility for exacting the 
price of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.I27 
To this end, Prime Minister Fraser embarked on an official visit to the 
United States, Britain, France, Gern1any and again to Washington in late 
January and early February 1980. At the same time, Foreign Minister 
Peacock visited seven countries in South Asia and South East Asia for 
consultations on the situation in Afghanistan.I28 Fraser had argued the 
need for urgent talks w ·h Australia's allies but other leaders relied upon 
the normal and efficie:.nt channels of diplomatic communication. The 
Australian Prime Minister wanted to illustrate the gravity of the situation 
through high level personal discussions.129 In contrast to Peacock's low-key 
124 See National Times, 24 February-1 March 1980, 2-8 March 1980, and 9-15 March 1980; Age, 
26 February 1980 and 10 March 1980; and Australian, 6 March 1980. See also Fraser, answer to 
question, CPD, HR., vol. 117,5 March 1980, pp. 644-7. 
125 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117,19 February 1980, p.17. 
126 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, pp. 17-18. 
127 See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 96. See generally, 
Martin Indyk, Walking tall with a short stick: Australian policy towards the crisis in Iran 
and Afghanistan, World Review, vol. 20, 3, August 1981. 128 Stockwin, op. cit., p. 340. See also Leaver, op. cit., p. 271. 
129 In visiting Vvashington twice, Fraser claimed that President Carter wished to receive a 
report on the views of others~ but Carter denied making any such request. Renouf, Malcolm 
Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 91. 
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approach, Fraser attempted to heighten concern about Afghanistan, at one 
point remarking that 'we might be at war in three days'.13D 
It was suggested that the purpose of Fraser's diplomatic efforts was to 
'encourage the United States into adopting the global role which was the 
basis for US foreign policy prior to the Vietnam experience' .131 Fraser was 
intent on strengthening the resolve of the United States on econon1ic and 
diplomatic sanctions against the Soviet Union. In exchange, the Prime 
Minister revived the offer of Fremantle as a United States naval base.132 
President Carter apparently considered this idea but Fremantle was too 
distant from the important north west area of the Indian Ocean.133 
In the European capitals, Prime Minister Fra.ser received guarded responses 
to the message of alarm and disaster. France and Germany did not want to 
discard the notion of detente and preferred extensive consultations with the 
United States prior to any decisions on sanctions against the Soviet Union. 
It seemed that Europe favoured a 'graduated response across the range of 
policy areas and the co-ordination of action with key developing 
countries' .134 Nevertheless, in the Parliament, Fraser offered the 
impression that the nations in Europe and Asia shared the Australian 
position of serious concern over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In 
effect, international opinion was demonstrated through 104 countries 
condemning the Soviet Union at the United Nations.135 
The Australian government imposed a number of penalties upon the 
Soviet Union in January 1980.' The Prime Minister explained that any 
reaction should improve communications with the Soviet Union in order 
to send clear and consistent signals.136 Thus, Fraser decided to implement a 
13° Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February 1980. Fraser later withdrew the phrase. See 
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 340. 
131 Leaver, op. cit., p. 271. See Age, 4 February 1980. 
132 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 120. To offer the city of 
Fremantle as a base was distinct from the idea of facilities at Cockburn Sound which is some 
kilometres south of Fremantle. 
133 Renouf, ibid., p. 120. Even at the time of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the 
United States was reluctant to commit to the defence of Australia while acknowledging that 
the establishment of a US base in Western Australia had been a long-standing goal of 
Australian governments. Nevertheless, the Carter administration used Fraser's state of 
alarm to make a counter offer. This was to persuade the Liberal and Country Parties 
government to accept flights of B52 strategic bombers in Australian territory. Fraser agreed to 
the proposal as this implied greater US involvement in the defence of Australia. 
134 Leaver, op. cit., p. 271. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, 
op. cit, pp. 91 & 99 and Australian, 9-10 February 1980. 
135 See Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 20. 
136 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 21. 
.. 
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number of substantive and symbolic measures which altered Australia's 
relations with the Soviet Union. These included: 
• support for the United States embargo on grain sales to the Soviet 
Union; 
• suspension of Soviet shipping access to Australian ports, including 
cruise ships and research vessels; 
• withdrawal from fishing feasibility projects involving Soviet 
participation; 
• suspension of Ministerial and offici.al visits between Australia and the 
Soviet Union; 
• rejection of a Soviet proposal to establish direct air services; 
• suspension of proposed and established scientific, agricultural, and 
cultural relations; and 
• opposition to the staging of the Olympics at Moscow while the Soviet 
Union remained in Afghanistan.137 
These measures drew criticism for the method by which they were decided 
and for not meeting the rhetoric of the Prime Minister. Immediately, 
Hayden captured the personal nature of the reaction to the Soviet Union: 
The pace has been set entirely by the Prime Minister on the basis 
of personal prejudice and political expediency. The analysis we 
might have expected from the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr 
Peacock) and his Department played no part in Australia's policy 
formulation and public stance on Afghanistan.13S 
Also, several significant options of retaliation against the Soviet Union 
were not adopted. The Fraser government could have halted grain sales, as 
the US had done, but this would have damaged Australian trade and the 
members of the Country Party would not have agreed. Diplomatic relations 
could have been severed but this also would have led to a reduction in the 
profitable trade with the Soviet Union. Thus, many of the measures were 
entirely symbolic and the more strident options were not impleme:t.~ed. 
In the longer-term debate, the central issues were the extent of trade with 
the Soviet Union and the boycott of the Olympic Games to be held in 
Moscow in July-August 1980. On trade, Fraser explained that Australia, in 
cooperation with other major grain exporting nations, would support the 
137 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 24. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and 
Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit, pp. 94-5 and Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit., pp. 182-
3. 
138 Hayden~ CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 29. 
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United States decision to halt the sale of 17 million tonnes of grain by not 
replacing this shortfall. This amounted to a partial sanction as Australian 
grain sales continued.139 Further, Fraser announced that Australia would 
review the trade in mineral raw materials with the Soviet Union. The 
essential criteria, the Prime Minister stated in the Parliament, 'must be the 
effectiveness of the measures in terms of their impact on the Soviet 
Union'.140 Fraser continued, to explain that: 
The USSR is not dependent on imports of strategic materials, and 
would have little difficulty in replacing Australia as a supplier of 
mineral raw materials. The Government has, therefore, decided 
that exports of these mineral raw materials to the USSR should 
continue normally. This is consistent with the position of the 
United States and the United Kingdom.141 
The Fraser governm.ent seemed to conform with the established position of 
previous Liberal and Country Parties governments which divorced trade 
from politics even though the United States obviously used trade as a 
foreign policy instrument. The Fraser government did not fulfil the 
alarmist rhetoric of the Prime Minister in the trade sanctions which caused 
considerable debate when compared to the proposed Australian boycott of 
the Moscow Olympic Games. 
For a number of reasons relating to the Australian electorate, the idea of 
boycotting the Olympic Games generated an unusually high level of public 
debate not replicated on other issues. Initially, Foreign Minister Peacock 
had offered the considered opinion that a boycott of the Olympics would be 
ineffectual and that a boycott was a matter for sporting bodies.142 
Subsequently, President Carter openly advocated the notion of an 
international boycott of the Moscow Games with the expectation that allies 
of the United States would agree. Suddenly, Peacock was arguing for the 
boycott in line with the views of Carter and Prime Minister Fraser.143 
139 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 26. However, total Australian exports to 
the Soviet Union nearly tripled bet\veen 1979 and 1982. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and 
Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 103, Stockwin, op. cit., pp. 339-42 and Canbetra Times, 
10 & 11 January 1980. 
140 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 27. 
141 Fraser, CPD F HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 27. See also Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 
op. cit., pp. 182-3. 
142 Patrick Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: A study in Prime Ministerial Power in Australia, 
Penguin, Ringwood, 1989, p. 345., using cabinet documents of 8 January 1980. 143 On 8 January 1980, Peacock stated 'I am not moved by suggestit)ns that the Olympic Games 
be boycotted, because it is mainly a question for sporting bodies and I am not sure the USSR 
would suffer from a boycott'. By mid-January, President Carter had signalled the possibility 
of a boycott and the idea of a..'1. 'alternative Olympics'. On 21 January, Carter publicly 
proposed the boycott and suggested a permanent venue for the Olympics in Greece. Also on 21 
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Fraser strongly supported the boycott of the Moscow Games as the most 
effective method of inflicting some form of loss on the Soviet Union.144 
The basis for Fraser's position was a moral argument which stood 
independent of any question of effectiveness: 
First, we believe that it is wrong that a country which is engaged 
in the invasion, occupation and suppression of a people should 
be regarded as a fit host for the Olympic Games.145 
In addition, Fraser argued that the participation of Australian athletes in 
Moscow would be used as an endorsement of Soviet foreign policy. Also, 
the Prime Minister wanted to align with, and support the position of, other 
countries, especially the United States, which favoured the boycott.146 
Ultimately, the attraction of the boycott was the little cost to Australia 
compared to the expected impact on the Soviet Union.147 
Within an active public debate, the arguments against a boycott of the 
Olympic Games varied according to. their source. I? general, arguments 
focused on whether any sanction could deter the Soviet Union, that politics 
should be separated from sport, that the Olympic ideal should not be 
compromised, that an alternative Games was not likely to be organised, and 
that athletes should not be 'the principal vehide of the government's 
displeasure' _148 However, the central critique of Fraser's position was the 
contradiction between the boycott of the Olympic Games and continuing 
trade with the Soviet Union. Australian grain and wool sales to the Soviet 
Union prospered throughout 1979-80. In the public debate, the contrast was 
stark when it was revealed that wool from the Prime :Minister's property of 
January, Peacock experienced a complete conversion stating that 'boycotting the Games is 
clearly the greatest rebuff one could serve to Russia'. This change was attributed to the 
influence of Prime Minister Fraser which was summarised in the Melbourne Herald headline 
'Peacock up the Khyber Pass'. See Hayden, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 29, 
Stoc..lcwin, op. cit., p. 341 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., 
pp. 100-1. 
144 Stockwin, op. cit., p. 342 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. 
cit., p. 94. See also Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., pp. 326-7 and Age, 18 February 
1980. 
145 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 19 February 1980, p. 21. See also Stockwin, op. cit., p. 343. 
146 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol.l17, 19 February 1980, p. 21. Fraser explained that 35 governments 
of countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean, Latin America and North 
America had favoured a boycott of the Moscow Games if Soviet troops were not withdrawn 
from Mghanistan. Fraser also promised to actively promote and support the organising of 
alternative international Games. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign 
Policy, op. cit.¥ p. 93. 
147 Stockwin, op. cit., p. 343. 
148 See Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 327 and Stockwin, op. cit., p. 344. 
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Nareen continued to be sold to the Soviet Union_149 Further, in June 1980, 
the Australian government renewed grain sales to the Soviet Union with 
the support of the Australian Wheat growers' Federation_Iso 
Meanwhile, the Prime Minister was attempting to persuade the Australian 
Olympic Federation to agree to a boycott of the Moscow Games. In the 
United States, President Carter directed that the US team would not attend 
but Fraser expected that the AOF would decide in line with the 
government's position.1s1 Once the International Olympic Committee had 
failed to cancel the Moscow Olympics, it was inevitable that the Australia-n 
Olympic Federation would refuse to overturn the individual decisions of 
their composite sporting associations to attend the Gantes.152 Fraser 
i.nfl,amed the domestic public debate by castigating the Federation for placing 
duty to the Olympic movement above duty to Australia. In the end, many 
countries did not enforce the boycott, including Australia. 
The Moscow Olympic Games were a limited success notwithstanding the 
boycott by the United States. It seemed that the Fraser government handled 
149 See Mick Young, CPD, HR., vol 117, 28 February 1980, p. 480, on the sale of rams to the 
Soviet Union and the need for the government to issue export permits for the sales: 
What is the government going to do? ... The Deputy Prime Minister (Mr 
Anthony), the Minister for Primary Industry (Mr Nixon), the Minister for 
Industrial Relations (Mr Street), the Prime Minister, and the Minister for 
Transport (Mr Hunt) are all cockies. What do honourable members think they 
are going to do? They will be issuing permits by the dozen. 
Paul Keating, CPD, HR, vol. 117,28 February 1980, p. 485, added: 
When we look at the pathetic list of responses [to Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan], we saw that the only response was the Olympic boycott. There 
were to be no trade embargoes,. .. the wool will go, the wheat will go, the 
minerals will go, but, more damningly, the Prime W.dnister's wool will go. He 
will take the roubles and run. He will say ... that the wool was sold before the 
invasion. The wool is still in Australia. 
See CPD, HR, vol. 117, 27 February 1980, pp. 408-46 & 28 February 1980, pp. 474-98. 
1Sr Leaver, op. cit., p. 272. See Age, 25 June 1980. Restrictions limited the sales to 3.9 million 
!on.'1es, the same amount sold jn 1979-80. Despite a fierce attack on the decision from the 
Labor spokesperson on primary industry, Senator Peter Walsh, the Minister for Primary 
Industry, Nixon, stated that 'sales to the Soviet Union in 1980-81 could have been far more, so 
a "real restriction" was being enforced'. The Australian Wheat Growers Federation preferred 
no government restrictions on trade. 
151 Renou£, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 100-1. In attempting to 
convince the Australian Olympic Federation, Fraser argued the line of national security and 
the need to oppose Soviet aggression. President Carter had decided that the US would not 
participate which included the implication that passports of athletes would be withheld. 
See LeG:<L"!',:r, op. cit., p. 272. 
152 Stock,vin, op. cit., p. 344. President Ca...--ter attempted to influence the International 
Olympic Committee to cancel the 1980 Olymric Games in Moscow. See also Leaver, op. cit., p. 
273. In Australia, some sporting organisations were determined to send representatives while 
others supported the call for a boycott. The Australian Olympic Federation decided to send a 
team to Moscow by six votes to five Individual athletes could withdraw on the grounds of 
conscience and a few athletes chose this option. 
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the issue badly and for some, did not have the courage to stop the 
Australian team from attending the Moscow Games.153 For others, Fraser's 
attempts to influence the debate were targeted more at don1estic opinion 
than Soviet foreign policy.154 The debate in Australia focused on the 
proposed boycott of the Olympic Games at the expense of discussion on 
Afghanistan.155 
By the end of 1980, the Prime Minister had maintained an alarmist posture 
on the Soviet Union while Foreign Minister Peacock had attempted to 
soften Australia's position through more considered analysis.156 Relations 
with the Soviet Union were influenced by the campaign and election of 
Ronald Reagan for the Presidency of the United States. Fraser was more 
inclined to follow US foreign policy after 1980 given the conservative 
agenda of the Reagan administration.157 It was no surprise that diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union did not improve during the tenure of the 
Fraser government.158 
Finally, the depth of Fraser's hostility to the Soviet Union was puzzling, 
particularly as few colleagues in the Liberal and Country Parties shared the 
intensity of sentiment. The Prime Minister had no direct knowledge of the 
Soviet Union, was not widely read on Russian or Soviet issues and was not 
interested in advice which differed from established personal views,l59 
Fraser may have wanted to exploit the anti-Soviet opinion in Australia for 
domestic political advantage. With this aimt, Fraser may have drawn upon 
the style and approach of Menzies to the threat of communism in the late 
1940s and 1950s. Fraser was influenced by the leadership style of Menzies 
and the methods through which Menzies utilised the issue of communism 
to justify participation in international debates and to dictate the political 
agenda in the Australian electorate. Conveniently, Fraser's opposition to 
the Soviet invasion of Afgha..rristan preceded the federal election in October 
1980. However, this serves as only a partial explanation. 
153 See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 102 and Renouf, 
Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 327. 
154 Leaver, op. cit., p. 273. 
155 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit, p. 183. 
156 R.J. Lim, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December.1980, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 27, 1, 1981, p. 7. Tiris was at a time of considerable personal 
distance between the Foreign Minister and the Prime .Minista. 157 Tiris was demonstrated on the issue of continuing the grain embargo on the Soviet Union. 
Meetings in 1980 saw Australia wait for a decision from the newly elected Reagan. ibid. 158 In contrast, trade relations contin~ed to improve for Australia through 1980-83. Renouf, 
Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 103. 159 ibid., p.189. 
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For Australia, the Soviet Union was a considerable distance in ten.ns of 
posing a physical threat. Australia was not justified in attempting to lead 
international opposition to the Soviet Union in the context of relatively 
restrained responses from more knowledgeable countries located closer to 
Soviet borders. Nevertheless, Fraser was virulent in criticising the actions 
and perceived. motives of the Soviet Union. This may have been an 
attempt to support the United States but could equally have emerged from 
Fraser's desire to participate in international events and to be seen as a 
world leader. In the end, the distance between Fraser's rhetoric and the 
government's actions suggested. that the Prime Minister conducted a 
personal assault against the Soviet Union with little support from Liberal 
and Country Party colleagues. 
In total, Fraser's concern about the expansionist intentions of the Soviet 
Union in the June 1976 statement appeared to be justified with the 
intervention into Afghanistan. In supporting the United States, Fraser 
implemented a range of measures against the Soviet Union including a 
boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games and increased defence arrangements 
in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, Australian trade with the Soviet 
Union prospered which caused difficulties for Fraser's argument. To extend 
the argument on Fraser's mishandling of the Olympic boycott, the entire 
Australian response to the Soviet action in Afghanistan wa'{ · !1i2directed 
and mismanaged. 
The United States and Iran 
In addition to Australia's early relations with the Carter administration, the 
issues which emerged in 1979-81 brought the Fraser government closer to 
US foreign policy. The key aspects of the relationship included the response 
to events in Iran, the change in US foreign policy from Carter to Reagan, 
and participation in the Sinai peacekeeping force. These topics also fitted 
the context of US and Australian relations with the Soviet Union, while the 
specific aspects provided distinct lhtks to developing countries. The Fraser 
government adjusted key elements of Australian foreign policy with the 
emergence of President Reagan and a more confrontational US foreign 
policy. 
In early 1979, the authority of the Shah of Iran collapsed and subsequently 
the Khomeini regime was installed. The dramatic events in Iran 
-------------------- ------
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demonstrated the inability of the Carter administration to effectively 
support the Shah.160 The seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran, 
including the holding of hostages, on 4 November 1979 was an act of 
defiance against the United States.161 The hostage crisis and the reaction of 
the Carter administration had a significant impact on Australian foreign 
policy, particularly relations with the United States. 
While Fraser did not adopt an alarmist response to the crisis in Iran, the 
Prime Minister gained confirmation for the view espoused in the June 1976 
statement that the world was inherently unstable and that the interests of 
the United States and allies were threatened. The central strategic 
implication of the rise of the Khomeini regime in Iran was the significant 
power realignment in the Gulf region, notably the decline of US 
influence.162 
Foreign Minister Peacock condemned the seizure of the US embassy in 
Tehran and stated that the holding of hostages contradicted iran's 
obligations under international law.1o3 Also, Australia joined with others 
in the United Nations to call for the release of tht~ hostages and for Iran to 
adhere to diplomatic conventjons. While these words conformed to the US 
position, Australia nevertheless recognised the new government of Iran in 
February 1980.164 
Throughout the debate on Irru"'l., Australia was interested in n1aintaining the 
perceived strength of the United States in international affairs which 
implied supporting the leadership of President Carter. The difference 
between Australian and US foreign policy at the tL.-ne was that Fraser was 
focused on the actions and intentions of the Soviet Union while Carter 
appeared entirely concerned with Iran. This was not an unreasonable 
position for Carter to adopt, given there were a number of US citizens being 
held hostage and given the mood of the US electorate. President Carter had 
160 Leaver, op. cit., p. 269. 
161 Stockwin, op. cit., p. 345 and Roger Bell, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July-
December 1979, Australian ]oumal of Politics and History, vol. 26, 1, 1980, p. 19. 
162 See Leaver, op. cit., pp. 269-70 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, 
op. cit., p. 144. 
163 See Peacock, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 116, 13 November 1979, pp. 2880-1, 
Peacock, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 116,20 November 1979, pp. 3164-5, and R Bell, op. 
cit., p. 19. See also Stockwin, op. cit., p. 346 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian 
Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 115. 
164 R Bell, op. cit, pp. 19-20 and Leaver, op. cit., p. 270. Australia ado;uted a strict view, 
according to international law, recognising the change in Iran as an intemal matter. The 
inconsistency within the ~overnment reflected the split in cabinet between those supporting 
trade boycotts and others defending Am:tralian exports to Iran. 
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declined in domestic popularity through 1979 and attempted to bolster em 
ailing election campaign in early '1980 with tough foreign policy decisions 
on Iran.165 
In response to the hostage crisis and the retention of US corporate assets in 
Iran, President Carter moved to impose economic and trade sanctions. At 
the end of 1979, Carter was not able to gain the support from European allies 
or Japan for a trade embargo or sanctions against Iran.166 The Fraser 
government appeared reluctant to join an embargo as profitable Australian 
trade with Iran had the potential for further improvement.167 To join a 
tradre blockade would have damaged Australian trade but the United States 
required international support beyond not filling the trade gap left by a 
unilateral US trade embargo. Econmnic sanctions against Iran would also 
indicate support for action against developing countries at a time when the 
Fraser government was attempting to develop closer relations with 
countries in the Commonwealth, Africa and the Pacific region. 
Despite the unlikelihood of a concerted trade embargo against Iran, the 
Fraser government undertook to review Australian trade with Iran in 
January 1980. By April, President Carter decided to impose sanctions which 
excluded food items and medicines. In the Fraser government cabinet, the 
Liberal Party Ministers, led by Foreign Minister Peacock, tended to favour 
compliance with the United States while the Country Party Ministers, led by 
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Resources, Doug 
Anthony, sought to defend rural export interests. Prime Minister Fraser 
apparently adopted a middle position which reflected a personal and 
political stance on most issues between the Liberal and Country Parties.l6B 
Australia decided to support the United States by halti..ng trade except the 
permitted sale of wheat, other grains and lamb to Iran.169 This cost Australia 
165 Stockwin, op. cit., pp. 345-6. 
166 R Bell, op. cit., p. 20. The European countries and Japan were concerr.ed not to upset the 
Middle East countries, particularly the oil-producers due to their dependence on oil products 
and the need for a low oil price. 
167 Bell, ibid., explained that Australia would have earned more than $200million from 
sales of wheat and meat to Iran in the 1979-80 financial year. Iran provided only about one 
percent of Australia's oil needs but any reduction in Iran's supply to the international oil 
market would have raised oil prices and thus inflated Australia's energy costs. See also 
Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 114-15 and Leaver, op. 
cit., p. 270. 
168 See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 115 and Leaver, op. 
cit., p. 270. 
169 Stockwin, op. cit., pp. 346-7. The embargo of non-food trade with Iran had been 
coordinated with the European Community and Japan, and emerged from a proposed 
resolution of the UN Security Council of 13 January 1980 which had been vetoed by the Soviet 
Union. See also Leaver, ibid., p. 271. 
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$70million but the bulk of Australian exports did not suffer. The United 
States appreciated the response of Australia which was more positive than 
the EEC or Japan.170 
In addition to trade, the Carter administration decided to break diplomatic 
relations with Iran in April.1980 and requested that allies reduce diplomatic 
representation in Iran. At this time, Australia W.lS without an ambassador 
in Tehran and, after some initial opposition from Peacock, the Fraser 
government decided not to replace the Australian ambassador. Also, the 
Australian trade commissioner was withdrawn, which may have been the 
more important of the two decisions, while officially, diplomatic relations 
were maintained.171 
The Fraser government's concerns about President Carter's leadership were 
heightened with the failure of the US military mission to rescue the 
hostages. This episode symbolised Carter's inadequacies as President and 
clearly signalled the end of Carter's hopes to be re-elected in late 1980.172 
Also, the Fraser government was worried that the United States might 
propose an embargo on food exports to Iran which would have tested 
Australia's support for the Carter administration. Further, while Fraser was 
anticipating a more robust foreign policy from Presidential candidate 
Reagan, a new approach to Iran could also have demanded more from 
Australia in terms of the trade embargo.173 
By early 1981, the "!dministration of President Reagan was setting a new 
foreign policy agenda ior the United States. In general terms, the 
Republican Reagan foreign policy was more confrontational, Soviet-focused 
and leadership driven than the pejoratively characterised human rights 
policies of Democrat President Carter.174 The Fraser government 
170 See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 115. 
171 Stockwin, op. cit., pp. 346-7. An important implication of the revolution in Iran was the 
closure of US intelligence bases, which immediately increased the value of the military 
facilitie.c; in Australia. In particular, the Pine Gap and Nurrungar bases became important for 
gathering intelligence from the Indian Ocean, South Asia, and Middle East regions. Leaver, 
op. cit., p. 270. 
172 See Stockwin, op. cit., p. 347; Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. 
cit., pp. 115-16; Leaver, op. cit., p. 272; and Lim, op. cit., p. 8. 
173 Leaver, op. cit.; pp. 276-7. 
174 On Reagan foreign policy, see Henry S. Albinski, The United States and Australia in the 
1980s, World Review, voL 19, 4, October 1980; Alexander M. Haig, A New Direction in US 
foreign policy, Atlantic Community Quarterly, vol. 19, 2, Summer 1981; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 
East/West relations: toward a new definition of a dift}ogue, World Affairs; vol. 144, 1, 
Summer 1981; Ralph L. Harry, Security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States of America, Australian Outlook, vol 35, 2, August 1981; and Noa.m Chomsky, 
The cold war and the superpowers, Monthly Review, vol. 33, 6, November 1981. 
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demonstrated immediate support for the direction of the Reagan foreign 
policy. On 11 March 1981, the Prime Minister announced that agreement 
had been reached to allow flights of United States B52 bomber aircraft into 
Darwin and other northern Australian locations.175 The Australian 
electorate had been prepared by the 3 February 1980 revelation that the 
United States had been allowed to conduct training and navigational flights 
by the bombers over northern Australia. In the context of the new US 
foreign policy, the 1981 decision provoked an extended debate in the 
Parliament on the issue of the US bombers, the US bases in Australia, and 
the relationship with the United States. The Labor Party adopted a position 
critical of the Fraser government and the political parties were seen to be 
split on key elements of the US alliance.176 
Follow:ir.g this clebate, Prime Minister Fraser and Foreign Minister Street 
welcomed the views of President Reagan and openly supported the 'new 
assertive~ess' of US foreign policy. The Australian government endorsed 
the view of the Reagan administration that human rights, though 
important_, should be tempered by the political and strategic interests of the 
United States and allies.177 Fraser supported Reagan's approach that the 
Soviet Union was the central problem in international affairs and thus 
attention should focus on this struggle. As such, Fraser was now able to 
follow the strong, anti-communist lead of Reagan and the United States.17B 
Prime Minister Fraser's first meeting with President Reagan in June 1981 
consisted of an exchange of fulsome praise. Australia was featured as a 
staunch ally of the new US administration.179 The ANWS treaty was used 
in positive terms by Reagan,. Fraser and Street to illustrate the alliance. In 
l75 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 121, F.A. Mediansky, 
Problems in Australian Foreign Policy January-June 1981, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, vol. 27, 3, 1981, p. 296 and Leaver, op. cit., pp. 274-5. The government did not explain 
why the US aircraft needed to use Australian territory. However, Renouf explained that, 
traditionally, the US relied on the eastern route for military access to the Middle East. At 
the time of increasing tension in the Middle East, the United States found a reluctance among 
countries to host military bases and facilities. Hence, the US had developed a need for a 
westerly approach to the Middle East. Australia was the only reliable and suitable country 
for such purposes. 
176 See Fraser, Ministerial statement: Staging of B52s through Australia for Sea Surveillance 
in the Indian Ocean and for Navigational Training, CPD, HR, voL 121r 11 March 1981, pp. 
664-6 & debate, including Hayden, Bowen, Beazley and Morrison, pp. 666-84. See also 
Mediansky, op. cit, p. 296. 
177 Mediansky, ibid., pp. 296-7. 
l78 Renouf, Makolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 63 & 122. See also 
Ralph Harry, A national foreign policy for Australia: the search for consensus, Australian 
Outlook1 vol. 34, 3, December 1980. 
179 Medianskyr .. .Australian Foreign Policy January-June 1981, op. cit., p. 297. 
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an interesting extension, the US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger 
described the ANZUS treaty as 'one of the pillars of Asian security'.lSO The 
Fraser government seemed to appreciate the importance placed on the 
relationship by the United States and, in reply, placed a greater degree of 
reliance upon the US. This reverted Australian foreign policy to a position 
similar to the policies of the Liberal and Country Parties governments prior · 
to 1972. Fraser .and others understood that the previous policies had 
preserved Australian security and provided a stable international context in 
which Australia could trade and prosper. With the change in US policy 
from Carter to Reagan, the Fraser government abandoned the position of 
qualified independence of the United States to support uncritically the 
security agenda of the ne\V US foreign policy .181 
Nevertheless, the Fraser government deferred to the domestic debate when, 
in May 1981, the United States requested Australian participation in the 
Sinai peacekeeping force. Australia was asked to commit troops to the 
peacekeeping force which was to oversee Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai 
which had been annexed during the 1967 Middle East conflict. The idea of a 
peacekeeping force emerged from the Camp David agreements between the 
United States, Israel and Egypt.1s2 Thus, the contingent was not a United 
Nations force. The United States acknowledged that, in the Security 
Council, the Soviet Union would veto a proposed UN force for the Sinai 
and agreement from the General Assembly was unlikely given that the US 
had instigated the idea and there was opposition from key Arab countries.183 
The United States proposed to construct a non-UN multinational 
peacekeeping force in which Australian participation would influence other 
potential contributors. 
Through 1981, the United States placed pressure on Australia to commit to 
the peacekeeping force. Simultaneously, the issue was fiercely debated 
180 T.B. Millar, Problems of Australian Foreign Policy July-December 1982, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 29, 1, 1983, p. 11. 
181 For more, see Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 183-6. 
See also Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 328. 
182 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 123-4, Nancy Viviani, 
Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1981, Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, vol. 28, 1, 1982, p. 8, and Mediansky, ... Australian Foreign Policy January-June 
1981, op. cit., p. 297. Also, Australian ht>.licopters and crews had participated with the 
United Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai from July 1976 until October 1979. See Ralph 
Harry, Australian Multilateral Diplomacy, chapter 5 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., pp. 88-9. 
183 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Folicy, op. cit., pp. 124 & 127, and 
Viviani, op. cit., p. 8. 
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within the Fraser government and in the Australian electorate.184 
Australian participation was opposed on various grounds, including that 
the peacekeeping force was not under the auspices of the United Nations, 
lv other countries were reluctant} join, exports to the Middle East would be 
jeopardised, and Australia's security resources would be diverted from the 
prirnary focus of defence in the region.lBS Further, the Parliamentary Labor 
Party opposed Australian involvement in a non-UN force, although 
supporters of Israel in the opposition found this difficult to accept.186 From 
the backbench, former Minister for Foreign Affairs Peacock continued to 
doubt the value of Australian participation in a non-UN force while public 
opinion was consistently against involvement by Australia.187 
The debate was influenced by the assassination of the Egyptian President, 
Anwar Sadat on 7 October 1981. Hayden argued that this act demonstrated 
that Australia should not participate in the peacekeeping force in the Sinai. 
Fraser analysed the situation differently and on 22 October announced that 
Australia would contribute to the peacekeeping force.1 88 The Prime 
Minister explained that Australia must support the United States in the 
Middle East and argued that.' 1Stralia had a clear national interest in the 
progress of peace in the Middle East.IS9 As a concession to the domestic 
opposition, Fraser stated that an Australian contribution was conditional on 
the participation of Canada and Britain, a significant European 
commitment, and th.e Australian involvement would be limited to the 
initial size and duration.190 Also, after pressure from the US and 
considerable negotiations, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain and New 
Zealand agreed to contribute to the peacekeeping force.191 
184 ibid., pp. 8-9 and Mediansky, ... Australian Foreign Policy Januruy-June 1981, op. cit., p. 
297. See also Weller, op. cit., pp. 335-44. 
185 Mediansky, op. cit., p. 297 and Viviani, op. cit., p. 9. Significantly, the Country Party 
expressed fears about Aus:..:alian trade with the Middle East. 
186 Viviani, ibid., p. 11. See Fraser, Ministerial statement: Sinai Peacekeeping Force, CPD, 
HR, vol. 125,22 October 1981, pp. 2418-23 & debate, pp. 2423-54 & 29 October 1981, pp. 2741-
67. Barry Cohen, CPD, HR, vol. 125,22 October 1981, pp. 2451-3, struggled to follow the 
position of the Labor Party. Also, Bob Hawke, CPD, HR, vol. 125, 29 October 1981, pp. 2758-
61, attacked Fraser for comments which questioned Hawke's commitment to Israel. 
187 s v· · · 't 11 ee lVlan.I, op. a ., p. . 
188 ibid., p. 9 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 124. See 
also Fraser, Ministerial statement Sinai Peacekeeping Force, CPD, HR, vol. 125,22 October 
1981, pp. 2418-23. 
189 See Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 125, 22 October 1981, pp. 2419-20. The decision to contribute to 
the Sinai force was also influenced by the positi~n of Egypt as Australia's largest trading 
partner in the Middle East. Viviani, op. cit., p. 10. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and 
Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit, pp. 125-7 and Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., p. 162. 
19° Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 125, 22 October 1981, p. 2421. See also Viviani, op. cit., p. 11. 
191 Canada did not join the contingent. Viviani, ibid., pp.ll-12. See also Renouf, Malcolm 
Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 127-8. 
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In the context of relations with the United States, the debate on Australia's 
participation in the peacekeeping force included a complex interaction of 
domestic and interr"'ltional influences. The Fraser government was wary of 
public opinion but chose to become involved in the Sinai in support of US 
foreign policy objectives. As such, Australian participation in the Sinai 
force was one of the few ostensible foreign policy differences between the 
rival party leaderships during the election campaign of February-March 
1983.192 
In total, the Fraser government was pleased to embrace the United States 
following the election of President Reagan in 1980. In response .o events in 
Iran, Fraser .focused on the intentions of the Soviet Union and was 
concerned about the loss of influence of the United States in the Middle 
East. The Fraser government decided to impose a limited trade embargo on 
Iran which did not accord with the strident position of President Carter. In 
LOntrast, Fraser embraced the leadership of President Reagan from 1980, 
which accorded with Fraser's anti-Soviet perspective on foreign policy. As 
such, Australia provided troops to the Sinai peace-keeping force under the 
auspices of the United States security agenda for the Middle East. 
Conclusion 
Australia's relationship with the United States, and the antagonism toward 
the Soviet Union, were the key international issues confronting the Fraser 
government. The Prime Minister recognised the importance of these 
relationships in the June 1976 statement in which Fraser established the 
government's security focus and oppositioa to the Soviet Union. Further, 
the alliance with the United States involved a difficult relationship with the 
Carter foreign policy which highlighted human rights as opposed to 
strategic power. As an element of the relationship with the United States, 
Fraser was concerned about security issues in the Indian Ocean, especially in 
terms of Soviet activity in the region. Thus, Fraser rejected the idea of a 
zone of peace for the Indian Ocean and supported the development of 
military facilities at Diego Garcia to encourage a greater US presence in the 
li1.di~ · '. Ocean region. In response to events in Afghanistan, Fraser aligned 
Australia with the United States in explicitly opposing the actions of the 
Soviet Union and attempted to gain support for a boycott of the Moscow 
Olympic: Games. Fraser was faced with considerable difficulties in pursuing 
192 Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., p. 163 and Viviani, op. cit., p. 12. 
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these international objectives in the domestic arena, particularly in relation 
to the comparison between the sporting boycott and the continuation of 
trade. Soon thereafter, Fraser found support from the newly elected 
President Reagan for a greater emphasis on security in international affairs. 
As a collection, these international issues formed the framework for the 
lPraser government's relations with developing countries and specifically, 
policies on Africa. The focus on the alliance with the United States fitted 
with Fraser's understanding of international relations and underpinned 
Fraser's approach toward developing countries. 
chapter 8 
Fraser foreign policy and developing countries 
The Fraser government's relations with developing countries were framed 
to continue some of the changes initiated by Whitb.m and. to coincide with 
Fraser's approach to international relations in general. Prime Minister 
Fraser played an important role in directing Australia's support for the 
demands of th~ developing countries. From the foreign policy agenda 
which prioritised ~ecurity and opposition to the Soviet Union, Fraser 
responded to the interests of the developing countries by opposing 
colonialism and racial discrimination. 
The June 1976 statement to the Parliament provided the point of departure 
for Fraser to outline the Liberal and Country Parties government's relations 
with developing countries. Subsequently, the government commissioned a 
report on 'Australia's relations with the Third World' but this study, while 
supporting some elements of Fraser's security agenda, initiated ideas which 
challenged the Fraser foreign policy agenda. The international discussion 
initiated by the developing countries on economic structures, known as the 
North South debate, offered an opportunity for Fraser to demonstrate 
Australia's support for the dema11ds of the developing countries. An 
important part of this agenda was Frase.r's promotion of trade liberalisation 
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in the context of discussions of a new international economic order and 
Fraser's argument for a Common Fund which could stabilise commodity 
prices. Through this work, Fraser attempted to combine Australia's trade 
interests with support for the developing countries. 
Integral to these issues, the Fraser government tried to build constructive 
relations with the developing countries in the Asia Pacific region. With 
some difficulty, Fraser attempted to balance Australian relations with China 
and with the members of ASEAN. Within this diplomatic situation, Fraser 
was negotiating with both sides of an established political conflict. 
Connected to this, Fraser reacted against the intervention of Vietnam into 
Kampuchea but did not act against the actions of Indonesia in East Timor. 
Also, Australia continued to support the economy of Papua New Guinea 
while constructing relations with the island states of the South Pacific. In 
addition, Fraser used aid policy to support Australian relations with 
developing countries. In particular, Fraser used aid for political purposes in 
opposing the Soviet Union in the Asia Pacific region. Significantly, the 
Fraser government reversed the work of the Whitlam Labor goverrunent in 
establishlng a separate aid agency. 
This discussion of the Fraser government's relations with developing 
countries provides a comparison with the Whitlam government's 
approach. Fraser's position also offered an important shift from the 
previous Liberal and Country Parties governments' relations with 
developing countries, especially with the Asia Pacific region. 
Fraser and developing countries 
In actively promoting relations with developing countries, the Fraser 
government broke with the foreign policy tradition of the Liberal and 
Country Parties. Prime Minister Fraser attempted to combine an anti-Soviet 
security agenda with a constructive approach toward developing countries. 
Specifically, this involved active encouragement for the alliance with the 
United States while vigorously opposing racial discrimination in Africa. 
This merging of different philosophies was illustrated in Fraser's June 1976 
statement to the Parliament. Further questions were addressed in the 
Harries report on Australia's relations with the 'Third '1\Torld'. 
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On 1 June 1976, Fraser linked international security with the interests of the 
developing countries, explaining that 'the appalling widespread problen1s of 
poverty, hunger. and disease are not only an affront to human dignity, but 
constantly threaten discord and conflict between nations'.! With this 
position established, the Prime Minister proceeded to chide the industrial 
nations: 
By no measure can the developed nations of the world claim that 
they have acted with adequate foresight to redress the balance. 
The developed countries have pursued a policy of tied loans and 
tied aid but they have completely failed to open their n1arkets to 
the developing countries to permit terms of trade that will 
provide proper returns for their products to the developing 
countries. :Che developed countries are regrettably more 
interested in trade between themselves than they are in 
facilitating the progress of nations poorer than themselves. They 
can take no pride in their actions in this area.2 
This im.portant government statement illustrated Fraser's concern ; ,: the 
situation of developing countries in the international economy while 
recognising the security implications of deteriorating economic conditions. 
Despite this, the first year of foreign policy formation hy th~ Fraser 
government did not give prominence to issues central to developing 
countries. Rather, priority was placed on relations with the United Stq.tes, 
China, Japan, and Indonesia. These were Australia's key relationships in 
terms of internntional diplomacy, trade, and security. Also, it seemed that 
the Fraser government would need to allow for time to pass before 
continuing the policies of the Whitlam Labor government on developing 
countries. Nevertheless, in 1976, the FraEer government decided to 
continue food aid to 11ozambiqu.e.3 
Also, domestic pressures limited Fraser's ability to assist the developing 
countries. On tariffs1 the percE:ption was that lowering the restrictions on 
imports would damage Australian manufacturing and other industries. In 
this case, to act on the rhetoric of increased access for cleveloping countries 
1 Fraser, 1vfinisterial statement: Australia and the World Situation, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 99, 1 June 197r.J p. 2736. 
2 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2736. See also Philip Eldridge, Diplomacy, 
Development and 'Small Government': Conflicting Directions in Australia's Overseas Aid 
Program, Australia-Asia Papers, no. 23, Centce for the Study of Australian-Asia...'"l Relations, 
Griffith University, January 1983, pp. 10-12, on Australia as a 'middle power' in ~:.tempting 
to provide a link between developing countries and industrialised countries. 
3 Alan Renou£, lvfalcolm Fra;;er arzd Australian Foreign Policy, Australia-. Professional 
Publications, Sydney, 1986, p. 133. 
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to industrialised markets may have been costly in econmnic and therefore 
electoral terms for the Fraser government. The Prime Minister was able to 
articulate a personal agenda for foreign policy but the Liberal and Country 
Parties restricted Fraser's ability to implement this position in relation to 
greater trade with developing countdes.4 
This tension between Fraser and the Liberal and Country Par"'::ies was 
mollified somewhat by the Prime Minister's authority within the 
gcr,rernment. In the end, the questions remained whether Fraser acted to 
sufficiently s .. ,pport the rhetoric on developing countries, whether the 
developing c ~1ntries accepted Australia as an ally, and whether Fraser 
actually broke with the foreign policy tradition of the Liberal and Country 
Parties. 
To some extent, these questions were tackled in the Harries report on 
Australia's relations with the 'Third World'.5 In April1978, Prime Minister 
Fraser announced the establishment of a committee, chaired by Professor 
Owen Harries, to investigate Austra-lia's relatior~s with developing 
countries. As an adviser to both Peacock and Fraser, IIarries provided the 
driving force for the revie\V from within the government offices.6 
The Harries report recommended that the Australian government should 
close the gulf between rhetoric and action toward developing countries, 
reduce restrictions on jmports from developing countries in South East 
Asia, not exaggerate the importance of the Comrrwnwealth and avoid any 
prominence in southern Africa, and should aim to allocate 0.7 percent of 
GDP to aid.7 The report also promoted econ0mic growth as the key 
development strategy and displayed a distinct anti-Soviet agenda. 
4 J.D.B. Miller, Australia and Western Em·ope_. chapter 10 in P.J. Boyce and J.R Angel, eds, 
Independence and Alliance: Australia in. World Affairs 1976-80, .Allen & Unwin and the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, 1983, p. 162. 
s Report of the Committee on Australia's Relations with the Third WorlP, (l-.nmvn as the 
Harries report), AGPS, Canberra, September 1979. For analysis of the report, see for example 
Peter King and Martin Indyk, Australia's relations with the third world: a revif.~w of the 
Harries report, Current Affairs Bulletin, val. 56, 12, May 1980 and Hedley Bull, The Harries 
Report and the Tirlrd World, Quadrant, vol. 24, 7, July 1980. 
6 Coral Bell, Australic- ·.n a World of Powers, chapter 2 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 33. 
Renouf, op. cit., p. 150, claimed that Foreign Minister Peacock was hLStrumental in persuading 
the government to launch this inquiry. See also Peacock, Foreign Policy: A Year of Change 
and C..ltallenge, CPD, HR, vol. 109,9 May 1978, p. 2033, Coral Bell, Problems in Australian 
Foreign Policy, January to June 1978.~ Australian Journal of Politics and History, p. 298, and 
Andrew Peacock, Australia and the Third World, Roy Milne Memorial let.· .ure, Per.h, 15 
September 1978, Australian Outlook, vol. 33, 1, April1979, p. 3. 
7 See Ha..Lies report, op. cit., Recommendations, pp. 177-90. 
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Foreign Minister Peacock endorsed the Harries report upon presentation to 
the Parliament. Peacock stated that Harries and the committee had 
produced 'an outstanding report which is a major contribution to the 
discussion of Australia's foreign policy' .s The report represented an 
opportunity for Pea.cor.:k to move the more reluctant members of cabinet 
away from traditional attitudes and toward policies which supported 
developing countries.9 The pragmatism .of the Harriea report appeared to 
reflect Peacock's views but the recommendations did not entirely fit with 
the Fraser government's foreign policy. 
Despite apparently radical recommendations on the reduction of tar~:~'J and 
an increase in aid funds}' the Harries report was widely regarded as a 
profoundly conservative document. The Labor Party criticised the Fraser 
government for accepting ':1e recommendations of the Harries report 
because this represented an endorsement of the status quo.1° From the 
Labor perspective, the Harries report restated the view that there should be 
no fundamental change in the relationship between developed and 
developing countries. Brian Howe pointed to the la of an historical 
approach to the analysis of developing countries and the shallow political 
and economic context of the report.ll The Harries report assumed the 
benefits of free market economic growth for developing countries and urged 
Australia to promote economic growth with social development and 
political stability.12 Specificrlly, the Harries report argued that Australian 
8 Peacock, CPD, HR., vol.ll5, 18 September 1979, p. 1190. See also Dobie, CPD, HR,2 April 
1980, p. 1655 and see generally, Peacock, Australia and the Third World, op. cit. 
9 See Roger Bell, Problems in Australian :Foreign Policy, July-December 1979, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 26, 1, 1980, p. 21. 
lO Howe, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 April1980, p. 1652. See also Kerin, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 April 
1980, p. 1658 C.· !d Blewett, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 April1980, p. 1662. A separate debate 
emerged on tic~ definition of the 'Third World' as used in the Harries report and the place of 
Australia with regard to the general groupings of industrial countries and developing 
countries. The terms of reference for the Harries report assumed a coherent 'Third World' and 
the report reflected this position. This assumption was questioned, in particular, in a brief 
dissenting view by committee member J.T. Smith which was included in the Harries report. 
Smith disagreed that Australia should be classified as a 'Western' country given the 
multicultural nature of the Australian community. Strangely, the Labor Party, principally 
the key Labor spokesperson Lionel Bowen, argued in favour of the Smith view and pror;eeded 
to criticise the report and the Fraser government from this spurious ground. See Harries 
report, op. ci~., Appendix B, The Meaning of 'The Third World', pp. 195-6; Dissenting View 
from Mr. J.T. Smith, in Harries report, ibid., pp. 191-2; Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 115, 18 
September 1979, pp.1189-90; Bowan, CPD, HR, vol.ll7, 26 March 19801 p.l211; and Dobie, 
CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 April1980, pp. 1655-6. See also R BeJl, op. cit., p. 22. 
n Howe, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 April19801 p. 1652. See also Blewett, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 
Aprfi 196~, p. 1663. 
12 See Ralph Pettman, Tne Radical Critique of Australian Foreign Policy, chapter 18 in 
Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 306 and Eldridge, op. cit., p. 15. The focus on growth was seen to 
advocate income inequality in developing c:ountries. See Pettman, op. cit., pp. 306-8, on the 
impact of economic growth models on developing countries . 
............ .a ______ .. ____ _. _________________ ~·--------------
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aid should attempt to achieve economic and social development through 
overall economic growth in developing countries.13 
As expected, the report offered an anti-Soviet perspective. This was 
explained in terms of countering the intentions of the Soviet Union in 
developing countries which accorded with the view of the Fraser 
government.14 While adopting a more pragmatic line on relations with 
China, the Harries report warned that Australia should avoid actions which 
might push non-aligned countries toward the Soviet Union. This wq_s an 
implied criticism of the Fraser govemr.nent' s decision to end aid to Vietnam 
and the subsequent inflexible approach to the dispute in Kampuchea.lS 
Also within the anti-Soviet framework, the Harries report suggested that 
Australia should avoid prominence in southern Africa but should support 
efforts to find settlements which would prevent the growth of Soviet 
influence.16 This position recognised the collective influence of African 
countries in the United Nations and the Commonwealth. On the other side 
of this view, the anti-Soviet npproach to Africa provided Fraser with a 
justification for further Australian involvement in southern Africa when 
debating with sceptical members of the Liberal and Country Parties.17 
In contrast, the economic position of the Harries report did not accord with 
the preferences of the Fraser government. The report favoured free world 
trade and recommended that Australia should reduce tariffs and other 
n?*ltrictions on imports.1s In opposing protectionism, the Harries report: 
argued that trade between industrialised countries and developing countries 
was beneficial to both parties. The deputy leader of the Labor Party, Lionel 
Bowen criticised this 'simple-m;"'lded free trade approach of Treasury' 
which ignored the impact of reduced tariffs on industry and unemployment 
in Australia.19 The Labor Party accepted the need for co-operation in trading 
relations, particulady with ASEAN, but not at the expense of Australian 
indus tries. 
13 See Harries report, op. cit., p. 189. See also R Bell, op. cit., p. 22. 
14 See Bell, ibid., p. 21; Eldridge, op. cit., p. 8; Bowan, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 26 March 1980, p. 
1211; and Kerin, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 April1980, p. 1660. 
15 See Harries report, op. cit., p. 180. See also R. Bell, op. cit., p. 24 and Howe, CPD, HR, vol. 
117, 2 April1980, p. 1653. 
16 Harries report, op. cit., p. 184. See also R Bell, op. cit., pp. 23-4. 
17 Bell, ibid., pp. 23-4 and Eldridge, op. cit., p. 9. 
18 Harries report, op. cit., pp. 186-7. 
19 Bowen,. CPD, HR, vol.115, 18 September 1979, pp. 1191-3. See also Pettman, op. cit., pp. 
304-5. 
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The Harries report endorsed the view of the members of ASEAN that 
Australian tariffs should be lowered to allow greater access for imports from 
South East Asia. The problem for the Fraser government was the gap 
between the rhetoric of greater trade opportunities for developing countries 
and the l;:~.ck of action on Australian restrictions on imports.2o The Harries 
report argued for co-operation with the anti-communist governments of 
ASEAN and East Asia and that Australia should promote foreign economic 
policies concurrent with the demcmds of these countries.21 This position set 
the anti-Soviet strategic framework above the free trade argument for lower 
tariffs. 
In addition, the Harries report recommended that Australian aid should be 
progressively increased. Indeed, the report argued that the Australian 
government should prevent any further reduction of funds allocated to aid 
in order to achieve the target of 0.7 percent of GNP for official development 
assistance. However, the Harries report also recommended that 'the 
proportion of the annual aid budget directed at Papua New Guinea should 
continue to be reduced'.22 
Apart from Papua New Guinea, the Harries report argued that Australian 
aid should continue to be allocated in the form of grants, and related to 
specific projects where possible.23 Signi.ficantly, the report rejected the view 
that basic human needs should determine aid and trade policies because 
Australian interests would not appear to be served by this approach.24 The 
Harries report advocated that aid should be used to assist Australian trade in 
the Asia Pacific region and to prmnote political stability in developing 
countries. 
20 SeeR. Bell, op. cit., p. 23 and Bowen, CPD, HR, vo1.115, 18 September 1979, p. 1192. See 
also Bowen, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 26 March 1980, pp. 1212-13. 
21 Harries report, op. cit., pp. 181-2. &=e also R. Bell, op. cit., p. 23. 
22 Harries report, op. cit., p. 189. The report continued to explain that 'the budget support 
grant component should be complemented. by project aid and technical assistance, so as to 
place Papua New Guinea on a less dissimilar footing to that of other recipients'. However, 
Kerin explained that at the time of PNG independence in 1975, Australian aid comprised 
about 50 percent of the PNG budget, but by 1980 Australian aid counted for only 33 percent of 
the PNG budget. Kerin, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 April1980, p. 1660. 
23 Harries report, op. cit., pp. 189-90. See also Falconer, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 April1980, p. 
1660 and R. Bell, op. cit., p. 22. 
24 Harries report, op. cit, p. 189: 
In Australia's aid program there will be many opportunities for providing for 
the basic 11eed.s of the very poor while simultaneously promoting long-term 
economic growth on a national basis. However, our aid programming sh0uld not 
make the meeting of basic needs an overriding test. 
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Finally, while supporting the Fraser government approach to foreign policy, 
the conclusions in the Harries report presented an argument that Australia 
needed to develop more balanced, comprehensive and consistent policies 
toward developing countries.2s By March 1980, Peacock was more critical of 
the Harries report. While agreeing with most of the recommendations, the 
Foreign Minister expressed concern about the implications of two key 
points, notably tariff reductions and increases in aid allocations. Indeed, 
Peacock effectively dismissed the report by claiming that the central 
elements of the document would be under continual review.26 
In conclusion, Fraser attempted to combine an anti-Soviet security agenda 
with support for issues central to developing countries in the June 1976 
statement. Further questions were addressed in the Harries report which 
did not entirely accord with the policy preferences of the Fraser 
government. Indeed, the policy objectives and outcomes of Fraser were 
more clearly visible in Australia's participation in the North South debate, 
Fraser's approach on the Asia Pacific region, and changes in aid policy. 
the North South debate 
Prime Minister Fraser linked Australia with the developing countries 
through. active participation in debates on North South issues. Discussions 
initiated by the developing countries in international forums focused on 
the economic relationships between industrial countries and the non-
industrial, commodity exporting developing countries. Fraser supported 
the demands of the developing countries for a New International Economic 
Order, that is, a restructuring of global trade and investment relations. 
Fraser also advocated the need for a Com·mon Fund to stabilise commodity 
prices and thereby assist the export earnings of developing countries. 
Nevertheless, Australia was criticised in these debates for maintaining high 
tariffs and reducing aid to developing countries. 
In the June 1976 statement, Fraser outlined the government's 
understanding of, and commitment to, the international demands of 
developing ~ountries: 
25 ibid., pp. 177-82. See also R. Bell, op. cit., p. 24. 
26 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol.l17, 26 March 1980, pp. 1208-10 & debate, pp. 1211)-14. See also 
Dobie, CPD, HR, vol. 117, 2 April1980, p. 1655 and Renouf, op. cit, p. 150. 
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There is a g~e.at need in general for more practical recognition of 
the significance of international economic relations for the 
developing countries. More than any other single factor the 
developing countries need adequate access for their products to 
the markets of developed countries which we believe would 
come to be reflected in more appropriate terms of trade. 
International trading arrangements which provide relativ~ly free 
trade for the industrial products of the developed countries while 
placing excessively high barriers before the products of the 
developing countries, offer little hope to the poqrer nations in 
solving their problems. One of the greatest contributions which 
could be made by the industrial countries to the peace of the 
world wou:d be international trading arrangements which 
provide greater opportunities for the primary products of the 
developing countries.27 
This statement established a political link between Australia and the 
developing countries. The criticisms of protectionism were directed at the 
European Community and the United States and therefore Fraser argued 
that Australia would attempt to improve trade access into these markets for 
the prhnary products of both Australia and developing countries.2s In this, 
Fraser aligned Australia with the developing countries rather than 
prorrdsing greater access to the Australian economy. Fraser's words also 
provided support for the idea of a new international economic order.29 
However, the clear outline of intent offered a point of reference for later 
criticis1ns of the Fraser government's policies on unequal terms of trade 
with developing countries, particularly with ASEAN. 
Further, the work of Fraser and Peacock formed a loose plan designed to 
improve the economic conditions of poor countr~es and to stimulate 
economic recovery in industrial nation.c;.3° Indeed, Australian foreign policy 
emphasised the need to incorporate developing countries into 'a 
comprehensive strategy for world development'.31 11lis involved greater 
assistance from wealthy countries to include the developing countries in a 
basic programme for world development while promoting growth in world 
27 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2742. 
28 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2742. 
29 Indeed, Foreign Minister Peacock, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2749, explained that the 
Prime Minister's statement was an endorsement of a new international economic order. 
Peacock also showed a commitment to narrcrwiitg the economic gap between developed and 
developing countries. 
30 J.M. McCarthy, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1977, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, ve;L 23, 3, December 1977, p. 344. 
31 Ian Bickerdyke, Australia, the international .economy and the 'Third World, Economic 
Activity, October 1978, p. 1. 
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trade.32 The specifics of Australian policy centred on the notion of a New 
International Economic Order, through which the developing countries 
argued for a restructuring of the world economy, and the proposal for a 
Common Fund for the stabilisation of commodity prices. 
The idea of a New International Economic Order and Australia's position in 
relation to this notion was explained by Foreign Minister Peacock in a public 
campaign through 1978.33 The strategy started with a Ministerial statement 
on foreign policy to the Parliament on 9 May 1978 which highlighted the 
importance of the debate on international economic issues.34 Peacock also 
made five significant speeches on the issue, culminating with an address to 
the United Nations General Assembly on 6 October 1978.35 The wider North 
South debate was geared toward a UNGA Special Session on Economic 
32 Fraser's plan and the support for t.'le New International Economic Order tended to suppress 
the demands for a basic needs approach to development. See Eldridge, op. cit., pp. 14-16. 
33 There was substantial debate on the New International Economic Order, including R.H. 
Green, Toward a rational and equitable new international economic order: a case for 
neg•Jtiated structural change, World Development, vol. 3, 6, June 1975; M. Abdel-Fadil, et al., 
A new international economic order?, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 1, 2, June 1977; 
Johan Galtung, Grand designs on a collision course, International Development Review, vol. 
20, 3/4, 1978; lain Guest, North versus South: commodities, the common fund, and the sad 
demise of the 'new international economic order', Round Table, no. 273, January 1979; Samir 
Amin, New international economic order and strategy for the use of financial surpluses of 
developing countries, Alternatives, vol. 4, 4, March 1979; Paul Sweezy, On the new global 
disorder, Monthly Review, vol. 30, 11, April 1979; Bob Catley and Bruce McFarlane, An 
Australian perspective on the new international economic order, Australian Left Review, no. 
71, October 1979; E.J.G. Prince, Australia, the third world and a new international economic 
order, Dyason House Papers, vol. 6, December 1979; Neil Dias Karunaratne, Strategies for a 
new international economic order, Asian Quarterly, no. 4, 1979; E.L. Wheelwright, Australia 
and the New International Economic Order, Australian Disarmament Times, vol. 1, 
February /March 1981; Samir Amin, After the New International Economic Order: the future 
of international economic relations, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 12, 4, 1982; and 
Michael W. Doyle, Stalemate :in the North-South debate: strategies and the New 
Intemational Economic Order, World Politics, vol. 35, 3, AprJ 1983. 
34 Peac-ock, CPD, HR., vol.109, 9 May 1978, pp. 2029-43. 
35 SE~e range of speeches by the Minister for Foreign Affairs: Peacock, Australia and the 
International Economic Order, ad<iress to the Victorian branch of the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs, 20 July 1978, in Department of Foreign Affairs, Backgrounder, no. 148, 
28 July 1978; Peacock" Contemporary Foreign Policy issues, address to the Sturt electorate, 21 
July 1978, in Backgrounder, no. 148, 28 July 1978; Peacock, The Implications for Australia of a 
New International Economic Order, H.V. Evatt Memorial lecture, United Nations 
Association of Australia, 10 August 1978, in Backgrounder, no. 151, 18 August 1978; and 
Peacock, Statement to the United Nations General Assembly, 6 October 1978r in 
Backgrounder, no. 159, 11 October 1978. See also Glen St.J. Barclay, Problems in Australian 
Foreign Policy, July-December 1978, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 25, 1, 
April i979, pp. 7-10, RJ. Lim, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1980, 
Australian fournul of Politics and History, vol. 27, 1, 1981, p. 15, and J.R Angel, Australia and 
South-East Asia, chapter 14 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 232. See generally, Andrew 
Peacock, The direction of Australian foreign policy in 1977, Pacific Defence Reporter, vol. 3, 9, 
March 1977. 
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Development on 27 August 1980 at which Peacock revisited the notion of a 
NIEO with a further address to the General Assembly.36 
Initially, Peacock attempted to explain the background and content of the 
idea of a New International Economic Order. Many developing countries 
understood that the wealth of industrial countries was the result of 
systematic exploitation of commodity producing developing countries. 
Also, the developing countries perceived that international economic 
structures were governed by rules of trade and finance which had been 
designed by industrial countries to entrench established economic 
relations.37 Without denying these arguments, Peacock explained that this 
position was not accepted by the industrial countries. Nevertheless, the 
analysis of the developing countries formed the background to the 
collection of proposals referred to as the New International Economic Order. 
The belief in past and present exploitation provided a strong moral 
component to the demands of the developing countries for structural 
change. Peacock concurred that: 
it may be arguable that there is a moral injustice in an 
international system which has tolerated declinfug real levels of 
r-:tfficial development assistance during a period of serious balance 
of payments and debt servicing problems in many developing 
countries.38 
The developing countries argued for radical restructuring of economic and 
political systems on grounds of natural justice and equality. This argument 
involved a number of key issues including trade access to world markets, 
commodity exports, industrialisation, transfer of technology, financial debt, 
develo?ment assistance and other institutional arrangements. 
The position o£ Australia in the debate on a New International Economic 
Order was made plain by Peacock: 
The Government believes that a fundamental re-appraisal of 
present thinking is required on the grotmds of justice to the Third 
36 Peacock, Statement to the Special United Nations Session on Economic Development, 27 
August 1980, in Backgrounder, no. 249, 27 August 1980. 
37 Peacock, Australia and the Third World, op. cit., p. 5. See also, for example, A.G. Frank, 
The Development of Underdevelopment, New England Free Press, Boston, 1966, F.H. Cardoso, 
Dependency and Development in Latin America, Nw Left Review, 74, July-August 1972, and 
S. Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, two 
volumes, Monthly Review, New York, 1974. 
38 Peacock, The Implications for Australia ... , op. cit., p. v. 
------------------------
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World and in the interests of the developed countries . . . [T]here 
are areas where action would result in mutual advantage: Action 
which will help to restructure trade relationships could stimulate 
world economic growth.39 
Here, Peacock highlighted the benefits to Australia of greater international 
trade in total and attempted to bring the Parliament into the debate. In 
supporting the NIEO debate, Peacock was critical of the rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations which were undertaken to expand and 
lib~ralise world trade through tlte reduction of trade barriers such as tariffs.4o 
The multilateral trade negotiations had focused on the problems of 
industrial countries and had ignored the need for liberalisation of 
agricultural trade which would assist primary producing developing 
countries. Indeed, Fraser preferred to focus on primary products in this 
debate in accordance with the trade priorities of Australia.41 In line with the 
Prime Minister, Peacock admonished the industrial countries for lifting 
restrictions on trade between industrial countries while constructing 
barriers against the primary and secondary products of the developing 
countries.42 However, in adopting this position on the inadequacies of the 
rnultilateral trade negotiations, Peacock was openly criticising Australia's 
protectionist stance against trade with developing countries in the Asia 
Pacific region. 
Frorn this situation, it was not surpns1ng that the debate on a New 
International Economic Order moved slowly or not at all. Peac9ck wanted 
to link the multilateral trade negotiations with the calls for restructuring 
from the developing countries: 
39 Peacock, CPD, HR., vol. 109,9 May 78, p. 2031. See also Peacock, Australia and the Third 
World, op. cit., p. 9. 
40 Peacock, CPD, fffi, vol. 109,9 May 1978, p. 2032. See also Peacock, Australia and the 
Third World, op. cit., p. 9. 
41 While the developing countries supported the critique of the multilateral trade 
negotiation, Fraser's agenda did not entirely accord with the view of the developing 
countries. Fraser tended to ignore industrial products from the developing countries in the 
plan to liberalise trade. The tariffs imposed by the industrial countries on manufactured 
products from developing countries were an 11"1pediment to dialogue. The industrial countries 
provided concessions under generalised schemes of preferences for manufactured and processed 
agricultural products from developing countries, but these schemes were limited to particular 
products and had quotas and ceilings. The developing countries argued that trade in 
industrial products was linked to trade in pl'imary products and that the process of 
industrialisation would require concessions from the rich countries in both areas. See 
Bickerdyke, op. cit., p. 4. 
42 Peacock, Statement to the United Nations General AsEembly, 6 October 1978, op. cit., p. 
vii. 
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Progress in the negotiation of international economic issues has 
been disappointing ... The present impasse has arisen because the 
two key problems- slow growth rates in the developed economies 
and the need to accommodate the interests of developing 
countries- have been treated as distinct and separate processes ... 
There will be greater prospect if [these issues] are considered in 
conjunction instead of as entirely separate questions.43 
Peacock also appealed to the members of the United Nations General 
Assembly: 
The international community cannot c-Jlow negotiations on 
international economic issues to proceed at their present pace. 
There must be a renewed effort by governments to achieve results 
... We must make a start on the preparation of the framework for 
a new international development strategy: a framework which 
can accommodate the objectives of growth and equity.44 
In the end, Peacock was disappointed by the lack of support shown by the 
industrial countries for international economic change. LT"L aligning with 
the developing countries, Peacock demonstrated that the Fraser 
government accepted the moral argument that the industrial countries had 
exploited the developing countries and continued to control international 
economic systems to the detriment to primary producing economies, 
including Australia. 
Meanwhile, Australia's support for the demands of the developing 
countries was most clearly demonstrated through Prime Minister Fraser's 
consistent promotion of the Common Fund. This scheme was proposed to 
stabilise price fluctuations of major commodities and to support the prices 
at remunerative and just levels.4s Any country that relied upon a small 
number. of commodity exports would benefit and, therefore, many 
developing countries wouJd be assisted with stable commodity prices. 
43 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 109, 9 May 1S78, p. 2031. 
44 Peacock, Statement to the United Nati•:>ns General Assembly, 6 October 1978, op. cit., p. x. 
On the slow progress of discussions on NIEO topics, see Roger D. Hansen, North-South policy-
what's the problem?, Foreign Affairs, vol. 58, 5, Summer 1980, Mahbub Ul Haq, Negotiating 
the future, Foreign Affairs, vol. 59, 2, Winter 1980/81 and D. Ingram, An Australian 
initiative to end North/South deadlock?, Commonwealth, August/September 1981. 
45 Price fluctuations on international commodity markets cause difficulties for planning and 
disadvantage may be suffered by producers due to insufficient demand. The proposed 
commodity scheme employed a central authority supported by the Common Fund to buy and 
sell the commodity on the world market to counteract market movements and thus ensure that 
the supply and demand were equated at an agreed guaranteed price. See also Peacock, CPD, 
HR, vol 109, 9 May 1978, p. 2031, Peacock, Statement to the United Nations General 
Assembly, 6 October 1978, op. cit., p. x, and Pe;;.cock, Australia and the Third World, op. cit., 
p. 8. 
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However, the developing countries accounted for only one half of world 
commodity trade, which implied that the Common Fund would also assist 
other commodity dependent economies such as Australia.46 
Significantly, the Fraser government's alignment with the developing 
countries on the issue of commodity exports was in direct opposition to the 
interests of industrial economies. It was sensible for the Fraser government 
to adopt this position as the prices for commodity exports had been 
depressed for several years.47 At a personal level, the Prime Minister and 
several other memb~.~.;·s of the government were involved in primary 
production and therefore the sponsorship by the Liberal and Country Parties 
government of this radical international cause was less than surprising.4s 
A.. constitution for the Common Fund was agreed in June 1980 but there 
•.vere insufficient ratifications by participating countries to bring the scheme 
into operation. The problem was that the developing countries argued that 
the industrial countries should contribute more generously in order to 
flatten fluctuations in the returns from the selected commodities while the 
industrial countries wanted the Common Fund to be self-supporting.49 This 
disagreement threatened the idea of a Common Fund but Fraser wa,s 
determined to continue promoting the need for this structure. 
Prime Minister Fraser, in the first meeting with President Reagan in early 
1981, attempted to gain endorsement from the United States on North 
South issues, particularly on the Common Fund. However, Fraser was 
unable to secure any financial support for the Common Fund from Reagan. 
Subsequently, Fraser integrated the notion of a Common Fund with 
46 Bickerdyke, op. cit., pp. 1-2. However, the commodity export revenue of developed 
couiltries was unlikely to be as crucial to foreign exchange when compared to the greater 
reliance of developing countries on one or two commodities. On the Common Fund, see 
generally, Dietrich Kebschull, Common Fund a matter of time only, Intereconomics, no. 11/12, 
November/December 1977; J.D.A. Cuddy, The common fund and earnings stabilisation, Jounuzl 
of World Trade Law, vol. 12, 3, May-June 1978; Dragoslav Avramovic, Common fund: why and 
what kind?, Journal of World Trade I.o.w, vol. 12, 5, September-October 1978; R.J. Wickes, 
Australia, commodities and the third world, Australian Outlook, vol. 35, 2, August 1981; R.J. 
Wickes, Australia and the Common Fund, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 27, 
1, 1981; and S. Harris, Australia's interests in third world development: the perspective of a 
resource exporter, in Robert Cassen, et al., eds, Rich Country Interests and Third World 
Devei~ent,. Croom Helm, London, 1982. 
47 See Age, 5 June 1978. On Australia's co.~ttinual support for the Common Fund, see Ralph 
Harry, Australian Multilateral Diplomacy, chapter 5 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 82 and 
T.B. Millar, Australian Foreign Policy: More of the same in a colder world, Current Affairs 
Bulletin, vol. 57, 12, May 1981, p. 11. 
48 Bell, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, op. cit., p. 294. 
49 Renouf, op. cit., pp.148-9. 
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Australian support for the Reagan administration in the strategic rivalry 
between the United States and the Soviet Union: 
East-West rivalry and NortY .-South issues do not exist 
independently of each other; they are already enmeshed and if 
conditi0'·"·5 in the Third World are allowed to deteriorate further, 
the risk ( .f super power conflict then will be greatly int.::reased.so 
In May 1981 the Fraser government signed the 'Agreement Establishing the 
Common Fund for Com:L10r!ities' and promised more than $10million for 
this arrangement.51 The contribution by Australia belied the difficulties in 
raising sufficient financial support for the Common Fund from 
industrialised countries. The Common Fund suffered s.t a time of 
international austerity led by the Reagan administration. Also, the support 
of the rich countries was always in doubt while the prices of commodities 
could be controlled by the United States and allies to the detriment of the 
developing countries. The Common Fund threatened this part of the global 
economic power base of the industrial countries and, in the end, the dispute 
over contributions to the Common Fund caused the idea for commodity 
price stabilisation to be abandoned by the international community. 
Undeterred, Fraser continued to pursue issues central to the developing 
countries. In October 1981, Fraser stressed the importance of North South 
issues to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Melbourne. 
Australia was influential in constructing the Melbourne declaration from 
the Commonwealth on North South issues and the communique which 
argued for a new approach to relations between rich and poor countries.s2 
The Fraser government was operating against the tide of opinion from the 
industrial countries which continued t-:; oppose the idea of a new 
international economic order. Throughout the debates, and particularly 
50 Fraser, address to the Commonwealth Club, Adelaide, 9 February 1981, in Backgrounder, 
no. 270, 11 February 1981, state.."Uents, p. x. For Fraser, global stability was dependent on the 
strategic equation as well as on re~tions between rich md poor countries. See also F.A. 
Mediansky, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy Janucuy-June Jq81, Austra!Ian Journal of 
Politics and Risto; y, vol. 27, 3.,. 1981, p. 297 and Bell, ... Australic:.- tloreign Policy, January to 
June 1978, op. cit., p. 294. 
51 Mediansky, op. cit., pp. 294-5. The fund had two accounts, the first to assist with the 
financing of buffer stock operations, and the second to help finance measures aimed at 
improving commodity trade such as research and producti'\oity improvements. Australia 
agreed to !:0ntribute $4.7million, or ten percent, to the first account, and $5.5million to the 
second account. See also Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 12S, 13 October 1981, p. 1891; Renoui, op. cit., 
pp. 148-9i Bickerdyke, op. cit., p. 2; and Alan Renouf, Australian Diplomacy 1976-1980, 
chapter 20 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 328. 
52 Mediansky, op. cit., p. 294 and Nancy Viviani, Problems in .A1.ustralian Foreign Policy, July 
to December 1981, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 28, 1, 1982, p. 17. 
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into the 1980s, the industrial countries proceeded as slowly as possible in 
considering concessions for the developing countries.s3 To the credit of 
Fraser, Australia was a progressive and consistent force in the North South 
debate against the views of major allies such as the United States. 
By 1980-81, the hopes for a New International Economic Order, a Common 
Fund and a new dialogue between developed and developing countries had 
faded. In addressing the United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
on Economic Development in August 1980, Peacock concluded that the: 
central tenet of the debates should have recognised the interdependence of 
the world economy. Further, Peacock drew several lessons from the :t--.Jorth 
South dialogue, concluding that 'progress is most likely when it is 
recognised that mutual interests are involved, and that agreement depends 
on a readiness on all sides to consider concessions'.54 Unfortunately for 
Peacock and Fraser, the industrial countries, especially the United States and 
the European Community, were unwilling to entertain the arguments of 
the developing countries and were not prepared to offer concessions in the 
debate on trade. To a substantial degree, this outcome proved the 
a:r:guments of the developing countries on the eftablished power relations 
within the interna-tional economic system.ss 
In conclusion, the position of Fraser and Peacock in the North South debate 
was said to form 'the moral centrepiece of Australian foreign policy' .56 The 
Frasei" government's support for the devdoplng countries was not 
axiomatic for the Liberal and Country Parties and indeed it was Fraser's 
personal standing which facilitated the role of Australia in the international 
debate.57 This situation could not have been predicted of the Liberal. Party 
prior to election in 1975. 
53 See Miller, op. cit., p. 161 and Coral Bell, Dependent Ally, Oxford University Press, 
Melbc:mro~, 1988, F· 160. 
54 P!'~\' '">;V;k, Statement to the Special United Nations Session on Economic Development, 27 
Aug~~•'>t ~380, op. cit., p. ix. See also Commonwealth Secretariat, The World Economic Crisis: 
a Commonwealth Perspective, Report by Group of Experts, chaired by Prof. H.W. Arndt, 1980 
and Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: a . 
programme for survival, report, chaired by Willy Brandt, Pan Books, London, 1980. On the 
Brandt report, see Stuart Harris, The Brandt Commission Report and its significance for 
Australia, Ausiralian Outlook, vol. S6, 1, April 1982 and Ron Wickes, The Brandt Report: 
North-South- a programme for survival, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 58, 1, June 1981. 
55 By 1982, Fraser was arguing for the development of multilateral negotiating processes to 
improve the management of interdependence. See Malcolm Fraser, The Third World and the 
West, Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 20, 2, Summer 1982 and G. Evans, Australia a.J.1d the Third 
World: economic perspectives, in Paul Dibb, ed., Australia's External Relations in the 1980s: 
the Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors, Croom Helm, Canberra, 1983. 
56 BeJl, Dependent Ally, op. cit., p. 160. 
57 Mill'' •t 162 er, op. a ., p. . 
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Despite the work of Fraser and Peacock within the North South debate~ 
Australia was an easy target for criticism while maintaining high tariff 
barriers against trade with the developing countries while also substantially 
reducing the level of aid.ss This was most clearly shown in the Fraser 
government's relations with the Asia Pacific region~ especially with the 
members of the Association of South East Asian Nations. 
Asia and ASEAN 
Part of the Fraser government's position on developing countries was 
Australia's bilateral relations with many coun'i:ries in the Asia Pacific 
region. Central to Australia's stance was Fraser's balancing of relations with 
ASEAN and China. In attempting to build constructive relations with both1 
the Fraser government was often negotiating between serious diplomatic 
tensions. The simple comparison of the Fraser government's approach on 
these issues demonstrated the difficulties within Australia's policy on the 
Asia Pacific region. 
In general terms~ Fraser expressed Australia's interests in. the region by 
arguing that: 
. . . the region should not become in the future an arena of great 
power conflicts; that relations between states should be peaceful 
and co-operative; that political change in the area should not 
provide occasion for the assertion of a dominant role by any of 
the great powers; and that there should be opportunity for 
commercial and cultural exchange between Australia and the 
countries of the area. Beyond these interests we would wish~ 
within the Hmits of our possibilities, to help in the region's 
de,lelupment needs and to be an understanding and dependable 
n~ighbour.59 
In comparison with the Whitlam government, Prime Minister Fraser 
stressed Australia's strategic relationship with the countries o£ Asia which 
implied a different approach. The security agenda included the need to 
reduce tension in the region which, for Fraser, meant the need for a strong 
United States presence to oppose the Soviet Union. This position emerged 
58 See Renouf, Malcolm Fra<?er and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 117-18 & 149, 
Millar, ... More of tbe same ... , op. cit., p. 11. and RicharJ. Higgott, Australia and Africa, 
chapter 15 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 251. 
59 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99" 1 June 1976, pp. 2738-9. On the notion of an Asia Pacific region, 
see Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 109, 9 May 1978, p. 2038 and Peacock, Australia and the Third 
World" op. cit." p. 11. 
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from Fraser's views as Minister for Defence during the war in Vietnam and 
linked to the Australian desire for US activity in the Indian Ocean region. 
Fraser appeared to be less attentive to the Asia Pacific region than previous 
Australian Prime Ministers. The region remained important but Fraser 
regarded Asia as only one of many areas which required vigilance. Fraser's 
approach to foreign affaire meant that Australia's intererts in the region 
would not override attention to other international issues.60 As a resu.lt, 
Fraser was also concerned about more distant regions and conflicts 
including the European Community, the Soviet presence i.."'1. the Indian 
Ocean, the role of the United States in the Middle East, the Commonwealth 
of Nations, and southern Africa. 
Notwithstanding this international vision for Australian foreign policy, 
Fraser attempted to build constructive relations with the members of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations. This approach was dominated by 
trade issues which drew attention to the Fraser government's maintenance 
of protectionist policies. Throughout the term of the Fraser government, 
the debate on trade with ASEAN operated in parallel with the participation 
of Fraser and Peacock in discussions on trade liberalisation within the 
North South dialogue. Further, Australia was involved in a dispute with 
ASEAN over air travel while Fraser was attempting to promote the idea of a 
Pacific Rim economic community. Clearly, the Fraser government position 
on relations with ASEAN was filled with tensions which caused significant 
problems for Australia's image in the Asia Pacific region. 
The Prime Minister was engaged in the Asia region early in 1976 when 
combining attendance at the funeral of Tun Razak in Kuala Lumpur with 
official talks. The aim of these discussions was to improve Australia's 
formal relationship with ASEAN following unsuccessful attempts by the 
Whitlam government to forge secure links. Fraser also attempted to gain 
consultations with the ASEAN leaders at the regular meetings of ASEAN.61 
While attempting to providE: a positive image for Australia with ASEAN, 
Fraser was also maintaining Australia's close relations with China. Indeed, 
Fraser expF.citly accepted the Whitlam government's enthusiasm for China 
and embraced China as a regional ally in opposition to the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, Fraser's attraction to China distanced the Liberal and Country 
60 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 163. 
61 ibid., p. 166. On Australia meeting with ASEAN, see also Barclay, op. cit., p. 15. 
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Parties government from the anti-communist and anti-China governments 
of Menzies, Holt and McMahon. However, the members of ASEAN were 
concerned about China's motives in the Asia Pacific region and thus 
distanced theJ?selves from Australia's support for China.62 In particular, 
the Indonesian government was puzzled by the behaviour of the apparently 
anti-communist Fraser. 
In this context of early tension with ASEAN, Fraser attempted to offer a 
constructive policy in the June 1976 statement~ 
Australia has long standing friendships with all ASEAN 
governments. We welcome the activities of ASEAN as providing 
a constructive basis for regional relations. We want to identify 
and develop further arer:ts of practical co-operation on shared 
political and strategic interests. We will seek to do so through our 
aid programs, through involvement in regional efforts to 
advance economic and social development, and by the promotion 
of trade and other economic co-operation.63 
This statement could be read as an attempt to repair the damage inflicted 
upon Australia's :relations with ASEAN in the early months of 1976. 
Nevertheless, within days of this important foreign policy announcement, 
relations with ASEAN were again in crisis. During an official visit to China 
in June 1976, a transcript of comments made by Fraser was made public. 
Apparently, in meeting with Chinese officials, Fraser made derogatory 
comments about the future stability of some nations in South East Asia.64 
This revelation negated the constructive tone of the words on ASEAN in 
the June statement and illustrated the problems with Australia's attempt to 
balance relations with both China and ASEAN. 
The Fraser government prioritised stra,tegic considerations In the Asia 
Pacific region which meant that the stability of the region was seen as closely 
62 See J.A.C. Mackie, Australian Foreign Policy: From Whitlam to Fraser, Dyason House 
Papers, vol. 3, 1, August 1976, p. 4. 
63 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2739. OnASEAN, see Robert E. Bedeski, ASEAN 
h1 the wake of Vietnam: the road to Bali and beyond, International Perspectives, November-
December 1976; Stuart Drummond, ASEAN: the growth of an economic dimension, World 
Today, vol. 35, 1, January 1979; Frank Frost, The origins and evolution of ASEAN, World 
Review, vol. 19, 3, August 1980; Nancy Viviani, Australia's relations with ASEAN, World 
Review, vol. 19, 3, August 1980; Frank Frost, Political issues in Australian-ASEAN relations, 
Asian Pacific Community, no. 7, Winter 1980; and Chee-Meow Seah, Major powers and the 
search for a new equilibrium in Southeast Asia, Asia Pacific Community, no. 7, Winter 1980. 
64 Mackie, op. cit., p. 4. 
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tied to the viability of ASEAN as a regional organisation.6s Following the 
opportunity to meet with the Heads of Government of ASEAN in August 
1977, Fraser reiterated the govemment's position on the region: 
Australia strongly supports ASEAN's objective of preventing 
domination of the region by any major power and we have a 
significant interest in helping to ensure that ASEAN succeeds in 
its efforts to generate the economic growth and political stability 
for which it is striving. Our relationship with ASEAN is one 
which will require continuing and special attention. 66 
Again, strategic factors were interwoven with economic interests, which 
implied trade and aid issues. 
Indeed, the Fraser government was encouraging the United States to 
maintain a commitment to the region and thereby preserve the security of 
Australia. However, the United States reduced its involvement with the 
withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea. The members of ASEAN 
were concerned that the United States woulci further reduce its presence in 
Korea and the region, and publicly signalled their disquiet.67 At the same 
time, the ASEAN members, except perhaps Singapore, held reservations 
about military involvement within their borders, including the presence of 
the United States. The Philippine leaders, for example, viewed the US bases 
in their country as a risk to security rather than a benefit. 68 The apparent 
contradiction in this approach emerged from the ASEAN members wanting 
the US to resist communist action in the region but not wanting permanent 
facilities in their countries. In the end, the United States maintained a level 
of commitment in the Asia Pacific region which was designed to placate 
ASEAN, Australia and others.69 
65 HenryS. Albinski, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to Decemb~.r 1977, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 24, 1, April1978, p. 9. 
66 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol.106, 17 August 1977, p. 351. Fraser and the ASEAN leaders agreed on 
the need for a sound basis of knowledge from which a long term economic relationship would 
be developed. To this end, a joint ASEAN-Australia research project was established to 
assemble the basic material, ideas and proposals for greater co-operation. See Fraser, CPD, 
HR, vol. 106, 17 August 1977, p. 353. 
67 See Albinski, op. cit., pp. 9-10. On the Peacock memorandum to the Secretary of Stater ~1 
ASEAN, see Financial Review, 4, 5 & 6 October 1977. See also Frank C. Darling, United 
States policy in South-east Asia: Permanency and change, Asian Survey, vol. 14, 7, July 1974 
and J.A.C. Mackie, United States interests in Southeast Asia, Australian Outlook, vol. 32, 2, 
August 1978. 
68 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 164. 
69 Similar to the Fraser government's position, the United States combined the political 
stability of the region with (?.conomic development. Albinski, op. cit., p. 10. 
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In terms of trade, the Fraser government was confronted with conflicting 
priorities which remained unresolved through the entire term of 
government. The problems rested with distinct political pressures on tariff 
policies and the limited access to the Australian economy for ASEAN 
exports. Specifically, the Fraser government resolved to protect Australian 
industries through relatively high tariff barriers.7o This situation implied 
that prices for imports would remain uncompetitive in the Australian 
economy. 
The Fraser government's resistance to demands for greater access to the 
Australian markets resulted in an acrimonious dialogue between Australia 
and the members of ASEAN. Irritation was heightened when Prime 
Minister Fraser criticised the European Economic Community for excessive 
protectionism without acknowledging the barriers imposed by Australia. 
Peacock argued that domestic economic conditions needed to improve 
before tariffs could be lowered and thereafter more imports could compete 
in the Australian market.n 
Nevertheless, as early as December 1976, the Fraser government, and in 
particular the Minister for Foreign Affairs, recognised the calls from 
ASEAN on trade issues. A small initiative was the establishment of a high 
level interdepartmental committee directed to monitor 'all aspects of 
Australia's relations with the five member countries of the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations'.72 The committee had the potential to provide 
constructive policy advice to meet the grievances of ASEAN but, while the 
government was not prepared to implement domestic reforms on tariffs, 
the committee was faced with limited options. 
Foreign Minister Peacock made the government's position clear in March 
1977 by acknowledging and supporting the concerns of ASEAN for 
'increased economic relations with Australia.'73 Peacock recognised the 
70 R. Bell, op. cit., pp. 9-10. On tensions with Japan on trade issues, see Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 
99, 1 June 1976, pp. 2739-40; J.L. Richardson, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to 
June 1976, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 22, 3, December 1976, pp. 334-5; 
Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 158-9; T.B. Millar, 
ilustralia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977, Australian National University 
Press, Canberra, 1978, pp. 426-7; McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 335-6; Fraser, Ministerial statement: 
Post ASEAN Conference Talks, CPD, HR, vol. 106, 17 August 1977, pp. 353-4; and Albinslci, op. 
cit., pp. 14-15. 
7l See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 167 and Peacock, 
Australia and the Third World, op. cit., p. 11. 
72 McCarthy, op. cit., p. 339. 
73 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 104, 15 March 1977, p. 203. 
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importance of economic growth in the region and the value of expanding 
trade for developing countries in general. The qualification to this position 
was t..hat: 
. . . any significant change in our trade relations will have to take 
place gradually to minimise any domestic dislocation in this 
country . . . Progress in these matters depends on the recovery of 
the Australian economy.74 
Peacock was again attempting to balance policy objectives in the region but 
foreshadowed a consistent negative response to all calls for tariff reductions. 
Interestingly, Senator Sim claimed that the members of ASEAN understood 
the predicament of the Australian government: 
The present domestic problems facing Australia are understood 
but they will not be understood if we disrupt the economies of the 
less developed countries in protecting Australian industry. 
While the problems are understood now, they are less likely to be 
understood in, say, 12 months' time. The time will come when 
we will be expected to stop talking and to deliver the goods. 75 
However, individual ASEAN members again registered protests over 
Australia's tariff policies and, in particular, the Philippines reduced by half 
the level of imports of Australian steel in a clear act of retaliation.76 These 
criticisms provoked a tour by Peacock to the ASEAN countries in April1977. 
The Foreign Minister was able to make a personal impression but trade 
relations did not improve. 
Progress on these issues was sabotaged on occasions by the Minister for 
Overseas Trade and leader of the Country Party, Doug Anthony, in defence 
of protectionist policies. Anthony argued that Australian imports of 
clothing and footwear from developing; countries compared favourably 
with other developed countries and criticised the developing countries 
which were derrtMlding greater access to Australian markets: 
I have verv real difficulties with those who maintain that our 
actions hav"e been unduly restrictive or harsh. Nor do I accept the 
criticism that our policy has provided little opportunity for 
developing countries to expand their trade.77 
74 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol.104, 15 March 1977, p. 203. 
75 Sim, CPD, Senate, vol. 72, 22 March 1977, p. 34\8. 
76 See McCarthy, op. cit, p. 340. See also Finandal Review, 15 March 1977. 
77 Anthony, Ministerial statement: International Trade, CPD, HR., vol. 105, 25 May 1977, p. 
1806. 
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Possibly in response to the Minister for Overseas Trade, or in reaction to the 
trade policies of the Fraser government as a whole, the Malaysian Trade 
Minister threatened to switch wheat orders to Canada.78 Thus, the trend in 
Australian trade relations with ASEAN were entrenched by mid. 1977. 
The pivotal opportunity for Fraser to alleviate tensions with ASEAN 
arrived in August 1977 when Australia, New Zealand and Japan were 
invited to the ASEAN Heads of Government meeting in Kuala Lumpur.79 
Prime Minister Fraser reported to the Parliament that: 
The meetings with the ASEAN Heads of Government were of the 
greatest value in furthering the strong and friendly ties that have 
linked Australia with these five countries for more than three 
decades. The meeting demonstrated, at the highest level, our 
mutual desire to enhance Australian-ASEAN cooperation. 80 
This understanding of the discussions with the ASEAN le? ders contrasted 
with the barrage of criticism against Fraser and Australia's protectionist 
policies. 81 
Possibly in response to these objections, the Prime Minister attempted to 
explain the government's policy as stated to the ASEAN countries: 
The ASEAN Heads of Government raised the question of our 
trade and they expressed the strong wish to increase their share of 
trade with Australia. I emphasised that the balance of trade with 
ASEAN countries had been moving relatively in ASEAN's 
favour since 1970-71 from a ratio of 3:1 against them to 2:1. The 
growth rate of imports to Australia from ASEAN over the last 
five years has averaged 30 per cent, much higher than the general 
growth rate of imports from all countries to Australia.82 
The growth in imports from the members of ASEAN was actually thirty 
percent for the entire five year period employed but this was a minor flaw 
in the argument. Fundamentally, Fraser reiterated the government's 
position that ASEAN imports would not continue to grow at the expense of 
78 See McCarthy, op. cit., p. 340. The Malaysian Trade Minister, Datuk Hamzah, outlined 
the possibility of shifting trade away from Australia only weeks after the statement by Doug 
Anthony. 
79 The 6-7 August meeting was the first at which leaders of other countries had been invited 
to meet with the five ASEAN Heads of Government. 
80 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 106, 17 Augul:lt 1977, p. 351: 
81 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit, p. 167. See also Millar, 
Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., pp. 428-9. 
82 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 106, 17 August 19771 p. 351. 
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Australian industry. More opporhmities for imports from ASEAN would 
be dependent upon improvements in the economic situation in Australia.s3 
Whitlam was critical of Fraser's argument: 
The Prime Minister repeatedly makes comparisons between the 
growth of trade with ASEAN countries on one hand and our 
industrialised trade partners in Europe, North America and 
Japan. It is an irrelevant and counter-productive comparison. It 
demonstrates the complete failure of the Prime Minister to 
understand the real nature of our relations with the ASEAN 
countries and their view of their relations with Australia. 
Simply, they are our neighbours. They expect to be treated as 
such. They expect our trade relations as much as our other 
relations to reflect that inescapable fact of geography. At present 
our trade with ASEAN clearly does not reflect our true situation 
as the nearest neighbours, the most industrialised neighbours of 
these large and rapidly developing nations.S4 
More pointedly, Whitlam attempted to show that the Fraser governm~mt 
had ignored the claims of ASEAN by further restricting imports to 
Australia: 
At 8 o'clock last Wednesday night [Ministerial Statement on Post 
ASEAN Conference Talks, 17 August 1977] the Prime Minister 
announced that it had been arranged in Kuala Lumpur that there 
should be consultative machinery with ASEAN members on 
trade matters, particularly, presumably, quotas and tariffs. Twenty 
minutes later the Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs 
(Mr Fife) announced that the Government would soon announce 
lower quotas for footwear, textiles and clothing - the very three 
areas identified in the Prime Minister's ASEAN statement as 
having been discussed in Kuala Lumpur. One can only marvel at 
the exquisite sense of timing of this Government.ss 
Essentially, the Fraser government dismissed the pleas from ASEAN for 
trade liberalisation while lowering quotas for imports of textiles, clothing 
and footwear to the detriment of ASEAN trade with Australia.B6 
83 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol.106, 17 August 1977, pp. 351-2. 
84 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 106,24 August 1977, p. 588. 
85 Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 106,24 August 1977, p. 589. 
86 Albinski, op. cit, p. 11 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., 
p. 168. See also Frank Frost, Australia and ASEAN - a report by a study group of the 
Canberra branch of the AliA, Dyason House Papers, vol. 5, 1, September 1978 and Peter 
Drysdale and Alan G. Rix, Australia's economic relations with Asia and the Pacific, Current 
Affairs Bulletin, vol. 55, 11, April1979. 
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On this, the members of ASEAN attempted to draw on the Fraser 
government's support for a new ~nternational economic order to gain 
concessions within the Australian protectionist trade system.87 Rather than 
offer greater trade opportunities, Fraser emphasised the value of the 
Australian aid program as compensation.88 In 1977, the Prime Minister 
announced a significant expansion in the size of Australia's aid program to 
ASEAN and several measures to improve the quality of this aid. Australia 
promised an additional $10million for the ASEA.t'J-Australia Economic Co-
operative Program and increased the forward commitment to bilateral aid 
to the five members of ASEAN by $90million to $250million.89 However, 
the aid was not an adequate substitute for the trade benefits enjoyed by 
Australia.9o 
Subsequently, Australia's relationship with ASEAN deteriorated further 
during a dispute over air fares and air routes. Whether by ignorance or 
arrogance, the Minister for Transport, Peter Nixon, announced in October 
1979 a new International Civil Aviation policy which would assist Australia 
and ASEAN, with the exception of Singapore. The reduced prices on air 
routes between Australia, Asia, Europe and North America would boost 
tourist trade to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand but 
prohibit stops in Singapore as part of direct point to point travel. While 
Singapore ~ould benefit from an increase in travel in general, passengers 
from Australia would be prevented from breaking their journey in 
Singapore, or elsewhere, en route.91 
Minister Nixon may have anticipated that Singapore would be isolated 
within ASEAN given the considerable benefits for the other member 
countries but this strategy was quickly defeated. ASEAN presented a urctited 
front to the Australian government and identified the Nixon policy as 
reflecting the high protectionism noted on other trade issues. Minister Goh 
Chok Tong of Singapore threatened considerable political and economic 
damage for Australia if the air fare policy was not changed. Sensibly, the 
diplomatic skills of Foreign Minister Peacock were invoked to improve 
87 See Angel, op. cit., p. 232. 
88 ibid., p. 231. Australia also claimed to assist the members of ASEAN through investment, 
tourism, trade promotion and preferential tariffs. 
89 The Australian aid would also be partly untied to allow increased procurement of 
materials and equipment from within the ASEAN region. Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 106, 17 
August 1977, pp. 353. See also H.W. Arndt, ASEAN industrial projects, Asia Pacific 
Community, no. 2, Fall1978. 
90 Millar, Australia in Peace and War.~ op. cit., p. 429. See also Angel, op. cit~ p. 231. 
91 J.M. McCarthy, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to Ju..""te 1979, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 25, 3, 1979, p. 304. 
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relations between Australia and ASEAN on this issue.92 It was clear that the 
Minister for Transport would be forced to compromise. The settlement 
maintained the cheap air fares, discarded the point to point travel withovt 
stops, and provided ASEAN with the right to compete with Qantas and 
British airways on equal terms.93 Nixon was defeated on the policy is~,ues as 
ASEAN demonstrated a growing d1plomatic strength. Millar claimed that 
Australia's desire to accommodate the demands of ASEAN on trade 
relations created a vulnerability on the air fares dispute.94 Certainly the 
Fraser government's desire to maintain productive relations with the 
ASEAN countries determined the substantial compromise on the specific 
air fares policy. 
More constructively, Australia and ASEAN were involved in discussions 
on a Pacific Rim concept from late 1979. The proactive debate on a regional 
economic structure provided a new context for Australian support for the 
demands of developing countries for greater access to world markets.9s 
Further, Australia's foreign economic policies were increasingly directed 
toward participation in a notional regional arrangement. In response to 
Japanese initiatives, the Fraser government appeared ready to embrace the 
Pacific Rim idea.96 The concept included closer formal economic 
interdependence between states in the Asia Pacific region. The proposed 
regional structure would utilise the complementary capacities of the 
various countries to increase the rate of economic development beyond 
other regional groupings such as the European Economic Community.97 
The Fraser government seemed committed to the Pacific Rim arrangement 
and moved slowly to adjust tariff and quota levels to comply with the idea 
of a more open regional economic structure. Implicitly, Australia accepted 
the argument of the South East and East Asia states that expzmded 
92 tiy March 1979, talks with ASEAN representatives on the air fares policy had collapsed, 
Australian airport ground staff had refused to refuel a Malaysian aircraft in Sydney in 
protest over the imprisol'l.ment of Malaysian unionists, and Dr Mahathir had commented that 
relations wit'l:l Australia were 'deteriorating like a house on fire'. ibid. 
93 ibid., pp. 304-5. 
94 Millar, ... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 11. Millar's brief reference to this dispute 
described Singapore's position as 'blunt and acquisitive' which implied the Fraser 
government was forced to compromise with an overly assertive ASEAN. 
95 See R Bell, op. cit., p. 24. 
96 See Backgrounder, no.190, 13 June 1979, pp. 5-6. 
97 Far from an equitable arrangement, the Pacific rum structure was based on separation of 
capacities: the advanced industria?. countries such as Japan and the United States would 
provide capital, technology and planning; Australia, New Zealand and Canada would act as 
sources of foodstuffs, raw materials and energy; and ASEAN and East Asia states would 
provide manufactured goods through cheap labour. R Bell, op. cit, p. 26. 
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international trade would accelerate development and generate improved 
living standards throughout the region. However, the alleged nexus 
between trade and development was criticised by organisations and 
individuals concerned with the inequitable consequences of the economic 
strategies employed by the developing countries.98 The new industrialising 
countries and developing countries of ASEAN and East Asia continued to 
display signs of unemployment, rural poverty, maldistribution of income, 
social inequality and political repression despite their success in export 
strategies. Nevertheless, the Australian government did not scrutinise the 
implications of the idea of a regional economic structure. In particular, the 
Fraser government was quiet on the possibilities of political unrest in the 
region given the potential for greater economic inequality and did not 
emphasise the impact of greater regional integration on unemployment and 
social inequality within Australia.99 
For some time, the Pacific Rim idea shifted attention away from Australia's 
protectionist trade relationships with ASEAN. Nevertheless, the Fraser 
government continued to be unpopular with the members of ASEAN 
because Australia was not prepared to alter trade and tariff policies. The 
Fraser government had provided sufficient grounds· for the ASEAN 
countries to disregard and dismiss Australia in the Asia Pacific region_loo In 
total, the Fraser government refused to make changes to Australian 
industry and trade policies and thereby resolved to endure the criticisms 
from the members of ASEAN. 
China 
The Fraser government continued to develop diplomatic relations 
established by Whitlam with the People's Republic of China, albeit from a 
different political understanding of China's international role. There were 
specific difficulties within Australia's position on China in 1979 to 1981 but 
overall, the relationship was a success for the Fraser government. 
98 Bell, ibid., quoted Oxfam at the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development in Rome in July 1979: 'Governments which have failed to provide elementary 
economic and social justice to their own people were the most strident in demanding access to 
international markets, improved terms of trade, transfer of resources, and an increase in the 
flow of aid'. 
99 See ibid., pp. 26-7 for further criticisms of the concept of a regional economic arrangement 
from Philip Eldridge and Max Teichmann. 
page233 
Prime Minister Fraser clearly placed Australia's relations with China in 
terms of a common desire to lhJ..lit the influence of the Soviet Union: 
A realistic view requires us to recognise that despite ideological 
differences there are important areas where our interests overlap 
... Australia and China have a like interest in seeing that Soviet 
power in the Pacific and South East Asia is balanced by the power 
of other major states or by appropriate regional arrangements. 
We can therefore expect Chinese support for our own views on 
the need for an effective American presence in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans.1o1 
Fraser understood China as an ally in the global strategic balance. Thus, the 
Prime Minister minimiser.:1 the ideological differences between the 
Australian government and the Chinese communist government to the 
extent necessary to envisage a strategic alliance. As such, Fraser's analysis of 
China was a major departure from previous Liberal and Country Parties 
foreign policy.102 
Prime Minister Fraser's position discar Jed the relatively r€" __ nt history of 
the Liberal Party which refused to recognise China.l03 Indeed, Fraser had 
made alarmist statements about China prior to gaining government.104 As 
late as 1973, Fraser portrayed Chir..a as the principle obstacle to harmony and 
progress in the region and criticised the Whitlam government for 
recognising China without consulting ASEAN and other countries in the 
region.1os · In a short s_ ;e of time, Fraser's view of China shifted from a 
potential enemy to a potential ally. Millar suggested that Fraser may have 
been influenced by the degree of responsibility shown by China in the 
international community.106 More likely, Fraser saw a need to balance the 
100 See Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 329 and T.B. Millar, Problems of 
Australian Foreign Policy July-December 1982, Australian ]oumal of Politics and History, 
vol. 29, 1, 1983, p. 12. 
101 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2740. 
102 Richardson, op. cit., p. 331. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign 
Policy, op. cit., pp. 154-5, Millar, ... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 6, and Renouf, Australian 
Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 322. 
103 Coral Bell, Mr Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, World Today, vol. 35, October 1979, 
p.415. 
104 Fraser had attempted to generate a fear C'f China, accused China of nuclear blackmaH, 
suggested that China was a threat in the region and to Australia, and criticised both 
Whitlam and Kissinger for visiting China in 1971. See Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 
1976, p. 2746 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., P¥· 41, 44 & 
48-9. 
105 See Whitlam criticism of Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2746. 
106 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 425. Strangely, Hasluck and Freeth had 
considered gaining support from the Soviet "'Jnior. ~15 a counterweight against China in the 
late 1960s. See Bell, Mr Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 416. 
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perceived expansion of Soviet influence in th~ Pacific and Indian Ocean 
regions. 
At a personal level, Prime Minister Fraser appeared to be converted through 
the diplomatic hospitality of China during a visit in June 1976. To Fraser's 
surprise, the Chi.nese :epresentatives disregarded previous hostile 
statements and welcomed the Australian Prime Minister with an 
impressive r.<?.ception. Fraser was pleased with the tone of discussion~ at 
which the Prime Minister pushed the need to resist Soviet foreign polky.lo7 
Jil.'loreover, Fraser canvassed the idea that China, Japan, the United States 
and Australia had a common interest in containing Soviet military 
expansion.108 China was happy to agree with Australia about the Soviet 
Union and agreed with Fraser about the need for sl:ability in the Asia Pacific 
region and the objective of discouraging military escalation in the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans.109 
The Pr:h.."Ue Minister's visit to China developed domestic support in terms of 
criticising the Soviet Union but seemed problematic in relation to foreign 
policy i...'L the region. The close relationship with China aroused suspicion of 
Australia from ASEAN, Japan and India. These countries perceived a need 
to distance themselves from the Fraser government.no Fraser's criticism of 
Whitlam not consulting ASEAN prior to recognising China had some 
familiarity here. As Prime Minister, Fraser seemed to misread the concerns 
of many countries and Australia's relations with China tended to 
compound the difficult relations with ASEAN over trade. 
Nevertheless, the Fraser government attempted to enhance relations with 
China through economic aid and diplomatic links. Development assistance 
was extended to China in contrast to the Whitlam government which had 
decided not to implerrtent an aid program in China. After some 
negotiations, Australia established a $10million program over three years. 
Projects concentrated on English language training and assistance with 
primary production. The aid allocation was significant because Australia 
107 Renouf, Malcolm .Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 155. 
108 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 424. 
109 Renouf, Malcolm ,Fraser and • LJStralian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 155-6. The views of 
China were qualified by their commitment to support revolutionary groups 1n Asia. On the 
visit to China, see L.R i'\iarchant, Australia and East Asia: China and Korea, chapter 13 in 
Boyce and Angel .. op. cit., pp. 212-13 and Bell, Mr Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. 
cit., p. 415. 
110 See P.J. Boyce, The Foreign Policy Process, chapter 1, in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 13. On 
related issues, see Angel, op. cit., p. 243 and Millar, Australia in Peace and War. op. cit., p. 
436. 
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was the first Western donor to provide grant aid to China. Also, at this 
time, Australia separated the aid program from trade considerations which 
was a victory for the Department of Foreign Affairs over the Department of 
Trade.l11 Further, the Fraser government encouraged cultural and scientific 
links. The Australia-China Council was established and funded to develop 
exchanges, despite opposition from some supporters of the Fraser 
government. Thus, trade with China expanded, assisted by government 
credits, and China became an important market for Australian products.n2 
Diplomatic relations were further fadlitated in late 1978 with the 
establishment of consulates-general in Sydney and in Shanghai. Australian 
sales to China had doubled over the previous year and the exchange of 
visitors had increased. Indeed, the Minister for Trade led a delegation to 
China in an attempt to sell any and all Australian products in the Chinese 
market.113 Importantly, the United States announced on 15 December 1978 
that relations would be normalised with the Peoples' Republic of China.114 
The Fraser government was ahead of the United States on China which was 
a new situation for Liberal and Country Parties foreign policy. • 
The positive image of Australia on China was disturbed by divisions within 
the Fraser governn1ent over relations with China and Taiwan. There was 
some disillusionrnent within the Liberal Party about the shift in policy 
which was not anticipated with the election of Fraser .ns The supporters of 
Taiwan advocated an anti-communiet position which opposed Liberal Party 
policy t0ward China. Dissent also emerged from others within the Fraser 
gove:~.nment, possibly with different motives and aims, primarily as a result 
of the efforts of Senator Peter Sim, Chair of the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. The Western Australian 
Senator may have been influenced by or concurred with the views of the 
Western Australian Premier, Charles Court who was an enthusiastic 
supporter of Taiwan.116 Within the Fraser government, the dissenting 
group was influential in softening AustraEa..-.:_ policy on Taiwan in 1979-80. 
111 Mediansky, op. cit., pp. 298-9. Australia was also among the first and largest donors of 
humanitariar.. ~elief to China. Through the United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation, 
the Fraser gov~:.rnment pledged wheat valued at $1.5million and medical supplies valued at 
$100000 for natural disaster victims in two Orinese provinces. 
112 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit,?· 156. 
113 Barclay, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
114 ibid., p. 14. 
115 Marchant, op. cit., p. 209. 
116 As Premier of Western Australia from 1974 to 1982, Court attempted to develop trade 
with Taiwan while the extended Court family expanded business relations with Taiwanese 
companies. 
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Further, this group provided support for Foreign Minister Peacock to 
challenge Prime Minister Fraser for the Liberal Party leadership based on 
:Fraser's firm line on Chinr.'- t i 
Nonetheless, Australia's relations with China continued to improve and 
expand through 1980-82. Whil~ China continued to oppose the Soviet 
Union, the Australian government approved of China testing an unarmed 
inter-continental ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean irt 1980. Further, 
agreements were reached on cultural relations, the exchange of military 
attaches and the visit of Premier Zhao to Australia. These close links 
contrasted with China's difficulties with the Reagan administration due to 
the United States proposals to transfer military assistance to Taiwan.liS 
~ ustralia was keen to maintain excellent relations with China within the 
Sin<rAmerican context but this wa3 problematic. 
In total, Whitlam had posed the central question in critique of Fraser in 
June 1976. Whitlam rhetorically asked what Australia would gain in taking 
sides in the dispute between China and the Soviet Union.llS The new 
Liberal and Country Parties position on China appeared to be enlightened 
but for the wrong reasons. In maintaining close relations with China as 
established by the Whitlam government, Fraser understood th.i.t Australia 
and China were allied in opposition to the Soviet Union. With reference to 
"' China in the June 1976 statement, Prime Minister Fraser explained that 
'constructive relations did not depend on agreement of all aspects of 
relations'_120 This approach could have applied equally to the Soviet Union 
as it did for China which may have facilitated a more even international 
position for Australia. In regional terms, thr! Fraser government's 
association with China created suspicion among members of ASEAN. 
Nevertheless, Fraser was able to improve relations with China at many 
levels and, significantly, increased Austr=.lian trade to China. 
Vietnam and Kampuchea 
The Fraser government continued the cordial relations with Vietnam that 
had been established by the Whitlam Labor government. This was a 
117 Marchant, op. cit, pp. 209 & 218-19. 
118 ibid., pp. 298-9. See also Street, Ministerial statement: Australia's Foreign Relations 
Policy, CPD, HR, vol. 121, 24 March 1981, pp. 829-34. 
119 Whitlam, CPD, HR., vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2746. 
120 Fraser, CPD, HRr vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2740 
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surprise for some supporters of the Liberal and Country Parties 
government. However, in 1978, Fraser's position turned to opposition 
when Vietnam signed an agreernent with the Soviet Union and 
subsequently deposed the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. Prhne Minister 
Fraser ceased Austraiian aid to Vietnam and aligned the Australian 
government with ASEAN and China against Vietnam. In the complex 
diplomatic alliances and developments on Kampuchea, the Fraser 
government combined a fear of the Soviet Union and Vietnam with a 
commitment to developing countries and the region. Tensions in 
Australian foreign policy were also demonstrated in regard to the flow of 
refugees from Vietnam. 
Similar to other foreign policy issuesr Prime Minister c;Fraser had a 
significant influence over the formulation and implementation of the 
government's position on Vietnam and Kampuchea. Fraser's 
understanding of the interna·donal context of Vietnam._'s actions waf' 
predicated upon long-held concerns about the region. In 1963-64:, Fraser had 
argued that communist imperialism was a serious threat to the Asia and 
Pacific region and that the conflict in Vietnam was central to stopping the 
spread of communism in the region.1z1 As Minister for the Army, Fraser 
engaged in a bitter exchange with Whitlam over Vietnam during 1966-67 in 
which Fraser advocated increased bombing of North Vietnam by the United 
States.122 By February 1973, Fraser was attacking the Labor government for 
halting aid to South Vietnam and disagreed with Whitlam's protest to the 
United States over the bombing of Hanoi.123 As leader of the Liberal Party in 
1975, Fraser attempted to refute Whitlam's description of the conflict in 
Vietnam as a civil war.124 For more than a de:cade, Fraser had adopted the 
position that Soviet communist aggression in Vietnam required sustained 
resistance from the United States and Australia in order to halt the spread of 
communism through the region. 
Understandably, there was an expectation that the Fraser Liberal and 
Country Parties government would re-establish an anti-communist policy 
121 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 40, 22 October 1963, p. 2100 and Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 41, 5 March 
1964, pp. 299-300. 
122 See Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 50, 17 March 1966, pp. 402-5, Whitlam and Fraser debate, CPD, 
HR, vol. 51, 11 May 1966, pp. 1676-77, and Fraser and \Vhitl?.m debate, CPD, HR, vol. 57, 5 
October 1967, pp. 1756-9. Also, as Minister for Defence, Fraser, CPD, HR, vol66, 10 March 
1970, pp. 232-4 and CPD, HR, vol. 67, 7 May 1970, pp. 1861-7 warned of the continuity of 
communist tactics as employed in Vietnam. 
123 Fraser, CPD, H.R, vol. 82, 28 February 1973, p. 64. 
124 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 94, 8 Apri11975, p. 1261. 
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on Vietnam. However, at first, the Fraser government was not overtly 
hostile toward Vietnam and instead, encouraged a relaxed relationship 
between Vietnam and the region.125 Fraser maintained aid programs to 
Vietnam and Laos which signalled the potential for constructive relations. 
The emerging diplomatic relationship with Vietnam was interrupted by the 
need to deal with refugees arriving in Australia.t26 In April 1976, a boat 
carrying Vietnamese refugees arrived in Darwin. This method of entry into 
Australia foreshadowed many more arrivals in the next five years. For both 
domestic and foreign policy reasons, the Fraser government was reluctant to 
accept a large number of refugees and, for 1~761' allowed the entry of only 800 
refugees. Fraser also refused to establish a resettlement program despite 
continuing pressures from ASEAN. The four countries most involved and 
affected by the arriva~ of refugees, namely Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand 
and Indonesia, as well as the United States, were displeased with this 
approach by the Fraser government.127 
Through 1977, the members of ASEAN intensified their diplomatic efforts 
while refusing to allow more boats to land on their shores,128 In an attempt 
to force the debate on resettlement, the Malaysian and Indonesian 
authorities seemed to assist the passage of boats toward Australia. In turn, 
the Fraser government attempted to persuade the ASEAN countries to halt 
the flow of refugees to Australia. By mid-1978, this diplomatic impasse was 
mediated as ASEAN undertook to hold boats bound for Australia while the 
Fraser government agreed to expand resettlement to 9000 refugees per year. 
The unauthorised arrivals of boats with refugees diminished while there 
was a substantial increase in authorised air arrivals. By the end of 1980, 
official arrivals of refugees in Australia totalled approximately 45000.129 The 
125 Albinski, op. cit., p. 5. 
126 Despite a coalition of pressures to accept more refugees, the Whitlam government 
permitted only about 1000 Vietnamese refugees to enter Australia in 1975. Nancy Viviani, 
Aid Policies and Programmes, chapter 7 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 133 & 138. See also N. 
Viviani, Australian Government Policy on the Entry of Vietnamese Refugees in 1975, CSAAR 
Research Paper, no. 1, 1980 and N. Viviani and Joanna Lawe-Davies, Australian Government 
Policies on the Entry of Vietnamese Refugees, 1976 to 1978, CSAAR Research Paper no. 2, 
Griffith University, Brisbane, 1980. 
127 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 168 and Viviani, Aid 
Policie.; and Programmes, ibld., p. 133. See also R Bell, op. cit., p. 14 and see generally, J.M. 
van der Kroef, Hanoi and ASEAN: a new confrontation in Southeast Asia?, Asia Quarterly, 
no.4, 1976. 
128 Viviani, op. cit., pp. 133-4. See also McCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to 
June 1979,. op. cit., p. 302 and Albinski, op. cit., p. 5. 
129 Viviani, op. cit., pp. 131-2. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign 
Policy, op. cit., pp. 169-70. Once landed, the refugees were protected by inten."lational 
obligations which directed that the boats should not be sent back to sea and the refugees 
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members of ASEAN expected Australia to accept a share of the 
responsibility for resettling the refugees and any hesitation by the Fraser 
government was interpreted as a return to a selective immigration policy 
and a rejection of regional co-operation. 
The prospect of large numbers of refugees from Vietnam linked the Fraser 
government's foreign policy objectives with domestic considerations. 
While there was some support in the Australian electorate for the entry of 
Vietnamese refugees, there were also serious reservations expressed about 
their impact on Australian society. The fear of greater unemployment was 
central to the debate on refugees which was linked both explicitly and 
implicitly with racist groups opposing immigration from Asia.l30 Where 
the Fraser government was attempting to deflect criticism of the 
reintroduction of restrictive immigration practices, groups within Australia 
were openly advocating the exclusion of the refugees from Vietnam which 
provided an international image of racism and isolation. 
For both domestic and international reasons, Prime Minister Fraser 
initiated a conference in Geneva in November 1978 to gain resettlement 
places from countries tangential to the refugee issue. This attempt to 
:mternationalise' the problem was not successful and thus pressure was 
maintained upon Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia to accommodate the 
flow of refugees. Another attempt by Australia to broaden the base of 
concern was to work through the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees by contributing $3.7million for refugee relief.I3l As the 
international standing of Vietnam declined in 1979, the attitude toward the 
refugees shifted. At another conference in Geneva in July 1979, several 
countries accepted responsibility for resettlement places, the largest number 
in the United States, with Australia promising 14000 places for 1979-80.132 
On the issue of refugees, the intersection of humanitarian arguments, 
regional associations and domestic concerns posed a significant test for the 
Fraser government. The refugee crisis compelled Australia to recognise that 
participation in the Asia Pacific region involved responsibilities beyond 
should not be compulsorily repatriated. See generally Dick Wilson, Future relations ASEAN 
and Indochina, Asia Pacific Community, no. 1, Summer 1978. 
130 McCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1979, t)p. cit., p. 303. On the nexus 
of domestic and foreign policies, see Angel, op. cit.,. pp. 226-7. 
131 McCarthy, op. cit., p. 303. There was a suggestion that an island transit camp should be 
established off Indonesia to temporarily house the refugees prior to resettlement. 
132 Viviani, Aid Policies and l!rogrammes. op. cit., p. 134, Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and 
Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 170, aJ:.'ld R Bell, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
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trade relations. From the negotiations over refugees, Australia eventually 
offer~d a sensitive and flexible response and the Fraser government was 
more active than the Whitlam government on tb\is issue.133 
Meanwhile, in Kampuchea, formerly Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge, led by 
Pol Pot, had attempted to implement a social and economic revolution. 
Supported by China, the Khmer Rouge engaged in skirmishes along the 
border with Vietnam and, in 1978, attacked Vietnamese villages in border 
reg\ons. 134 Vietnam attempted to peacefully settle the dispute with 
Kampuchea but was ignored by Pol Pot and rejected by the United Nations. 
Simultaneously, the Khmer Rouge was instituting structural change in 
Kampuchea through brutal methods which cost perhaps three million 
lives.135 
In late 1978, Vietnamese armed forces overthrew the Khmer Rouge 
government in Kampuchea and established the Heng Samrin regime in 
early 1979. Whether a primary, secondary or tangential motive, the military 
action by Vietnam ended the destructive revolution of Pol Pot. Indeed, the 
methods of the Khmer Rouge may have continued for some years longer 
had Vietnam not intervened. Further, it was argued that Kampuchea had 
provoked Vietnam for some time with the border incursions and 
diplomatic taunts which suggested that Vietnam had been quite tolerant.136 
Immediately prior to moving against Pol Pot, Vietnam signed a Treaty of 
Friendship with the Soviet Union in November 1978.137 The signing of the 
Treaty provided w~ight for the argument that Vietnam was acting for the 
Soviet Union against Kampuchea and therefore against China. Analysis 
within the Fraser government gravitated toward this simplistic conclusion. 
Foreign Minister Peacock interpreted the events a!'l part of the rivalry 
133 See Bell, ibid., p. 15. 
134 McCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1979, op. cit., p. 300. On the border 
incidents, see Ben Kiernan, New light on the origins of the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict, 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 12, 4, October-December 1980. 
135 R. Bell, op. cit., pp.ll-12. See also Gavan McCormack, The Kampuchean Revolution 
1975-1978: the problem of knowing the .ruth, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 10, 1/2, 1980. 
136 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 171. On Vietnam's 
intervention, see Gareth Porter, Why Vietnam invaded Cambodia, Nation, vol. 228,22, June 
1979; Justus M. van der Kroef, Cambodia: .from 'Democratic Kampuchea' to 'People's 
;t:. Republic', Asian Survey, vol. 19, 8, August 1979; Milton Osbo;Wne, Vietnam and South East 
Asia: partner or pariah, Round Table, no. 276, October 1979; and John Girling, Crisis over 
Kampuchea: regional and global implications, Third World Quarterly, vol. 2, 4, October 
1980. 
137 Renouf, op. cit., p. 89. See also McCarthy, .. .Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 
1979, op. cit., p. 301. 
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between regional powers, in this case communist states, rather than as 
limited conflicts with essentially local causes.138 Further, Prime Minister 
Fraser resorted to an anti-Soviet response which criticised Vietnam for 
invading Kampuchea.139 
Both Fraser and Peacock attempted to generate inte:rnational interest in the 
situation in Kampuchea but their concern was not shared by others, notably 
the United States.140 The apparent alliance of Vietnam with the Soviet 
Union produced a temporary coincidence of interests between China and 
ASEAN. The Khmer Rouge continued to be supplied by China which 
opposed Vietnam· while ASEAN and Australia were concerned about 
Vietnam's intentions in the region.141 To various degrees, this coalition 
supported the standing of the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea against the 
imposed Vietnam-backed regime. 
The web of conflict was escalated when China attacked Vietnam in February 
1979.142 These border incursions were designed for short-term strategic 
impact rather than sustained military invasion. The Fraser government 
was quiet on the actions of China in direct contrast to the criticism aimed at 
Vietnam's move into Kampuchea. This 'tilt' in Australian policy appeared 
to support China, and to some extent ASEAN, in the diplomatic 
manoeuvres over Vietnam.143 In an attempt to restore an even-handed 
approach, Fraser argued that, in general, the use of force was not acceptable 
for the settlement of disputes.144 This statement on Vietnam and China was 
immediately used to point out the inconsistency in the Fraser foreign policy 
with reference to Australia's passive response to Indonesia's use of force in 
East Timor .145 
138 See Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 113, 27 February 1979, pp. 361, 363-4 and R. Bell, op. cit., p. 10. 
See also Barclay, op. dt., p. 13 and Millar, ... More of the sanv: , op. cit., p. 6. 
139 Fraser in J\1cCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January tG •• une 1979, op. cit, p. 301. In 
the same vein, Senator Carrick, CPD, Senate, vol. 79, 18 October 1978, p. 1382, was able to 
deplore the actions of Vietnam without expressing sympathy for the Khmer Rouge. 
140 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 89. It seemed that the 
United States administration was relatively unperturbed about the situation in Kampuchea, 
adopting the view that conflict between communist states, and the demise of the Pol Pot 
regime, were acceptable outcomes in terms of US foreign policy objectives. 
141 Millar, .. .More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 6. See also Angel, op. cit., p. 234, on the ASEAN 
position on Kampuchea and Vietnam. 
142 McCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1979, op. cit., p. 302. See also 
Peacock, CPD, HR., vol. 113, 27 February 1979, p. 363, Bell, Mr Fraser and Australian Foreign 
Policy, op. cit., p. 414 and Renouf1 Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 
89, and see generally, Leo Goodstadt, Race, refugees and rice: China and the Indo-China 
triangle, Round Table, no. 271, July 1978. 
143 Bell, Mr Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 415. 
144 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 113, 22 January 1979, p. 261. 
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The decision to halt Australian aid to Vietnam also displayed contradictory 
elements. While Foreign Minister Peacock was attending a Disarmament 
Conference in Geneva, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ian Sinclair, 
with the support of Prime Minister Fraser, decided to withhold aid to 
Vietnam and suspend all cultural exchanget:,..146 Peacock was not consulted 
prior to the announcement of this decision. Other donor nations had not 
cut aid which suggested the Australian government wished to overtly 
display an anti-Soviet position on Vietnam. In fact, Vietnam had valued 
the small amount of Australian aid because it had helped to diversify the 
sources of international assistance. Arguably, the decision to cut aid was 
contrary to the Fraser gove1'11D1ent aim not to push Vietnam closer to the 
Soviet Union. 
Parallel to this, Australia's difficult relationship with ASEAN was central to 
the Fraser government's position on the complicated issue of recognising a 
government in Kampuchea. The ASEAN agenda was accepted in a United 
Nations resolution of 16 November 1979 which stated that the Khmer 
Rouge, under the leadership of Pol Pot, should be recognised as the 
legitimate government of Kampuchea.147 Given the immediate criticisms 
of the actions of Vietnam, the Fraser government could not recognise the 
Heng Samrin regime and thereiore maintained recognition of Pol Pot and 
the Khmer Rouge. ASEAN and China preferred this position and Australia 
was eager to agree.148 The Fraser government's support for the repressive 
Pol Pot regime was challenged within Australia as inappropriate and 
fundamentally unethical. 
'~- Britain l.e~d international opinion in late 1979 by withdrawing recognition 
of the Khmer Rouge regime. This simple exit from the difficulties did not 
involve recognition of the new regime. Fraser explained that Australia 
would not follow Britain because the withdrawal of recognition implied 
approval for the Heng Samrin regime. In fact, Britain had explicitly 
145 McCarthy, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1979, op. cit., p. 302. 
146 ibid., p. 301. Sinclair was Minister for Primary Industry. The decision was dated 23 
January 1979. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 172; 
Bell, Mr Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 415; R Bell, op. cit., p. 11; Millar, 
... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 7, and Sydney Morning Herald, 25 January 1979. Vietnam 
had previously asked for food supplies to help with relief in areas affected by floods and 
Australia's small aid programme of $7.1million was due to expire in June 1979. 
147 R Bell, op. cit., pp. 10-11. The UN resolution also stipulated that the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops was the basic prerequisite to any solution and that all states and humanitarian 
agencies should give economic and humanitarian aid on a non-discriminatory basis to 
Kampuchea's civilian population. 
148 ibid., pp. 11-13 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 
172-3. See also Angel, op. cit.F p. 226. 
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disavowed this implication.149 Fraser appeared to be wedded to the Khmer 
Rouge, or more accurately, aligned with ASEAN and China on Kampuchea, 
against the Labor Party, elements of the Liberal Party and domestic public 
opinion.150 Also, it became known that Peacock, with the support of some 
members of the Parliamentary Liberal Party, disagreed with the view of the 
Prime Minister.151 In line with Peacock, the public debate focused on the 
repressive nature of the Khmer Rouge. 
Further, Peacock consulted with the ASEAN foreign ministers in June 1980 
about the possibilift·;s of withdrawing recognition of the Khmer Rouge 
which evoked strong criticism from Thailand and Singapore. Lim claimed 
that, shortly thereafter, in a heated cabinet meeting, Peacock's 
recommendation to withdraw recognition of the Pol Pot regime was 
defeated.152 Nevertheless, public opinion on this issue was mounting 
against the government. By October 1980, the Prime Minister relented to 
domestic considerations over regional alliances in deciding to withdraw 
recognition of the Khmer Rouge: 
This means that Australia now does not recognise any regime in 
Kampuchea. Australia has no intention of recognising the Heng 
Samrin regime, condemns Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea 
and calls for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from that 
country. 
We are committed to a comprehensive political settlement in 
Kampuchea, and fully support the provisions of the ASEAN 
sponsored UNGA resolutions on Kampuchea.153 
149 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 173 an.d J.A.A. 
Stockwin, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January-June 1980, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, vol. 26, 3, 1980, p. 347. Renouf explained some of the international issues 
and criteria involved in the processes of recognition. Stockwin outlined the government view 
as expressed by Peacock in December 1979: 
The record of the Pol Pot administration on human rights was utterly 
reprehensible ... Indeed, Australia had made it abundantly clear, both in the 
United Nations and elsewhere, that it utterly abhorred and condemned the 
policies of that Government. However, perspectives of South-East Asia as seen 
from Europe were different from those of the nations and peoples nearer the 
region. In particular Australia could not accept Vietnamese intervention in 
Kampuchea. and its virtual occupation of that country. The Australian 
Government believed that to de-recognise would be interpreted as endorsing 
Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. This it was not prepared to do. 
>' 150 See Stockwin, ibid., p. 348. See also Milton OsboJlrne, Kampuchea: the crisis continues, 
"f Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 57, 6, November 1980 and Milton Osbo)lrne, Kampuchea: the 
politics of recognition, World Review, vol. 20, 2, June 1981. 
151 &..oe Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit, p. 173. 
152 Lim, op. cit., p. 9. Peacock offered to resign but was prevailed upon to remain. 
153 Backgrounder, no. 271, 18 February 1981, p. ill. See also Mediansky, op. cit, pp. 300-1. The 
official date of derecogn.ition was 14 February 1981. 
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The withdrawal of recognition was described as a 'small gesture of 
independence, a tiny but significant stand on principle' _154 This was a 
generous interpretation given the lapse of time required to decide and the 
imperative of electoral support. 
An additional aspect of the recognition problem was the representation of 
Kampuchea at the United Nations.. In 1979, the Khmer Rouge regime 
continued to be recognised by the United Nations which assisted the 
Australian government's early argument on recognition. The UN position 
was also a victory for the tactics of China and ASEAN, especially Singapore, 
which argued that the transfer of recognition to Heng Samrin would violate 
the principle of non-intervention. These considerations had been ignored 
with regard to Uganda and similar constrarnts had not influenced Australia 
and others on Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor_155 Similar to 
Australia's dilemma over Kampuchea, the United Nations could have 
withdrawn recognition of the Khmer Rouge without supporting Heng 
Samrin. 
At the United Nations General Assembly in 1980, Australia supported a 
recommendation to accept the credentials of 'Democratic Kampuchea', that 
is, the Pol Pot regime.156 In the revisiting of credentials in September 1981, 
Australia was again under pressure from ASEAN and China not to abstain 
on the Kampuchea seat, but to support the Khmer Rouge representatives. 
However, given the withdrawal of recognition by Australia earlier in the 
year, and in the context of increased public pressure from the electorate, the 
Fraser government decided to abstain. Australian relations with ASEAN 
did not appear to be strained by this decision.157 
The debates on Kampuchea also focused the personal and political struggles 
between Foreign Minister Peacock and Prime Minister Fraser. Peacock had 
not been consulted on the decision to cut Australian aid to Vietnam and 
indeed it appeared that the decision was taken at a time to exclude the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. There was also the long-standing difference of 
opinion between Fraser and Peacock over the recognition of the Pol Pot 
154 Millar, ... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 7. 
155 R. Bell, op. cit., p. 12. 
156 Lim, op. cit., p. 10. The vote to seat the Kampuchea delegation in the UNGA was taken 
on 14 October 1980. Australia voted in favour with the members of ASEAN, the United 
States, United Kingdom, China1 Japan, and Canada, among others. See also Russell H. 
Fifield, ASEAN, Kampuchea and the United Nations, Asia Pacific Community, no. 17, 
Summer 1982. 
157 Viviani, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to Dec~er 1981, op. cit., p. 18. 
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regime. Peacock resigned from the Fraser cabinet in April 1981 citing the 
issue of Kampuchea as a key determinant.1ss 
The complex political issues and diplomatic relations surrounding 
Kampuchea were central to defining the Fraser foreign policy and the role of 
Australia in the Asia Pacific region. The reaction to Vietnam's move into 
Kampuchea in late 1978 demonstrated the connections between 
international politics, regional alliances, relations with developing 
countries, the use of development assistance, and issues of recognition. In 
addition, the Fraser government was praised for accepting many refugees 
from Vietnam but this interpretation may have been overstated. Australia 
assisted the ASEAN countries in resettling refugees but the Fraser 
government was initially hesitant and appeared to be more concerned with 
relations with the region than the welfare of the refugees.159 
Further, the Fraser goveni.ment's approach to constructive relations with 
China and ASEAN on the recognition of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea 
inevitably forced Vietnam toward the SC!viet Union. Vietnam increasingly 
relied upon the Soviet Union for military and development aid.160 For the 
Fraser government, this created a more hostile strategic situation in the 
region, which required careful management of policies toward Vietnam and 
Kampuchea. By 1981, it could be argued that the Fraser government had 
been unsuccessful in key elements of policy on Vietnam and the Asia Pacific 
region. 
East Timor and Indonesia 
The issue of East Timor proved difficult for the Fraser government. The 
annexation of East Timor by Indonesia in December 1975 provoked 
sustained political debate and press coverage on Australia's forei.gn policy. 
As a cons,fquence, Australia's relationship with Indonesia was strained at 
times, and in a state of disrepair at other times. Indeed, Boyce captured the 
situation in stating that the 'East Timor issue impaled both the Whitlam 
and Fraser governments on the sharp horns of a moral dilemma' .161 The 
158 See Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 122, 28 April1981, pp. 1611-12. See also McCarthy, 
... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1979, op. cit., p. 301 and Renouf, Malcolm Fraser 
and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 75. 
159 Angel, op. cit., p. 226. 
160 Millar, ... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 7. 
161 P.J. Boycez Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to Decemb~r 1976, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 23, no. 1, April1977, p. 5. 
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early enthusiasm of both governments for the principle of national self-
determination for East Timor, with which Australia had shared friendly 
I'Ssociation through peace and war, slowly yielded to the long-term claims of 
national security and support for Indonesia ir. the Asia :?acific region. 
Australia's position on East Timor also illustrated the Fraser government's 
emerging policy toward developing countries. Fraser was caught between 
the historical support for Indonesia as a anti-communist bastion in South 
East Asia and the perceived need to support the people of East Timor against 
political oppression.l62 
In caretaker mode and subsequently as the elected government after the 
December 1975 federal election, Prime Minister Fraser adopted a stronger 
line than the Whitlam Labor government on Indonesia's actions in East 
Timor. On the day immediately prior to the election, Fraser directed that 
Australia should vote in the United Nations to maintain the territorial 
:integrity of East Timor and to refer the matter to the Security Council.l63 
This action effectively demonstrated Australia's opposition to the actions of 
Indonesia in East Timor. On this ... Fraser did not consult acting Foreign 
Minister Peacock or other countries in the region.164 Instead, Fraser acted 
quickly to direct the Australian vote in the United Nations. Therefore, irr 
the UN vote on 22 December 1975, Australia was in the majority that 
l62 On Timor, see Heinz Arndt, Timor: expediency or principle?, Quadrant, vol. 20, 5, May 
1976; Nancy Viviani, Australians and the Timor issue, Australian Outlook, vol. 30, 2, August 
1976; Denis Freney, Guerrilla war in East Timor, Australian Left Review, no. 52, 1976; James 
Dunn, East Timor: from Portuguese colonialism to Indonesia,t incorporation, Legislative 
Research Service, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 1977; Helen Hill, Timor: the politics of 
conscience, Arena, no. 46, 1977; Keith D. Suter, The conquest of East Timor, Contemporary 
Review, vol. 232, 1346, March 1978; Hilman Adil, The problem of East Timor in fr,e context of 
Indonesian-Australian relations, World Review, vol. 17, 4, October 1978; J.S. Dunn, The Timor 
affair in international perspective, World R~iew, vol. 17, 4, October 1978; Keith D. Suter, 
International law and East Timor, Dyason. House Papers, vol. 5, 2, December 1978; Nancy 
Viviani, Australians and the Timor issue: II, Australian Outlook, vol. 32, 3, December 1978; 
Noam Chomsky, The plight of East Timor, Australian Quarterly, vol. 51, 1, March 1979; 
Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, Benign ter.cor: East Timor, Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars, vol. 11, 2, April-June 1979; Scott Sidell, The United States and genocide in East 
Timor, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 11, 1, 1981; Pat Walsh, Intionesia in Timor, Arena, 
no. 57, 1981; Pat Waist, Timor Report: Whitlam and Hastings observed, Arena, no. 60, 1982; 
and James Dunn, Timor, a people betrayed, Jacaranda, Milton, 1983. 
163 See W.J. Hudson, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1975, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 22, 1, April1976, p. 4. See also Australian, 13 December 
1975. Tne General Assembly called on Indonesia to withdraw from Portuguese Timor by a vote 
of 72, including Australia, to 42, with 10 abstentions, including the US, Britain and 
Singapore. Gough Whitlam,. The Whitlam Government 1912-1975, Viking, Ringwood, 1985, 
p. 112. The political parties did not appear to be substantially different on East Timor. 
Peacock, as acting Foreign Minister, was critical of the approach of the Whitlam Labor 
government toward Indonesia's actions but Peacock also used the same argument as Whitlam 
in trying to simultaneously appease Indonesia and Fretilin while invoking Portugal as the 
responsible actor. 
164 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Fureign Policy, op. d.t., p. 78. 
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disapproved of the Indonesian action and sought urgent intervention from 
the Security Council to preserve the territorial integrity of East Timor .165 In 
the end, Portugal, as the former colonial power, invoked the Security 
Council on the position of East Timor thus relieving Australia and others of 
the need to act. 
The position of Australia in the United Nations was part of the rhetorical 
critique of Indonesia. "This stance reflected disappointment after much work 
was initiated by the Australian delegation during 1975 to negotiate a 
resolution to enable a genuine act of self-determination in East Timor.166 
From an Australian recom:.mendation, the Secretary-General d.ecided to 
send a UN envoy to report on the situation in East Timor. Strangely 
enough, the Australian government was entirely unhelpful in the 
facilitation of the envoy's visit to East Timor, somewhat weakening what, 
to many, was a firmer policy on Indonesia.167 
A further conundrum in this episode was the leaked. cable from the 
Australian Ambasf.ador to Indonesia., Richard Woolcott which urged the 
Fraser government to opt for the realist acceptance of the inevitable 
integration of East Timor. Adverse public reaction to this position in the 
context of evidence of severe repression in both Ind,·;;;{esia and East Timor 
provoked a rejection of th~ Ambassador's advice and pushed Australia 
somewhat closer to the Ur.lted Nations stance.168 Thus, in the early months 
of 1976, the relatively new Liberal and · ;'IU1"'1t:ry Parties government, with 
Peacock leading the argument, actively s ....... ,-norted the involvement of the 
United Nations in E1.st Timor. 
Furthet, the Fraser government advocated a cease-fire in East Timor, the 
resumption of humanitarian aid through the return of the International 
Red Cross, !! withdrawal of Indonesian forces and an act of self-
de·,;'~rmi..'"laticn. Also, during a visit to Jakarta in April 1976, Foreign 
11inister Peacock gained assurances from the Indonesian government 
concerning the involvement of the Red Cross, the withdrawal of 
Indonesian 'volunteers' and a further investigation of the deaths of five 
165 hudson, op. cit., p. 4 and Harry, op. cit., p. 91. 
166 Harry, ibid., p. 91, outlined the details of Australian recommendations to the Security 
Council on East Timor. See also Hudson, op. cit., p. 4, for an analysis from an alternative 
context. 
167 Richardson, op. cit., p. 333. For more information on the January 1976 visit of UN envoy, 
Dr. Winspeare-Guicciardi to Indonesia-controlled East Timor, see Harry, op. cit., p. 91. 
168 Richardson, op. cit., p. 333, and Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, 
op. cit., p. 5. 
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journalists at Balibo in October 1975.169 In addition, Australia refused to 
send an observer to a specially convened Popular Assembly in Dili on 31 
May 1976 which approved a petition to integrate East. Timor into fudonesia. 
This decision by the Fraser government apparently influenced the views of 
other countries which led to reports of Indonesian disquiet toward 
Australia.170 
Indeed, the Indonesian government might have expected that the Liberal 
and Country Parties government would bre more understanding and 
supportive of the annexation of East Timor. Indonesia could not 
understand why the Australian government was critical of a small matter of 
a few thousand troops in a neighbouring territory in the face of silent? in 
the region. According to Millar, the Fraser government did offer some 
assurance to Indonesia by accepting the result of the invasion but regretting 
the means of annexation and demonstrating this regret in the United 
Nations.171 Given Indonesia's expectations, the early view of Fraser on East 
Timor caused serious disruptions in the relationship with Indonesia.172 
Prime Minister Fraser attempted to clarify Australia's position on East 
Timor in the June 1976 foreign policy statement, and thereby reassure 
Indonesia, but the difficult policy choices simply, caused more ambiguity. 
Within a foreign policy analysis that prioritised security in the Asia Pacific 
region, Fraser outlined that Australia would maintain close relations with 
Indonesia. In this context, Australia would also support a genuine act of 
self-determination in East Timor.173 The Prime Minister intimated that this 
policy might be a point of difference with Indonesia. 
Indonesia might also have been concerned about the tactics of the Fraser 
government within the continuing hostile Parliamentary atmosphere of 
Australian party politics. At every opportunity, Foreign Minister Peacock 
used the East Timor issue to embarrass the Labor Party on the previous 
government's 'tacit or avowed support for Indonesian E!~Xpansion in 
Timor' .174 Peacock used East Timor as an excuse to criticise the m€'mbers of 
169 Richardson, op. cit., pp. 333-4. See also Australian, 17 April1976. 
170 See Richardson, ibid., p. 334. See also Australian, 2 June 1976 and Financial Review, 3 
June1976. 
171 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 423. See also Renouf, Australian I) 
Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 329. 
172 Mackie, ... From Whitlam to Fraser, op. cit., p. 5. 
173 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2739. 
174 See, for example, Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2748. 
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the Whitlam government in a personal and vindictive manner.175 For the 
Indonesian government, the Foreign Minister was intimating that the 
invasion of East Timor was a most unacceptable act and that Australia 
would defend the East Timorese people under a Liberal and Country Parties 
government. Some distance could be seen between the language used by 
the Prime Minister in the June statement ar~J the Foreign Minister only 
minutes later, albeit with different targets. 
For the remainder of 1976, the Fraser government became progressively less 
critical of Indonesia and thereby less vocal on the issue of East Timor. In 
July, the formal incorporation of East Timor as Indonesia's twenty-seventh 
province failed to enlist Australian recognition but did not provoke official 
protest from the Fraser government. ASEAN was not objecting to the 
Indonesian act, a majority of developing countries were not aroused and the 
United States seemed anxious to avoid offending Indonesia.l76 In August 
1976, Peacock promised that $250000 of aid would be sent to East Timor 
through the Indonesian Red Cross which was an abandonment of the 
Minister's earlier insistence that all aid be routed through international 
agencies. 
Subsequently, Prime Minister Fraser visited Indonesia where talks with 
President Suharto seemed to progress smoothly. There was an expectation 
that Australia would resolve the perceived dispute which had arisen over 
East Timor. The Prime Minister was briefed to accept de facto incorporation 
of East Timor into Indonesia but, believing this would cause political 
difficulties in Australia, Fraser declined to offer this support .._o Indonesia.177 
However, immediately following the talks, an Indonesian Mjnister 
informed the press that Fraser had offered de facto recognition of the East 
Timor annexation.178 This may have been the basis upon which Fraser 
claimed to have improved relations with Indones5.a. 
In the Parliament in October 1976, the debate on East Timor was reignited. 
The Labor Party argued a lack of confide.n ,_~ in the government 'because it 
175 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2749. In attacking Mick Young and thereby the 
whole Labor Party, Peacock claimed that East Timor was a constant reminder of the 
hypocrisy, the deceit and the avowed evasion of truth of the previous Labor government. 
176 Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., p. 5. See also J. 
Panglaykim, Indonesia's economic and business relations with other ASEAN countries, 
Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 4, 2/3/4, 1976. 
177 See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit, pp. 166-7. See also 
Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. cit., p. 329. 
178 Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit, p. 5. See also Renouf, 
Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy~ op. cit., pp. 166-7. 
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could not pursue and express a coherent and principled foreign policy'.179 
The debate covered allegations of secret undertakings on East Timor 
entertained by both Whitlam and Fraser, the accuracy of remarks, of 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik in conversation with the Canadian 
Foreign Minister in September 1976, and the cable from Ambassador 
Richard Woolcott to the Labor government in August 1975.180 The debate 
also included the link between Australia providing recognition of the 
annexation of East Timor with the negotiation of terms for the disputed 
Australia-Timor off-shore border. This was important for Australian oil 
exploration, particularly for the renewal of leases for Australian 
companies.1s1 
Further, on 20 October 1976 in the Parliament, Peacock attempted to restate 
the government's policy on East Timor. While Boyce suggested that 
Peacock almost conceded recognition of the Indonesian annexation of East 
Timor, the Minister for Foreign Affairs was balanced in stressing the context 
in which policy was constructed: 
This Government has not recognised Indonesia's incorporation 
of East Timor. On the other hand, for quite practical reasons such 
as the provision of humanitarian aid and the reuniting of 
families, we have to accept certain realities.182 
This ambiguous statement was variously interpreted as offering recognition 
of Indonesia's actions, or a clear rejection of the annexation of East Timor, 
or as a cautious foreign policy position. The domestic political agendas of 
com.m:entators, journalists and academics overshadowed the policy itself. 
Certainly, Peacock struggled with the principle of self-determination and the 
fact of invasion by Indonesia. At this time, however, the Fraser 
government's public position did not offer recognition of Indonesia's 
actions. 
Nevertheless, the public debate simmered beyond the government 
statements as intimations emerged from Indonesia and due to the 
179 Whitlam, Motion of Want of Confidence, CPD, HR, vol. 101, 12 October 1976, pp. 1718-23. 
The motion was resolved 32 in favnur, 83 against. 
180 See debate between vVhitlam, Fraser, Uren and Sinclair, CPD I HR, vol. 101, 12 October 
1976, pp. 1718-34. See also Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., 
p. 6; Age, 16 October 1976; Financial Review, 18 October 1976; and Richard Woolcott letter to 
Canberra Times, 27 October 1976. 
181 Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., p. 6. See also 
Whitlam, CPD, HR, vol. 101, 12 October 1976, p. 1720 and Financial Review, 19 Octobe 1976. 
182 In response to a question from Uren, CPD, HR, vol 101, 20 October 1976, p. 2016. 5£,. J3oyce, 
... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., p. 6. 
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importance of the border negotiations over oil in the Timor Sea. Millar 
demonstrated the tone of the discussions explaining that both the Labor 
Party and the Liberal Party: 
resorted to that hypocrisy which at times appears the only refuge 
of a democratic political party but which inevitably produces the 
worst of all worlds: conceding the inevitable in private while 
condemning it in public.183 
The mixed messages emerging from the press and, at times, from the Fraser 
government raised questions about the private guarantees offered to the 
Indonesian government against the public announcements for domestic 
political consumption. 
By late 1976, the Fraser government was keen to end debate on Australia's 
policy on East Timor. The Telecommunication Commission was instructed 
not to distribute any further messages from Fretilin forces in East Timor and 
several Fretilin 'ministers' were denied entry visas to Australia. While 
halting the links with East Timor which were promoting discussion and 
criticism of Indonesia, the Fraser government's position at the end of 1976 
was moving away from East Timor and tending to implicitly favour 
Indonesia. 
Again, the relationship with Indonesia was strained in early 1977 when 
allegations were raised that Indonesian troops had been involved in 
atrocities during the invasion of East Timor, particularly in Dili, in 
December 1975. Indeed, the chair of the Labor Party Defence and Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Gordon Bryant, called for an international inquiry into 
'Indonesian atrocities in Timor' _184 Further, the former Australian Consul 
in East Timor, Jim Dunn, reported to Peacock and gave evidence at the 
United States House Corn.mittee on International Relations on alleged 
atrocities in East Timor. In an extraordinary response, the Indonesian 
government threatened reprisals against Australia vnless Dunn became 
more retiring. Within Australia, discussions mentioned notions of 
blackmail by Indonesia against the Fraser government which, while not 
unfounded, signalled a diplomatic crisis.185 Peacock was conciliatory if 
somewhat submissive in explaining that the incident was a 'delicate 
183 Millar, ... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 6. See also J.A.C. Mackie, Australian-Indonesian 
relations, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 53, 5, October 1976. 
184 Bryant (ALP Member for Wills, Victoria) was speaking from Lisbon after interviewing 
groups CJf East Timorese refugees evacuated to Portugal. Age, 14 January 1977. See also 
McCarthv, ... Australian Foreign Pohcy, January to June 1977, op. cit, p. 340. 
185 McC~y, ibid., p. 341. 
.·· ... · --: .. . ~:.· ~ . .. .:·. :': .:-: -. 
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question affecting a bilateral relationship of high importance to Indonesia 
and Australia' _186 
The Fraser government continued to dampen any discussion of atrocities in 
East Timor. In practical terms, the government refused to be involved in a 
proposed visit to East Timor by several members of the Australian 
Parliament. In the end, Indonesie;\ refused to issue visas for a perceived 
intervention into their internal affairs.187 At the same time, the Labor Party 
could have been more critical of the Fraser government's policy on East 
Timor but the Labor Party was conducting an internal debate on the 
traditional support for Indonesia against the need to support the people of 
East Timor. At the 1977 ALP National conference, the delegates 
overwhelmingly endorsed a resolution to suspend military aid to Indonesia 
until all troops were withdrawn from East Timor. Whitlam spoke against 
these measures which moved file Labor Party caucus to threaten censure of 
the leader and to ask for an explanation.188 
In November 1977, the United Nations Decolonisation Committee passed a 
resolution to reject the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. The 
United States voted against this position while Australia abstained from the 
vote. Australia's diplomatic decision not to vote in favour nor against was 
designed to avoid unsettling the Indonesian government. Nevertheless, 
Australia's international policy displeased Indonesia as the abstention 
appeared to demonstrate a lack of support for the Indonesian government. 
Moreover, from 1977, Australia abstained on similar resolutions in the 
United Nations with many other member states while active criticism of 
Indonesia diminished. Australia also joined the members of ASEAN in 
abstaining on the resolution calling for Indonesia to withdraw from East 
Timor. Thus, it was suggested by Harry that Australia's voting pattern in 
the United Nations from 1977 offered de facto recognition of the 
incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia.189 
186 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 104, 16 March 1977, p. 343. Subsequently, it was revealed H-
while in Bali in September 1975, Peacock apparently assured Indonesia that the Lib . .U 
Party would not protest if Indonesia moved into East Timor. This meeting also incl· ~d an 
outline of how the Whitlam government would be dismissed. See National Tinu.. ·7 May 
1977. 
187 Albinski, op. cit., p. 8. See also Canberra Times, 7 September 1977, Age, 1 September 1977, 
and Sydney Morning Herald, 2 September 1977. 
188 See Albinski_, op. cit, p. 8. See also Age, 9 July 1977; Bulletin, 16 July 1977; Age, 22 
September 1977; and National Times£ 26 September 1977. 
189 Harry, op. cit., p. 91. 
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Shortly after the overwhelming re-election of the Liberal and Country 
Parties government in December 1977, Fraser formally announced 
recognition of the incorporation of East Timor as part of Indonesia.190 In 
domestic political terms, this was the opportune moment to declare a 
controversial decision. The Fret.ser government had gained an additional 
mandate, some said their first mandate, at the December 1977 federal 
election to direct Australia's domestic and foreign policies. Also, the Labor 
Party was demoralised and Whitlam resigned as leader of the Labor Party 
after the election. Further, the Parliament would not resume until 21 
February 1978 which denied an opportunity for immediate scrutiny of the 
government's decision on East Timor. In diplomatic terms, the position 
adopted by Australia in the United Nations, that is, to abstain on the 
Decolonisation Committee vote in November 1977, had foreshadowed an 
official announcement on East Timor by the Fraser government. 
The announcement to recognise the actions of Indonesia provoked 
substantial dissent in the Parliament and in the electorate.191 The critics of 
the government attributed the decision to pressure from the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, the business lobby, multinational companies and other 
governn~2nts. The dissenters questioned the assumption that Indonesia 
controlled the main administrative functions in East Timor and argued that 
Indonesia controlled only one-third of the territory. These criticisms were 
insufficient to shift the Fraser government.192 
Nevertheless, the clear denunciation of the Fraser government policy on 
East Timor allowed for easier arrangement of Australian participation in an 
oil exploration program in the Timor Sea. The ownership of the sea-bed 
between Australia and Timor had been in dispute. Portugal had argued that 
the mid point was the correct border whereas Australia claimed the area to 
the edge of the continental shelf. It was the region near the extremity of the 
190 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 423 and Bell, ... Australian Foreign Policy, 
January to June 1978, op. cit., p. 298. See also Peacock, Relations with Indonesia, in 
Backgrounder, no. 122, 27 January 1978, pp. 16-17 and Philip Eldridge, Recent trends and issues 
in Australia-Indonesia relations, Politics, vol. 13, 1, May 1978. On the 1977 election, see Don 
:z'\itken, Australia: another 23 years of Liberal rule?, World Today, vol. 34, 6, June 1978. 
191 Bell, .. .Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, op. cit, p. 296. In the Parliament, 
see Bowen, CPD, HR, vol. 108, 23 February 1978, p. 144; James, CPD, HR., vol. 108, 23 February 
1978, p. 179; Uren, CPD, HR, vol. 108, 23 February 1978, p. 190; Hodgman, CPD, HR, vol. 108, 7 
March 1978, pp. 485-8; Bowen question to Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 108, 13 Apri11978, pp. 1481-
2; Hodgman, Grievance debate, CPD, HR., vo1.109, 11 May 1978, pp. 2229-31; and Fry, question 
to Mackeller, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, CPD, HR, vol. 109, 7 June 1978, p. 
3152. 
192 Bell, .. .Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, op. cit., p. 296. See also Peacock, 
CPD, HR, vol. 109, 9 May 1978, p. 2038 and Bowen, CPD, HR, voL 109, 9 May 1978, p. 2051. 
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shelf in which the oil companies were hoping 'to find oil or gas. Australia 
and Indonesia had agreed to a common sea-boundary except for the crucial 
area under dispute due to the ambiguous status of the previous Portuguese 
territory.193 This issue was important for both Australia and Indonesia but 
was not explicitly included as a reason for the Fraser government's decision 
to recognise the incorporation of East Timor. 
Not surprisingly, the domestic debate on East Timor, or more accurately, the 
strong criticism of the government's policy toward Indonesia's actions in 
East Timor, continued in the Australian press and the electorate.194 This 
discussion was fuelled by further evidence in the press of atrocities 
committed by Indonesian troops in East Timor_195 The response of the 
Fraser government to the criticism demonstrated a continuing willingness 
to support the Indonesian government and the activities of the Indonesian 
armed forces in East Timor. Indeed, the interpretation of events by the 
Fraser government paralleled the official Indonesian view. After 
consulting Indonesia, the Australian government offered an additional 
$2million for relief work by the Indonesian Red Cross in conjunction with 
the International Committee of the Red Cross in the region. This allocation 
more than doubled Australia's contribution to humanitarian work in East 
Timor since 1975_196 
The problem for the Fraser government seemed to be the Indonesian 
government's inability to distinguish between the official Australian view 
and the perspectives offered in the Australian press. Thus, the relationship 
between the governments of Australia and Indonesia remained tense while 
the press repeatedly revealed new information and allegations about the 
Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Significantly, this issue was publicly 
193 Bell, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, op. cit., p. 296. On Australia's 
position in the Law of the Sea debates, see Henry S. Albinski, Problems in Australian Foreign 
Policy, January to June 1982, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 28, 3, 1982, p. 322, 
Millar, ... Australian foreign policy, July to December 1982, op. cit., p. 9, and Gerard A. 
Brennan, Australia and International Law, chapter 4 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., pp. 59-67, 
and see generally, Gene Hayden, Reopening the negotiations on the Law of the Sea treaty, 
International Perspectives, July-August 1981 and Anton Vratusa, The law of the sea 
convention, Review of International Affairs, vol. 33, 771, May 1982. 
194 R. Bell, op. cit., p. 15. See Sydney Morning Herald, 24 & 30 October 1979. 
195 Evidence uncovered by Peter Rodgers, and debate continued in Sydney Morning Herald, 31 
October, 1 & 5 November 1979, Age, 2 November 1979 and Australian, 3 November 1979. 
196 R. Bell, op. cit., p. 16. The total amount of Australian aid was $3.9million. However, 
Smith explained that Australia was also providing Indonesia with military aid. For the 
period 1976-1980, the Australian military aid program to Indonesia amounted to $6-
lOmillion per annum and included the transfer of Nomad aircraft and patrol craft for 
maritime surveillance. Also, Indonesian service personnel continued to attend training courses 
in Australia. See Hugh Smith, Defence Policy, chapter 3 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 49. 
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debated into the 1980s and, therefore, was troublesome for Fraser in every 
year of government.197 
By early 1983, and in preparation for a federal election, the Fraser 
government explicitly declared its support for Indonesia. Minister for 
Defence Sinclair visited Indonesia in January 1983. During this trip, Sinclair 
visited East Timor and thereby was the first Australian Minister to visit the 
disputed territory since annexation in 1975. The Minister for Defence stated 
the Australian government's strong support for th€' Indonesian 
administration of East Timor and blamed the poor conditions in East Timor 
on the years of Portuguese colonialism. Further, Sinclair accused the 
Australian media of reporting incidents with an inadequate understanding 
of the problems facing the Indonesian government.198 The Minister for 
Defence also sought to expand Australia's role in developing Indonesia's 
defence forces.199 As a prelude to the election campaign for a federal ballot 
on 5 March 1983, the statements by Minister Sinclair demonstrated a 
complete abandonment of East Timor in order to project the image of a 
close relationship with Indonesia. 
In conclusion, it was remarkable that the issue of East Timor was sustained 
as a point of contention for the entire term of the Fraser government. The 
status of East Timor"' and the actions of Indonesia in East Timor, appeared 
more prominent as a foreign policy issue than other international conflicts. 
In this context, it was striking that the Fraser government was willing to 
persist with an apparently unpopular Indonesia policy. Indeed, the Fraser 
government advocated that the interests of the East Timorese people should 
197 On the issue of Australian press coverage of East Timor, see Lim, op. cit., p. 12, including 
information on the publication of cables from J.R Walsh and G.J. Munster, eds, Documents on 
Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1968-75, Walsh and Munster, 1980; Viviani, 
... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1981, op. cit., pp. 7 & 18; Millar, .. .Australian 
Foreign Policy July-December 1982, op. cit., pp. 11-12; and Renouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , 
op. cit.7 p. 329. Specifically, on the disappearance of journalist Roger East in East Timor in 
1975, see Canberra Times, 23 October 1980, on alleged atrocities, see Australian, 9 October 
1981, and on reports that a serious famine was imminent in East Timor, see Australian, 3-4 
October 1981. In practical terms, the Indonesian government decided to close the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission office in Jakarta in mid 1980. Most of the notable press activity 
occurred before and after the federal election of 18 October 1980. See also Nancy Viviani, 
Australia-Indonesia relations - bilateral puzzles and regional perspectives, Australian 
Outlook, vol. 36, 3, December 1982. 
198 See Financial Reviewr 1 February 1983. See also Michael McKinley, Problems in 
Australian Foreign Policy January-June 1983, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 
29, 3, 1983, pp. 418-19. 
199 See Canberra Times, 26 January 1983. 
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be subordinated to the longer term security interests of the Asia Pacific 
region.2oo 
On the political agenda of the Fraser foreign policy, Bell questioned the lack 
of action by Australia on East Timor while Fraser actively opposed similar 
actions of Vietnam in Kampuchea. Moreover, it was clear that Fraser 
supported the anti-communist government of Indonesia while opposing 
the communist government of Vietnam.2o1 This may have been conceived 
as consistent by Fraser but appeared inconsistent in terms of arguing for the 
protection of peoples in developing countries. 
Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific 
The Fraser government understood Australia's relationships with Papua 
New Guinea and the island states of the South Pacific as primarily based on 
the allocation of development assistance. However, the allocation of aid, 
especially to the South Pacific, involved an explicit security agenda which 
aimecl. to minimise the influence of the Soviet Union in the region. 
Relations with Papua New Guinea were also based on the historical 
Australian support of the PNG economy, and on an emerging arrangement 
for defence cooperation. Also, the Fraser government's relations with the 
island states of the South Pacific combined the concerns on s~curity, the 
need for increased aid, the idea of exclusive fishing zones, and improved 
diplomatic contacts. Significantly, over the term of the Fraser goverrunent, 
Australia demonstrated a greater commitment to the South Pacific region, 
principally through increased aid allocations. For the Fraser government, 
relations with both PNG and the South Pacific were framed by a foreign 
policy which prioritised the need for improved alliances with developing 
countries. 
In the Prime Minister's June 1976 statement, Papua New Guinea was 
reaffirmed as Australia's highest priority for the aid program. Fraser 
emphasised the five year aid package of $180million per year, which 
represented a substantial increase in Australian assistance to PNG.202 By 
200 See also Boyce, The Foreign Policy Process, op. cit, p. 23, on the influence of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. 
201 R Bell, op. cit., p. 17. 
202 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2739. See also Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 
1976, p. 2748 attack on the record of the Whitlam Labor government, specifically the 
intimation that Whitlam had reduced the amount of aid to Papua New Guinea. 
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November 1977, Australia had agreed to allocate an additional $35million to 
PNG for 1978-79. At this stage, Papua New Guinea was r~ceiving 52 percent 
of Australia's total aid budget.203 With the visit to Australia of the PNG 
Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan in December 1980, a new aid agreement was 
signed to provide budget support grants of at least $1326million in the five 
year period from 1981 to 1986. Prime Minister Chan expressed satisfaction at 
Australia's aid program and called for increased Australian investment in 
PNG.204 Thus, Australia's relationship with Papua New Guinea was based 
on t.he levels of aid allocated for budgetary support, which included the costs 
of Australian personnel working in PNG. Indeed, the Fraser government 
built upon the commitments of the Whitlam government to Papua New 
Guinea.2os 
As part of the aid relationship, issues of defence were central to Australia's 
policy toward Papua New Guinea. Interim defence arrangements provided 
for the continuation of Australian military assistance after independence in 
September 1975.206 In January 1977, the governments of Australia and PNG 
reached formal agreement on the Status of Forces Arrangement and 
procedures to ensure effective consultation.207 In addition to development 
assistance, Australia allocated $11-15million per annum for military aid to 
Papua New Guinea, the largest amount of Australian military assist.ance.2os 
203 Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1977, op. cit., p. 11. See also 
Australian, 19 December 1977 and National Times, 19 December 1977. 
204 Lim, op. cit., p. 14. The aid agreement with PNG followed recommendations from Sir John 
Crawford. In defence of the untied grant arrangements with PNG, see John D. Conroy, Aid 
from the Recipients' Viewpoint: Disturbing Possibilities for Papua New Guinea, Australian 
Outlook, .vol. 34, 2, August 1980, pp. 959-970. See also Eldr.idge, Diplomacy, Development..., 
op. cit., pp. 4 & 22 and Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1977, op. cit., 
p.ll. 
205 On Papua New Guinea, see gent:'rally, After independence, New Guinea and Australia, 
the Pacific and South East Asia, (series of articles), val. 10, 4, 1975-76; R. Gerard Ward and 
J.A. Ballard, In their own image: Australia's impact on Papua New Guinea and lesson for 
future aid, Australian Outlook, vol. 30, 3, December 1976; D.J. Baker, Papua New Guinea 
review1 Australian Quarterly, vol. 49, 1, March 1977; Keith D. Suter, Papua New Guinea, 
Contemporary Review, vol. 230, 1334, March 1977; Jim D. Stevenson and Neil Dias 
Karunaratne, The need and criteria for the sectoral programing of Australian aid to Papua 
New Guinea, Developing Economics, vol. 16, 2, June 1978; Roger Berry, Papua New Guinea 
review, Australian Quarterly, vol. 50, 3, September 1978; Ulli Beier, Papua New Guinea: the 
first three years of independence, Quadrant, vol. 22, 12, December 1978; Nonie Sharp, Papua 
New Guinea: Indonesia's next domino?, Arena, no. 52,1979; and H. Burmester, The Torres 
Strait Treaty: ocean boundary delimitation by agreement, American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 76, 2, April1982. 
206 In 1976, 400 Australian service personnel were on loan to the PNG Defence Force with an 
additional250 personnel in other units or administrative positions. Over time, the number of 
loan personnel was reduced as PNG staff were trained. Smith, op. cit., p. 49. 
207 See Killen, CPD, HR, vol. 103, 23 February 1977, pp. 345-6. 
208 s .th 't. 49 rm , op. c , p. . 
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The defence relationship became complicated in 1978 when Indonesian 
armed forces continued to cross the PNG border in an attempt to apprehend 
West Irian activists. At a diplomatic level, Australia was placed in the 
invidious position between PNG and Indonesia. The Fraser government 
decided not to assist PNG against Indonesia.zo9 The border issue provoked 
debate in the Australian Senate on the need for a formal military alliance 
with PNG. In the end, however, no formal defence treaty was 
contemplated.210 
In contrast, Australia's support for the PNG armed forces was displayed in 
1980 with the suppression of a separatist rebellion in Vanuatu. At 
independence, the government of Vanuatu called upon PNG troops to 
move against a group of rebels on the island of Espiritu Santo to restore law 
and order. Australia agreed to permit twenty Australian service personnel 
to support the PNG force in Vanuatu.211 This action by the Fraser 
government also reflected the level of concern for regional security in the 
South Pa:cific. 
On the South Pacific, Fraser was apprehensive about the level of Soviet 
influence in the region. In particular, the Soviet Ambassador to New 
Zealand Selyaninov, visited Tonga in April 1976 to meet with King 
Taufa'ahau Tupou IV. At first, Australia and New Zealand did not appear 
overly concerned. However, reactions became L.'1.ore vociferous when it 
appeared that the Soviet Ambassador had offered economic assistance to 
expand the airport at Fuamotu, one of the King's favourite projects, In 
exchange for a servicing base for the Soviet Pacific fishing fleet.z12 
The Fraser government used the South Pacific Forum held in Nauru on 26-
28 July 1976, to consult with the independent island states.213 The leader of 
209 Barclay, op. cit., p. 14. 
210 Senator Durack, acting for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, CPD, SP..nate, vol. 78, 12 
September 1978, p. 513, in response to a question from Senator Sibraa, explained that the 
defence relationship had been set out in the joint statement issued by Prime Ministers Somare 
ana: Fraser on 11 February 1977, See also Senator Sibraa question, CPD, Senate, vol. 79, 19 
October 1978, p. 1499, concerning the government's view of the various issues related to the 
West Irian-New Guinea border conflict. See also Smith, op. cit., p. 49, with regard to the 
need for a defence treaty. 
211 See Smith, ibid., p. 49 and RA. Herr, Australia and the South-West Pacif:~, chapter 17 
in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 283. 
212 Herr, ibid., p. 280. See also Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, J~y to December 1976, op. 
cit., p. 4 and see generally, Alexander lv!alyashkin, USSR, the Pacific, Pacific Islands 
Monthly, vol. 49, 1, January 1978 and P.J. Boyce, Gr~t powers in the Southwest Pacific, 
World Review, vol. 18, 3, August 1979. 
213 The South Pacific Forum included the Prime rvfinisters of all the independent island 
states, with New Zealand and Australia. 
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t..lte Australian delegation, Senator Cotton, warned the South Pacific leaders 
against assuming that Soviet involvement in the region would be benign. 
This note of caution was not reflected in the final communique of the 
Forum but the exchange of views may have persuaded the Tongan Prime 
Minister to postpone a decision on th~ Soviet offer.214 
Only a week later, at the ANWS Council meeting in Canberra, the issue of 
Soviet influence in the South Pacific was raised with the United States. To 
the surprise and disappointment of the Australian and New Zealand 
govetnments, the United States seemed less concerned with thf: activities of 
the Soviets and did not regard the ANZUS Treaty as pertinent to the island 
states of the South Pacific.21s It transpired that the UniteJ States had 
assumed that Australia and New Zealand would accept military 
responsibility for the island states. Adding to the surprise of the Fraser 
government, there was an ill-concealed suspicion among US State 
Department officials that Australia and New Zealand had overreacted to the 
Soviet initiatives in the South Pacific in order ·to involve the US i.T"L the 
region, and thereby share the security responsibilities.216 
As a result of the discussions on the Soviet activities, the ANZUS meeting 
concluded that Australia and New Zealand would provide greater priority 
to the South Pacific in their development assistance programs. The United 
States also promised n1ore aid to the region. This reflected the perceived 
need to strengthen regional institutions and to provide assistance as a 
means of countering the Soviet initiatives in the South Pacific.217 Thus, 
over the 1976-78 triennium, Australia allocated $60million in untied 
economic aid to the members of the South Pacific Forum.218 
214 Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., p. 4. 
215 Herr, op. cit., p. 280. The US government maintained that if there had been any coverage 
extending to the independent island states, it had arisen solely because the islands were 
dependent tenitories of Australia or New Zealand. As independent states, the status of the 
islands was different and the implications for the United States were minimised. 
216 See ibid., pp. 280-1. 
217 Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., p. 4. See also Herr, op. 
cit., p. 281. By 1977, it becamf:; {~~~{JMent that the Soviet threat .:....1 the region had been 
overstated. While establishinr~ . .~C~cial relations with Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa, the 
Soviets were unwilling to exter.t.,: md tc the South Pacific. The Soviet diplomatic actions 
provided credibility to the view thac ~1:\e purpose of the overtures to Tonga was to counter 
China in the region. In contrast, China was never regarded as a cause for concern despite 
establishing permanent missions in Suva in Apri11975 and Apia in October 1976. 
218 Boyce, .. .Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., p. 4 and Herr, op. cit., 
p.281. 
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In the context of assistanc~ to the South Pacific" the Fraser government 
supported the idea of a 200-mile fishing zone around each island state. At 
the South Pacific Forum meeting held in Port Moresby in August 1977, the 
members agreed to establish. the fishing or economic zones as quickly as 
possible 'to the fullest extent permissible under international law'.219 The 
meeting also agreed to establish a South Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency 
open to all South Pacific countries 'who support the sovereign rights of the 
coastal state to conserve and manage living resources including highly 
migratory species in its 200-mile zone'.220 Significantly, the Fisheries 
Agency would be temporarily housed in Australia, denoting a. level of 
support from the Fraser government. 
The fishing zones were designed to provide an element of economic 
security for the small island economies of the South Pacific. The anticipated 
improvement in access to fishing stocks and the promotion of future 
fishing stocks clearly proved attractive to the members of the South Pacific 
Forum. However, the implementation of the fishing zones by the island 
states implied exclusive access to several million square kilometres of the 
South Pacific. This situation would not be readily accepted by the major 
fishing powers, namely the Soviet Union and Japan.221 Despite this, 
Australia provided support for the aspirations of the South Pacific island 
states which may have involved issues of security a.Yld political alignment 
as well as economic development. 
Related to the heightened sensitivity on the South Pacific, Australia 
undertook to secure closer diplomatic relations with the region. Following 
the pr~cess of decoloniscJ:ion in the South Pacific, Australia established 
High Commissions in Apia (1977), Honiara (1978), Nuku'alofa (1979) and 
Vila (1980). This irtcrease in diplomatic representation was conducted 
despite the reductions in funding in other areas of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs.222 
219 Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1977, op. cit., p. 11 and Millar, 
Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 429. On the implications of law of the sea problems, 
see Financial Reuiew, 16 September 1977. 
210 :Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 429. See also Albinski, ... Australian 
Foreign Policy, July to December 1977, op. cit., p. 11. 
221 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 429. See also Herr, op. cit., p. 282. 222 Herr, ibid., pp. 281 & 284. See Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
Australia and the South Padfic, AGPS, Canberra, 1978. This inquiry was initiated after 
prompting from Senator Knight. See presentation of the report by the committee chair, 
Senator Sim, CPD, Senate, vol. 76,13 April1978, pp. 1245-9. 
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However, at the political and diplomatic levels, relations with Fiji tended to 
overshadow Australia's attempt to improve and diversify official contacts 
in the region. Fiji had been central to Australia's commercial, political and 
social activities in the South Pacific for many years. Ab0,, Fiji retained a pre-
eminent position in the region given its relative size, population, location 
and economic base. For these reasons, Fiji received the largest share of 
Australian aid to the region and more than half of the commercial 
investments from Australia.223 Further, Fiji served as Australia's 
diplomatic point of access to the South Pacific as the Australian mission in 
Suva had, until the mid 1970s, co-ordinated ancillary services for the 
Commonwealth to the other island states. While Fiji continued to host a 
number of important regional bodies, it was clear that Australian bilateral 
relations with Fiji would remain central despite the expansion of direct 
relations with the region.224 
Also at the diplomatic level, Prime Minister Fraser initiated a 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting in Sydney in 
February 1978. The conference included Commonwealth leaders from 
South Asia, South East Asia and the South Pacific.22s Fraser was attempting 
to assist the island states of the South Pacific, and otber smaller states in the 
Asia Pacific region, to broaden their diplomatic outlets and to establish a 
wider community in the Pacific area.226 
The idea of regional Commonwealth meetings appeared attractive to the 
South Pacific members because the general Commonwealth conferences 
tended to be dominated by African issues. The opportunity to discuss other 
issues, if not particularly regional topics, was attractive.227 Further, Fraser's 
attempt to provide some specialisation was predicated upon the 
maintenance of the larger Commonwealth membership and agenda. The 
regional Commonwealth conference was seen to be a constructive initiative 
223 Herr, op. cit., pp. 284-5. 
224 ibid., p. 285. 
225 Fraser had issued invitations for the regional meeting during the 1977 CHOGM in London. 
See Bell, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, op. cit., p. 292, Renouf, Malcolm 
Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 135 and Harry, op. cit., p. 96. 
226 Hen:, op. cit., p. 287. The initiative revived an idea proposed by Evatt in the 1940s on 
Commonwealth regionalism. See also Margot Simington, Australian Relations with the 
Pacific Islands, World Review, vol. 17, August 1979, pp. 60-1. 
227 Bell, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, op. cit., p. 293. See also Herr, op. 
cit., p. 287 and see generally, W.T. Roy, Regionalism in U:e South West Pacific, Rou~~ Table, 
no. 274, Apri11979, Richard Herr, Cross-cutting pressures m contemporary South Pacific . 
regionalism, World Review, vol. 18, 3, August 1979 and A.S.B. Olver, The Commonwealth m 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Round Table, no. 284, October 1981. 
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which was to enhance the work of Kt.~' biennial Heads of Government 
meetings. 
The scheduled Sydney CHOGRM was relocated to the town of Bowral 
following the explosion of a bomb at the hotel venue immediately prior to 
the meeting.228 Nevertheless, the CHOGRM was productive and the 
participants agreed to establish four consultative groups on trade, energy, 
drugs and terrorism. Fraser claimed that this outcome represented a 'strong 
commitment to practical cooperation' among the Commonwealth 
members.229 It was agreed to meet again in September 1980 in New Delhi 
where the regional Commonwealth Heads of Government added two 
further groups on industrial issues and cooperation in agricultural research 
and development.230 The continu, ~0n of working groups formalised the 
regional cooperation but these groups did not publish outcomes from talks 
which suggested that the interaction was merely a reason to meet without 
the imperative to produce outcomes.231 
Subsequently, the regional Commonwealth Heads of Government met in 
Suva in October 1982. On balance, there was some argument amongst a lot 
of agreement. In Suva, following from the goodwill produced during the 
Commonwealth Games in Brisbane, Prime Minister Fraser announced the 
provision of ten scholarships for athletes from developing Commonwealth 
countries to attend the Australian Institute of Sport in Canberra. Fraser 
gained strong support from the meeting when reiterating the need to reduce 
protectionism but Australia needed to bolster this position with greater 
action in domestic trade and industry policies.232 
In sum, the Fraser government had substantially increased Australia's 
commitment to the South Pacific through increased aid contributions. In 
1975, Australia was third amongst aid donors to the region but by 1980, 
Australia had become the primary external source of assistance to the island 
228 Bell, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, op. cit., pp. 292-3. The explosive 
devise was planted outside the Sydney hotel and was accidentally detonated, killing two 
people. See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Forei~ Policy_, op. ~t., pp. 135-6. ., 
229 Fraser in Renouf, ibid., p. 135. See also Bell, ... Australian Foragn Policy, January to Jun-
1978, op. cit., p. 292 and Harry, op. cit.r P· 96. 
230 Fraser, CPD, ~ vo1.119, 11 September 1980, p.1200 and text of Commonwealth 
communique from New Delhi, CPD ,~ HR, vol. 119, 11 September 1980, pr. 1201-6. 
231 See Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., ¥· 136. See also 
Hayden critique, CPD, HR, vol. 119, 11 September 1980, p. 1206. 
232 Millar, ... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 10. 
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states of the South Pacific.233 This shift in Australia's role seemed to 
provide some concerns for New Zealand which had previously carried 
responsibility for South Pacific issues. 
The relationships constructed by the Fraser government with Papua New 
Guinea and the island states of the South Pacific incorporated the 
sometimes conflicting issues of development assistance, trade, security, and 
diplomacy. The Australian foreign policy agenda in the South Pacific was 
also an attempt by Fraser to improve relations with the developing 
countries in the Asia Pacific region. Again, this approach t~nded to be 
couched in the language of security for Australia and the reg ;on. 
Aid policy 
The aid policies of the Fraser government termed part of tJ:-.e attempt to 
promote relations with developing countries. This link brought aid and 
foreign policy closer in the international outlook of the Fraser government. 
Not surprisingly, diplomatic goals tended to dominate in the formulation of 
aid policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs was central to this 
process.234 The Prime 1.finister was also instrumental in directing aid in the 
construction of foreign policy. Fraser was assisted by the lack of attention 
paid to aid policy by the eleCtorate and the Parliament which provided 
substantial scope for manoeuvre. 
Generally, the Fraser government attempted to expand relations with 
developing countries but implemented domestic economic policies which 
limited the growth in aid levels. The result of this collision tended to be 
determined by financial considerations rather than by development 
objectives for aid.235 Specifically, the Fraser government made some initial 
changes to aid policy in reaction to initiatives of the Whitlam government. 
Fraser also used aid for overt political purposes and shifted the geographical 
233 See Herr, Australia and the South·West Pacific, op. cit., p. 279. On the South Pacific in 
1981-82, see E.G. Whitlam, New nations and old impetlalism, Australian Outlook, vol. 35, 1, 
April 1981; RA. Herr, The South Pacific in the eighties and nineties, Current Affairs 
Bulletin, vol. 58, 7, December 1981; Malcolm Salmon, Australia and the Islands: a mutual 
trust, a mutual watchfulness, Pacific Islands Monthly, vol. 53, 4, Apri11982; E.K Fisk, 
Development and aid in the South Pacific in the 1980s, Australian Outlook, vol. 36, 2, August 
1982; and Walter Lini, Australia and the South Pacific: a Vanuatu perspective, Australian 
Outlook, vol. 36, 2, August 1982. 
234 Eldridge, Diplomacy, Development ... , op. cit., pp. 1 & 6 and Viviani, Aid Policies and 
Programmes, op. cit, p. 121. 
235 Viviani, ibid., and Eldridger Diplomacy, Development ... , op. cit, PP· 1-2. 
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distribution of aid. Further, over time, the Fraser government reduced the 
level of aid and substantially changed the administration of aid policy. 
In the initial months of government, Fraser made a number of changes 
relating to aid policy, most obviously in the administration of aid and the 
level of aid. The Whitlam Labor government had attempted to recruit staff 
dedicated to aid policy and some effort had been made to reach the United 
Nations aid target of 0.7 percent of Gross National Product. Thus, there was 
a brief controversy in February 1976 when the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
announced a reduction of $21.5million in foreign aid, including $5.3million 
in food aid anq $12million in multilateral aid. vVhile other areas of 
government were:: also experiencing financial restrictions, the cuts in aid 
allocations were much greater than average, given more than half the aid 
budget of $385.5million went to Papua New Guinea.236 The substantial 
reductions in both food aid and multilateral aid also indicated a greater 
impact on the poorest countries, particularly Africa, rather than regional 
neighbours which were allocated bilateral aid for particular projects. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Fraser government decided to maintain food 
aid to Mozambique. During the 1975 election campaign, Fraser had been 
critical of Whitlam government policies toward Africa but decided to 
uphold the 1975 CHOGM commitment of $1million food aid to the Marxist 
government of Mozambique. This allocation of aid in the form of skim-
milk powder was understood as compensation for costs incurred in 
enforcing sanctions against Rhodesia.237 The maintenance of this aid may. 
have been based on Fraser's personal attraction to the Commonwealth as an 
institution which was capable of influencing international conflicts. It was 
also significant that this decision to continue a Whitlam government 
inl~ative emerged against resistance from some in the Liberal Party who 
supported the minority government in Rhodesia.238 
Also in the early months of government, the status of aid policy was 
downgraded with the abolition of the Australian Development Assistance 
Agency and the incorporation of aid administration into the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. This move clearly reinforced the connection between aid 
236 Richardson~ op. cit., p. 335. The cut of $21million represented a relatively large 
proportion of the remaining $175m.illion. The decision announced by Peacock on 4 Febr:rary 
1976 was criticised by aid agencies and commentators. See Age, 7 February 1976 and Canberra 
Times, 11 Febn·~'IY 1976 & 27 April1976. 
237 Higgott, op. O:t, p. 247 and David Goldsworthy, Australia's Southern Africa Policy, 
World Review, vol. 17, June 1978, p. 60. 
238 ibid. See also Australian, 9 March 1976. 
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and foreign policy. Moreover, the restructuring of aid administration 
accorded partly with economic considerations and partly with the Fraser 
government understanding that aid should be an expression of foreign 
policy.239 
Further, in the June 1976 statement, the Prime l\1inister provided an early 
indication of the direction of aid policy. As stated, Fraser explicitly 
connected problems of poverty with the potential for conflict and criticised 
the industrial countries for limiting trade with the developing countries.240 
Fraser also linked regional strategic cooperation with the aim of increased 
aid and trade.241 It was clear from the Prime Minister's emphasis that aid 
would be used to complement security and strategic elements of foreign 
policy. This approach to developing countries openly advocated the use of 
aid to blunt any attempts by the Soviet Union to influence poor countries 
through ec~nomic assistance.242 The Fraser government demonstrated this 
view by increasing aid to Tonga when there was a perception of Soviet 
interest and by withholding aid to Vietnam in retaliation for the 
intervention into Kampuchea.243 Similarly, aid was channelled to East 
Timor through the Indonesian Red Cross in an attempt to promote 
relations with Indonesia and thereby encourage regional security.244 The 
political content of Australian aid was also demonstrated with a decline in 
Australian aid to India following the signing of the USSR-India friendship 
treaty and the allocation of aid to the Philippines for development of 
Mindanao and Saman where insurgency and rebellion continued.245 
The political dimension of Australian aid could also be seen in the regional 
distribution of development assistance. Australian aid to Papua New 
Guinea was committed in five year allocations for non-project budgetary 
support. The aid for PNG dominated the Australian aid budget but required 
239 Richardson, op. cit., p. 335, Viviani, .Aid Policies and Programme!'>, op. cit., p. 122 and 
Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., pp. 429-30. 
240 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2736. 
241 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2739. 
242 See Eldridge, Diplomacy, Development ... , op. cit., p. 13 and Albinski, ... Australian 
Foreign Policy, July to December 1977, op. cit., p. 11. See also Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and 
Australian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 193. 
243 See Renouf, ibid., pp. 172 & 177, McCarthy, ... Australian Fore~~ Poll~, January to June 
1979, op. cit., p. 301 and Herr, Australia and the South-West P~cific,_ op. crt., P· 280. ~e also 
Millar, ... More of the same ... , op. cit., p. 7 and Re..."1ouf, Australian Diplomacy ... , op. c1t., P· 
324. 
244 See Boyce, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., p. 5 and R. Bell, op. 
cit., p. 16. 
245 Viviani, Aid Policies and Programmes, op. cit, p. 123. On defence aid, mostly to the 
region, see Smith, op. cit, pp. 48-9. 
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little administrative monitoring. Apart from Papua New Guinea, the 
members of ASEAN received a large share of the Australian aid budget. For 
example, the Fraser government contributed $20million over a five-year 
period toward an extensive rural aid program in the Philippines, promised 
an additional $10million for joint ASEAN development projects, and 
offered $90million in bilateral aid to individual ASEAN members.246 This 
aid did not placate the ASEAN demands for greater trade access to 
Australian markets. 
Aid to the South Pacific was placed in the context of proposed Soviet 
involvement with some island states. In October 1976, Foreign Minister 
Peacock announced a 300 percent increase in Australian aid commitments 
to the South Pacific states.247 The island states also wanted greater trade 
access to Australia but, rather than reduce tariffs, the Fraser government 
agreed to establish the South Pacific Trade Commission in Sydney in 1979. 
By 1982, Australia had become the principal aid donor in the region with 
the consequence of frustrating the efforts of the South Pacific states to 
diversify aid sources.24S 
Australian aid to Africa was not significant in absolute terms. Aid was 
committed for educational s'upport under the Special Commonwealth 
African Assistance Plcn and the Commonwealth Cooperation in Education 
Scheme. Also, food aid increased over time and Australia was keen to 
increase project aid to Africa. The political significance of bilateral aid was 
more important than the level of aid. For example, Fraser allocated 
$11million to Zimbabwe immediately after independence. Multilateral aid 
was small and dispensed to Africa through international organisations such 
as the UN Trust Fund for South Africa, ·liN Fund for Namibia and the 
Special Commonwealth Fund for Zimbabweans.249 
In terms of the level of aid, the Fraser government announced a reduction 
in aid in February 1976 and there was further pressure to reduce all 
elements of government spending in the August 1976 budget. For 1976-77, 
the aid allocation was $378million which represented 0.46 percent of GNP.250 
246 See Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to DecE'.mber 1977, op. cit, pp. 10-12 and 
Angel, op. cit., p. 231. See also Philip Eldridge, Australia's overseas aid programme, Current 
Affairs Bulletin, vol. 55, 9, February 1979. 
247 Boyce, .. .Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, op. cit., p. 4. 
248 Herr, Australia and the South-West Pacific, op. cit., p. 287. 
249 See Higgott, op. cit., pp. 255-6. . . 
250 While the amount of funds increased, the percentage of GNP declined. See Eldridge, 
Diplomacy, Development •.. , op. cit., p. 3. Bickerdyke, op. cit., F· 5, argued that the 
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There were proportional increases in multilateral aid and in allocations to 
non-government aid groups, and the decision to untie project aid was 
reaffirmed.251 In subsequent budgets, the Fraser government maintained 
the level of aid at about 0.45 percent of Gross National Product.2s2 
Australian development assistance 1975 to 1983 253 
total aid budget %change %of GNP 
1975-76 346.9m 5.7 0.50 
1976-77 378.3m 9.1 0.46 
1977-78 418.4m 10.6 0.47 
1978-79 460.5m 10.1 0.45 
1979-80 500.2m 8.6 0.43 
1980-81 568.0m 13.6 0.44 
1981-82 657.8m 15.8 0.45 
1982-83 727.2m 10.6 0.46 
Significantly, the Fraser government maintained the level of aid despite 
pressure from Treasury to reduce aid allocations.254 Moreover, in a climate 
percentage of GDP declined from 0.60 in 1975 to 0.42 in 1976. Albinski, ... Australian Foreign 
Policy, July to December 1977, op. cit., p. 11 claimed that the 1976 budget did not change the 
level of aid in real terms while Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 429, stated 
that the Fraser government did not reduce aid in its first budget. 
251 Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1977, op. cit., p. 11: See also 
Peacock, CPD, HR, vol.109, 9 May 1978, pp. 2033-4. 
252 In 1981, Hayden was critical of the level of aid allocated by the Fraser government. The 
leader of the Labor Party explained that: 
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product on official development aid. [the highest level was actually 0.56 percent 
in 1974-75] We were on the threshold of fulfilling our commitment to be one of 
the few countries in the world providing 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product as 
official development aid. 
Hayden also claimed that a T~abor government would reach the UN objective of 0.7 percent of 
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percent of GDP by, at the L ,cest, 1990. Hayden, CPD, HR, vol. 125, 13 October 1981, p. 1902. 
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exaggerated and unbelievable. 
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Development Assistance Programme 1982-83, Budget Paper no. 9, Canberra, August 1982 and 
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254 See Eldridge, Diplomacy, Development ... , op. cit., p. 7. 
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of financial constraint, the Prime Minister seemed to protect aid allocations 
over a long period of time. Indeed, Fraser must have won the fiscal 
argument that the level of aid was important in the process of achieving 
diplomatic and strategic foreign policy goals. This was a demonstration of 
the role played by Fraser that this argument prevailed, to a greate7: or lesser 
extent, for seven budgetary processes. 
Similar to the maintenance of the level of aid, Fraser, Peacock and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs won the argument with Treasury on aid 
policies and aid administration.2ss While Treasury wanted to reduce aid 
funding, including funds for aid administration, Fraser and Peacock had an 
interest in maintaining aid levels and aid administration capabilities in 
order to pursue diplomatic goals. At the margins, the Department of Trade 
attempted to link more closely issues of aid and trade. This argument had 
little influence on the foreign policy orientation of aid but the Department 
of Trade was successful in establishing the Development Import Finance 
Facility.256 
The structure of aid administration as the Australian Development 
Assistance Bureau within the Department of Foreign Affairs suited the aims 
of both Fraser and Peacock. However, by 1980, ADAB staff had been reduced 
by thirty percent, with the only consolation that the Bureau had survived 
Treasury pressure for abolition.257 At this time, the Auditor-General 
reviewed aid administration which caused a reorganisation of ADAB.2ss 
This was immediately followed by the Review of Commonwealth 
Functions after the 1980 federal election which examined all government 
spending. From this, there was an attempt to make further savings in aid 
administration which eroded the relative autonomy of ADAB. This process 
included more reductions in staff while actually causing additional costs.259 
In response to the Auditor-General's review, the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts provided a report on Australia's Bilateral 
255 ibid., pp. 18 & 35. 
256 ibid., p. 23. On the issue of a greater role for commercial interests in the aid program, see 
Viviani, Aid Policies and Programmes, op. cit., p. 124. See also G.R. Webb, Australia's 
official development assistance: some future considerations, Australian Outlook, vol 36, 1, 
April1982. 
257 Viviani, Aid Policies and Programmes, op. cit., p. 122. 
258 See Auditor-General, Report on an Efficiency Audit: Administration of Australia's 
Bilateral Overseas Aid Program by the Australian Development Assistance Bureau~ AGPS, 
Canberra, 1981. 
259 Eldridge, Diplomacy, Development ... 1 op. cit., p. 36. 
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Overseas Aid Program.260 This report offered strongly worded comments on 
the impact of staff cutbacks on the efficiency of projects and reinforced the 
need fm ·autonomy in aid administration. The Public Accounts Committee 
recommended that more ADAB staff should be posted overseas to ensure 
that Australian projects were given a distinctively Australian character.261 
This report was used to support the argument that the professional ro}.e of 
ADAB should be upgraded and the social and developmental objectives of 
the aid program should be strengthened. 
In conclusion, the Fraser government used the Australian aid program to 
achieve foreign policy go;lls. In political terms, the Prime Minister acted to 
direct aid policy at particular times in an effort to strengthen the argument 
for regional security, especially in opposing Soviet activity in the South 
Pacific. Fraser also used Australian aid in an overt manner against. Vietnam 
and in support of Indonesia. Also, the geographical distribution of aid 
remained focused on Papua New Guinea and South East Asia, with small 
amounts allocated to other regions, including Africa. Significantly, after the 
Whitlam government had established a separate aid agency, the Fraser 
government subsumed the administration of aid into the Department of 
Foreign Mfairs. 
Rather than increase the level of aid to support the needs of developing 
countries, Prime Minister Fraser tended to shift aid, sometimes with explicit 
motives, to support Australia's relations with allies and potential allies. 
Therefore, at times, aid policy was a controversial issue for the Fraser 
government. In total, aid was utilised as one aspect of foreign policy and the 
Fraser government was open about the connections between aid and 
security, and thereby aid and the political objectives of foreign policy. 
Conclusion 
The combination of philosophies held by Prime Minister Fraser imparted a 
distinct outlook for Australia on relations with develoi-'ing countries. 
Fra$er established Australia's position in support of the interests of 
developing countries in the June 1976 statement and proposed to review 
this stance through the Harries report. While Fraser used the elements of 
260 See Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Report on Efficiency Audit: 
Administration of Australia's Bilateral Overseas Aid Prcgram, Report 201, AGPS, Canberra, 
1982. 
261 See ibid., pp. 44-8. See also Eldridge, Diplomacy, Development ... , op. cit., p. 52. 
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the Harries report that endorsed the government's position, the Prime 
Minister ignored the majority of recommendations which challenged the 
established foreign policy agenda. Further, Fraser den1onstrated support for 
the developing countries through personal promotion of the ideas of a new 
international economic order and a Comm.on Fund. The Fraser 
government pursued Australia's interests in these debates while expressing 
concern for the economic progress of developing countries. 
In the Asia Pacific region, the Fraser government attempted to balance 
relations with the members of ASEAN and China, but this act merely 
revealed the tensions in Australia's position. Fraser reacted to the 
intervention of Vietnam into Kampuchea while not acting against 
Indonesia in East Timor, ag~in revealing the regional security agenda of the 
Prime Minister. The Fraser government also built upon the historical 
relations with Papua New Guinea, including support for the independence 
process, and attempted to improve contacts in the South Pacific. In 
addition, the Australian aid program was used to support the Fraser 
government's policy objectives on developing countries. For example, 
Fraser used aid allocations for strategic political purposes in relation to 
Vietnam and the South Pacific. 
In total, Fraser adopted key elements of Whitlam's approach toward 
developing countries, especially in generating an anti-racist and anti-
colonial foreign policy for Australia. This international position provided 
the context for Prime Minister Fraser's active role on African issues. 
chapter.9 
Fraser foreign policy and Africa 
Prime Minister Fraser established an anti-racist and anti-colonial foreign 
policy on Africa. Fraser's personal commitment to racial equality was an 
important factor in the construction of policies by the Libera.l and Country 
Parties government, especially in provided explicit opposition to the 
minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. Significantly, Fraser's 
position on Africa continued many of the policies established by the 
Whitlam Labor government. In the first instance, Fraser's stance against 
the racial discrimination in southern Africa was ·demonstrated at the 1977 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in London and through 
the attempt to close the Rhodesia Information Centre in Sydney. Later, 
Fraser played a significant role in the negotiations on Rhodesia at the 1979 
CHOGM in Lusaka. The Australian Prime Minister advocated the need for 
a new constitution and new elections in Rhodesia and acted as mediator 
between British Prime Minister Thatcher and Presidents Nyerere r.tnd 
Kaunda to produce an effective outcome from the Commonwealth 
meeting. This ·was a significant achievement for both Fraser and the 
Commonwealth. 
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As the international environment changed in 1980, Fraser continued to 
support the role of the Commonwealth and continued to oppose the 
apartheid system in South Africa. This position was clearly demonstrated 
through the 1981 CHOGM in Melbourne and in the preparations for the 
1982 Commonwealth Games in Brisbane. 
In total, Fraser's position on Africa became the Australian government's 
position on Africa. This was important because members of the Liberal and 
Country Parties held various positions on Rhodesia and South Africa, 
including the view of some in the government that the minority regimes 
should be supported. Given this, Fraser's alignment with the African 
leaders in opposition to minority rule in southern Africa was an ir~.portant 
contribution to international politics. 
Fraser and Africa 
Prime Minister Fraser showed a personal interest and long-held 
commitment to racial equality as the necessary basis for Australian foreign 
policy. From the time Fraser entered the Parliament, this approach 
informed several speeches on South Africa, Rhodesia and the value of the 
Commonwealth. As Prime Minister, Fraser was, for ill-informed reasons, 
expected to adopt a conservative stance on the minority regimes in South 
Africa and Rhodesia. Instead, initial government policy reflected the 
personal views of Fraser, and this included an overt contempt for racial 
discrimination. 
As a member of the Menzies government, Fraser had made two key 
speeches to the Parliament which focused on the Commonwealth and 
South Africa. The first was on 15 March 1956 in which the relativelv new 
J 
Member for Wannon signalled the value of the new Commonwealth as a 
transformation of the British empirz.1 The second address on 12 April1961 
examined the question of South Africa's membership of the British 
Commonwealth.2 Fraser outlined the advantages and disadvantages of 
1 Fraser, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debaies, House of Representatives, vol. 9, 15 March 
1956, pp. 860-3. 
2 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 30, 12 April1961, pp. 769-73. In March 1960, South African 
government soldiers had shot and killed 67 residents of Sharpeville township and injured a 
f-..11ther 186 residents. Given the international and domestic criticism of the apartheid 
regime, a referendum of white citizens in South Africa in October 1960 resolved to leave the 
Commonwealth. This was achieved in 1...-Iay 1961. See Claire Clark, ed., Australian Foreign 
Policy: Toward a Reassessment, Cassell, North Melbourne, 1973, pp. 144 & 2E)7. 
f 1t WJ ~ orr W .\G ~ ;.,_ f&J': o--!l-;tlek~ k ~f ;._ ~-- L~~ 
-J-"Yt-l\" 1 ~.w.v .\\..v ~vrw..t Fh,OY-4 '\ Mev.."tM4 ~ ~"" ~~ ~r""k-a-:t 
~ ~~(LV-~ ~ ~e.to~t 6\) .1:\..c.. k~ ? .. ~~ ~~ ~ 4 
c..:,~~~. 
' 
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South African membership and discussed the effects of continued 
L.l.embership on the Commonwealth and for Australia. Significantly, F~aser 
identified that the common denominator of Commonwealth membership 
was racial equality. Accordingly, Fraser argued that South Africa should not 
continue in the Commonwealth} T'nis position set Fraser apart from then 
Prime Minister Menzies who was reluctant to advocate the expulsion of 
South Africa from the Commonwealth. Fraser's position also 
demonstrated a high value placed on the role of the Commonwealth which 
was also different from the view of Menzies.4 
Once in government, Prime Minister Fraser offered strong support for the 
Commonwealth. In the June 1976 statement, Fraser explained that, 'as a 
means of fostering co-operation and consultation in many varie~ areas, it 
[the Commonwealth] retains a lasting importance' .s Fraser embraced 
Whitlam's enthusiasm for the Commonwealth with the additional 
rationale that the forum could be made into 'a vital, innovative, problem-
solving instrument, one capable ... of acting as a catalyst when deadlock or 
stalemate threaten'.6 This position was part of Fraser's commitment to 
multilateral relations which included active Australian participation in the 
United Nations. 
Fraser's optimistic view of the Commonwealth fitted with the government 
policy on Rhodesia which stressed the need for a negotiated settlement. 
This stance argued for a rapid but non-violent tr .~..n::,~tion to majority rule 
and included support for United Nations' imposed 5:tnctions against 
Rhodesia.7 Fraser also emphasised that conflict could lead to the influence 
of external powers, namely the Soviet Union, which was linked with 
security concerns in southern Africa. Further, the Prime Minister boldly 
stated that apartheid would not work and that Australia would play a 
constructive role on South Africa within the frame of the Commonwealth. 8 
3 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 30,12 Apiil1961, p. 771. 
4 See Alan Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, Australian Professional 
P.ublications, Sydney, 1986, pp. 39-40. For more, see Coral Bell, Dependent Ally, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1988, p. 157 and Renouf, op. cit., pp. 134-5.). 
5 Fr.:iSer, CPD, HR., vol. 99,1 June 1976, p. 2742. 
6 Fraser quoted in Renouf, op. cit., p. 139. See also Richard Higgott, Australia and Africa 
1970-80: A Decade of Change and Growth, Africa Contemporary Record, vol. 14, 1981, p. 226. 
7 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2741 and HenryS. Albinski, Problems in Australian 
Foreign Policy, July to December 1977, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 24, 1, 
April1978, p. 4. See also Colin Legum, Rhodesian deadlock: the Smith regime's black 
challengers, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 53, 12, May 1977. 
8 Fraser, CPD, HR, voL 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2741. 
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Fraser's fervent opposition to apartheid and racial discrimination in South 
Africa and Rhodesia was based in a personal rejection of racism in all forms. 
Weller docum.ented Fraser's comments to a colleague that 'there are not 
many issues of conscience you can afford to have as successful politician. 
Race is mine. I will never tolerate racism'.9 As Weller added, Fraser was 
not prepared to compromise on issues of racism and this personal stance 
was reflected in the government's policies on Rhodesia and South Africa.1° 
In support of Fraser, Foreign Minister Peacock reiterated the government's 
policy towards southern Africa which involved: 
first, supporting both the ending of white minority rule and the 
protection of white minority rights. Secondly, Australia is 
concerned that the conflicts in the region shall be resolved by 
political compromise without the resort to force and the shedding 
of blood. Thirdly, we are concerned that the process by which a 
settlement is advanced should not involve the installation of a 
major power as a dominating influence in the region.11 
These objectives tended to coincide with the aims of the United States and 
Britain. In addition, the Fraser gove:nment hoped to build economic 
relations with post-independent Soufh Africa and Rhodesia, and with 
southern Africa in general.12 
9 Fraser's comments to Ian Macphee quoted in Patrick Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: A study in 
Prime Ministerial Power in Australia, Penguin, Ringwood, 1989, p. 316. 
10 With Weller, ibid., p. 316, Fraser reflected on the constant search for explanations or 
personal reasons for the stance against racism: 'People have to find a reason, because they 
think that somebody that lives in Nareen and was edueated at Melbourne Grammar and 
Oxford couldn't possibly have these views. So they look for some other explanation'. 
11 Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 99, 1 June 1976, p. 2750. The priority on security in southern Africa 
was informed by the situation in Angola. Following the abdication of Portuguese colonial 
authority in Angola in 1974, there was a struggle between three nationalist movements to 
control the political process toward independence. The Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA) was supported by the Soviet Union, the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNIT A) was supported by South Africa and the United States, 
while the National Front of Angolan Liberation (FNLA) appeared to be caught between the 
other two groups. Conflict intensified and by 1975, the MPLA, with assistance from Cuban 
troops, established a socialist regime in a new republic. This outcome was pdceived to be a 
victory fot communism in southern Africa. See Coral Bell, Australia in a World of Powers, 
chapter 2 in P.J. Boyce and J.R. Angel, eds, Independence and Alliance: Australia in World 
Affairs 1976-80, Allen & Unwin and the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
Sydney, 1983, pp. 27-8, and Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., p. 155. See also Renouf, op. cit., p. 
59 and see generally, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Angola after independence: struggle 
for supremacy, Conflict studies, no. 64, November 1975, Basil Davidson, Angola: a success that 
changes history, Race and Class, vol. 18, 1, Summer 1976 and O:;lin Legum, The Soviet Union, 
China and the West in Southern Africa, Foreign Affairs, V9l. 54, 4, July 1976. 12 David Goldsworthy, Australia's Southern Africa Polic.y, World Review, vol. 17, June 1978, 
p.61. 
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At the domestic level, these aspects of foreign policy remained witrJn the 
personal and political discretion of Fraser and Peacock, with assistance from 
the Department of Foreign Affairs. General public opinion was not strong 
on African issues. However, specific interest groups attempted to lobby the 
government on the policies toward southern Africa, notably, a conservative 
group in support of the minority regime in Rhodesia, while other groups 
attempted to weaken AustraJ.ian links with South Africa and Rhodesia.13 
Both sides in this debate wer,~ represented inside the Liberal and Country 
Parties government which suggested that this issue would not be easily 
resolved. Nevertheless, in the early months of government, the influence 
of Prime Minister Fraser meant that Australia formed part of the 
international consensus which opposed minority rule in southern Africa 
and stressed the need for safe majority govenrments.14 
This approach by the Fraser government was demonstrated at the United 
Nations in September 1976. In an address to the General Assernbly, Foreign 
Minister Peacock condemned the South African government for the 
'abhorrent' system of apartheid and the 'continued illegal occupation of 
Namibia' .15 The passionate language and open criticism of the South 
African government accorded with the vocal opinions in the General 
Assembly. Importantly, the speech by Peacock established the position of 
the new Australian government within the United Nations debates on 
southern Africa. Peacock's performance at the United Nations signalled the 
continuation of Australia's critical stance on the minority regirnes in South 
Africa and Rhodesia as established by the Whitlam Labor government. 
Continuity of foreign policy on Africa 
The election of the Fraser government in December 1975 co-incided with 
international debates in which African issues were central.16 This 
atmosphere of political discussion provided Prime Minister Fraser with the 
opportunity to continue the policies of the Whitlam government on Africa. 
13 ibid., p. 62. 
14 ibid., p. 63. See also Financial Review, 7 May 1976 and Australian, 11. November 1976. 15 Peacock, Statement to the United Nations General Assembly, 29 September 1976, in 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Backgrounder, no. 59, 1 October 1976, p. 6. See P.J. Boyce, 
Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1976, Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, vol. 23, 1, April 1977, p. 9 and Ralph Harry, Australian Multilateral 
Diplomacy, chapter 5 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., pp. 83-4. 
16 Coral Bell, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1978, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 24, 3, 1978, p. 293. 
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The corollary here was Fraser's personal commitment to oppose racial 
exploitation and the minority regimes in southern Africa. 
Indeed, African issues remained important to the Fraser government at a 
time when these political struggles could have been devalued within 
Australian foreign policy. The specific elements of continuity, such as the 
maintenance of aid to Mozarnbique, linked with Fraser's positions and 
actions within the Commonwealth on African issues in 1977-78 and with 
Fraser's role at the 1979 Lusaka CHOGM. 
The conth"luity thesis from Whitlam to Fraser on African issues was 
embraced by the major commentators of the time.17 In the combative 
political climate of Australian politics in 1976, it might have been expected 
that Fraser would allow some time to pass before adopting particular 
policies of the Whitlam government. On Australian involvement in 
southern African issues, Renouf stated that 'Fraser owed a large debt of 
gratitude to Whitlam but it would have been unusual to acknowledge such 
a debt to an opponent'.18 However, Fraser demonstrated considerable 
political courage to quickly embrace the Whitlam government's policies on 
Africa. The Fraser government's position was publicly confirmed on 25 
September 1976 when the Prin1e Minister declared the government's 
support for majority rule in Rhodesia: 
The Government welcomes reports that the authorities in 
Rhodesia have accepted the principle of majority rule . . . Such an 
outcome would accord with the long standing policy and 
conviction of the Australian Government . . .19 
This statement clearly acknowledged the continuity in policy on southern 
Africa from the Whitlam government. 
Notwith.standing this example, neither Whitiam nor Fraser would reaciily 
admit to the value of continuity in foreign policy given the hostile domestic 
17 See Boyce, op. cit., p. 8; Bell, op. cit., p. 293; T.B. Milieu:, Australia in Peace and War: 
External Relations 1788-1977, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1978, p. 425; 
Richard Higgott, Australia and Africa, chapter 15 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., pp. 245-6; 
Higgott, .. .A Decade of Change and Growth, op. cit., p. 224; and Renouf, op. cit., pp. 76-7. 
18 Renouf, ibid. Renouf commented that 'Fraser could eas:ily have offered Whitlam an 
ambassadorship; Whitlam would have made an excellent ambassador, Fraser would have 
been regarded as magnanimous and the offer would not have entailed any cost to the 
Government'. See also Renouf, ibid., p. 133. 
19 Statement by the Prime Minister on Rhodesia, 25 September 1976, in Backgrounder, no. 59, 1 
October 1976, p. 13. See: also Peacock, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 29 
SeptE:mber 1976, op. cit., p. 6 and Boyce, op. cit., p. 8. 
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political environment. In 1976, the legacy of the Whitlam Labor 
government was not entirely clear but Higgott argued that Fraser's policies 
drew heavily on the inheritance from Whitlam.2o This was in direct 
reference to policies on South Africa and Rhodesia. More uncomfortable 
for Fraser was the argument of Millar that the major successes in the Liberal 
and Country Parties government's international affairs were grounded ~ 
the work of the Whitlam government.21 This position devalued the 
influence of Fraser in the construction and expansion of Australian foreign 
policy. 
Nevertheless, the elements of continuity in the first term of the Fraser 
government were important. Within expectations of the time, several 
aspects of Australian foreign policy could have been entirely opposite. For 
example, Fraser decided to uphold the Labor government's commitment to 
send food aid to the Marxist government in Mozambique as compensation 
for costs incurred in enforcing sanctions against Rhodesia.22 Also, Australia 
did not resume the role of speaking for South Africa in the International 
Monetary Fund and did not reinstate the Cape Town Commission.23 As an 
international gesture, these decisions were highly symbolic and clearly 
pointed to an attitude of active support for majority rule in South Africa 
and Rhodesia.24 
Similarly, Fraser did not reverse the Labor government's policy of excluding 
racially selected South African sporting teams from Australia. This decision 
acted against the expectations of some within the Liberal and Country 
Parties government and in the electorate.2s Indeed, the South African 
Minister for Sport expressed considerable surprise at Fraser's attack on the 
apartheid sporting policies.26 Again, this largely symbolic act of limiting 
sporting contacts had an impact on the Australian public and on the 
20 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 245. 
21 T.B. Millar, From Whitlam to Fraser, Foreign Affairs, vol. 55, 4, 1977, p. 864. 
22 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 247, Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 60, and Renouf, op. 
dt., p. 133. See also Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 426 and Higgott, ... A 
Decade of Change and Growth, op. cit., p. 224. 
23 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 247, Higgott, ... A Decade of Change and Growth, 
op. ci.t., p. 224 and Nation Review, 26 April1979. Nevertheless, the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation was given authority to reinstate links with the South African 
intelligence agency. 
24 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 247. See also Renouf, op. cit., p. 133 and 
Australian, 9 March 1976. 
25 Boyce, op. cit., p. 8. Prime :Minister Fraser also wrote to state Premiers on 27 September 
1976 to seek intervention to cancel the proposed tour of South Africa by members of state 
police forces. 
26 See Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 53. 
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colonial South African population. At the level of popular debate, the 
Fraser government showed a determination to link sport with politics and 
therefore to isolate the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
At the United Nations, Fraser did not alter the Whitlam government 
approach to international diplomatic debate. Continuity was apparent in 
the view that Australia would not advocate the expulsion of South Africa 
from the UN but would support radical resolutions in opposition to 
apartheid in both the General Assembly and the Commonwealth.27 
Further, Fraser followed the lead of Whitlam in complying with the UN 
sanctions against Rhodesia which were extended in April 1976. This 
included a refusal to permit entry to Australia of Chief Chirau as a guest of 
the Australia-Rhodesia Association. This exclusion represented a literal 
observance of UN resolutions on Rhodesia which, in diplomatic terms, 
demonstrated a strict opposition to the minority regime.28 Strangely, during 
the time of the Whitlam government, Fraser had not supported anti-racist 
policies related to immigration and naturalisation.29 
Also at the United Nations, Australia continued to be a member of the 
General Assembly Committee on Decolonisation and the UN Council for 
Namibia. Indeed, during the 1970s, Australia was the only Western country 
to participate on both committees.3o Further, Foreign Minister Peacock was 
elected as one of the Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly, a position 
which carried membership of the General (Steering) Committee of the 
Assembly. Australia was also elected to the Governing Council of the UN 
Development Program and the World Food Council.31 The election of 
Australia to committees which focused on issues central to developing 
countries showed an acceptance of Australia's stance in the United Nations. 
On trade, Fraser continued to enforce the policies of disincentive established 
by the Whitlam government.32 The Liberal and Country Parties 
government contained differing viewpoints on trade with South Africa and 
27 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 426. See also Harry, op. cit., p. 81. 
28 Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 60. The UN resolutions limited immigration from Rh::~desia and 
restricted entry to Australia from Rhodesia. Chief Chirau was subsequently one of the 
signatories to Rhodesia's internal settlement. See also Harry, op. cit., p. 90. 
29 Renouf, op. cit, p. 133. Fraser's position prior to government coincided \\<ith the need for 
political gain rather than Fraser's personal views. 
30 Harry, op. cit., p. 88. The Australian representative was chair of the Small Territories 
sub-committee and helped to formulate proposals suited to the needs of mini-states as they 
moved toward independence. See also Millar, Australia in Peace and War, op. cit., p. 426. 31 Harry, op. cit., p. 87. Also at the UN, Sir Robert Jackson was a Special Adviser on Aid. 32 Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 57 and Higgott, Australia and Africa~ op. cit., p. 251. 
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these positions were supported by different groups in the community. 
While Fraser, and possibly the Department of Foreign Affairs, could find 
support for the discouragement of economic links from anti-apartheid 
community groups, others in the government could draw upon industry 
groups to argue for the restoration of trade relations with South Africa.33 
In particular, the Fraser government decided not to return a trade 
<;om.missioner to Cape Town.34 Further, where Australia and South Africa 
had previously worked together in the Jl:lternational Wool Secretariat, it 
seemed that the two countries would be competitors in the areas of 
uranium sales and other commodities markets. It was not clear in 1976-77 
that the discouragement of trade with South Africa and the promotion of 
trade with the rest of Africa was maJc..h1.g an impact on the trade balance.35 
Given there were many policy decisions which supported the continuity 
argument from Whitlam to Fraser, there were some qualifications to this 
position. These related to policy details rather than the substantive aspects 
of Australia's approach to South Africa and Rhodesia. Primarily, the Fraser 
government did not advocate widespread action against South Africa and, 
indeed, Peacock explained that Australia would maintain diplomatic and 
economic relations with South Africa.36 As an explicit policy, this was 
marginally more conciliatm.y than the Whitlam government position. 
Linked to this approach was the Fraser government's determination not to 
support violent .means in Africa, and thereby not to provide assistance to 
particular liberation movements. It was made clear that apartheid should 
be dismantled through peaceful methods. Therefore, aid which assisted 
liberation movements in southern Africa \vas stopped while the aid to 
Mozambique was understood as a separate matter.37 Also, in the UN 
33 Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 58. See also Kenneth Good, South Africa's links with the world 
economy, World Revie-1.0, vol. 17, 2, June 1978. 
34 Higgott, AustraliC\ and Africa, op. cit., p. 252. The Whitlam government had established 
a new trade commission i..'l. Nigeria in an attempt to promote trade with Africa and in 1976, 
Nigeria opened a High Commission in Canberra. Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 57. 
35 See Goldsworthy, ibid., pp. 57-9. See also Higgott, ... A Decade of Change and Growth, op. 
cit., p. 225. 
36 Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 55. See Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 98, 4 Marc.b 1976, p. 569. The 
Foreign Minister prefaced the qualification with a clear statement on the premise of the 
government's policy: 
We recognise and acknowledge the legitimate interests and aspirations of the 
governments and peoples of Africa and hope to continue to work with them for 
fue attainment of shared objectives. While we will maintain a correct 
diplomatic relationship with South Africa, we are completely opposed to the 
system of apartheid. 37 See Goldsworthy, op. cit., pp. 55 & 60-1. 
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General Assembly in 1976, Australia did not support a resolution 
advocating the use of violence to overthrow the minority regime in South 
Africa.38 
Also, with reference to sporting contacts with South Africa, the Fraser 
government did not favour a total boycott. Foreign Minister Peacock 
explained that the government would permit contacts, subject to reasonable , 
conditions, which would encourage change in South Africa.39 Meanwhile, 
the Prime Minister supported the visits to Australia by individual South 
African sports people, such as cricketers playing in the World Series 
competition. Fraser argued that these people were clearly prepared to play 
in multi-racial competitions.4o 
These qualifications to the continuity thesis gave the impression of subtly 
altered emphasis by Fraser in government policy toward the minority 
regimes in southern Africa. It was probably unfair of Goldsworthy to 
describe the alterations as 'noticeable departures from Whitlam policy' buf, 
on sensitive international issues, these small shifts were important and 
may have been interpreted as a repudiation of earlier, strictly-enforced 
policy decisions.41 
In conclusion, these issues through 1976 provided Prime Minister Fraser 
with the opportunity to demonstrate Australia's continuing opposition to 
the minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. As such, Fraser 
adopted significant elements of the Whitlam Labor government's agenda 
on Africa. The continuity in many areas of Australia's position o~ Africa 
provided an important starting point for Fraser in international de ....... tes on 
southern Africa. Indeed, the continuity of policies on Africa established a 
basis for Fraser's active position on southern African issues in the 
Commonwealth. 
South Mrica and Rhodesia, 1977-78 
Following the initial questions of continuity on Africa, the Fraser 
governmeri~t's foreign policy was focused at the Commonwealth Heads of 
38 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit, p. 247. The Whitlam government had voted ill 
favour of such a resolution the previous year. 
~= Peacock, CPD, HR, vol. 98, 4 March 1976, p. 569. 
"R1 Etaser quoted in Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 56. 
41 Il:J~d., p. 60. 
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Government Meeting in London in 1977. Fraser's opposition to the policies 
of the minority regimes in southern Africa was displayed in London and 
was subsequently reinforced at Gleneagles during discussions on sporting 
contacts with South Africa. At home, Fraser attempted to close the 
Rhodesian Information Centre while confronting views in support of 
Rhodesia within the government. Also, the Fraser government had to 
decide whether to commit to a proposed United Nations force for Namibia. 
Through involvement in the Commonwealth and activity on related 
issues, the Fraser government built upon the initial continuity .in policies 
from the Whitlam government. This position provided the context for 
Fraser's central role at the 1979 CHOGM in Lusaka. 
In June 1977, Prime Minister Fraser and Foreign Minister Peacock attended 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in London. As a key 
international forum, the Commonwealth of Nations became the 'major 
vehicle for promotion and development of Australia's foreign policy 
interests'.42 Indeed, Peacock stated that the Commonwealth was the 
centrepiece of Australia's foreign policy.43 As explained, Australia was able 
to adopt a leadership position within the Commonwealth because this 
forum was considerably smaller than the United Nations General 
Assembly. Alternatively, it was argued that Australia was able to play a 
significant role in the Commonwealth because this forum was relatively 
powerless in world affairs.44 
The London CHOGM was dominated by issues of racial discrimination and, 
in particular, by a condemnation of South Africa. In this context, Prime 
Minister Fraser attacked racism as 'an offence to human decency' and 
explained that Australia supported measures in opposition to apartheid.45 
Fraser also called for majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia which placed 
the Australian Prime Minister as one of the first leaders to use the language 
42 Harry, op. cit., p. 95. On the London CHOGM, see also J.M. McCarthy, Problems in 
Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1977, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
vol. 23, 3, December 1977, p. 342 and Renouf, op. cit., p. 133. 
43 Peacock quoted in McCarthy, op. cit., p. 343. 44 ibid. This point was illustrated by the example of Idi Amin's status at the London meeting 
of Commonwealth Heads of Government. The question was whether the Ugandan leader 
would be allowed to attend the London CHOGM and what would happen if Idi Amin arrived 
unannounced. Uganda's membership was to be determined by the Commonwealth as a whole 
but there were doubts whether many African leaders would vote to expel fue Idi Amin-led 
Uganda. Potentially, this situation threatened the London CHOGM before it had startecl. In 
the end, this difficult issue was averted as Idi Amin did not attend the London meeting. 45 Fraser quoted m National Times, 23 June 1979. See McCarthy, op. cit., p. 343 and Higgott, 
... A Decade of Change and Growth, op. cit., p. 226. See also Higgott, Australia and Africa, 
op. cit., p. 248; Weller, op. cit., pp. 318-21; Renouf, op. cit, p. 133; and .. t\lbinski, op. cit., p. 4. 
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of the African nationalist movements.46 Th~se statements and remarks 
were impressive in showing that some people outside of Africa supported 
the aspirations of African leaders for equality in terms of human and 
political rights. As a result, Fraser was invited to visit Zambia when 
convenient.47 
At the time of the London CHOGM, Fraser illustrated the Australian 
government's theme of a moral concern for human rights, condemnation 
of apartheid, and demand for majority rule in southern Africa. This 
rhetoric aligned Fraser with the majority of Commonwealth members. For 
some of Fraser's allies, the pragmatic concern for security in South Africa 
and Rhodesia added to the strength of Australia's position. The underlying 
element in this position was majority rule as the best way to prevent 
international communist influence in southern Africa.48 For some in the 
Asia Pacific region, this immediately co-incided with an anti-communist 
agenda. While Fraser did nc.t seem to flaunt this element, it was 
nonetheless part of the Prime Minister's case, and it proveu useful in 
relation to the anti-communist leaders in the region. Fraser emerged from 
the London CHOG!v! as an ardent opponent of racism in Rhodesia and 
46 Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 53, Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 248 and McCarthy, 
op. cit., p. 343. During the London CHOGM, New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon reminded 
Fraser that Aboriginal people in Australia lived with disadvantages. This particular 
criticism of Fraser may have brought the African leaders closer to the Australian Prime 
Minister as :~/uldoon was not wdl regarded in Africa. See McCarthy, op. cit., p. 343. 47 McCarthy, ibid., pp. 343-4. The invitation from Zambia was significant given President 
Kaunda's key role in southern Africa and within the Commonwealth, in conjunction with 
President Nyerere of Tanzania. Further, Weller recalled the story from Tony Eggleton, a 
senior member of the Australian delegation to the London meeting, on the impact of Fraser's 
statements and the development of personal contacts within the Commonwealth: 
[Fraser] made some good interventions in the course of the first morning, about the 
strategy of warming relations with the Third World. I walked out to have my 
cup of morning tea and down this grand ornate staircase at Lancaster House came 
Malcolm. I just had to blink and look again, because there was Michael Manley 
with his arm around Malcolm, walking down the staircase. He had made a good 
impression at the start. He emerged from that meeting with a sudden 
international stature which was never quite appreciated in Australia. 
See also Derek Ingram, Anguish over Africa, and Andrew Walker, Tackling world economic 
problems: Commonwealth conference 19'17- racial conflict, economic challenges and the 
problem of Uganda, Round Table, no. 267, July 1977 and Andrew Peacock, Australia in the 
modem Commom•realth, Round Table, no. 271, July 1978. 
48 Goldsworthy, op. cit, pp. 54-5. In answering questions during a forum of gc.vemment 
ministers at the NSW Liberal Party state convention, Fraser attempted to silence internal 
critics of the government's policy on Africa by asserting that 'if you want a door opened to 
communism in Africa, people will then support a racist white minority regime that denies 
political equality for the great and overwhelming majority'. Fraser quoted in Age, 20 August 
1977 also made a personal commitment that 
I will never be persuaded that white people have some inalienable right to rule 
others because of the color [sic] of their skins. If anyone seeks to dissuade me from 
the views I hold in relation to southern Africa, rm afraid I won't change my 
views because this is one of the issues on which my views are fixed. 
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South Africa and a champion of the Commonwealth. The meeting of the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government offered an international 
opportunity for Fraser to project a positive image of Australian foreign 
policy. 
In addition, during the retreat at the Gleneagles Hotel in Scotland following 
the London CHOGM, Fraser supported the reaffirmation of the 
Commonwealth decision to discourage sporting links with South Africa.49 
The Gleneagles Agreement on Sporting Contacts with South Africa was 
central to the Commonwealth's policy on apartheid.50 The difficulty with 
the agreement was that each member of the Commonwealth was 
responsible for interpreting the document in relation to their sporting 
contacts with South Africa.s1 This freedom led to some flexibility in 
implementing the agreement, including Prime Minister Muldoon's 
relatively loose reading of the key clauses. Essentially, the success of the 
Gleneagles agreement relied upon the political will of the Commonwealth 
members to interpret the document in a strict manner. More importantly, 
the document was used to preserve the unity of the Commonwealth on the 
potentially divisive issue of sporting relations with South Africa.s2 
Domestically, the Fraser government was faced with the presence and 
activities of the Rhodesia Information Centre in Sydney. Legislation was 
drafted to close the Centre in late 1977 in compliance with the United 
Nations injunction against the minority regime in Rhodesia. However, 
prior to introduction to the Parliament, it was made known that the 
legislation would be opposed by some members in the government who 
were sympathetic to Rhodesia or, separately, were concerned about 'freedom 
of speech'.53 It was decided within the Fraser government that the draft 
49 Harry, op. cit., p. 96. See also Renouf, op. cit., p. 139. The communique from Gleneagles was 
written by a small inner group. As New Zealand was the main source of problems, Prime 
Minister Muldoon was included in the group and Muldoon effectively vetoed Fraser's presence 
~y refusing to participate if Fraser was invited to attend. Weller, op. cit., p. 321. 
00 See Commonwealth Secretariat, The Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport, 
Marlborough House, London, 1977. 
51 See A. Payne, The International Politics of the Gleneagles Agreement, Round Table, 320, 
October 1991, p. 418. 
52 ibid., p. 428. Further, in August 1977, Peacock addressed the World Conference for Action 
agaL."lSt Apartheid in Lagos. See World Conference for Action against Apartheid, Lagos, 
Nigeria, 22-26 August 1977, United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and documents, 
September 1977. Australia also participated in the Maputo conference on southern African 
problems. See Albinski, op. cit., p. 4. See also Harry, op. cit., p. 98 and Millar, Australia in 
Peace and War, op. cit., p. 426. 
53 See Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 258. Members of the 'civil liberties' or 
'freedom of speech' group included Mel Bungey (Liberal Party; Caruting, WA), Don Cameron 
(LP; Fadden, Qld), Bruce Graham (LP; North Sydney, NSW), John Haslem (LP; Canberra, 
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legislation should be r'-'~written and this issue remained unresolved at the 
tim.e of the 1977 feder.li election.54 
Prime Minister Fraser also demonstrated that the entire Liberal and Country 
Parties government would support the anti-apartheid argument 
promulgated in London and elsewhere. Following the December 1977 
election, Queensland Senator Glenister Shiel was nominated by the Country 
Party to the min:stry but was dropped from the list after the Senate:.i made 
remarks in defence of apartheid in South Africa and the minority regime in 
Rhodesia, and indicated approval for an apartheid. system for the Aboriginal 
peoples of Australia.55 The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy 
Leader of the Country Party, Ian Sinclair angrily rebuked Senator Shiel, 
stating that: 
The Australian Government utterly repudiates and condemns 
such views ... Senator Shiel's action in making this statement is 
to be regretted and deplored ... Senator Shiel's views on these 
matters are entirely personal and are rejected totally by the 
Australian Government and by the overwhelming mahrity of 
Australians.56 
In this context, Prime Minister Fraser insisted that apartheid was 'a 
pernicious and evil_ doctrine ... It must be condemned'.57 This issue wc.s 
important for the ilnage of the Fraser government which vVf:is preparing for 
ACT), 1\.fichael Hodgeman (LP; Denison, Tas), Alan Jarman (LP; Deal-..in, Vic), S'!tnator Don 
Jessop (LP; SA), Senator Alan Missen (LP; Vic), Senator Peter Rae (LP; Tas), and ~"':enator Reg 
Wright (LP, Tas). Members of the 'Rhodesia lobby' included Sam Calder (Country Party; 
NT), Senator Tom Dral<e-Brockman (CP; WA), Tom McVeigh (CP; Darling Downs, Qld), 
Senator Glenister Shiel (CP; Qld), and Senator Ian Wood (LP; Qld). See National Times, 26 
September-1 October 1976 and Age, 18 August 1977. For 'freedom of speech' arguments, see 
Canberra Times, 19 August 1977 and Age, 5 November 1977. See also Higgott, ... Decade of 
Change and Growth, op. cit., p. 230 and see generally, M. Indyk, Influence without power: the 
role of the backbeJ.~ch in Australian Foreign Policy, 1976-1977, 20th Conference, Australasian 
Political Studies Association, Adelaide, 1978. 
54 Albinski, op. cit., p. 4. Foreign Minister Peacock explained that the draft legislation was 
'too wide in ambit' and that, in accordance with the sanctions voted by the UN Security 
Council, the government would confomt to the international obligations in due course. 
Peacock's qualification was that ~he government would not present legislation to the 
Parliament that would 'trample over the rights of individual Australians to participate in 
political matters and express a particular view about Rhodesia'. See questions from 
W.aitlam to Peacock, CPD~ HR, vol. :06,20 September 1977, pp. 1290-1 and CPD, HR, vol. 
107, 1 November 1977, pp. 2587-9. See also National Times,26 September-1 October 1977. 55 Albinski, op. cit., p. 4. See also Glen St.J Ba:':clay, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, 
July-December 1978, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 25, 1, April1979, p. 11. 
Senator Shiel made the comments at the Commonwealth Pa.Jiamentary Association 
Conference in Kingston, Jamaica. 56 The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ian Sinclair, news release, 27 September 1978 in 
Backgrounder, no. 157, 27 September 1978, p. xx. 
57 Fraser quoted in Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 54. 
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the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting to be held in 
Sydney in February 1978. The conference may have been boycotted by 
particular regional leaders if swift action was not taken against Senator 
Shiel. 58 
The Fraser government continued to build constructive relations with 
Africa through the United Nations, particularly on Namibia. As stated, 
Australia was the only Western country on the UN Council for Namibia 
and the Decolonisation Committee, and was elected Vice-·President of the 
< 
Council in 1979. Australia supported all UN resolutions on Namibia except, 
in 1978, the resolutions calling for the recognition of the. South West 
African People's Organisation as the 'sole representative of the Namibian 
people' ond support for the 'armed struggle of the Nam~bian people' ,59 
Instead, .n.tJ.stralia adhered to a Security Council resolution calling for a 
peacefttl resolution and thus provided the voice of moderation in the 
Council for NarrJbia. The Fraser government continued to provide a 
contribution to the UN Fund for Namibia which was small in economic 
terms but not insignificant in political terms. 60 
In an important departure, Foreign Minister Peacock stated in August 1978 
that Australia would not commit troops to a proposed Namibia 
Peacekeeping Force .61 Essentially, the Fraser government lacked the 
political will to be involved to this extent in :Namibia. However, by 
February 1979, the Prime Minister announced that Australia was indeed 
willing to provide an engineering contingent for the proposed UN 
Transitional Assistance Group in Narnibia.62 In the end, this initiative did 
not materialise. It was not clear whether Australia made a genuine 
commitment of resources and personnel to the UN force or whether Fraser 
suspected that the Transitional Assistance G ... oup would not gain sufficient 
support and therefore made a diplomatic victory from the previous 
negathre position. Nevertheless, Australia was seen to take a cautious 
58 ibid., p. 54-5. 
59 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 256. 
60 ibid. 
, . 
61 Peacock, Ministerial statement, Namibia: Contribution to Uni'ed Nations Peacekeeping 
Force, CPD, HR, vol. 110,23 August 1978, pp. 618-21 and reply by Bowan, pp. 621-3. See also 
Barclay, op. cit., p. 10. 
62 Hugh Smith, Defence Policy, chapter 3 in Boyce and Angel, op. cit., p. 50. See also 
Higgott, AustraJ: 1. and Africa, op. cit., p. 256 and McCarthy, op. cit., p. 307 and see generally, 
Clarence S. Rea~kop, The limits of diplomacy: the case of Namibia, International Journal, 
vol. 35, 1, Winter 1979/80, Christopher Coker, Peacekeeping in Southern Africa: the United 
Nations and Namibia, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 19, 2, July 
1981 and Kevin Danaher, Namibia: profits, racism and the 'Soviet threat', Monthly Review, 
vol. 33, 8, Jcumary 1982. 
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approach to the allocation of troops to Namibia and, after some debate, 
decided to contribute a degree of political commitment to a complex African 
conflict. 
In sum, Prime Minister Fraser presented Australia's position on Africa at 
the 1977 London CHOGM, and subsequently at Gleneagles. These meetings 
of the Commonwealth provided a forurn for Fraser to build personal 
contacts with African leaders in opposition to the minority regimes in 
Rhodesia and South Africa. At the same time, Frc;~,ser was forced to confront 
opposing views within the Liberal and Country Parties government, 
particularly in relation to the proposed closure of the Rhodesia Information 
Centre in Sydney. Fraser built upon the initial continuity in foreign policy 
with the Whitlam government by expanding relations 1'·ith Africa, 
especially through the Commonwealth. Both the maintenance of Whitlam 
government policies and the development of foreign policy on Africa 
through 1977 and 1 0"78 provided a considerable basis for Fraser's 
participation at the 1979 Lusaka CHOGM. 
Rhodesia and the 1979 Lusaka CHOGM 
The difficult issue of a political settlement in Rhodesia was prominent in 
international debates from 1977 to 1980. Negotiations were facilitated, an 
internal solution was proposed, a referendum was conducted and 
eventually a general elFJction was held to establish a majority government 
in the newly proclaimed Zimbabwe. Prime Minister Fraser played an active 
role in the discussions on Rhodesia, with an emphasis on the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in August 1979 in Lusaka. 
The timing and agenda of this conference tested the capacity of the 
Com:rrr ·nwealth to provide effective outcomes to international conflicts.63 
Indeed, Fraser's participation was grounded in the initial continuity with 
the Whitlam government and the constructive work at the 1977 London 
CHOGM. Fraser was firm in displaying Australia's opposition to the 
minority regime in Rhodesia and formed alliances in Lusaka with the more 
radicql African leaders. In the end, Fraser's role at b.~e Lusaka CHOGM was 
a highlight in Australian foreign policy. 
63 See Renouf, op. cit., p. 139. 
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Through 1977, the United States and Britain engaged in discussion on the 
situation in Rhodesia. By September, the Carter administration, with 
British support, announced the Anglo-American proposals on Rhodesia. 
The main elements of this offer were the restoration of the rule of law, a 
transitional period under British authority, the drafting of a democratic 
constitution, majority rule with the protection of rights for all citizens, and 
impartial elections under British supervision and international 
observation.64 The Australian position on these proposals was unclear. 
While the British approach to Rhodesia was essentially the Australian 
position, the Fraser government was not vocal in supporting the Anglo-
American proposals which suggested some reticence in proclaiming support 
for the details of the plan. Nevertheless, Australia supported the proposals 
of the United States and Britain some tiroe later.65 
The confusion on Australia's position was illustrated when an internal 
settlement was proclaimed in Rhodesia in February 1978. This arrangement 
excluded the Patriotic Front liberation armies, was not a move toward 
majority rule in Rhodesia and was not understood as more legitimate than 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of November 1965.66 The Fraser 
government may have favoured the internal settlement as a peaceful 
solution but, more likely, the official silence from Australia reflected a need 
to wait for both Britain and the United States to clarify their reactions to the 
Rhodesian outcome, and to gain impressions from Africa, principally 
Zambia and Tanzania, on the internal settlement.67 Another option was 
that Prime Minister Fraser opposed the internal settlement and needed 
64 ibid., p. 140. See also Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 62. 
65 See ibid., Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 249, and Renouf, op. cit., p. 141. See 
also Masipula Sithole, Rhodesia: an assessment of the viability of the Anglo-American 
proposals, World Affairs, vol. 141, 1, Summer 1978, Joshua Nkomo, The struggle until the 
final victory, Review of Intemation." 1 Affairs, vol. 30, 692, February 1979 and Ronald T. 
Libby, Anglo-American diplomacy and the Rhodesian settlement a loss of impetus, Orbis, 
vol. 23, 1, Spring 1979. 
66 Roger Bell, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July-December 1979, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 26, 1, 1980, pp. 17-18. While the internal settlement claimed to 
institute a majority government, the constitution gave the four percent colonial population 
more than a quarter of all seats in Parliament, various Commissio:ns could by-pass the new 
Parliament, and African citizens were effective! y prevented from hr.ilding senior positions in 
the armed forces, police force or judiciary. See Australian policy 0:!.1 Rhodesia, Backgrounder, 
no.196, 25 July 1979, pp. 16-19 and see generally, I.R Hancock, Against the odds: a triumph 
for the internal settlement in Rhodesia, Australian Outlook, vol. 33, 2, August 1979. 
67 Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 62. See also Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 249. See 
question regarding internal settlement in Rhodesia from Wheeldon to Withers, Minister 
representing the :Minister for Foreign Affairs, CPD, Senate, vol. 76, 7 March 1978, p. 353. On 
support for the h'"lternal settlement within the Liberal Pan'y, see Higgott, ... A Decade of 
Change and Growth, op. cit., p. 230, Canberra Times, 5 August 1979 an.d Australian, 1 August 
1979. 
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some time to convince a majority in the Liberal and Country Parties 
government that Australia should be critical of an arrangement which did 
not accord with Fraser's understanding of majority rule. By late 1978, the 
details of Australia's international stance on Rhodesia were important in 
the prelude to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting planned 
for August 1979. 
In the context of the continuing guerilla war, political events in Rhodesia 
appeared to be deteriorating. As a result, elections previously planned for 
December 1978 were postponed until 20 April 1979.68 In late 1978, Foreign 
Minister Peacock explained that the internal settlement in Rhodesia had not 
brought about a ceasefire or conditions in which free and fair elections could 
be held and that the Australian government accordingly believed that it was 
unrealistic to expect the ceasefire to be effective unless all the parties were 
involved..69 Further, Peacock addressed the United Nations General 
Assembly in October 1978 to state that: 
the Australian government would continue to support efforts for 
a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe which provides for majority 
rule and independence. We believe that the Anglo-American 
proposals on Zimbabwe still provide the best available basjs for 
such a settlement. 70 
The Foreign Minister was clear in expressing that Australia advocated the 
need for majorit'f rule in Rhodesia. On this issu12, the Fraser government 
was aligning with the African leaders in refusing to entertain more limited 
options and, to a large extent, was maintaining the international pressure 
on Rhodesia. 
As a prelude to the scheduled elections, a majority of voters in Rhodesia, 
within the limited frar~chise, endorsed the need for majority rule through a 
referendum on 30 January 1979. This result averted the immediate collapse 
of the Ian Smith-Bishop Muzorewa interim government. The next task was 
to hold elections with a complete franchise of more than six million African 
voters and 250000 other voters. The elections would be conducted despite of 
the violent opposition of th~ Patriotic Front liberation armies led by Robert 
Mugabe and Joshua 1\i1<omo.71 
68 McCarthy, op. cit., p. 306. 
69 Peacock, answer tc question, CPD, HR, vol. 110, 14 September 1978, p. 1001. 
70 Peacock, Statement to the United Nations General Assembly, 6 October 1978, in 
Backgrounder, no. 159, 11 Octob~ 1978, p. vii See als.' Barclay; op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
71 McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 306-7. 
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The April 1979 Rhodesian elections were observed by international 
representatives, including an unofficial delegation from the Australian 
Parliament. These observers claimed that the elections were free and fair 
but others, primarily the United States representative to the United 
Nations, Andrew Young vehemently disagreed. The more critical position 
claimed that the elections were not sufficient to ensure majority rule despite 
the situation that Bishop Muzorewa now led the government.72 This 
approach also implied that sanctions would be maintained in an attempt to 
coerce the Rhodesian government to implement greater reform. 
While debate continued over the implications of the Rhodesian election, 
the Thatcher government was elected on 3 May 1979 in Britain. The view of 
this government on Rhodesia was unknown. There could have been some 
support for the previous minority government forces in Rhodesia, with 
others offering pragmatic support for the Muzorewa regime in recognition 
of the need for a peaceful outcome. The personal views of Prime Minister 
Thatcher were unclear and, at the time, the authority of Thatcher could 
have dismantled any progress on political reform in Rhodesia. 
Nevertheless, at the insistence of the British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Carrington, diplomatic efforts with the United States were reignited in 
relation to the principles of the Ari.glo-American proposals.73 
Meanwhile, Fraser was faced with opposition from within the government 
in relation to Australia's policy on Rhodesia, similar to the opposition to 
legislation to close the Rhodesia Information Centre.74 Indeed, it seemed 
that Fraser and Peacock were advocating policies more progressive than the 
position adopted by some in the Labor Party. Similar to the critique 
emerging from the Liberal dissenters, Labor Senc:.tor Wheeldon favoured 
the earlier internal settlement and recognition of the Muzorewa 
government. 75 
Deapite the differing op1n1ons 1n the domestic debate, the Fraser 
government announced in July 1979 that Australia would not recognise the 
new gcvernment of Bishop Muzorewa and that Australia would maintain 
72 ibid., p. 307. Higgott, Australia and Africa, :.>p. cit., p. 249, explained that the basis for 
the Australian position, and for others including the US, was that recognition of the 
government led by Bishop Muzorewa, but controlled by the Rhodesian Front of Ian Smith, 
would not end the guerrilla war and would provide the opportunit7 for further Soviet 
involvement in sou them Africa. 
73 Renouf, op. cit., pp.140-1. 
74 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., pp. 258. 
75 See 'Wheeldon, CPD, Senate, vol 82, 28 August 1979, pp. 282-9. 
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sanctions against the government of Rhodesia. Significantly, Bishop 
Muzorewa had expressed a willirlgness to request assistance from South 
African troops to defeat the Patriotic Fronf:.76 Nevertheless, Fraser appeared 
to be influenced by the position of the Carter administration, although the 
Australian stance had been clear for some time under Fraser and Peacock. 
The Australian policy also reflected a desire to align with, and a 
commitment to support, the African states in the Commonwealth. 
Moreover, Prime Minister Fraser was attempting to provide support for the 
idea of a new settlement plan for Rhodesia to be debated at the L:.tsaka 
CHOGM. 
In contrast, the Thatcher government foreshadowed that Britain would 
recognise the Muzorewa regime.77 Interestingly, Prime Minister Thatcher 
did not immediately provide legitimacy to the Rhodesian regime upon 
assuming office. The foreshadowing of recognition provided time for Lord 
Carrington to dispatch emissary Lord Harlech to Africa in June and July 
1979. The emissary reported that there was some potential for reform in 
Rhodesia and this news apparently made an impression on Tnatcher .78 
As the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting drew closer, 
Fraser and Peacock focused their energies on gaining a more acceptable and 
restructured outcome in Rhodesia. The Prime Minister liaised with 
Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley on the necessary discussions to be 
arranged prior to the CHOGM.79 To this end, Fraser organised talks with 
Prin1.e Minister Thatcher in Canberra prior to the conference. Over several 
hours, Fraser apparently shifted Thatcher's view· to consider negotiations on 
Rhodesia, while Thatcher continued to publicly proclaim the contrary 
position. Thus, Fraser held confidential information about Thatcher's 
capacity to shift on Rhodesia with which to reassure other Commonwealth 
leaders that a constructive and alternate outcome could be manufactured in 
Lusaka. so 
The first task for Fraser was to write to the Commonwealth leaders to 
outline a plan for Lusaka. This four-point plan was to provide a lead into a 
76 See David Goldswor~hy, Zimbabwe: a question the West must face, Age, 16 July 1979. See 
also Age, editorial, 26 July 1979 and Rolf Hasse, Why economic sanctions always fail- the 
case of Rhodesia, Intereconomics, no. 7/8, July I August 1978. 
77 R. Bell, op. cit., p. 17. 
78 Renouf, op. cit., p. 141. 
79 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 249. 
80 ibid. See also Weller, op. cit., p. 325 and Financial Review, 6 July 1979. 
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revised settlement in Rhodesia, and asked the conference to: 
recognise the Muzorewa government as a transitionary step only; 
acknowledge the need for constitutional changes which would 
give the majority greater access to power; recognise the need for 
change without permitting small details to hinder progress; and 
appreciate that a lasting settlement depends on broad acceptance 
by African states.Bl 
The conciliatory tone of this proposal would have appealed to Brital':"t which 
would thereby not oppose this form of settlP.ment while providing a starting 
point for the African leaders to involve the resistance groups in Rhodesia. 
Further to the letters, Fraser and Peacock met with several African leaders 
prior to the meeting in Lusaka.s2 Given Australia's international position 
on Rhodesia and Fraser's personal efforts on the issue, the Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister were welcomed by the African leaders. In particular, 
Fraser travelled to Nigeria to talk with General Obasanjo.s3 This was an 
important meeting because General Obasanjo would not be attending the 
CHOGM due to an impending presidential election.B4 
Also, Peacock conducted separate discussions with representatives of the 
British government and the Rhodesian government in London, and with 
the leaders of the Tanzanian and Kenyan governments. ss At these 
discussions, both Fraser and Peacock confirmed that Australia would not 
recognj.se the Muzorewa government in Rhodesia.B6 The efforts of Fraser 
and Peacock were rewarded with a seat for Australia on the small Steering 
Committee established to organise proceedings at Lusaka.s7 
The accumulation of Fraser's efforts prim~ to the Lusaka CHOGM provides 
evidence that the Australian Prime Minister played a significant role in the 
Bl Sydney Morning Herald, 25 July 1979 and Age, 26 July 1979. See also R. Bell, op. cit., p. 18. 
82 See ibid., McCarthy, op. cit., p. 307 and Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 249. 
83 See Age, 1 August 1979 and Weller, op. cit., p. 326. 
84 Instead, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, General Adefobe represented Nigeria in 
Lusaka and participated in all deliberations at the CHOGM. See Derek Ingram, Lusaka 
1979: A Significant Commonwealth Meeting, Round Table, no. 276, October 1979, p. 279. 
85 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 115,23 August 1979, p. 577. See also BackgroundeJ', no. 195, 18 July 
1979, p. i; Sydney Morning Herald, 5 July 1979; Age, 26 July 1979; Sydney Morning Herald, 27 
July 1979; and R. Bell, op. cit., p. 18. 
86 See outline of Australian position, Backgrounder, no. 196, 25 July 1979, pp. 16-19. David 
Goldsworthy, Age, 16 July 1979, suggested that Australian recognition of the Muzo rewa 
regime would damage the burgeoning trade relations with Nigeria and adversely affect 
Australia's relations with developing countries in general. On Nigeria, see supplement in 
Australian, 1 October 1976. 
87 Renouf, op. cit., p. 141. 
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negotiation process on Rhodesia. Fraser ens~1red that Australia projected a 
policy which opposed the minority reginle of Rhodesia and offered a 
critique of the internal settlement and subsequent election of Bishop 
Muzorewa. For Fraser, these events did not provide a sufficient model of 
rnajority rule in Rhodesia. In terms of the work conducted before the 
Lusaka meeting, Fraser acted in a prominent role which was instrumental 
in achieving a breakthrough on the Rhodesia issue. 
As expected, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka 
from 1 to 7 August 1979 was dominated by the Rhodesia issue. The meeting 
centred on the continuing conflict in Rhodesia and the need to secure 
constitutional change and new elections in order to ensure majority rule. 
Also at Lusaka, there was a fear that the health of the Con1monwealth was 
under threat if British Prime Minister Thatcher unilaterally recognised the 
Muzorewa government in Rhodesia.ss This act would have split the 
Commonwealth leaders and could have caused irreparable damage to the 
forum. 
In an address at the opening session of the meeting, Prime Minister Fraser 
stressed that the Commonwealth should proceed with moderation and 
compromise on the issue of Rhodesia in order to provide an equitabie 
solution. This approach did not resile from the principles of racial equality: 
The issues involved in Southern Africa, and in particular in 
Zimbabwe, are enormously complex ones. They present different 
member States with different problems, both domestic and 
international ... 
Formidable as the differences on some issues are, I believe that ... 
they are differences about means and timing, not about ends. We 
must not allow means to dominate ends . 
. . . Mr. President, I think it is clear that if a non-violent solution 
to the problem of Zimbabwe is to be found it must involve 
flexibility on all sides - flexibility not about the objective of a non-
racialist society, but concerning the process of arriving at that 
objective and the individual interests of the principals. 
Compromise and moderation should be seen not merely in terms 
of establishing a bridge between different positions. They should 
be seen as positive values in their own right - the essential values 
both of democratic politics and of peaceful relationships between 
States which are siL.'lultaneously sovereign and interdependent. 
There is an urgent need to rally and invigorate the forces of 
88 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 249. s~ also Higgott, ... A Decade of Change and 
Growth, O'{>. cit., p. 227. 
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moderation and reasonableness in international affairs. We 
should advocate and proclaim moderation not apologetically and 
out of expediency, but confidently- even passionately- as a matter 
of fundamental principle. If we do so, the bridges are likely to 
emerge of their own accord. 
Mr. President and fellow delegates, it is our solemn duty at this 
meeting to contribute positively to the search for comprehensive, 
equitable and peaceful solutions to the problems of this region. At 
the end of the day it is vital that we will have reached agreement 
among ourselves which will enable constructive negotiation and 
consultation to proceed.89 
This impassioned appeal to the Heac of Governments revealed Fraser's 
agenda for the meeting in attempting to bring the divergent interests in 
Rhodesia to an acceptable outcome. 
The Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shridath Ramphal suggested the 
establishment of a small contact group to work on the Rhodesia issue 
during the Lusaka meeting. The obvious participants in the group, namely 
Kaunda (Zambia), Nyerere (Tanzania), Thatcher (Britain) and Manley 
(Jamaica), with Ramphal, agreed that Nigeria and Australia should be 
invited into the group.90 It was important to include Nigeria in order to 
gain African approval for any outcome, even when President Obasanjo was 
not in Lusaka, and Fraser had been vocal on Rhodesia and was perceived as 
a useful linkage within the group.91 
In addition to forming the contact group, the Secretary-General specifically 
asked Fraser to play a mediation role bern.~een the new British Prime 
Minister and the African leaders.91 Thus, in the morning before the contact 
89 Prime Minister Fraser, Address at opening session of CHOGM, 2 August 1979, in 
Backgrounder, no. 198, 8 August 1979. Annex pp. i-iii. See also Weller, op. cit., pp. 327-8. It 
seems that Rhodesia was transformed into Zimbabwe following the elections in April1979. 
Both names for the courd:ry were used through 1979-80 with an indication of the political 
persuasion of any speak<:!r denoted by their use of either Rhodesia, to signify the value of t.l-te 
past, or Zimbabwe, ~o note the value of majority rule. Through 1979, Rhodesia was the most 
common nomenclature in international debates which provided added impact for Prime 
Minister Fraser when consistently using the name of Zimbabwe. See also Peacock, Address to 
the United Nations General Assembly, 29 September 1976, op. cit., p. 5 and Peacock, 
Statement to the United Nations General Assembly, 6 October 1978, op. cit., p. vii. For the 
reason of accuracy, I have defined the point for changing nomenclature from Rhodesia to 
Zimbabwe as the February 1980 election. 
90 National Times, 18 August 1979. See also Derek Ingram, Lusaka 1979; A Significant 
Commonwealth Meeting, Round Table~ no. 276, October 1979~ p. 27~and Sydney Morning 
Herald, 6 August 1979. 
91 Indeed, Australia's role was crucial in the absence of a strong lead from Canada. Ingram, 
op. cit., p. 278. See also Sydney Morning Herald, 6 August 1979. 
92 National Tin-£s, 18 August 1979. See also National Times, 11 August 1979. 
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group met, Fraser talked with ~yerere and, separately, with Thatcher to 
gauge the level of flexibility in their respective positions. With Thatcher, 
Fraser needed to establish whether Britain would agree to new elections 
with a new constitution in Rhodesia. The mediation process appeared to 
provide the context for a significant shift in position by Thatcher, 
notwithstanding Fraser's prior knowledge of Thatcher's propensity for 
change from their previous meeting in Canberra. Fraser was able to play the 
role of mediator effectively because the Australian Prime Minister was 
closer to the African position than to the British position, and thereby Fraser 
had the confidence of Kaunda and Nyerere.93 
Following Fraser's ~.onsultations, the contact group was able to agree on a 
nine-point program for Rhodesia.94 This outcome implied that Thatcher 
had conceded the requirement for a new constitution and new elections in 
Rhodesia and that Nyerere had agreed to convince the Patriotic Front on the 
need for a ceasefire. Also, the agreement signalled Nigeria's compliance 
with the position of Zambia and Tanzania.95 
For the Commonwealth as a whole, the agreed outcome was a significant 
achievement. Until the last moment, there remained significant doubt on 
Thatcher's willingness to negotiate on Rhodesia and therefore on the ability 
of the Commonwealth Heads of Government to influence the most 
important issue of the time. The role of Fraser was central to this outcome 
and there were several reasons for Fraser's success as a mediator in Lusaka. 
First, Fraser's position within the Commonwealth was built upon a high 
level of goodwill generated through Australia's relations with Africa. This 
included the policies of the Whitlam government, Fraser's consistent 
opposition to apartheid, and Fraser's constructive role at the 1977 CHOGM 
93 See Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 249 and Coral Bell, 1v!r Fraser and Australian 
Foreign Policy, World Today, vol. 35, October 1979, p. 414. See also Age, editorial, 26 July 
1979. 
94 Ingram, Lusaka 1979 .. ,, op. cit., p. 279, claimed that the group concluded on the plan 'in 
little more than an hour on the Saturday morning of the weekend retreat at Lusaka's State 
House'. 
95 After complaining that nothing had changed in Rhodesia since 1977 and again hinting 
that Nigeria was reconsidering its position in the Commonwealth, General Adefobe 
appeared to agree with Kaunda and Nyerere on the need for a negotiated outcome on 
Rhodesia. Incidentally, on the eve Df the Lus<tka CHOGM, Nigeria had announced the 
nationalisation of BP assets to the fury of Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, 
Lord Carrington. ibid., pp. 279-80. 
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in London. This goodwill translated into a level of credibility for Fraser 
with the African leaders in Lusaka.96 
Second, a major ingredient in Fraser's successful mediating role was the 
Australian Prime Minister's friendship with the Jamaican Prime Minister 
Michael Manley. 1'1- i.s unlikely alliance arose from Fraser's position in 
support of the developing countries' demands for international economic 
change, especially in relation to the proposed Common Fund. Manley also 
saw Fraser as both _passionate anti-racist and a conservative leader. This 
combination made Fraser a useh;~ ~:tHy and credible actor with African 
leaders and with Britain.97 
Third, Fraser's mediation was assisted by knowledge, attained in me~tings 
with Prime Minister Thatcher in Canberra prior to the Lusaka CHOGM, that 
Britain may be prepared to negotiate on an alternative settlement in 
Rhodesia. This information, and the recent history of long discussions with 
Thatcher, helped Fraser in reassuring the African leaders about Britain's 
position and in sec:uring Thatcher's support for a negotiated outcome for 
Rhodesia.9s 
Fourth, from the collection of Commonwealth leaders gathered at Lusaka, 
Fraser was the only participant capable of gaining significant concessions 
from Thatcher. Further to the value of holding knowledge about Britain's 
position on Rhodesia, Fraser was seen to be a conservative leader, similar to 
Prime rv1.inister Thatcher in terms of domestic economic outlook, and anti-
communist like Thatch~r in relation to southern Africa. Moreover, 
Secretary-General Ramphal explained that 'Malcolm Fraser was the only 
leader from the older Commonwe;:~,.lth countries that could help us bridge 
the gap between the old and the new, between Africa and Britain' .99 A more 
appropriate mediator could not have been foun.d in the circumstances of the 
Lusaka CHOGM and the issue of Rhodesia. 
:,:; :mewhat surprisingly, Fraser lc::1ked details of the outcome on Rhodesia to 
the Australian press prior to agreement from all the Heads of Goverru:nent. 
In fact, Tony Eggleton, feder3.l director of the Liberal .~·arty and senior 
96 In fact, Patriotic Front leaders had discussions with Peacock which demonstrated a degree 
of trust in the Ausf:ralian delegation in Lusaka. Higgott, ... A Decade of Change and Growth, 
op. cit., ?· 228. 
97 See Ir.gram, Lusaka 1979 ... , op. cit., p. 278 and National Times, 18 August 1979. 
98 See Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit, p. 250 and National Times, 18 August 1979. 
99 Ramphal quoted in Weller, op. cit, p. 325. 
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member of the Australian delegation, revealed the information to several 
Australian journalists.1°0 Understandably, Prime Ministers Thatcher and 
Muldoon were angry about the leak.101 
Fraser's motive in prematurely releasing the agreement was based in a 
combination of objectives. The immediate allegation was that the leak was 
designed to promote Fraser's involvement in negotiating the document on 
Rhodesia. More likely, the leak was intended to secure any reluctant 
Commonwealth leaders such as Prime Ministers Thatcher and Muldoon. 
Fu.rther, Fraser seemed to be the most appropriate leader to leak the details. 
That is, Kaunda and Nyerere were not critical of Fraser's actions which 
suggested some approval for the timing and method of the leak. Also, it 
was more difficult for Thatcher to berate Fraser and the Australian press 
than the African leaders and the African press. Again, Fraser's position as 
an anti-racist and conservative participant proved useful to the 
Commonwealth. 
The Lusaka CHOGM produced a lengthy communique. On southern Africa, 
the communique stated that: 
Heads of Govern!n.ent had a frank discussion on the current 
problems of southern Africa and their implications for the 
Commonwealth and the wider international community. While 
recognising that certain developments since their meeting in 
London have added new dimensions, they remained concerned 
by the potential dangers inherent in the existing situation. They 
therefore stressed the urgent need for finding satisfactory 
solutions to the remaining problems of this region.1o2 
On the situation in Rhodesia, the Heads of Government: 
a. confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black 
majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe; 
b. recognised, in this context, that the internal settlement 
cons6h . .t tion is defective in certain important respects; 
100 National Times, 18 August 1979. See also Higgott, ... A Decade of Change and Growth, op. 
cit., p. 228 and Age, 8 August 1979. 
101 Renouf, op. cit., p.142, Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 250 and Weller, op. cit., 
pp. 329-30. Muldoon's anger was manufactured given the New Zealand Prime Minister had 
leaked the details of the outcome to two New Zealand journalists the previous night. 
National Times, 18 August 1979. 
102 The communique included a section on southern A.fri!.:a, part of which was released \!n 5 
August, and referred to the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial 
Prejudice which was released on 7 August See full text of the final communique and the 
Lusaka Declaration in Backgrounder, no. 198, 8 August 1979, Annex pp. xi-xxvi. 
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c. fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the 
British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on 
the:! basis of majority rule; 
d. recognised that the search for a lasting settlement must involve 
all parties to the conflict; 
e. were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a 
settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their 
neighbours; 
f. accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule 
requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including 
appropriate safeguards fur minorities; 
g. acknowledged that the goverrunent formed under such an 
independence constitution rnust be chosen through free and fair 
elections, properly supervised under British Government 
authority, and with Commonwealth observers; 
h. welcomed the British Government's indication tl1at an 
appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives 
would be for them to call a constitutional conference to which all 
the parties would be invited; and 
i. consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring 
about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of 
the process of implementation of a lasting settlement.l03 
This outcome on Rhodesia accorded with the aims of the African 
Commonwealth leaders, and the views of Fraser, while the details also 
rPflected the objectives of the Patriotic Front. In this case, it seemed that the 
other Commonwea.lth leaders agreed, or were convinced to agree, with the 
African agenda. Certainly, the proposed conference to be convened by 
Britain and the recognition of the need for a new constitution and new 
elections in Rhodesia were significant outcomes for tl.e Lusaka CHOGM. 
The communique also endorsed the Lusaka Declaration of the 
Con1monwealth on R«ldsm and Racial Prejudice which focused on South 
Africa. Importantly, the committee which drafted this Declaration was 
chaired by the Australian Foreign Minister:104 
The peoples of the Commonwealth have the right to live freely in 
dignity and equality, without any distinction or exclusion based 
on race, colour, sex, descent, or national or ethnic origin. 
We reject as irumman and intolerable all policies designed to 
perpetuate apartheid, racial segregation or other policies based on 
theories that racial groups are or may be inherently superior or 
inferior. 
103 L akaC . ib'd . us ::>mmuruque, 1 ., pp. XV-XVI. 
104 See Age, 8 August 1979. 
page 298 
We reaffirm that it is the duty of all peoples of the 
Commonwealth to vvork together for the total eradication of the 
infamous policy of apartheid which is internationally recognised 
as a crirrte against the conscience and dignity of mankind a.nd the 
very existence of which is an affront to humanity.1os 
For an internationally agreed document, the Lusaka Declaration employed 
extremely strong language to condemn the system of apartheid. The 
Declaration was also important in reconfirming the commihr.ent of the 
Commonwealth to isolate South Africa while apartheid remained. 
In addition, the Commonwealth was critical of South Africa's 
administration of Namibia: 
Heads of Government deplored South Africa's continued refusal 
to implement the relevant Security Council Resolutions 
providing for Namibia's independence ... They commended the 
positive response of those Commonwealth Governments which 
had been requested by the Secretary-General to provide military or 
civilian personnel as part of the proposed UN Transitional 
Assistance Group for Namibia.l06 
In total, the Communique provided a clear direction from the 
Commonwealth on complex and protracted political issues.l07 In addition, 
it appeared that Prime Minister Fraser achieved long-held objectives in the 
negotiated outcome on Rhodesia. 
Immediately after the Lusaka CHOGM, the press in Australia lauded 
Fraser's mediating role between the Commonwealth leaders and attributed 
the Zimbabwe settlement as a major diplomatic achievement for the Fraser 
government.10s For example, Stuart Simson in the National Times claimed 
that: 
105 See Lusaka Declaration ... , op. cit., p. :xi. See also Lusaka Communique, section 16, op. cit., 
p.:xvi. 
106 Lusaka Communique, ibid., pp. :xvi. 
107 Harry, op. cit., p. 96 and Higgott, Auetralia and Africa, op. cit., p. 250. Among other 
initiatives, the Heads of Government agreed to convene a committee under Heinz Arndt from 
the Australian National University to examine international trade issues. See also Bell, Mr 
Fraser and Australi<m Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 420, Age, 8 August 1979 and see generally, 
Ingram, Lusaka 1~79 ... , op. cit. 
108 See Sydney Morning Herald, front page and editorial, 6 August 1979, Age, 8 August 1979, 
and National Times, 11 August 1979. See also R Bell, op. cit., p. 18, Renouf, op. cit., p. 142 and 
Philip Eldridge, Diplomacy, Development and 'Small Government': Conflicting Directions in 
Australia's Overseas Aid Program, Australia-Asia Papers, no. 23, Centre for the Study of 
Australian-Asian Relations, Griffith University, January 1983, p. 9. 
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Malcolm Fraser's ambition to become a genuinely influential 
internationai figure is now closer to realisation than ~ver before. 
This is the significance of Lusaka where Fraser's determination at 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting was 
instrumental in the compromise agree""i:h'=!nt over the future of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.l09 
In the atmosphere of the congratulations from the press, Fraser was modest 
in explaining the Australian delegation's role at Lusaka. In a ministerial 
statement to the Parliament, Fraser praised the role of Prime Minister 
Thatcher in reaffirming Britain's unqualified commitment to the goal of 
majority government in Rhodesia and recognised the important 
contributions of the leaders of Zambia and Tanzania: 
President Kaunda and President Nyerere showed a restraint and 
patience, and a confidence in the British Government which were 
an essential element in creating the trust necessary for a·greement 
and progress.llO 
Fraser's role as mediator between Thatcher and the African leaders was 
understated and did not need to be expanded because this aspect had been 
highlighted by the Australian press. 
In relation to the proposed solution, Fraser explained to the Parliament, 
especially to the members of the Liberal and Country Parties, that an end to 
the conflict was essential. Indeed, the Prime Minister argued that an 
intensification of the violence in Zimbabwe would lead to more 
involvement by communist countries in supplying arms to the forces in 
opposition to the Muzorewa regime.1n 
Significantly, Hayde:r. commended Fraser on the position adopted at the 
Lusaka CHOGM. The Labor Party leader conceded that Fraser's role in the 
negotiation process was impressive, constructive and important.112 
Further to this praise, Fraser's leadership position within the government 
seemed to be strengthened at a tin1e of discontent from the backbenches on 
Australia's approach to southern Africa. Indeed, prior to Lusaka, there were 
suggestions of a leadership challenge from Peacock.ll3 However, because 
109 National Times, 18 August 1979. 
110 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol.l15,23 August 1979, p. 577. 
111 Fraser, CPD, HR., vol. 115, 23 August 1979, p. 579. 
112 Hayden, CPD, HR., vol. 115, 23 August 1979, p. 581. See also R. Bell, op. cit., p. 18. 
113 See National Times, 11 August 1979. 
page300 
Thatcher endorsed the outcome on Rhodesia as mediated by Fraser, the 
opponents of Fraser within the Liberal and Country Parties government 
were momentarily silenced.l14 
Given the apparent success of Fraser at Lusaka, it was disappointing for the 
Prime Minister to gain little public reward for the government from the 
electorate. African issues remained a low priority in domestic debates.ns 
The venture in Lusaka implied that ambitious and progressive foreign 
policy options were only viable when the government held a secure 
majority in the Parliament and a federal election was not due. Indeed, 
Fraser may have been forced to alter Australia's approach on Zimbabwe if 
the Lusaka meeting had coincided with an election campaign. 
The importance of thE:: Lusaka CHOGM in the Zimbabwe settlement may 
have been overstated by the participants and the press. It was argued that 
the Commonwealth meeting merely finalised an agreement which had 
been brokered elsewhere and that greater credit should have been allocated 
to the diplon1atic work of Britain and the United States.n6 This position 
contradicted the praiseft-lauded upon Prime Minister Fraser for the work 
apparently completed through the Commonwealth, especially in Lusaka. 
Uoon reflection, Lord Carrington provided the catalyst role in the process of 
the Zimbabwe settlement where Fr.aser acted to moderate the differences in 
the Commonwealth.117 Certainly, the timing of the CHOGM in 1979 placed 
pressure on Britain to hasten toward a satisfactory resolution. The British 
government was wary of international condemnation in Lusaka. Also, 
without the concessions on Zimbabwe granted by Thatcher, or the 
constructive work of Tanzanian President Nyerere among the African 
leaders, the Fraser initiatives would have failed.118 However, those 
qualifications do not devalue the long-term role played by Fraser, and 
Peacock, on Zimbabwe. Fraser's initiatives to bring the Commonwealth 
leaders to a point of agreement was crucial for the outcome. 
At the international level, the Lusaka agreement provided the basis for a 
meeting of Zimbabwe groups at Lancaster House in London in September-
114 See National Times, 18 August 1979. 
115 Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit, p. 259 and Higgott, ... A Decade of Change and 
Growth, op. cit, p. 231. 
116 Renouf, op. cit., p.139. 
117 Renouf, ibid., p. 142, quoted Cyrus Vance in stating that Fraser played a powerful role in 
moderating the differences at Lusaka. 
ns R. Bell, op. cit., p. 18. 
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October-November 1979.119 The central characters were representatives of 
the Patriotic Front, namely Nkomo and Mugabe, the Zimbabwe 
government including Muzorewa, and the British Foreign Minister Lord 
Carrington acting as facilitator. These negotiations eventually produced the 
course of action which had been proposed in Lusaka. The parties agreed to a 
cease-fire which would permit new elections under the supervision of a 
British Governor and a Commonwealth monitoring force. Australia's role 
at the Lancaster Hopse meeting was to again mediate between the old and 
new Commonwealth members through the Australian High 
Commissioner in London.12o 
With a significant breakthrough agreed in London, Australia decided to 
follow Britain in lifting sanctions against Zimbabwe. The Fraser 
government asserted that: 
with signature of an all-parties settlement and British authority 
re-established in Rhodesia, the Australian Government can be 
satisfied that the objectives for which sanctions were imposed 
have been achieved. The Australian Government will therefore 
now take the necessary steps to remove sanctions against 
Rhodesia.121 
For Fraser, the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia at the time of an 
agreement between all parties in London conformed to the Lusaka 
communique which referred to the need for 'an end to sanctions as part of 
the process of implementation of a lasting settlement' .122 Other 
governments decided to maintain the sanctions until the elections were 
held. On this, the Fraser government aligned Australia with Britain on the 
issue of sanctions which was different from the previous position in 
support of the African nations. Fraser appeared to placate Prime Minister 
119 See ibid. and Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 251. 
120 R. Bell, op. cit., p. 18, Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. cit., p. 251, and Higgott, ... A 
Decade of Change and Growth, op. cit., p. 228. The Australian High Commissioner was 
Gordon Freeth. 
121 See statement on Rhodesia, 18 December 1979, in Backgrounder, no. 217, 16 January 1980, p. 
ii. See also Sydney Morning Herald, 19 December 1979. Previously, Peacock had signalled 
that, if the talks were successful, Australia would lift sanctions and provide a contingent for 
a ceasefire monitoring force. Peacock, Ministerial statement: Rhodesia, CPD, HR, vol. 116,22 
November 1979, pp. 3386-9. However, Lionel Bowen was cautious on the proposal to lift 
sanctions while the Rhodesian armed forces continued to cross into Zambia to sabotage key 
installations, such as the destruction of the Chambesi River bridge. Essentially, Bowen 
wanted to provide support for President Kaunda in Zambia by maintaining sanctions on 
Rhodesia for a longer period. Bowen, CPD, HR., vol. 116, 22 November 1979, pp. 3389-91. See 
also Statement on Rhodesia, Backgrounder, no. 213,21 November 1979, pp. ii-iii, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 23 November 1979r including editorial, and R. Bell, op. cit, p. 19. 
122 L akaC . "t . us ommuruque, op. C1 ., p. XVI. 
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Thai.cher with the early removal of sanctions and may have succumbed to 
the business-based Rhodesia lobby .in Australia.123 
As part of the implementation of the Lancaster House agreement, Australia 
contributed a contingent of 150 Army personnel to the Commonwealth 
Military Cease-fire Monitoring Force. These troops began duty in Zirnbabwe 
in December 1979 and remained until March 1980.124 The objective of the 
Commonwealth Force was to monitor rather than attempt to enforce the 
cease-fire. Again, this constructive international activity by the Fraser 
government attracted little attention, and thereby little opposition, in 
Australia.125 
In February 1980, the supervised elections in Zimbabwe resulted in an 
overwhelming majority for the party led by Robert Mugabe.126 In April, 
Rhodesia became the independent state of Zimbabwe and was admitted to 
the United Nations. Prime Minister Fraser was a welcome guest at the 
independence celebrations.127 Subsequently, in July 1980, the Fraser 
government doubled Australian economic aid to Zimbabwe to $10million 
over two years.128 
123 R. Bell, op. cit., p. 19. 
124 ibid., pp. 18-19 and Smith, op. cit., p. 50. Also, on Australia's contribution to the ceasefire 
monitoring force and the election observation process, see Higgott, Australia and Africa, op. 
cit., p. 251; Renouf, op. cit., p. 142; Harry, op. cit., p. 89; J.A.A. Stockwin, Problems in 
Australian Foreign Policy, January-June 1980, Australian Journal of Politics and History, val. 
26, 3, 1980, p. 349; Backgrounder, no. 212, 14 November 1978, pp. i-ii; Peacock, Ministerial 
statement: Rhodesia, CPD, HR, val. 116,22 November 1979, pp. ;:,:~86-9; Statement on 
Rhodesia, 18 December 1979, in Backgrounder, no. 217, 16 Januat]1980, pp. ii-v; Sydney 
Morning Herald, 23 November 1979, including editorial; and Sydney Morning Herald, 19 
December 1979. 
125 Smith, op. cit., p. 50. 
126 Stockwin, op. cit., p. 349 and Renouf, op. cit., p. 142. Australia had provided an Observer 
Group of eight for the elections. See Higgott, Australic'. and Africa, op. cit., p. 251 and R. 
Bell, op. cit., p. 18. For more on issues related to the election, see James Barber, Zimbabwe's 
Southern Africa setting, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, val. 18, 1, 
March 1980 and Martyr. Gregory, Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation through armed struggle and 
electoral mobilisation, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, val. 19, 1, March 
1981. 
127 Stockwin, op. cit., p. 349 and Harry, op. cit., p. 83. 
128 R.J. Lim, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1980, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 27, 1, 1981, p. 14. See Street, Ministerial statement: Response to 
the Report on Zimbabwe, CPD, HR, vol. 120, 4 December 1980, pp. 414-7 and Report of the 
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Zimbabwe, tabled in May 1980, produced by 
the sub-committee on southern Africa. On Zimbabwe after the 1980 election, see Derek 
Ingram, et al., Zimbabwe: year one, Commonwealth,, April-May 1981, Herbert Ushewokunke, 
Zimbabwe: problems and prospects of socialist dev1elopment, Race at'ld Class, vol. 23, 4, Spring 
1982 and Virginia Curtin Knight, The social and eco:nornic transformation of Zimbabwe, 
Current History, vol. 82, 482, March 1983. 
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In conclusion, the Fraser government's position on Rhodesia centred on 
the Prime Minister's role before and during the CHOGM in Lusaka in 
August 1979. Prior to the meeting, Fraser shifted the position of Prime 
lviinister Thatcher in relation to Britain's view of the internal settlement in 
Rhodesia and Fraser built upon the personal relationships with key African 
leaders. At the Lusaka meeting, Fraser's role in mediating between 
Thatcher and the African leaders was crucial to the negotiated 
Commonwealth outcome. After the meeting, Fraser continued to support 
the process of a peaceful transition into elections in Rhodesia. Fraser 
ensured that Australia was consistent in opposing the minority regime in 
Rhodesia while playing a significant role in the international negotiations 
on a settlement in Rhodesia. Further, Fraser was an important actor in 
maintaining Australia's anti-racist and anti-colonial posture in 
international affairs through the Commonwealth forum and thereby with 
key African countries. 
South Africa and the Commonwealth, 1980-83 
By late 1980, the international context had changed with the conflicts in Iran 
and Afghanistan, and the election of Reagan as United States President. 
This combination of events heralded a renewed security agenda in world 
politics. While Fraser embraced this change, the Prime Minister continued 
to provide explicit support for the Commonwealth and continued to oppose 
the apartheid regime in South Africa.129 Thus, as host of the 1981 CHOGM 
in Melbourne, Fraser ensured that the outcome of this meeting offered 
support for the developing countries and opposed apartheid. Similarly, as 
organise: of the 1982 Commonwealth Games in Brisbane, Fraser mediated 
between tt'le renegade New Zealand government and the African members 
to stage a successful event. In both examples, Prime Minister Fraser traded 
on an established standing within the Commonw·ealth as a fierce opponent 
of apartheid and explicit supporter of Africa. 
This approach formed the background to the preparations for the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government M~~eting scheduled for Melbourne 
in September-October 1981. The Melbourne CHOGM again focused on 
southern Africa and the Heads of Government condemned apartheid and 
129 For example, Australia sent two representatives to the Co~unonwealth observer team to 
monitor elections in Uganda in December 1980. The Fraser government also contributed 
toward the cost of the elections. Lim, op. cit., p. 14. 
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the minority government of South Africa. In addition, the Commonwealth 
expressed concern about continuing international economic debates. Prime 
Minister Fraser n Lanaged to emerge from the Melbourne CHOGM with an 
enhanced credibility as an international leader. 
Immediately prior to the Melbourne CHOGM, the Fraser government 
increased the level of Australian aid by 15.8 percent in the 1981-82 budget. 
This increase contrasted with the continual decline in Australian aid 
through the late 1970s.l30 The aid increase was a political attempt to ensure 
the success of the Melbourne CHOGM and in particular, it was a gesture to 
boost Prime Minister Fraser's standing as the apprehensive host of the 
Commonwealth meeting. Moreover, Renouf claimed that the obviously 
timed decision to provide more money to Commonwealth countries 
illustrated Fraser's method of conducting diplomacy with developing 
countries.131 
To host the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Melbourne 
was the climax in Fraser's efforts to build the Commonwealth into a major 
international organisation. The CHOGM was the largest international 
meeting ever held in Australia with the attendance of 42 Heads of 
Commonwealth governments. The purpose of this meeting was to 
recommit the Commonwealth to a number of key issues and to reinforce 
the prestige of the Australian Prime Minister within the Commonwealth, 
particularly in terms of restating Fraser's commitment on questions of 
southern Africa. Prior to the meeting, there was some jousting among 
Prime Ministers Muldoon, Mugabe, Thatcher and Fraser which raised 
interest in the deliberations.132 In the end, the Melbourne CHOGM 
reinforced the high standing of Fraser within the Commonwealth. 
As a guide to the content of discussions during the Melbourne meeting, the 
CHOGM Communique was a substantial document which outlined, at 
130 Eldridge, op. cit., p. 2. With a different method of calculation, Renouf, op. cit., p. 149 
claimed that there was an 18 percent increase in real terms in the 1981-82 budget. 
131 Renouf, ibid., p. 150, explained that: ' 
almost invariably, before the Prime Minister attended a meeting dominated 
numerically by developing countries, [Fraser] would direct that a packet of 
'goodies' be put together for presentation. Possibly, the developing countries 
were impressed with Australia's new generosity. More likely, some at least 
regcrded [Australia] as pretentious and patronising. 
132 Nancy Viviani, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1981, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 28, 1, 1982, p. 16. See also Bell, Dependent Ally, op. cit., 
p.l60. 
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length, the Commonwealth position on many international topics.l33 Some 
of the words used in the Communique revealed the influence of Prime 
Minister Fraser. In a self-congratulatory tone on Zimbabwe, the 
Communique stated that: 
Heads of Government recalled with particular satisfaction the 
Commonwealth's role in helping to bring Zimbabwe to 
independence under majority rule following their Meeting in 
Lusaka. They were encouraged by this demonstration of the 
contribution their Meetings could make to the resolution of long-
standing international problems.134 
The Commonwealth leaders reaffirmed their 'total and unequivocal 
co?-demnation of apartheid as a crime against humanity' and resolved to act 
agajnst the minority regime in South Africa.13S 
The Heads of Government also reaffirmed their Gleneagles Agreement of 
1977 which restricted sporting contact with South Africa. Prime Minister 
Muldoon threatened to withdraw from the Gleneagles Agreement if New 
Zealand was subject to further boycotts or attacks on the issue. Indeed, 
Muldoon clashed with Mugabe and departed early from the conference.136 
It was a show of support for Fraser from Nyerere and Mugabe that the clash 
with Muldoon did not divert the conference. As Higgott documented, the 
diplomatic course chosen by the African leaders was 'due in no small part to 
the high regard in which they held Malcolm Fraser and their desire not to 
detract from a conference into which Fraser had put so much effort and 
personal capital' .137 Further, Mugabe refused to raise the cause of the 
133 The Communique was agreed by all attending membe>:s of the Commonwealth: Australia, 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Britain, Canada, Cyprus, Fiji, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, St Lucia, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Za:.r.bia and Zimbabwe. See 
text of the Melbourne Communique, CPD, HR, val. 125, 13 October 1981, pp. 1893-1900. 
134 Melbourne Communique, CPD, HR, vol. 125, 13 October 1981, p. 1893. 
135 Melbourne Communique, CPD, HR, vol. 125, 13 October 1981, p. 1894. See statements on the 
establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and 
on Namibia, CPD, HR, vol. 125, 13 October 1981, p. 1894 and Fraser on Namibia, CPD, HR, 
val. 125, 13 October 1981, p. 1891. In this context, see Chester Ai'-Greker, South Africa: 
strategy for change, Foreign Affairs, vol. 59, 2, Winter 1980/81 and Basil Davidson, South 
Africa's border wars, New Society, vol. 55, 957, 19 March 1981. 
136 Viviani, op. cit, p. 17. See Melbourne Communique, CPD, HR, vol. 125,13 October 1981, 
pp. 1891 & 1894 . The communique also expressed the collective concern of the Commonwealth 
on continuing tensions in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and the Middle East, particularly 
Palestine, and noted with disappointment the increase in military prese:J.""tce in the Indian 
Ocean. Melbourne Communique, CPD, HR, vol. 125, 13 October 1981, pp. 1895-6. 
137 Higgott, ... A Decade of Change and CorJlict, op. cit, p. 229. 
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Aboriginal people protesting against the Fraser government during the 
conference. If Fraser's standing among the African leaders had not been so 
high, the issue of Indigenous rights could have been used against the 
Australian Prime Minister.138 
The Commonwealth argued for greater levels of economic aid, and 
appeared to acknowledge the effort of Australia to increase aid in the 1981 
budget.139 The Heads of Government also expressed concern about food 
security in many developing countries and endorsed recommendations 
from the Commonwealth Ministerial Meeting on Food Production and 
Rural Development held in February 1981 in Dacca. Further, the 
Commonwealth welcomed the decision of the Australian government to 
establish the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research.140 
Fraser explained that Ausi:Ialia was satisfying its obligations under the 
world food program targets and highlighted that Sir John Crawford had 
agreed to be the initial chair of the Centre for International Agricultural 
Research.141 
The CHOGM also produced the Melbourne Declaration on economic 
problems faced by the developing countries, issued partly to influence the 
forthcoming North-South Summit Meeting in Cancun. Specifically, the 
Declaration stated that: 
... the gross inequality of wecJth and opportunity currently 
existing in the world, and the unbroken circle of poverty in which 
the lives of millions in developing countries are confined, are 
fundamental sources of tension and instability in the world.142 · 
The Melbourne Declaration seemed to be ineffectual because Fraser was not 
able to secure an invitation to Cancun and thus this document was not 
debated.143 
138 ibid. 
139 M~oume C0mmunique, CPD, HR, vol. 125, 13 October 1981, p. 1897. See Fraser comments 
on AusL~aJia's increase in aid, CPD, HR, vol.125, 13 October 1981, p. 1891. 
140 Melbourne Communique, CPD, HR., vol. 125, 13 October 1981, p. 1899. The Commonwealth 
also wdcomed the decision of the Canadian government to initiate a training program fol' 
agriculnrral extension workers which would reflect the important role of women in 
agricultural production. 
141 Fraser, CPD, HR, vol. 125,13 October 1981, p. 1891. 
142 Declaration by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting reproduced in CPD, 
HR, vol. 125, 13 October 1981, p. 1892. 
143 Renouf, op. cit., p. 143. The North-South Summit failed because US President Reagan 
refused to acknowledge the demands of the de.veloping countries. See also Walter Goldstein, 
Redistributing the world's wealth, Resources Policy, vol. 8, 1, March 1982. 
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Nevertheless, the Prime Minister proclaimed that the Melbourne CHOGM 
was a success for Australia and the Commonwealth: 
I believe we have emerged from the meeting with an enhanced 
reputation as an active and concerned member of the 
Commonwealth and as an enlightened and responsible middle 
power.144 
In response to Fraser's statement, Hayden initially commended the Prime 
Minister again in relation to the settlement in Zimbabwe and explained that 
the Labor Party supported a number of initiatives in the Commonwealth 
Communique and the Melbourne Declaration,145 In particular, Hayden 
concurred with the condemnation of racism in southern Africa and 
congratulated Fraser in persisting with this position despite the efforts of 
some colleagues in the government. However, Hayden also reminded the 
Parliament that the Melbourne CHOGM had been criticised by some of the 
participants. Notably, Prime Minister Mahathir suggested the CHOGM was 
'just talk and very little progress' while Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara had remarked that the meeting had been 'full of good intentions with 
little action' .146 
In the end, within terms of Commonwealth diplomatic objectives, the 
Melbourne CHOGM could be proclaimed a success.147 Despite the various 
critiques of the Commonwealth and the Melbourne meeting, Fraser 
emerged as an international leader and a progressive actor for change 
within a group of diverse nations. 
In the wake of the Melbourne CHOGM, the Commonwealth Games 
scheduled for September-October 1982 in Brisbane involved a number of 
political issues for the Fraser govern.ment. The question of which nations 
would agree to participate in the Games related to the Gleneagles 
Agreement, the resolve of the Commonwealth, Australia's credibility as a 
144 Fraser, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Ministerial statement, CPD, HR, 
vol. 125, 13 October 1981, p. 1889. 
145 Hayden, CPD, HR, vol. 125,13 October 1981, p. 1901. 
146 Hayden, CPD, HR., vol. 125, 13 October 1981, pp. 1902 quoted Mahathir from the Far 
Eastem Economic Review, 25 September 1981. ~e also Renouf, op. cit., p. 144. 
147 Viviani, op. cit., p. 18 and Higgott, ... A Decade of Change and Growth, op. cit., p. 229. 
See also Margaret Doxey, Strategies in multilateral diplomacy: the Commonwealth, 
Southern Africa, and the NIEO, International Journal, vol. 35, 2, Spring 1980; Shridath S. 
Ramphal, The Commonwealth in the 1980s: an era of negotiations, Round Table, no. 282, 
April 1981; E. Butler, Behind the Melbourne CHOGM circus, Intelligence Survey, vol. 30, 
October 1981; and Evan Charlton, The Commonwealth in the '80s: principles and prospects, 
Round Table, no. 284¥ October 1981. 
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member country opposed to apartheid, and Fraser's persona.l influence on 
these inter-related topics.148 
The difficulties centred on New Zealand's proposed involvement in the 
Commonwealth Games. During 1981, the South African rugby union team 
had played matches in New Zealand, without the approva:~ r~f the New 
Zealand government but not halted by the government. Many 
Commonwealth members, especially the African nations, felt this tour 
constituted a breach of the Gleneagles Agreement which prohibited sporting 
contact with South Africa.149 
In late 1981 and early 1982, a number of Commonwealth nations threatened 
not to participate in the Brisbr.1ne Commonwealth Games unless New 
Zealand was specifically excluded The Fraser government was caught 
between wanting to uphold the rules of the Games which encouraged 
extensive participation and wanting the African nations to attend. Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Tony Street commented that an African boycott 'would 
harm the Commonwealth, and could undermine community s11pport in 
Australia for the Government's policy on sporting contacts With South 
Africa' .150 
There were further distractions to the debate with New Zealand rugby 
officials visiting South Africa and British cricketers travelling to South 
Africa. Also, the Premier or ·:!ueensland, Joh Bjelke-Petersen was arguing 
for New Zealand's participauun in defiance of th-~ African view.15I Further, 
there was considerable confusion within the Labor Party on whether New 
Zealand should participate. Hayden stated that it would be a 
disappointment if the African countries decided not to attend the Brisbane 
Commonwealth Games and that, if this threat continued1 Fraser should 
attempt to exclude New Zealand to avert a boycott.152 However, others in 
the Labor Party disagreed, and Hayden was persuaded to change position 
and thereby not oppose the participation of New Zealand.I53 
148 Harry S. Albinski, Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1982, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 28, 3, 1982, p. 334. 
149 See ibid. 
150 Street, statement on African participation in Commonwealth Games, 2 March 1982, in 
Backgrounder, no. 322, 3 March 1982. See also Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January 
to June 1982, op. cit., p. 334, Australian, 4 March 1982, and Age, 5 March 1982. 
151 See Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1982, op. cit., pp. 334-5. 
152 Hayden, CPD, HR, vol. 126, 9 March 1982, pp. 707-8. 
1 . .::~ S?.e Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, Jar':.lary h.• June 1982, op. cit., p. 335. 
page 309 
Further, Aboriginal peoples in Australia threatened to protest at the 
Com!t~onwealth Games and attempted to persuade African Commonwealth 
nations to boycott the Games on the issue of discriminatory policies 
affecting Aboriginal peoples. A delegation of Aboriginal peoples travelled 
to Africa in June 1982, with former Prime Minister Whitlam as diplomatic 
adviser. While this group denied they were seeking support for a boycott, 
the African governments indicated that they would not stay away due to the 
issue of discdmination against Aboriginal peoples. The African nations, 
mad.(! a distinction between the Abori 3ffialland issue which was not seen as 
relevant, while the notion that New Zealand rugby union was encouraging 
discrimination was understood as central.154 
The Fraser government adopted two actions to reinforce African views of 
Australia's credentials on the issue. The first initiative involved explicit 
criticisms of individual Australian cricket players proposing to tour South 
Africa,l55 The second action was to authorise a new air servke to Zimbabwe 
while reaffirming the ban on the Qantas service to South Afric-3.)56 These 
efforts were supported by a diplomatic campaign through bilateral channels 
and through the Commonwealth. Australia traded on its continuing 
opposition to the apartheid regime with the African nations and exploited 
Fraser's personal standi..."'lg within the Commonwealth.157 
The Australian diplomatic efforts succeeded. There was no boycott of the 
Brisbane Commonwealth Games and the unity of the Commonwealth was 
secured. The Commonwealth Games Federation decided that the Gam.es 
154 ibid., pp. 334-5. Further, the Fraser government was able to capitalise on a letter sent 
from the South African Embassy in Canberra to all federal Members of Parliament. The 
letter emphasised the economi~ and stratr~gic links between South Africa and Australia and 
argued for closer relations as the two countries were 'derived largely from common stock'. 
This statement offended some Membe,;s of Parliament and the Fraser government ensured that 
th~:: critical reaction from the Foreign Minister was noticed by all Commonwealth nat~;)ns. 
See Senator Guilfoyle, answer to question, CPD, Senate, val. 93,25 March 1982, pp. 1157-8. 
See also Canberra Times, 26 March 1982. On the position of the Aboriginal peoples in 
relation to the Commonwealth Games, see Margaret Ann Franklin, Racism Australian style, 
Australian Quarterly, val. 5, 3, September 1979 and Colin Tatz, Aborigines and the Brisbane 
Games, Social Alternatives, val. 2, 2, August 1981. 
155 See Street, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 127, 23 March 1982, pp. 1228-9 and Sydney 
Morning Herald, 24 March 1982. 
156 See Minister for Transport, Ralph Hunt, answer to question, CPD, HR, vol. 127,20 April 
1982, p. 1611 and Hunt, answer to qt?<>Stion, CPD, HR., val. 127, 20 Apri11982, p. 1601. See also 
, Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1982, op. cit., p. 335; Canberra Times, 28 
· January 1982; Sydney Monting Herald, 26 March 1982; and Australian, 21 April 1982. 
l57 Albinski, ... Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1982, op. cit., p. 336. Fraser did not 
allow the South African rugby union team to transit in Australia during a flight to New 
Zealand in 1981. The Soutb. African team was forced to fly to New Zealand via the United 
States. 
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code was to be rewritten to provide that any Commonwealth member 
found in contravention of the Gleneagles agreement would be expelled 
from the Comrnonwealth Games. Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal, 
influential on the Games resolution, added that: 
the Commonwealth nations owed their attendance and 
participation to the government and people of Australia who had 
taken a sustained and resolute stand against apartheid.1ss 
Apart from the protests by Aboriginal peoples, the Commonwealth Games 
in Brisbane were seen as a resounding success for the Fraser government 
and the Commonwealth.159 
Through the final term of the Liberal and Country Parties government, 
Fraser was seen to oppose the apartheid regime in South Africa and support 
the African members of the Commonwealth. As host of the Melbourne 
CHOGM, Fraser's standing within the Commonv•. ealth was boosted while 
the Commonwealth continued to display an overt opposition to apartheid. 
It was Fraser's personal agenda and interest which fuelled .hustralia's active 
involvement within the Commonwealth in opposition to the apartheid 
regL.~e in South Africa. Through both the Melbourne CHOGM in 1981 and 
the Brisbane Commonwealth Ga.mes in 1982, Fraser demonstrated a 
consistent position :m support of the African members of the 
Commonwealth. 
Conclusirn 
The Fraser government placed Australia in the centre of discussions on 
African issues. Indeed, Prime Minister Fraser's arguments in opposition to 
the minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa were integral to 
Australian foreign policy. Fraser offered a personal commitment to racial 
equality in Africa as a basis for the government's foreign policy. 
AB Africa became pivotal to international debates,. F:aser was provided with 
the opportunity to continue many policy positions on Africa established by 
the VVhitlam Labor government. Beyond this, Fraser demonstrated more 
158 Ramphal quot~d in ibid., p. 336. . 
159 T.B. Millar, Problems of Australian Foreign Policy July-December 1982, Australzan Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 29, 1, 1983, p. 10. Aboriginal peoples were protesting against the 
discriminatory policies of the Bjelke-Petersen state goverrunent of Queensland rather than 
the Fraser government. 
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practical support for the arguments of African leaders than had Whitlam.16° 
On South Africa and Rhodesia, Prime Minister Fraser displayed Australia's 
opposition to the minority regimes at the 1977 CHOGM in London. Also, 
Fraser attempted to close th~·' .&:~hodesia Information Centre which was 
operating in Sydney while 0_,;-,~.ting with dissenting voices on southern 
Africa within the government. In a mixed outcome, Fraser managed to 
quieten the rumblings from the Liberal and Country Parties but was unable 
to restrict the activities of the Rhodesia Information Centre. 
At the 1979 Lusaka CHOGM, Fraser was instrumental in the negoi:iations on 
Rhodesia. In playing the role of mediator between Britain and the African 
countries, Prime Minister Fraser was central to the process which led to a 
new constitution and new elections in Rhodesia. Fraser showed that 
Au::,tralia would continue to argue from an anti-racist foreign policy 
position in relation to the minority government in Rhodesia. Fraser was 
also active in opposing apartheid in South Africa, with significant assistance 
from Peacock, and demonstrated a faith in the Commonwealth to provide 
effective outcomes to inten1ational conflicts. 
With a change in the international context in 1980, Fraser continued to 
support the role of the Commonwealth within a renewed security agenda. 
The Prime Minister successfully hosted the 1981 CHOGM in Melbourrle and 
demonstrated Australia's support for the interests of developing countries 
and Australia's continuing opposition to apartheid. As organiser of the 
1982 Commonwealth Games in Brisbane, fraser again negotiated between 
political positions in the Commonwealth, notably securing an agreed 
resolution on participation consistent with the demands of the African 
leaders. In both cases, Fraser utilised the personc>l standing established 
earlier with the African countries to deliver effective outcomes. 
Fraser played an important role in the construction of Australian foreign 
policy on Africa. Fraser's personal commitment to racial equality, and 
thereby strident opposition to the minority regimes in Rhodesia and South 
Africa, did not accord with the view of the Liberal and Country Parties. In 
this, it was clear that Fraser led the government to a position which 
consistently opposed racial discrimination in southern Africa. 
160 See T.B. Millar, Australian Foreign Policy: More of the same in a colder world, Current 
Affairs Bulletin, vol. 57, 12, May 1981, p. 8. 
Conclusiofl 
This thesis shows that Whitlam and Fraser produced similar foreign policy 
positions on Africa from quite different political perspectives. Both Prime 
Ministers actively opposed racial discrimination in South Africa and 
Rhodesia. This outcome was based on the personal influence of Whitlam 
and Fraser within their respective governments in constructing Australian 
foreign policy. Indeed, both Prime Ministers were impol'tant, even central, 
to the setting of Australia's international agenda and the implementation of 
Australia's foreign policy initiatives. 
Prime Ministers Whitlam and Fraser established different positions on 
some general issues in international relations, such as the extent of criticism 
of the Soviet Union. However, I have shown that both Whitlam and Fraser 
aligned Australia with the demands of the developing countries and that 
this was the context for Australia's policies on Africa. This analysis is 
particularly important in demonstrating the continuity in Australian 
foreign policy from the Whitlam Labor Party goo:;ernment to the Fraser 
Liberal and Country Parties government. 
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In relation to the literature on Australian foreign policy, this thesis 
highlights the value of the foreign policy initiatives of both Whitlam and 
Fraser. Again, this is particularly important with reference to Fraser's 
adoption of an anti-racist foreign policy and the linking of issues within 
Fraser's foreign policy. This thesis also offers original analysis of specific 
topics which have hitherto not been examined at length. For Whitlam, this 
includes the idea of an Asia Pacific forum, changes to aid policy and 
administration, and the economic relationship with South Africa. For 
Fraser, I have provided new analysis on the strategic situation in the Indian 
Ocean, policy on Kampuchea, and Fraser's role in the settlement of conflict 
in Rhodesia. Overall, this thesis is unique in comparing the foreign policies 
of Whitlam and Fraser, especially with a focus on Africa. 
Through the structure of the thesis, I have demonstrated that Whitlam and 
Fraser eBtablished connections between the general and specific elements of 
foreign policy. This argument rests on the analyses of foreign policy issues 
within each government and the linking of specific topics across the two 
governments. I have illustrated the extent of change and continuity in 
Australia's foreign policy positions by projecting a matrix of comparisons of 
key issues. 
On the domestic context of foreign policy, Whitlam was able to amend the 
Labor Party Platform to reflect the need for substantial change in Australia's 
international outlook, particularly in moving away from a racist position 
on immigration and to oppose racial discrimination in general. This new 
approach to foreign policy was announced and confirmed in the November 
1972 Labor Party policy speech delivered by Whitlam as leader and this 
outline was used as the template for action in government. 
Similarly, Fraser dominated the construction of the Liberal and Country 
Parties foreign policy agenda and established the parameters for 
government action in the June 1976 statement in the Parliament. Fraser's 
personal understanding of international politics was an important element 
in setting the direction of Australian foreign policy. Indeed, Fraser 
combined an anti-Soviet view with an anti-racist position to provide a 
distinct outlook for Australia. 
The analysis of the domestic contexts to foreign policy for both Whitlam 
and Fraser demonstrates the different starting points for each Prime 
Minister in implementing their view of Australian foreign policy. While 
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the political perspectives of Whitlam and Fraser were expected to be 
divergent, the views of both Prime Ministers dominated the construction of 
Australia's international position and directed that Australia would oppose 
the minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia. 
On Australia's international relationships, Whitlam was more critical of 
the United States compared with the previous Australian governments 
which had aligned with the US and Britain in an unquestioning manner. 
While Whitlam, and members of the Labor government, criticised the 
actions of the United States in Vietnam, Prime Minister Whitlam was also 
careful not to challenge the fundamental basis for the alliance, that is, the 
US military facilities located in Australia. In addition, Whitlam supported 
the notion of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, in conjunction with the 
littoral states, but this position by Australia was tainted by the continuing 
presence of the secret naval facilities at North West Cape. 
Significantly, Whitlam changed Australia's image in the United Nations by 
adopting a voting pattern independent of the United States and Britain. 
Thus, on occasions, Australia was aligned with a variety of smaller nations 
in the UN General Assembly. Whitlam also advocated the value of the 
United Nations and Australia's new approach in the UN was important for 
the implementation of more constructive relations with countries in the 
Asia Pacific region, the Indian Ocean region, and Africa. 
In response, Prime Minister Fraser attempted to strengthen the alliance 
with the United States given the perception that Whitlam had weakened 
this important relationship, Fraser was particularly concerned about the 
intentions of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean 
and therefore tried to involve the US to a greater extent in the security of 
these regions. Fraser was fervently opposed to the Soviet Union's 
intervention in Afghanistan and supported the US argument for a boycott 
of the Moscow Olympic Games. Further, Fraser was pleased t0 support the 
international approach of President Reagan which accorded with the 
Australian Prime Minister's anti-Soviet view. 
The international outlooks of Whitlam and Fraser Wf~re quite different and 
this reflected their personal understandings and their political allegiances 
within distinctive political parties. The divergence of views on particular 
issues also emerged from tL~ domestic political context which determined 
that Fraser needed to be seen to be significantly different from Whitlam. 
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It was Whitlam's intention to move Australia away from a racist 
international image and to provide an anti-racist and anti-colonial approach 
to foreign policy. Obviously, this new position was important in 
constructing relationships with African countries and in opposing the 
minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia. Prime Minister 
Fraser also advocated an anti-racist and anti-colonial position in 
implementing Australia's relations with the developing countries, thereby 
continuing Whitlam's approach. In particular, Fraser supported the agenda 
of the developing countries in the North South debate and actively 
promoted the idea of a Common Fund for the stabilisation of commodity 
prices. 
In the Asia Pacific region, Whitlam developed constructive relations with 
many countries in contrast to the reluctant approach of previous Australian 
governments. Fraser extended these relationships based on Whitlam's 
work in removing the racist image of Australian foreign policy. On China, 
Whitlam immediately recognised the Peoples' Republic and Fraser was 
pleased to extend diplomatic exchanges and trade with China as an 
opponent of the Soviet Union. However, Fraser was only partially 
successful in balancing Australia's relations with China and with the 
members of ASEAN. 
Whitlam struggled to deal with the shifting political events in Cambodia 
while Fraser was faced with the Khmer Rouge regime and the intervention 
of Vietnam into Kampuchea. While Whitl7.tm had battled with members of 
the Labor government over recognition of various groups in Vietnam, 
Fraser conformed with the anti-Soviet approach to condemn Vietnam's 
movement into Kampuchea. 
On Indonesia and East Timor, Whitlam was enthusia-stic about closer ties 
with the Indonesian government while advocating self-determination for 
the people of East Timor. Events overtook the Whitlam government and 
Fraser was confronted with Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. Over 
time, Fraser extended relations with Indonesia and did not actively oppose 
the incorporation of East Timor. For both Whitlam and Fraser, the 
principle of self-determination, in opposition to colonialism, was placed in 
contrast to effective relations with Indonesia which was a key actor in the 
Asia Pacific region. 
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Whitlam embraced the movement toward independence in Papua New 
Guinea when previous Australian governments had resisted this path, 
notwithstanding the efforts of Peacock in the last months of the McMahon 
government. Whitlam offered financial and political encouragement to 
end the colonial relationship between Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
Subsequently, Fraser supported the independence of PNG as part of the 
continuing anti-colonial approach of Australia foreign policy. 
Part of the new, constructive stance on developing countries was Whitlam's 
attempt to improve Australia's aid program. A separate aid agency was 
established, against considerable opposition, and a new vision for the 
implementation of aid was proposed. However, Fraser understood aid 
policy to be a part of foreign policy and therefore subsumed the 
administration of aid into the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Within the aid 
program, Whitlam and Fraser were unwilling to substantially increase the 
level of aid while, at times, using aid allocations for explicitly political 
purposes. Overall, aid policy was employed by both Prime Ministers to 
complement foreign policy objectives. 
It was significant that Fraser continued to promote the anti-racist and anti-
colonial image of Australian foreign policy that was established by 
Whitlam. This was an important difference between the Fraser foreign 
policy and the international approach of the Liberal and Country Parties 
prior to the Whitlam government. This position by both Whitlam and 
Fraser was central to Australia's policies on Africa. 
The most profound change in Australian foreign policy was the explicit 
opposition to the minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia 
which had gained support from the previous LibeiM~. and Country Parties 
governments. Both Whitlam and Fraser rejected the systems of apartheid 
and racial discrimination in southern Africa. Whitlam initiated this 
important shift in policy, quite obviously in the United Nations in the first 
days of govermnent in December 1972, and Fraser ensured that the Liberal 
and Country Parties government continued this stance. Significantly, 
Australia's position on South Africa and Rhodesia was opposed to many 
other countries, notably Britain. 
Prime Minister Whitlam opposed apartheid but continued to trade with 
South Africa in an era when economic sanctions were not instituted. Fraser 
was more resolute in opposition as international pressure mounted against 
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the apartheid system. Fraser was particularly successful in opposing the 
minority government in Rhodesia with a commendable performance at the 
1979 CHOGM in Lusaka which precipitated constitutional and political 
change in Rhodesia. Indeed, Fraser's role i11 consistently opposing the 
discriminatory structures in Rhodesia were a highlight in Australian 
foreign policy. 
In essence, Whitlam's rewriting of foreign policy on Africa was a central 
component of the new international position for Australia. Fraser's 
continuation and extension of this anti-racist position was important for 
Australia's standing in the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and 
thus with the United States, Britain and others. This shift was intimately 
linked ·with Australia's relations with developing countries and thereby 
with the countries in the Asia Pacific region. In total, Whitlam and Fraser 
established a new anti-racist and anti-colonial foreign policy for Australia. 
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